Amid the ongoing confrontation between Russia and the West, the processes of consolidation and divergence among political elites are crucial for understanding the mechanisms that form dividing lines. This is particularly important when examining the elites of the European Uni­on in their opposition to Russia. This article aims to develop a framework for analysing the dividing lines among EU elites in the context of relations with Russia. The analysis em­ploys a multi-tier model establishing a relationship between the ‘depth’ of a dividing line and the degree of elite disunity. The model includes two levels of analysis of dividing lines within the EU: supranational and national. The research demonstrates that, depending on the degree of interest misalignment and the availability of communication channels, elite divergence can result in segmentation, fragmentation or polarisation. Each of the tiers of divergence increa­singly reduces the likelihood of forming a common EU position on foreign policy issues. All three tendencies — segmentation, fragmentation and polarisation — are observed within the EU in relation to Russia at different levels of elite analysis. Crucial to the formation of a dividing line is the aspect of EU—Russia relations in question: the degree of distancing from the country or support for, and funding of, containment. Additional variables include factors such as the regional affiliation of the elite, their ideology and position within the power structure. Among all levels of analysis, polarisation is most evident in the efforts of supranational elites to promote ‘militant integration’, which conflicts with the interests of national elites and citizens of member states.

This paper investigates the global trend of the early 2020s, characterized by securitization of industrial strategies and the course towards technological self-sufficiency/sovereignty (the TS course) in both developed and developing countries, accompanied by geopolitical fragmentation of the world economy. We first identify typical features of the process of securitization of industrial policy in the context of its historical models’ evolution, then consider parameters of the TS course, including motives, objectives, tools, and risks, in Western nations (EU and USA) and in leading BRICS members (China, India, Brazil). It is shown that Western countries strive for product and technological independence from China while aiming for global leadership in the field of semiconductor (USA) or green (EU) technologies. Conversely, China aims for a central role in the global economy, prioritizing technological independence from the West. In India and Brazil, the TS course is shaped by structural economic challenges and the risks of growth slowdown. Against this background, we proceed to examine Russia’s TS course, analyzing its rationale, design of TS projects, as well as limitations and risks posed by sanctions. Then we highlight distinctions between Russia’s TS course and its foreign analogues, as well as reveal risks of Russia’s increasing technological dependence on China. The conclusion suggests that achieving TS, driven by security imperatives, may present a more formidable challenge than anticipated by governments across different types of countries.