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CITIES AND VILLAGES OF THE BALTIC REGION: RESPONSES TO MIGRATION AND OTHER CHALLENGES OF OUR TIME

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Immanuel Kant
Baltic Federal
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Editorial Office

Address:
14 A. Nevskogo St.,
Kaliningrad, Russia, 236016

Managing editor:

Tatyana Kuznetsova
tikuznetsova@kantiana.ru

Tel.: +7 4012 59-55-43
Fax: +7 4012 46-63-13

www.journals.kantiana.ru

Editorial council

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From the editors

The role of cities in economy, rural development problems and immigrant inflows have long received academic attention. Yet, life is always full of challenges for the research community. In recent years, considerable scholarly interest has been devoted to the way current problems manifest themselves in the Baltic region, which consists of countries with different models of natural population change, different national urban and migration policies and different external and internal migration trends shaped by dissimilar urbanisation patterns.

The new issue of the *Baltic Region* includes contributions from geographers, historians and economists employing a wide spectrum of approaches to studying how development is regulated in territories affected by the movement of people and investment. The focus of economic inquiries is on the effect two principal factors of production — labour and capital — have on the development of cities and rural areas. Such studies largely benefit from taking into consideration the geographical factor, be it the coastal position, settlement hierarchy or the condition of infrastructure.

The issue opens with an article from the famous regional studies scholar Prof. Olga Kuznetsova. Her contribution is devoted to Russia's national urban policy. Having analysed European, and especially German, practices, she offers recommendations for a national urban policy in Russia. The article proposes a shift from federal support for towns of specific types (single-industry towns and *science towns*) to a comprehensive and clearly-defined urban policy aimed to reduce the concentration of population and economic activity in Moscow.

The second article in the economic section of the issue also explores the role of the largest urban agglomerations. Its author, the corresponding member of the Russian Academy of Sciences Alexey Kuznetsov, puts to the test the city-hierarchy-dependent patterns of spatial FDI expansion established by geographers and economists in the 1970s-1990s. By looking at Asian companies working in Finland, Sweden, Denmark and the Baltics, he demonstrates that the hierarchical wavelike model holds for FDI diffusion, with capital agglomerations playing a dominant role (in the study region, these are Stockholm and Helsinki). Kuznetsov also shows that the current prevalence of mergers and acquisitions as a form of direct investment distorts the geographical patterns of the investor's network of subsidiaries and prompts firms with little knowledge of the Baltic region to sell their subsidiaries in the provinces and move closer to the capitals.

The next section of the issue contains two articles concentrating on coastalisation — a crucial factor in the economic development of the Baltic region. Dr Andrey Mikhaylov and Angelina Plotnikova demonstrate that a uniform approach to coastal zone delimitation cannot be applied even to a single, Baltic, region. They stress that marine economy processes are most evident within 10 km of the sea and 30 km of port infrastructure. For some countries, e.g. Germany, this zone extends to 150 km. The article by Prof Flera Sokolova and Dr Anna Lyalina examines empirical evidence from Russia to prove that coastal regions have special attractiveness to migrants. Not only St Petersburg and coastal municipalities of the Leningrad and Kaliningrad regions but also coastal territories of the Arkhangelsk region are more attractive to migrants than the inland parts of Russia's North-West.

The largest section of the issue is dedicated to studies of migrants with different cultural backgrounds in the Baltic region. The article by Drs Vladislav Vorotnikov and Andrzej Habarta analyses migration from the countries of post-Soviet space to the northwestern periphery of the EU: Poland, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. The authors demonstrate that, unlike Western Europe, Poland and, to a lesser extent, the Baltics welcome migrants from neighbouring nations with similar cultural and linguistic backgrounds. In the long run, this preference will facilitate migrant integration into the recipient society.

Sweden, which is the focus of the contribution from Dr Aleksey Sarabiev, has adopted a different migration policy. Arab Middle Eastern diasporas, especially the Syrian and Iraqi ones, are playing an increasing role in the country. The author argues that the business acumen, professional skills, education and many business ties of Syrian immigrants will soon make the diaspora, well integrated into Swedish society, the leader amongst Arab newcomers.

A continuation of the Swedish theme is the article by Ekaterina Talalaeva and Prof. Tatayna Pronina. They consider emerging elements of an institutionalised Muslim 'parallel society' in 'unprotected areas' — the marginalised immigrant districts of Swedish cities. The study states that the efforts of Swedish Islamist organisations committed to maintaining the Muslim identity both prevent the cultural assimilation of the immigrants and hamper the full implementation of Sweden's integration policy.

Another two studies explore the social and demographic development of rural areas, which has become ever more acute in recent decades. In their article 'The effect of geographical position and employment fluctuations on rural settlement trends', Prof Gennady Federov and Dr Tatyana Kuznetsova review findings they obtained when running various research projects. Both authors are acknowledged experts in regional economic and socio-demographic research, which Fedorov first embarked on in the 1970s under the supervision of Prof. Agafonov. In the 1980s, he proposed the concept of the geographical-demographic situation, which was the focus of Kuznetsova's doctoral thesis defended in 2008.

The article examines the economic and demographic problems of rural areas at meso- and micro-district levels. It estimates resources for rural-urban workforce redistribution, which increased dramatically when the organisational and technological change occurred in rural areas in the wave of privatisation. The authors believe that the attempts of the authorities to create non-agricultural jobs in villages will not solve the problem of rural employment in the near future, and the employment-related factor in rural-urban migration will persist. Still, none of this means that efforts to create rural jobs and solve social problems in rural areas are futile. The authors suggest building on the concept of a unified settlement system, proposed by Boris Khorev in the 1970s, to address social issues in villages.

Amongst Russian regions (at the mesolevel), the authors identify several types of territories with specific geographical-demographic features, calling for a differentiated approach to measures for rural development. Micro-district variations are shown for the Kaliningrad region, which has a developed and urbanised western part (the Kaliningrad agglomeration), whilst the eastern part lagging far behind it. The article proposes measures for rural development, different for the east and west of the region.

The contribution from Drs Ivan and Lidiya Gumenyuk 'Transport connectivity as a factor in overcoming challenges of the periphery: the case of rural areas in the Kaliningrad region' addresses yet another aspect of regional spatial organisation, also having a role in improving the quality of life in rural areas. The three-tier regional typology of central places proposed by the authors echoes the concept of a unified settlement system, which Fedorov and Kuznetsova describe in their article. Of considerable interest are the maps showing transport connectivity between local central places (smaller towns) and Kaliningrad and demonstrating the accessibility of local centres for adjacent territories.

The authors stress that the Kaliningrad region has transport connectivity above the national average. Still, trends towards population polarisation are also present there. The population is being pulled into the Kaliningrad agglomeration; municipal centres are losing stability; the rural settlement system is degenerating: the socio-economic space compression, typical of most Russian regions, is taking place on the territory.

Guest editors of the issue

Alexey V. Kuznetsov
MGIMO-University
Institute of Scientific Information for Social Sciences
Russian Academy of Sciences
E-mail: kuznetsov_alexei@mail.ru

Gennady M. Fedorov
Immanuel Kant Baltic Federal University
E-mail: GFedorov@kantiana.ru

THE ROLE OF CITIES IN MODERN ECONOMY

NATIONAL URBAN POLICY IN RUSSIA AND THE EUROPEAN EXPERIENCE

O. V. Kuznetsova

Federal Research Centre Computer Science
and Control of the Russian Academy of Sciences
44/2 Vavilova ul., Moscow, 119333, Russia

Immanuel Kant Baltic Federal University
14, A. Nevskogo ul., Kaliningrad, 236016, Russia

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This article analyses the features, shortcomings, prospects, and limitations of Russia's national urban policy (NUP) and similar initiatives abroad to formulate proposals for further development of the Russian NUP. To this end, the study examines international (particularly German) documents and publications on NUP and the Russian regulatory framework. The COVID-19 pandemic has drawn attention to the resilience of cities to crises and the development of urban green spaces. Germany's current NUP, adopted in 2007, stands out for its complexity and congruence with regional policy. The principal NUP document in Russia is the Spatial Development Strategy. However, it overlooks some issues essential for the development of the city system: the federal authorities support only selected types of towns, such as single-industry municipalities, and the NUP is not comprehensive as it pays little attention to the economic dimension. A feeble information framework and largely powerless municipal authorities impede further development of the NUP. A transition to a comprehensive and well-designed NUP in Russia is proposed, which includes counteracting the concentration of population and economic activity in Moscow and establishing Saint Petersburg as a centre of economic growth. There is also an urgent need to understand the economic development prospects of smaller towns.

Keywords:
national urban policy, regional policy, Germany, Spatial Development Strategy of Russia

Introduction. Problem setting

The socio-economic development of Russian cities has received increasing attention in the country, especially as part of the federal policy on regional de-

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velopment. The Strategy 2025 for the Spatial Development of Russia has set a significant landmark in this sphere. Adopted at the beginning of 2019, it emphasized the socio-economic development of larger urban agglomerations as the key to faster economic growth and to boosting research and development.[1]

The COVID-19 pandemic has foregrounded the problems of cities, which first fell victim to the outbreak because of their many international contacts and high population density. Cities have also been affected the most by the pandemic-related restrictions imposed on some industries. As a new challenge to cities, these circumstances have provoked discussions on the future role of cities in the national economy and settlement system.

At the same time, new visions of urban development are emerging in Russia: the foundation of new cities in Siberia or a million-strong city in the Far East.

All the above indicates that cities are becoming the focus of the federal socio-economic policy, whilst the need for a comprehensive urban policy, akin to the regional one, is growing. Both as a term and real-life phenomenon, the urban policy has existed for decades in Russia and abroad. Yet, the international literature, including OECD 2017—2021 reports, describes the national urban policy as a relatively new phenomenon, even when the most developed countries of the world are concerned.

This situation gives rise to the questions discussed below. One of them concerns international practices of devising national urban policies. Of particular interest are EU countries keeping a close eye on spatial development. The other questions help assess the Russian situation from an international perspective and establish what the country can learn from the international experience, in other words, which best practices are to be borrowed and what policy elements should remain nation-specific. The primary comparative focus is on Germany — part of the Baltic region, it is the undisputed leader in national urban policy.

National urban policies across the world, in the EU and Germany: a literature review

Many countries are actively developing national urban policies (NUPs). A comparison of OECD (or joint OECD and UN-Habitat) reports on NUPs in OECD countries and across the world testifies to this fact. In 2017, five out of 25 OECD members did not have a NUP; 15 had a well-articulated urban policy; the policy of another 15 states was not comprehensive; today, all the countries have some form of NUP. Although, as experts stress, definitions of NUP vary from country to country, the term generally stands for a coherent

[1] Order of the Government of the Russian Federation of 13 February 2019 No. 207-r. Consultant Plus legal research assistance system.

set of decisions through a deliberate government-led process of coordinating and rallying various actors towards a common vision and goal promoting more transformative, productive, inclusive, and resilient urban development for the long term.

The current European NUP originated in 2007 when the Leipzig Charter for a Sustainable European City was drawn up (Germany's NUP appeared the same year). The updated New Leipzig Charter has been in effect since 2020.[2] Another NUP framework document is the New Urban Agenda adopted in 2016 at the UN Conference on Housing and Sustainable Urban Development (Habitat III) [4].

The novelty of NUP is very much nominal: the OECD reported on Germany's NUP as early as 1999 [5]. Moreover, in 2005, Yakov Silin defined the policy very similar to the one quoted above[3] (Russian works viewing NUP in this light are few; see [7; 8]). Basic studies into urban policy also appeared at the time [9]. In other words, urban policy is not a new phenomenon, but it took on its contemporary form quite recently. In its current incarnation, NUP has several important features that Russia should take into account.

— Urban policy is, on the one hand, a collaboration of authorities of different levels (in federal states, these are federal bodies, regions, and cities [municipalities]); on the other hand, there is a need for a clear national-level vision of urban development prospects and the national funding of urban policies (this component of Germany's NUP has been demonstrated in [10]).

— Urban policy is an essential part of regional policy (in the EU, it is included in the so-called cohesion policy [11; 12]). NUP is a vision of cities aimed to satisfy their needs and ensure a balanced spatial structure of the country.

— NUP concerns a wide range of areas; any urban policy is comprehensive.

NUPs differ considerably across countries, even within Europe [13].

Based on a study of 86 countries, The Global State of National Urban Policy 2021 report [2] identifies the following NUP goals (the number of countries pursuing the goal is given in brackets):

— balanced territorial and urban development (47);
— a coherent vision of national urban development (38);
— policy coordination across sectors (27);
— productive and competitive cities with job opportunities (24);
— decent and affordable housing (20);

[2] Netzwerk und Wissensplattform für integrierte Stadtentwicklung, 2021, *Nationale Stadtentwicklungspolitik*, available at: https://www.nationale-stadtentwicklungspolitik.de/NSPWeb/DE/Home/home_node.html (accessed 02.08.2021).

[3] He described it as a deliberate official activity of international, national, regional or local authorities of all levels and other actors (non-profits, parties, alliances, corporations and citizens), having a legal and institutional framework that exerts a regulatory impact on the development of cities and their system to attain the goals set out [6, p. 96].

— basic urban services and infrastructure (19);
— less urban sprawl, more compact and connected cities (17);
— urban and rural connectivity (11);
— adaptation to climate change (9);
— social cohesion (8).

Overall, the increasing attention to urban issues seems to have two causes: the importance of cities as centers of economic growth (they have considerable innovation potential) and urban problems that even the most affluent cities must deal with, such as the consequences of distinct social stratification and the influx of migrants (urban development is discussed in many works, see [14—17]). Thus, disadvantaged city districts and the growing complexity of urban development were the two central themes of the Leipzig Charter 2007.

Adopted on 30 November 2020, the New Leipzig Charter had to embrace the COVID-19 challenges to NUP (the influence of the pandemic is examined in [18; 19]). The new document once again stresses the need for urban policy to be comprehensive, its three primary goals being "the green city", "the just city" and "the productive city". Special attention is drawn to the crisis resilience of cities[4] and empowering local authorities to handle impending social, economic and environmental problems. Digitalisation is mentioned as an indispensable tool for solving urban problems.

The Global State of National Urban Policy report from the OECD and UN-Habitat [2] sets similar NUP goals; cities must strive to be resilient, green, and inclusive.

In the wake of the COVID-19 outbreak, one must mention a contribution by renowned regional studies experts and urbanists [25]. They argue that while the pandemic will not drastically change the roles of cities in national economies, it will impose new requirements on cities and especially urban green spaces.

Germany's NUP provides a prime example of a comprehensive NUP complete with vertical and horizontal coordination tools (vertical coordination concerns authorities of different levels, whilst horizontal coordination relates to areas of socio-economic policy.) A website devoted to national urban policy (Nationale Stadtentwicklungspolitik)[5] provides a platform for project ideas and promotes dialogue on national and international urban development. It also contributes to the interdisciplinary discourse on urban development and encourages knowledge exchange.

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[4] The concept of resilience (shock resilience) of territories has been studied abroad since the 2009 economic crisis [20—22] with an emphasis on city resilience [23; 24].

[5] Netzwerk und Wissensplattform für integrierte Stadtentwicklung, 2021, *Nationale Stadtentwicklungspolitik,* available at: https://www.nationale-stadtentwicklungspolitik.de/NSPWeb/DE/Home/home_node.html (accessed 02.08.2021).

The fact that the country has a Federal Institute for Research on Building, Urban Affairs and Spatial Development (Bundesinstitut für Bau-, Stadt- und Raumforschung) under a federal ministry points to the rapt attention of Germany's federal authorities to NUP.[6] The website of the institute abounds with publications on the implementation of NUP in Germany and on spatial development in general, including the Regional Planning Report (Raumordnungsbericht [26]).

The state of national urban policy in Russia

This section examines the state of NUP in Russia by analysing relevant laws and regulations. In international practice, NUP is either made explicit in dedicated documents or embedded in less specific policy papers on spatial development. Russia has adopted the second approach: in 2021, the OECD named the Spatial Development Strategy of Russia (SDS) an NUP document [2], while in 2018, OECD experts stated that no information on an NUP in Russia's was available [1]. No Russian document before the SDS resembled an NUP. There are at least two reasons for the belated emergence of an NUP in Russia (it was introduced at the beginning of 2019).

The first reason is the late introduction of the nationwide regional policy. It provides the foundation for an urban policy through establishing a national framework of spatial development regulation. Some factors, above all the overly liberal state regulation of the economy, delayed active work on a federal policy on regional development until the 2009 economic crisis, which triggered the search for new opportunities to ensure national and regional progress [27].

The second reason is that the few regional policy measures that existed before 2009 were aimed solely at regions, whilst municipalities (and most Russian regions, except three federal cities, are ones) attracted little attention from the federal authorities. This situation, in its turn, was a product of the lack of statistics to back administrative decisions. Although municipal statistics is still not perfect, the municipal reform[7] and digital transformation, which started in the late 2000s, facilitated the creation of the municipal database now available on the Rosstat

[6] Stadt- und Raumforschung, 2021, *Bundesinstitut für Bau-*, available at: https://www.bbsr.bund.de/BBSR/DE/startseite/_node.html (accessed 02.08.2021).

[7] The municipal reform started with the adoption of federal law No. 131-FZ of 6 October 2003 *On the General Principles of Local Self-government Organisation in the Russian Federation*. Most of its clauses came into effect on 1 January 2006, but the period of transition to the new rules lasted until the end of 2008. An important novelty was the harmonisation of spatial frameworks for local self-government in Russian regions. A well-nigh unified system of territorial units for statistics emerged as a result.

website.[8] The availability of municipal statistics, albeit imperfect and incomplete, made it possible to analyse national spatial development and laid the groundwork for the SDS.

Being a part of the national strategic planning system, the Spatial Development Strategy was designed as a viable framework for an NUP. I believe, however, that the SDS in its current form cannot support a comprehensive NUP since it does not solve the fundamental problems of urban development and urban policy.

Firstly, it does not look at ways to reduce the concentration of population and economic activity in the mammoth Moscow agglomeration; nor does it strive to develop other cities with a population of over a million as alternative growth poles. It is still unclear whether St. Petersburg should become an alternative growth pole or rapid development will turn it into another behemoth. Nor is there an answer on whether the proposed measures should apply exclusively to million-strong cities (absent in the Far East).

The strategy's disregard of the need to decentralise Moscow has an obvious — political — reason. Spatial development priorities have never been identified, and the SDS contains mere declarations with no effect. More than half of Russia's regions, 51 out of 85, have the status of geostrategic territories: all border regions are identified as such along with traditional geostrategic areas (the Far East, the Arctic and the North Caucasus, Crimea, and the Kaliningrad region).

Aspiring economic growth poles, divided into several types, are located in all Russian regions. These are 95 cities and urban agglomerations of various sizes, 27 territories specialising in resource extraction and agriculture and 20 regions with proven potential for research and academic excellence. Although this approach is tenable as it outlines development prospects for all the territories, it fails to address the most pressing spatial development issues, including the extreme concentration of population and economic activity in Moscow, which harms the city itself.

In other words, the SDS does not explicitly call for the establishment of larger urban agglomerations as alternatives to Moscow, and this prospect has never been part of the discussion on spatial development. Attention is paid instead to rural areas and small towns, but, important as they are for the settlement system, they cannot provide an alternative to Moscow. At the same time, second-largest cities have received increasing attention recently in European countries [28].

The SDS does not specify the role of St. Petersburg in national spatial development either. As mentioned above, a considerable concern is that becoming an alternative to Moscow may make the city as overly dominant as the Russian

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[8] Municipal database, 2021, *Rosstat*, available at: https://rosstat.gov.ru/storage/mediabank/ykmb3eKg/munst.htm (accessed 17.08.2021) (in Russ.).

capital. Another issue is whether the geographical position of St. Petersburg can make it a major centre of international cooperation in the Baltic and beyond. Unfortunately, the SDS tends to ignore the involvement of Russian regions and cities in international trade, which is a principal development area for St. Petersburg [29].

The second significant shortcoming of the SDS seems to be its failure to discuss the prospects of the entire system of Russian cities or the place of cities and towns of different sizes in the country's socio-economic makeup. The SDS considers several problems of national spatial development. The first one is the lack of comfortable urban design in most cities, even the larger ones. The lethargic business activity in many small and medium-sized towns is the second problem. The third is the poor environmental quality in most industrial cities or those with over half a million population. Thus, the gravest concerns are social, economic and ecological. Yet, spatial development goals focus only on social and partly on environmental issues: the strategy highlights the need for a housing stock overhaul, better public utilities and transport infrastructure, balanced residential development in cities, environmental action, etc. Small and medium-sized towns are mentioned only in the context of supplementary measures to accelerate the socio-economic development of single-industry towns (economic diversification), naukograds[9] (enhancement of research and development facilities) and historical settlements. Overall, small and medium-sized towns are seen as inter-municipal service centres for rural areas, and resources for their development will be allocated after new regional poles of economic growth have been created.

On the face of it, this is a sensible approach. The economic problems the country is facing make aspiring growth poles, rarely small and medium-sized towns, likely rescuers. Germany's experience testifies to the viability of this strategy. After the reunification, the country concentrated on supporting the main cities of the new states (including Berlin) and establishing transport links between them. The logic behind that decision was similar to that found in the SDS: larger cities would provide the fastest return on investment. And even if they did not become growth poles for the surrounding areas, they would bring in revenues to increase the national budget and thus provide resources for developing the periphery.

Nonetheless, limiting the discussion about the development of small and medium-sized Russian towns to urban space enhancement may bring about more problems than it solves: even in the best living conditions, the lack of jobs will cause out-migration. A comfortable urban space is a key to urban development, but it is not sufficient. If a comprehensive approach targeting both social and

[9] Literally, "science city" (Russian).

economic development issues of small and medium-sized towns is not taken from the start, investment in infrastructure may become tantamount to funding dead loss.

This kind of discussion on the prospects of economic development of small and medium-sized towns will require acknowledging the lack of potential investors willing to revitalise the periphery, on the one hand, and the inevitability of people migrating to areas with a high population density, on the other. Then, the question will arise as to how the national settlement system should be transformed. Yet, as many experts and public officials have stressed, the SDS links system stability to its conservation.

The SDS was approved at the beginning of 2019, but the first federal initiatives supporting urban development had appeared earlier. Most were aimed at towns and cities of selected types, similar to how SDS would later focus on naukograds or single-industry settlements. The programmes targeted cities whose economies were dominated by government-owned organisations. These included closed cities established back in the Soviet time, homes to the military or nuclear facilities. Before the municipal reform, the fiscal relations of the federal authorities with closed cities were different from those with the rest of the country. After the reform, closed towns became ordinary Russian municipalities, but they still retained dedicated financing from the federal authorities. This is also true of naukograds, which depend heavily on research and development carried out at government-owned institutions. The first document on supporting naukograds, a presidential decree, was signed in 1997; the federal law followed in 1999. This line of federal policy had two problems. Firstly, not all the existing naukograds had the formal status (and thus missed out on additional funding). Secondly, for a long time, federal funds were allocated to the improvement of the social and utility infrastructure rather than research and development [27].

The early urban development initiatives also targeted cities and towns plagued by socio-economic problems. These municipalities, especially mining towns, have been the focus of federal attention since the early 1990s. However, a fully-fledged national policy did not come about until 2009, with the economic crisis necessitating support for single-industry towns. The socio-economic situation in many such municipalities deteriorated as their dominant enterprises succumbed to the economic downturn. Towns whose principal employers had thrived before the crisis suffered the most. The federal authorities could not ignore social tensions building up there. There is now a strong regulatory framework for support for single-industry towns; its principal document being the outline of the 2016—2015 Comprehensive Development of Single-industry Towns priority programme.[10]

[10] Russian state-supported programmes and projects are divided into national projects, federal projects and priority initiatives.

Only the federal policy on single-industry towns seems applicable to Russian regions lying in the Baltic (only one municipality in the area, Petergof, is a naukograd; this was the case in 2005—2010 [27]). The list of single-industry towns includes municipalities of the Kaliningrad and Leningrad regions (Yantarny in the former and Pikalevo, Slantsay and Syasstroy in the latter).[11]

Pikalevo has the status of a territory of advanced socio-economic development, which is essentially a variation of a special economic zone where those investing in projects stimulating economic diversification in cities and towns are provided with tax incentives. There are 321 single-industry towns in Russia, 95 of which are territories of advanced development, and it seems that the Baltic regions of Russia can benefit from this economic policy tool. In particular, the economic and geographical situation of the Leningrad region makes it more attractive to investors than many other Russian territories.

Improvement of urban spaces is part of the initiative A, Comfortable Urban Environment 2018—2024, of the Housing and Urban Environment national project. The project is supervised by the Ministry of Construction of Russia, which also oversees the Smart City project aimed at the digitalisation of urban economies (launched within the framework of the same national project). It is clear why the Ministry of Construction was charged with urban space development: this sphere has much in common with residential development and utility management, which was the remit of the Ministry of Regional Development of Russia almost throughout its existence (2004—2014) [27]. However, this way, urban space development becomes disengaged from the socio-economic development of cities. That being said, Russia has a success story in terms of comprehensive treatment of economic and social problems of cities — the 2018 programme for the social development of economic growth poles in the Far East.[12] Generally, the federal authorities implement a vigorous Far East policy employing a variety of tools for supporting the territory; the measures embrace the full spectrum of possibilities.

Russia has a range of federal urban policy tools, but they lack cohesion and coordination between the ministries responsible for their implementation. This situation, however, is in full conformity with the clauses of the Spatial Development Strategy; this comes as no surprise since the document reflects the existing state of affairs.

[11] Order of the Government of the Russian Federation of 29 July 2014 No. 1398-r On the Approval of the List of Single-industry Municipalities in the Russian Federation, as amended on 21 January 2020, 2020, *Consultant Plus*.

[12] Resolution of the Government of the Russian Federation of 14 March 2018 No. 254 On the Approval of Rules for Other Intergovernmental Fiscal Transfers to Support the Measures of Social Development Plans in the Economic Growth Poles of Russian Regions in the Far Eastern Federal District.

The indispensability and limitations of national urban policy development in Russia

It seems that Russian national urban policy requires further development: there is a need for a comprehensive vision for the development prospects of the entire system of cities and towns across their different types — from metropolitan Moscow to small towns in the periphery. It is also essential to identify possible strands of urban socio-economic development and define the extent of federal participation in the process.

The problems tackled by the Russian NUP are not dissimilar to those addressed by its counterparts in economically developed countries, given the existing national specifics. In Russia, like everywhere else, the largest cities are centres for innovation and economic growth. They must look for optimal planning solutions (including the development of green spaces, which caused much discussion during the COVID-19 pandemic) and deal with social inequality, migrant adaptation, and transport and other infrastructural issues. Steps are needed to create a polycentric system of rapidly developing cities capable of becoming growth poles for their macroregions. Such cities will retain population in their part of the country, reduce socio-economic disparities at the macroregional level and draw population and businesses out of Moscow.

International practices and the current situation in Russia suggest that the implementation of NUP in the country will be impeded by problems having no direct bearing on urban development.

Firstly, Russia's information framework is too feeble to support NUP and spatial development in general. The country continues to use the urban-rural population dichotomy, although the boundary between the two has blurred, and this division is no longer used abroad. For example, Germany publishes data on the proportion of the population residing in areas with a high, medium, and low population density. Eurostat releases data on specially designed typologies of regions featuring a threefold division into predominantly urban, intermediate and predominantly rural regions; areas of the two latter types are further classified according to the presence of a city. Russian statistics, however, does not distinguish between towns comprising large urban agglomerations and those located on the distant periphery. This lack of distinction fills Russian urban development discourse with erroneous assumptions. Eurostat garners data on metropolitan areas, whilst Russia has made little progress in the debate on urban agglomeration development since the SDS was published. To what degree cities and urban agglomerations are objects of NUPs is a contentious issue [30].

Furthermore, Russia does not have a body that could assume the role played by the Federal Institute for Research on Building, Urban Affairs and Spatial Development in Germany, i. e. carry out analysis of national spatial development and build links between research and public administration. The need to organise a centre for spatial analysis has been repeatedly emphasised in Russia, yet the idea of creating a ministry-led institute has never been articulated.

This state of affairs can be explained by a bulk of information on the regional component of the federal sectoral policy being restricted [27]. Before all else, harmonisation of different strands of industrial policy requires information on the industries.

Secondly, city authorities must participate in NUP. But to do so, they need fiscal independence and powers which Russian municipalities do not have ([8]; for a comparison of the fiscal situation of Russian and German cities see [31]).

All these problems have to be solved for the sake of urban policy and spatial development management in general.

Conclusion

As previously stated, national urban policy is a rapidly developing sphere of interest of various national authorities across the world. A new challenge to cities and urban policy, the COVID-19 pandemic, has accelerated processes in the area. Russia is keeping up with global trends, but its national urban policy has many problems still in need of solutions. The following initiatives will help remedy the situation:

— clear articulation of national urban policy as an area of responsibility of public authorities;

— transition from isolated measures to support cities towards a comprehensive urban policy congruous, and this is especially important, with the economic development goals of small and medium-sized towns;

— creation of a framework for a polycentric urban system with economic growth poles in different regions, accompanied by measures to offset the concentration of population and economic activity in Moscow;

— development of an information and statistical framework for administrative decisions commensurate with current challenges.

Attaining these goals is essential for Russia to remain competitive in the global arena and in the Baltic region. Since cities are the principal drivers for modern economic development, and neighbouring countries have created conditions to unlock their potential within national urban development policies, Russia must grasp its chance at developing its urban areas. All this applies to Russian Baltic regions, especially St. Petersburg. Like any other city with a population of several million, it has both considerable potential and numerous problems. Russian documents, however, do not contain a cogent policy on St. Petersburg and its agglomeration.

A national urban policy will contribute to the federal vision for the role of cities and towns of different types in the national spatial development and augment plans for supporting the socio-economic development in Russian cities in the Baltic and beyond.

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The author

Prof. Olga V. Kuznetsova, Senior Research Fellow, Federal Research Centre Computer Science and Control of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Russia; Professor, Immanuel Kant Baltic Federal University, Russia.

E-mail: kouznetsova_olga@mail.ru

https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4341-0934

SPATIAL DIFFUSION OF ASIAN DIRECT INVESTMENTS IN THE NORTHERN EUROPEAN EU COUNTRIES

A. V. Kuznetsov

MGIMO-University
76, Vernadskogo ave., Moscow, Russia, 119454
Institute of Scientific Information for Social Sciences
Russian Academy of Sciences
51/21 Nakhimovski ave., Moscow, Russia, 117418

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The first publications on the spatial diffusion of foreign direct investment (FDI) appeared in the 1970s-1990s. Since then, many of their provisions have been repeatedly criticised as outdated and inconsistent with empirical evidence of the current stage of globalisation. Previously, only examples of 'newcomers' to internationalisation were used to illustrate distinct phases in the expansion of transnational companies and their effort to first establish themselves in major economic centres, as the factor of gradually growing awareness of potential investors began to play an important role. This article aims to show the persistent character of FDI spatial diffusion patterns and their correlation with the existing hierarchy of cities. In our research, we used the example of Asian companies working in the Baltic states, Finland, Sweden and Denmark, newcomers to internationalisation, not affected by the 'neighbourhood effect', and contrasted them with Western European investors. We confirmed the validity of the hierarchical wavelike model of the FDI spatial diffusion with the dominance of metropolitan urban agglomerations. It was also found that mergers and acquisitions are dominant forms of FDI in developed countries. Their ascendancy leads both to a distortion of the geographical pattern of subsidiaries networks of investor companies and to the intention of investors to sell their assets in provinces and move their head offices closer to capital cities. Consequently, there is a simplification of the structure of businesses, which is typical of the earlier stages of the FDI spatial diffusion.

Keywords:
foreign direct investment, Asian multinational enterprises, Baltic region cities, FDI spatial diffusion

Problem statement

There are hundreds of scientific works on foreign direct investment (FDI). The interest the topic generates is hardly surprising. On the one hand, it has not lost its relevance over the past 50—70 years. After all, this type of investment in-

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variably serves a significant role in host economies, provides the inflow of funds and ensures the technology transfer required for new enterprises and industries. It can have both positive and negative effects on the national economy, for instance, by modifying the competitive environment. Outward FDI is also of importance. On the other hand, direct investment is constantly transforming, opening up new lines of research. For example, over the last 50 years, the list of FDI-exporting countries has significantly expanded; scientists are also striving to fill the knowledge gap on ways to integrate various enterprises and their clusters into cross-border value chains. Still, the geographical diffusion of FDI does not seem to receive sufficient attention.

Of course, empirical works on direct investment to regions and even its interregional features (for instance, in Russia [1, 2]) do exist. Yet, researchers often neglect to identify general patterns of spatial FDI diffusion. In our opinion, one of the primary reasons for this is disregard for modern dynamic location concepts. Many scholars still rely on almost a century-old ideas of agglomeration effect. At best, they are sprucing up August Lösch's conclusions with Paul Krugman's new economic geography (for an example of a well-cited work by two PhDs, see [3]).

This article aims to examine whether the 1970s-1990s' dynamic location concepts based on various centre-peripheral and hierarchical ideas about the organisation of economic space are adequate to describe FDI diffusion in the current conditions. The significance of these concepts for the emerging scientific discipline of company geography has been discussed in a separate article [4]. Six northern EU countries — Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Finland, Sweden and Denmark — were selected as a geographic 'testing ground' since they form a relatively isolated and compact macroregion. This selection limits the array of subsidiaries of multinational enterprises (MNEs), for instance, Japanese ones, owning hundreds of firms globally.

The study largely relies on the space segmentation done by investors. Adding non-EU states (for example, Norway, undoubtedly part of Northern Europe) or countries with large territories outside the Baltic region (Germany and Poland) to the 'testing ground' would grossly distort the diffusion pattern by including in the study fragments of subsidiary networks chains aimed at expansion to other regions. The Baltic voivodeships of Poland are the periphery of Warsaw rather than Stockholm, let alone Riga (although some investment firms may have a different vision of global and European macroregions). Viewing the six Northern EU countries together allows us to add another hierarchical level (assuming that the EU is a supranational quasi-state, which is the case when assessing foreign trade and competition policy essential for FDI).

As for the choice of investors, most Asian multinational companies are 'newcomers' to internationalisation. Therefore, identifying 'model' patterns is simpler in the case of such businesses since they, at least in Europe, have not so far developed intricate subsidiary networks. Moreover, Asian FDI in the Baltic region is mostly free from the 'neighbourhood effect', and this circumstance simplifies our analysis.

Spatial diffusion of direct investment models and modern methods for their confirmation

The first dynamic location concept was Harold Hotelling's simple ice cream vendor model of two sellers on the same beach, representing an evenly distributed consumer market [5]. We can use it to explain, for example, the territorial concentration of FDI in the Russian automotive industry in the urban agglomeration of St Petersburg or the Kaluga region. However, it was not until the late 1960s' Harvard's multinational enterprise project led by Raymond Vernon (for more detail, see [6]) that such dynamic concepts were regularly applied to explain FDI.

Whilst the product life cycle concept proposed by Vernon does little to explain the international contrasts in FDI diffusion, the applied works of James Vaupel [7] and William Davidson [8] on American transnational corporations allowed researchers, for the first time, to focus on the 'neighbourhood effect' in the geography of foreign investment. As early as the end of the 1990s, we showed, drawing on German data, the paramount importance of the 'neighbourhood effect' for many direct investors determining the in-country investment diffusion pattern [9, p. 78].

Another theoretical explanation of the spatial diffusion of FDI, also dating back to the late 1960s, is the Uppsala school with its internationalisation model led by Jan Johansson. In their most prominent works of the late 1970s, the Uppsala scholars replaced Vernon's 'neighbourhood effect' with a more general concept of 'psychological distance'. Still, the focus remained on the phased internationalisation of firms conditioned by the long time needed to learn how to run increasingly complex forms of international business or enter new countries and regions the company knows little about at the initial stages of foreign expansion (see [10]).

Lars Håkanson, the school's representative famous for proposing a stage model of corporate growth in the 1980s [11], recently produced a detailed analysis of the viability of the Scandinavian concept. Criticism of phased internationalisation as a consequence of the 'learning of firms' has been widely criticised by students of 'new international enterprises' and companies 'born global' (the pioneering works are [12, 13]; for modern interpretations, see [14, 15]). However, this criticism is easy to counter by clarifying one of the Uppsala School's ideas: after all, it is not firms that 'learn' but people working for them (in the 1970s, this circumstance was negligible). Thus, the rapid internationalisation of individual companies (those 'born global') is due to foreign business experience acquired by top management elsewhere [16]. In questioning the scientific validity of these interpretations, Håkanson proposes his own 'Casino Model' of internalisation. In essence, it holds that many decisions made by MNEs are not rational as companies enter various markets with small FDIs, seeking opportunities and acting upon those they discover. Although the motives of MNEs are as described by Johanson and his colleagues, the decisions these businesses make are not overly deterministic: for rapidly internationalising firms, the search for global niches is a substitute for gradual international expansion. In his model, Håkanson attempts to reconcile on a fundamental level the empirical evidence, the postulates of the Uppala School and the beliefs shared by advocates of research into 'born globals' [17].

The third significant development of spatial FDI diffusion concepts was the German researcher Rolf Schlunze's adaptation of the hierarchical wavelike innovation diffusion model by the Swedish geographer Torsten Hägerstrand [18]. Schlunze applied the model to produce a conceptual description of the expansion of Japanese firms in West Germany. In the early 2000s, having made adjustments for the insights provided by the models described above, we presented the resultant concept as a basically universal model [19].

The current version of the hierarchical wavelike diffusion of FDI has four central points. Firstly, foreign enterprises (especially with greenfield FDI) often choose urban agglomerations playing the role of major economic centres as their primary locations since foreign entrepreneurs are best informed about them, and they have good international transport links, etc. Secondly, distortions are often a result of the 'neighbourhood effect', the investor's previous collaborations with local producers (thus localisation is possible in a relative periphery) or industry specifics (raw materials extraction is confined to deposit sites and requires an extraction licence; boarding houses will concentrate in resort areas). Thirdly, further FDI diffusion has hierarchical elements as new enterprises will open in regions and cities of decreasing importance. Moreover, at least in the case of Russia, the hierarchy of urban agglomerations (especially for European MNEs) is determined not only by their population or regional product but also by how far east they are. Fourthly, the wavelike diffusion does not always involve many enterprises. This effect is due to industry-specific economies of scale when fewer than a dozen subsidiaries of one firm can cover a national market. Wavelike diffusion is typical of manufacturers of low-tech mass-market products and companies providing a standard set of services (retail chains, fast food restaurant groups, retail banks, etc.). An extensive subsidiary network develops incrementally in major urban agglomerations, gradually expanding into the periphery.

By summarising the insights of the three models, we can formulate several hypotheses to be tested by empirical data:

1) international economic relations, especially FDI, is more complex than doing business domestically; against the background of poor knowledge of foreign markets, this slows down expansion abroad;

2) varying knowledge of countries, regions and cities attaches importance to psychological distance. The latter, if the array of direct investors is wide enough, produces the 'neighbourhood effect', bringing out the factors of linguistic, cultural and historical proximity, as well as other non-economic circumstances. Yet, for some investors, psychological distance may play out differently because of certain specific features (for instance, an atypical ethnicity of the company owner)

or preference for a strategy of simultaneous entry into multiple markets, often by trial and error (the latter is especially characteristic of vibrant emerging service industries);

3) the geography of FDI is affected not only by the general investment climate or its distortions by non-economic influences but also by the role that cities (or their environs) housing foreign enterprises have in the national economy. Thus, wavelike spatial diffusion of FDI (which, as shown above, does not necessarily concern all investors) has cardinal importance.

As testing each of these hypotheses is a large-scale task, this article examines only the latter of the three. We chose Asian direct investment because, in its case, the 'neighbourhood effect' and associated distortions that may affect the analysis of investment climates of Northern EU countries are kept to a minimum.

The geographical dimension of Asian investment expansion in the Baltic region

Spatial FDI diffusion can be studied by investigating any company in any region. Firms, however, tend to focus on their recent accomplishments, and it is not easy to find even half a century old information on FDI. The failures of MNEs covered by the media quickly disappear from the newsfeed of investment companies' websites. Although the spatial patterns of foreign giants' ramified subsidiary networks are tempting to study, in practice, it is difficult to identify patterns in the corresponding arrays due to a variety of distortions complicating the search for reliable information. That is why, in our opinion, the emphasis should be on the analysis of 'newcomers' to internationalisation.

The first significant international expansion of Asian direct investment (aside from Japanese MNEs) occurred only 40—50 years ago [20]. Another reason for choosing the Baltic region as a 'testing ground' for studying the initial stages of diffusion is that Baltic countries opened for FDI only 30 years ago. Sweden and Finland were not attractive to non-European investors for several reasons until the early 1990s. Thus, the 2010 acquisition of Sweden's industry flagships, Volvo Cars, by China's Geely Holding Group was a significant globalisation milestone.

Of course, our choice has certain limitations: many Asian investors bypass the Baltic region. The four traditional groups of motives for FDI are supporting marketing expansion, reducing labour costs, facilitating resources extraction and establishing control over high-tech companies. Chinese and South Korean, not to mention Indian or Thai, investors lack interest in Northern Europe as concerns the second and third groups of motives. Moreover, Northern European sales markets are not huge, and high-tech companies operate in the region in a limited range of industries (for instance, different areas of mechanical engineering). As a result, many leading Asian MNEs willing to open factories in Europe do that in neighbouring Russia, Poland and other Visegrad Group countries, Germany and the UK. Few main EU sales headquarters covering the entire integration group are located in the north of Europe. Nevertheless, expanding the geographical scope of analysis would not help us prove or disprove that such hierarchical wavelike diffusion of FDI occurs for such investor companies in the Baltic region.

The most recent data on FDI stock from different countries currently available on the IMF website are for the end of 2019 (see Table 1). The total FDI from Asia (excluding the CIS) in the six countries under consideration amounted to USD 28bn or 4.4 per cent of the total amount of direct investment in the region. This percentage was slightly higher in Finland and Sweden — homes to many high-tech companies, which appeal to Asian investors. Moreover, Finnish and Swedish universities and science parks provide access to the achievements of some of the most advanced national innovation systems through acquisitions and greenfield investments.

Table 1

FDI stocks in the Northern EU countries as of the end of 2019, USD million

FDI Source Country	Denmark	Sweden	Finland	Estonia	Latvia	Lithuania	Total for the six countries
China	144	9,449	4,153	36	30	9	13,821
Japan	1,813	4,354	796	152	0	-5	7,110
Hong Kong	1,390	…	443	45	15	922	2,815
Israel	21	…	921	26	65	59	1,092
Singapore	515	…	6	143	69	24	757
Republic of Korea	52	670*	0	0	30	0	752
India	6	609*	6	5	7	13	646
UAE	…	−37	−9	184	17	134	289
Thailand	134	0	−4	1	0	67	198
Malaysia	157	−2	−1	1	0	6	161
Turkey	-36	127	16	19	16	−1	141
Vietnam	0	60	−1	0	30	0	89
Saudi Arabia	42	…	−13	1	0	3	33
Taiwan	…	35	−6	1	0	0	30
Top 14	4,238	15,265	6,307	614	279	1,231	27,934
Global	134,982	340,853	85,821	27,940	17,890	20,855	628,341
Share of top 14, %	3.1	4.5	7.3	2.2	1.6	5.9	4.4

Notes: 1) negative stocks are a result of the revaluation of previous FDI due to the termination of large investment projects; 2) information on inward FDI was used for all indicators of performance in Sweden (except those of South Korean and Indian companies); 3) FDI from post-Soviet states was not considered in the case of the Baltic States to avoid the 'neighbourhood effect'.

Source: Coordinated Direct Investment Survey (https://data.imf.org).

Almost half of all Asian direct investments came from China, whose contribution has significantly increased over the recent years. As a result, Japanese businesses, which came to Northern Europe as early as the 1980s-1990s, slid down to second place. Japanese and Chinese enterprises are the major Asian competitors in northern EU states.

Not all countries in the region are equally appealing to investors from Asian countries. Sweden is slightly more popular with Indian, South Korean, Turkish and Vietnamese companies, whilst Denmark attracts MNEs from Singapore, Thailand and Malaysia; the Baltic countries have allure for firms from the UAE. Remarkably, Taiwan ranks only 14th in terms of FDI in northern EU countries, whilst, in terms of outward FDI stocks, the island takes 7—8th place amongst all Asian countries.

The literature on the international expansion of Asian direct investment usually has little, if anything, to do with the analysis of FDI geographical patterns. Works on the topic, be they review papers on MNEs from different countries (see [21; 22]) or books and articles on investors from key states [23; 24], tend to focus on three aspects: reasons to export capital from China, India, countries of Southeast Asia and the Middle East; differences between Asian MNEs and the 'classical' US and EU models; the regulation of Asian FDI (Western protectionism). Econometric exercises with high-sounding names are not likely to clarify anything (to support this statement, here is a link to a recent work valuable mainly for its bibliographic review [25]). The few exceptions tend to focus on China (see [26]). The literature rarely views investments in the Baltic region, whilst the first significant work on Chinese direct investment was published 14 years ago [27]. Articles on Chinese investment in Northern Europe and the Baltic countries are published with a high degree of regularity (a most recent example is [28]), but FDI from other Asian countries in the region is rarely given even a paragraph.

We analysed individual Asian MNEs to examine our working hypothesis. Particularly, we investigated their websites, media reports and diplomatic mission websites. More than 50 firms from UNCTAD annual World Investment Reports and their electronic supplements were selected (with approximately the same number of leading Asian investors left out as not having assets in northern EU countries). The most recent instalment at the time of writing is [29]. For the Republic of Korea, Taiwan, Turkey and Israel, we also used the materials of an international study on MNEs from emerging markets, including the monograph [30].

The car manufacturer Toyota Motors, Japan's leading investor and the owner of seven factories and three R&D centres in Europe, including facilities in neighbouring Poland and Russia, has none in the study region. Nor are there any subsidiaries of Honda Motor, the second-largest Japanese investor by foreign assets. The leaders of some Asian countries have never carried out FDI in the region, amongst them the Chinese oil and gas corporation CNPC (it has significant assets in the UK, France and Russia) and the Taiwanese electrical engineering company Hon Hai Precision Industries (represented in three Visegrad group countries).

According to UNCTAD, the Japanese pharmaceutical company Takeda is the only Asian company amongst the world's top 25 non-financial MNEs to have subsidiaries in the region, even though they are less significant than its enterprises in Western Europe or its plant in Russia. In 2011, the company bought the renowned Scandinavian pharmaceutical company Nycomed headquartered in Roskilde and a factory in Hobro, both in Denmark. In 2014, Takeda Pharma A/S moved from Roskilde to Tostrup, closer to Copenhagen, announcing the relocation of its R&D units to Germany and the UK, leaving the Danish office solely to serve the Northern European markets. In 2018, major management functions were moved to Switzerland. The company's sales offices are in the capitals of all other countries in the region, which demonstrates the preference for the largest centres in the city hierarchy. Apart from its facilities in Denmark, Takeda used to have a regional plant in Põlva, Estonia (sold in 2016). The Japanese investor did not build either the enterprise in southeastern Estonia or the plant in provincial Hobro, but, having acquired them, the Asian company decided to simplify the geographical organisation of its business.

For an Asian investor, even the growing complexity of geography following the acquisition of a firm does not necessarily exclude FDI in large centres. In 2000, Toyota Industries, one of the world-leading manufacturers of handling and storage equipment, bought a major industry player — the Swedish company BT Industries, which has existed since the 1940s (now Toyota Material Handling Europe). Its headquarters, main plant, R&D centre and two other enterprises were located in the small provincial town of Mjölby more than 200 km away from Stockholm (with a sales office in the capital's western suburb of Bromma) and Gothenburg, Sweden's second-largest city. More than half a century of experience in Scandinavia did not prevent BT Industries from capturing the markets of neighbouring countries and opening sales offices in both the provinces (Slangerup in Denmark) and suburbs of capitals (Vantaa in Finland). And its acquisition by the Japanese did not lead to the closure of these divisions. Yet, the development of the Baltic market, supported by direct investments since 2001, is carried out by a new subsidiary company registered in Latvia's Riga —

the largest of the three Baltic capitals. Soon, the main R&D centre moved from Mjölby to Gothenburg, where the Japanese investor founded a new company in the Lindholmen Science Park.

Empirical research results: proving the four hierarchical wavelike diffusion theses

The above examples do not disprove the four theses about the hierarchical wavelike diffusion of FDI. Overall, the major localisation centres for the study array of Asian MNEs are Stockholm and Helsinki, a little less commonly Copenhagen and Gothenburg. Although the capitals of the Baltic countries are markedly inferior to them, they far surpass any other city of these states (except for the port of Klaipeda in Lithuania). Companies that are exceptions might 'prove the rule' later. For instance, in 2012, GRG Banking, a large Chinese manufacturer of ATMs and other equipment for financial institutions, decided to coordinate all its European activities from its office in Vilnius, Lithuania [28]. But, in a few years, it changed its strategy to a more traditional one, conquering the huge European market through offices in million cities in the most populated countries (Hamburg, Moscow and Istanbul).

Since most of the examined second-tier companies perceive Northern EU countries as a peripheral region for their expansion, these organisations either open sales offices only, or such offices become principal recipients of FDI. Their localisation usually fits neatly into the analysed hierarchical wavelike diffusion model. At the same time, an investor using FDI to support sales may choose a capital's suburb over the city itself, such as Ballerup in Denmark, Solna in Sweden and Espoo in Finland. The first and the third house South Korea's Samsung Electronics; the first and the second, Japan's Hitachi.

The Stockholm metropolitan area, to which Helsinki is not a serious rival, is another likely location for FDI in the service sector. In 2012, the Bank of China, a pioneer in Chinese financial expansion in Scandinavia, opened its only subsidiary bank serving Northern Europe (including Norway and Iceland) in Stockholm. Five out of 12 Indian IT firms in Sweden are registered in the centre of the Stockholm metropolitan area, four in the outskirts of the capital or nearby suburbs (Kista, Farsta, Solna), and three in cities within an hour drive from the capital (Sigtuna, Uppsala and Nynäshamn). There are over 20 Indian IT firms in Finland, mostly in Helsinki or its suburb Espoo. Of course, the choice between the metropolitan areas of Sweden and Finland often depends on the needs of the industry. For instance, in 2012, India's Trivitron Healthcare acquired a major manufacturer of medical test equipment, Ani Labsystems, with a plant in Vantaa (a suburb of Helsinki).

Within the hierarchical wavelike diffusion model, when the investor considers all northern EU countries together, Stockholm's narrow leadership means that other Swedish cities will be preferred as a destination for additional FDI over Helsinki or Copenhagen. Japan's Mitsubishi Electric has three sales companies in the study region: in the capital in the east of Sweden, Gothenburg in the west and Lund in the south (most likely, these offices also cover the markets of neighbouring countries).

The second thesis is illustrated by diffusion distortions caused by FDI in the purchase of long-standing local companies (or MNEs from Germany and other EU countries). There are also industry-specific distortions: India's hotel company Mahindra Holidays & Resorts makes all its FDI in the region far from Stockholm or Helsinki. In 2014—2017, this investor took control of the Finnish Holiday Club Resorts with hotels in Turku, Vuokatti (Kainuu), near Kuusamo (Northern Ostrobothnia) and Saariselkä (Lapland), as well as in the Swedish ski resort of Åre in remote Jämtland County and Ekerum on the island of Öland.

The discrepancy between how the investor company delineates the region's boundaries and its actual borders may also cause distortions. Viewing 'greater' Northern Europe or the entire Baltic region as a single destination may point to the construction of a transboundary hierarchical wavelike model taking into account production needs. For example, the European headquarters of China COSCO Shipping, China's largest transport company, are outside the study region, in Hamburg. Its offices in the Baltic region are located along the route to the east: in Oslo (Norway), Gothenburg (Sweden), Birkeröd (a northern suburb of Copenhagen), Gdynia (Poland) and Helsinki (Finland), i.e. there are no offices in Stockholm or Baltic ports. Only in 2020, Hong Kong's famous conglomerate Hutchison, owning 15 terminals in Europe, acquired its first port in the region, in Stockholm.

As for the purchase of existing plants, the common belief in the early 1990s was that a foreign investor in a small country did not care too much for the location but focused on other economic performance of the acquired assets. In other words, only the further expansion of such an MNE is of interest when describing spatial FDI diffusion. Geely Holding Group, having purchased Volvo Cars, got several factories, R&D centres and other enterprises in several European countries. Those in the study region are located in Gothenburg, where the company originated in 1915. Further FDI diffusion has been wavelike: in 2013, the Chinese investor opened another R&D centre — Uni3 by Geely — in Gothenburg (in the Lindholmen Science Park) to meet the needs of the parent Chinese company.

The third thesis, the one about the city hierarchy, requires further clarification based on the results of our analysis. If an Asian investor carries out FDI not to support its marketing expansion but to increase its technological level, it is essential to consider the hierarchy of university centres. A clear illustration is the case of the Chinese IT company Huawei Technologies. It has sales subsidiaries in central Stockholm, Helsinki, Copenhagen and Vilnius. Its R&D centres in the study region are located in the outskirts of the Swedish capital (in Kista — the local Silicon Valley housing several Asian R&D centres, for example, South Korea's Samsung Electronics), Gothenburg, Lund (home to the second-oldest university in Sweden, after Uppsala) and Tampere.

To what extent does Tampere, Finland's second-largest city, owe its appeal as an FDI destination to its economic potential and to what, to its general attractiveness to high-tech businesses? Not only does it have a good university, but also it boasts a high quality of life (one of the best in Europe, according to several opinion polls) — a factor particularly valued by well-paid specialists. The case of Huawei offers an answer to this question: in 2016, when Microsoft closed its R&D centre in the city, the Chinese took over its very professional team. Moreover, the 2021 world leader in smartphone sales Xiaomi Corporation opened its first European R&D centre in Tampere in 2019.

The fourth thesis, about diffusion reducing to simple forms with a few subsidiaries in a region, is clearly illustrated by most Asian investors in Northern Europe. But this does not mean that cases of branched wavelike diffusion will not be observed in the future.

Difficulties in identifying spatial diffusion patterns

The description of FDI spatial diffusion models aimed initially to facilitate the attraction of new investment in a country. Insights into what attracts new investor countries and industries to a national economy simplified raising awareness amongst potential investors and creating favourable conditions in the most likely locations for subsidiaries.

Knowledge of FDI diffusion mechanisms helps larger countries accelerate foreign expansion into peripheral areas.

In the case of small countries, especially those participating in integration projects, it is essential to understand what macro-region potential investors consider as a single destination. Within the perceived boundaries of such a macro-region, MNEs will create a hierarchy of cities or urban agglomerations. Representatives of different countries may have different views on the geographical division of Europe. It is equally important to remember that the hierarchy of cities changes over time, particularly under the influence of internal and external migration.

The mature stages of the internationalisation of firms have always been of lesser interest to researchers more focused on serving the interests of society and governments rather than entrepreneurs. When foreign investors come to a country or region, experts would assess their activities through the lens of purely economic analysis. As the case of Takeda shows, after acquiring local companies (for example, to gain access to their technology or knowledge of local markets), a foreign investor may seek to simplify the geography of its subsidiaries by moving closer to the capital and selling enterprises in the province. In other words, even though mergers and acquisitions, as a form of FDI, are currently dominating developed economies, a foreign investor unfamiliar with the details of doing business in the area goes back to earlier, more comfortable stages of spatial diffusion. At the same time, they do not curtail business activity in the region: the Japanese pharmaceutical company moved its operations to the countries where it felt more at ease (Germany, the UK and Switzerland).

There is, however, another factor not considered in the article: at mature stages, not only do the foreign investors have a lot of knowledge of the local environment, but they also actively cooperate with other foreign companies and local businesses, which grossly distorts any basic FDI spatial diffusion model.

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The author

Prof. Alexey Kuznetsov, Corresponding Member of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Professor, MGIMO-University, Russia; Director, Institute of Scientific Information for Social Sciences Russian Academy of Sciences, Russia

E-mail: kuznetsov_alexei@mail.ru

https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5172-9924

COASTAL STUDIES

THE COASTS WE LIVE IN: CAN THERE BE A SINGLE DEFINITION FOR A COASTAL ZONE?

A. S. Mikhaylov [1]
A. P. Plotnikova [2]

[1] Institute of Geography of the Russian Academy of Sciences
29, Staromonetniy per., Moscow, 119017

[2] Immanuel Kant Baltic Federal University
14, A. Nevskogo ul., Kaliningrad, 236016, Russia

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Throughout the history of humankind, people have settled along seashores. The gradual accumulation of population and industrial activity in coastal areas has created preconditions for coastalisation — the movement of people and socio-economic activity to marine coasts. To date, coastal areas have a higher rate of economic development, fostering migration and an influx of capital across the globe. Scholars and policymakers voice concerns about the asymmetry of regional development and the increasing anthropogenic impact on the coastal ecosystem. It reinforces the importance of coastal zone management. In this study, we use an example of the Baltic region to identify the coastalisation patterns in the Baltic region and answer the question, whether there can be a single definition of the coastal zone of the Baltic region. According to a broad definition, the Baltic macro-region is nearly all coastal and, consequently, all settlements are influenced by the coastalisation effect. We have studied urban population dynamics in 128 cities of 45 coastal regions through the lens of various characteristics of a coastal city — the distance from the sea (10, 50, 100, and 150 km), location in a coastal region (NUTS 2), availability of a port and its primary maritime activity (tankers, cargo, fishing, passenger, recreational vessels and others). The research results suggest that despite the strong coherence of the Baltic region countries, there should not be a single delimitation approach to defining the coastal zone. Overall, the most active marine economic processes occur in the zone up to 10 km from the seacoast and 30 km from ports and port infrastructure. However, in the case of Sweden, Poland, and Latvia, the coastal zone can be extended to 50 km, and in Germany — up to 150 km inland.

Keywords:
coastal region, coastal zone, coastalisation, Baltic region, coastal zone management

Introduction

Coastal regions around the globe demonstrate an increased concentration of population and infrastructure, as well as intensified economic activity. The all-embracing 'rush to the coast' described by McFadden [1, p.430], which results in depopulation and deterritorialisation of midland territories in favour of areas

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adjacent to sea and ocean shores, is known as coastalisation or thalasso-attractiveness. The unbalanced dynamics between the coast and the midland is said to be a historical phenomenon, with areas closer to the shoreline receiving migratory influxes for centuries and experiencing 'boom and burst development' [2]. By attracting new residents, the favourable environments of coastal zones become national and international development poles [3—5].

The results of previous studies suggest that, with a density over 2.5 times the global average, coastal areas are home to about 40 per cent of the world population [6; 7]. At a national level, scholars identify significant variations in coastal occupation — from 4.5 to 100 per cent [5, 8—20], depending on the study area and research design. Most of the studies provide valuable information on the spatial distribution of human activity, emphasising the remarkable attractiveness of 'low elevation coastal zone [s] ' [21] or 'coastal lowlands' [13] (2 per cent of the world's total land surface area inhabited by up to 10 per cent of the world population). Yet, ambiguity in the interpretation of coastal regions and inconsistent delimitation criteria for coastal areas obstruct both comparative analysis and the subsequent elaboration of policies on integrated coastal management.

This article focuses on the development patterns of coastal cities in ten countries of the Baltic region — a macro-region with strong cross-border ties and a historically embedded identity. We use various techniques and parameters to identify urban settlements affected by coastalisation, aiming to answer the question of whether there can be a uniform definition of the coastal zone, at least, in a single macro-region. The paper proceeds by discussing the conceptual understanding of coastal regions, drawing a distinction between the terrestrial area of the coastal zone and the adjacent territories of the inland area. Section 3 describes the methodological basis of the study, followed by Section 4 presenting research results. The article concludes with Section 5, which offers our interpretation of the data obtained.

Literature review

What is meant by a coastal region or coastal zone in the literature? In the broadest sense, these terms refer to the 'meeting point' of land and sea (ocean), a focal area of the land-water boundary or a locus of transition between the terrestrial and marine ecosystems [3; 22—29]. Both environments of the transitional region influence each other. The consequences of this interaction, such as floods, landslides, marine anthropogenic pollution, etc., are most strongly manifested in the littoral zone. The ambiguity of the term 'coastal' increases dramatically when its physiographical connotation is replaced by socio-humanitarian one, which is the subject of human geography. The coastal influence on social, economic, political, innovative and other systems extends inland, far beyond the coastline.[1] Reg-

[1] Researchers distinguish between coastal and marine (ocean) economies, pointing to the fact that coastal regions incorporate marine resources as direct or indirect inputs to economic activity, with marine-based enterprises located in both coastal and inland areas [30—32].

ularities in residential, infrastructural and industrial patterns suggest that regions termed as coastal spread the economic and social impacts of coastal and marine activities to inland areas, well beyond the narrowly defined shoreline. This suggests the necessity to push the virtual boundary of the coastal zone as far inland as needed to capture the effects of coastalisation and achieve the objectives of integrated coastal management [28].

The European Commission defines EU coastal regions as third-level territorial units for statistics (NUTS 3) with either direct access to the sea or ocean coastline or with most residents living within a 50-kilometre coastal band [33]. A similar criterion for coastal delimitation is used by scholars and state statistics bureaus of many countries when delineating the boundaries of a coastal zone or a coastal strip (the 50-mile coastal zone standard is applicable in the USA and Australia) (see [19, 34—39]. Despite the reasonable consistency of public bodies in this matter, the scientific community has not yet reached a consensus. Pernetta and Elder [40], Rakodi and Treloar [15] and Turner et al. [18] define the coastal zone as extending 60 km (or 40 miles) inland, whilst Salnikov [41] sets an 80 km limit. The 100 km threshold is used by most scholars when demarcating the boundaries of coastal cities and agglomerations (CCAs), coastal regions and 'near-coastal zones' as it is the psychological limit of remoteness from the coast (see [5—8, 11—14; 21; 42—46]. A strong argument for the 100 km limit has been put forward by Small et al. [47]. The findings of these highly cited scholars show that population density diminishes beyond 100 km of the sea. Many researchers, including Small and Cohen [17], have argued for other widths of land classified as coastal, ranging from 10 to 500 km (e.g. [9; 48—51]). Investigations focusing on islands (e.g. the Balearic Islands) tend to use a denser gradation and a lower threshold than those exploring China, Russia, the USA and other large and predominantly continental countries. With that, it remains questionable whether a 'flat-rate' approach to the delimitation and demarcation of coastal regions is applicable at all. Thus, the question posed by Colgan [30, p. 28] of 'how far inland the coast extends' is still relevant and should be approached using an integrated perspective.

Methodologically, the above calls for a research design based on a systemic approach: it is essential to consider coastal regions as holistic and homogeneous sociocultural, economic, demographic, geo-environmental and administrative-territorial systems. Therefore, the geophysical (i.e. natural, geospatial) approach involving an assessment of a region's geographical remoteness from sea and ocean shores against a predetermined or variable distance has to be complemented by analysis the integrity of its socio-economic system, i.e. an administrative approach. This conclusion, to some extent, falls in line with the Homogeneous Environmental Management Unit (HEMU) approach propounded by Balaguer et al. [52]. Delimitating the terrestrial area of a coastal zone from adjacent territories and other inland areas has to correspond to a territorial subdivision (e.g. LAU, NUTS3, or NUTS2) capturing a sufficient set of elements tied by intra-system socio-economic, political, technological and other relations and existing in a common contextual environment. This approach demonstrates that the socio-economic effects and properties of a coastal area are predetermined by not only the presence or proximity of a marine coast but the overall architecture of a territorial community and its geo-economic and geopolitical structure.

Research methodology

This study is based on an analysis of urban population dynamics in the coastal zone of the Baltic region. A broad interpretation of the macro-region is used extending to the Scandinavian states (Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden), the Baltic states (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania), the northern regions of Germany and Poland, and part of the North-Western Federal District of the Russian Federation (the Kaliningrad, Pskov and Leningrad regions, the city of St Petersburg and the Republic of Karelia). The geography of the study covered 128 cities with over 50 thousand residents (Fig. 1) without considering those with a smaller population. Coastal zone boundaries were set 10, 50, 100 and 150 km away from the sea. Additional segregation was carried out by identifying second-level territorial administrative units (NUTS 2). Russia's and the EU's administrative-territorial divisions were juxtaposed, and Russian regions were equated with territories at NUTS 2. Forty-five coastal regions were identified within the 150-km coastal zone at NUTS 2 in total.



Fig. 1. Urban population dynamics in coastal zones of the Baltic Sea region, 2000—2020

Source: prepared by the authors.

The study design aimed to consider the population share and dynamics for each possible definition of the coastal zone. Table 1 presents the distribution of sample cities by size relative to the resident population.

Table 1

Classification of cities in the Baltic region countries

City type	Population, 1,000 people	Number of cities		Growth rate, %
		2000	2020	
Below threshold value	Under 50	14	0	0
Small	50—99	61	67	9.8
Medium	100—249	34	40	17.6
Large	250—499	12	10	–16.7
Major	500—999	6	7	16.7
Millionaire	1 000—5 000	3	4	33.3

Source: calculated based on [2].

The study period was from 2000 to 2020. The sources of data on the population size were: for the cities of Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Poland and Sweden — the Eurostat database and the database of the City Population project, which accumulates census data by countries of the world; for Russia — Rosstat and the 2002 All-Russian Census results. The sources of data on the population of countries and regions were Eurostat and (for Russia) Rosstat.[3]

The involvement of coastal cities in maritime activities was evaluated using data on the performance and specialisation of ports. Amongst cities in the sample, 71 per cent had a port: 71 cities had a seaport, and 20 a river port with sea access (Table 2). Port specialisation data were obtained from the Marine Traffic website[4] and ship arrival information as of August 2021 (Fig. 2). The following categories of navigation were distinguished: tankers, cargo, fishing, passenger and high-speed vessels, pleasure and sailing vessels, others (including special vessels, tugs, search and rescue operations).

[2] Population on 1 January by age groups and sex — cities and greater cities, 2021, *Eurostat*, available at: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/urb_cpop1/default/table?lang=en (accessed 03.08.2021); Population statistics for countries, administrative divisions, cities, urban areas and agglomerations — interactive maps and charts, 2021, City Population, available at: https://www.citypopulation.de/Europe.html (accessed 03.08.2021); Database of indicators by municipalities, 2021, *Rosstat*, available at: https://www.gks.ru/free_doc/new_site/bd_munst/munst.htm (accessed 03.08.2021) (in Russ.); The size and location of the population, 2021, *All-Russian Population Census 2002,* available at: http://www.perepis2002.ru/index.html?id=11 (accessed 03.08.2021) (in Russ.).

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[4] *Marine Traffic*, 2021, available at: https://www.marinetraffic.com (accessed 03.08.2021).

Table 2

Distribution of cities in the Baltic region countries by port type

City type	Coastal zone, km					
	0—10		10—50		50—100	100—150
	Seaport	River port	Seaport	River port	Seaport	River port
Small	21	7	—	—	—	2
Medium	16	2	1	1	1	1
Large	6	—	—	1	—	1
Major	4	—	1	1	—	1
Millionaire	2	—	—	—	1	1
Total	49	9	2	3	2	6

Source: prepared by the authors based on the Marine Traffic database, 2021, available at: https://www.marinetraffic.com (accessed 03.08.2021).



Fig. 2. Shipping density in the Baltic region on 10.09.2021

Source: Marine Traffic database, 2021, available at: https://www.marinetraffic.com (accessed 03.08.2021).

Research results

Coastalisation in the Baltic region is closely related to urbanisation. Data in Table 1 suggest that the distribution of cities in the macro-region by size-type changed over the study period. There was a general tendency to enlargement: the number of cities with over a million population and major cities increased, whilst 14 towns surpassed the predefined minimum threshold of 50 thousand people, having moved to the group of small cities by 2020. Table 3 presents the results of the analysis of urbanisation in the coastal zone of the Baltic region in view of the distance from the city to the seacoast.

Table 3

Population dynamics in the Baltic region by types of cities and distance from the sea

Coastal zone, km*	Cities		Population, mln								
			2000			2020			2020 to 2000, %		
	Total	Incl. with seaport	total	with port	without port	total	with port	without port	total	with port	without port
Small											
Under 10	31	27	1.86	1.62	0.24	2.08	1.79	0.29	12.0	10.6	21.4
10—50	12	C	0.81	—	0.81	0.87	0.00	0.87	7.0	—	7.0
50—100	8	—	0.5	—	0.5	0.6	0.0	0.6	11.3	—	11.3
100—150	16	2	1.1	0.1	1.0	1.1	0.2	0.9	–1.1	39.1	–5.6
Total	67	29	4.28	1.73	2.56	4.61	1.94	2.67	7.7	12.3	4.5
Medium											
Under 10	23	19	3.05	2.56	0.49	3.64	3.04	0.60	19.3	18.9	21.4
10—50	5	2	0.61	0.32	0.29	0.81	0.29	0.52	33.4	–9.1	79.5
50—100	6	1	0.61	0.10	0.51	0.82	0.16	0.67	34.3	51.7	30.8
100—150	6	1	0.95	0.16	0.78	0.97	0.17	0.80	2.42	0.6	2.8
Total	40	23	5.22	3.14	2.08	6.24	3.65	2.59	19.7	16.2	24.9
Large											
10	7	6	2.27	2.06	0.21	2.60	2.31	0.29	14.3	12.1	35.9
10-50	1	1	0.42	0.42	0.0	0.40	0.40	0.0	–4.4	–4.4	0.0
100-150	2	1	0.64	0.27	0.38	0.66	0.32	0.34	2.6	18.0	–8.4
Total	10	8	3.33	2.74	0.59	3.66	3.02	0.63	9.7	10.2	7.6
Major											
Under 10	4	4	2.27	2.27	—	2.91	2.91	—	28.1	28.1	—
10—50	2	2	1.30	1.30	—	1.20	1.20	—	-8.2	-8.2	—
100—150	1	1	0.52	0.52	—	0.54	0.54	—	4.3	4.3	—
total	7	7	4.09	4.09	—	4.64	4.64	—	13.5	13.5	—
Millionaire											
Under 10	2	2	5.19	5.19	—	6.74	6.74	—	29.8	29.8	—
50-100	1	1	1.72	1.72	—	1.85	1.85	—	7.7	7.7	—
100—150	1	1	3.38	3.38	—	3.67	3.67	—	8.5	8.5	—
Total	4	4	10.29	10.29	—	12.25	12.25	—	19.1	19.1	—

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Total											
Under 10	67	58	14.64	13.69	0.95	17.96	16.78	1.18	22.7	22.5	24.7
10—50	20	5	3.14	2.04	1.10	3.27	1.88	1.39	4.3	–7.6	26.3
50—100	15	2	2.87	1.82	1.05	3.27	2.00	1.27	14.1	10.2	20.8
100—150	26	6	6.56	4.44	2.12	6.90	4.84	2.06	5.1	9.0	–3.0
Total	128	71	27.20	21.98	5.22	31.40	25.50	5.90	15.4	16.0	13.0

Note: * from the nearest point of the seacoast to the city centre.

Source: prepared by the authors based on City Population, Rosstat and Eurostat data.[5]

By 2020, 52.3 per cent of all cities in the sample (including 81.7 per cent of those having a port) were concentrated within 10 km of the sea. Moreover, the 10-km coastal zone attracted most population in the other zones considered: 10—50, 50—100, and 100—150 km. In 2020, it accounted for 57.2 per cent of the total urban population of the Baltic region (17.96 million people), which grew by 22.7 per cent in 2000—2020. For comparison, over the past 20 years, population growth in other coastal zones was more modest: within 10—50 km from the coast, it was 4.3 per cent; 50—100 km, 14.1 per cent; 100—150 km, 5.1 per cent. In addition, data in Table 3 show that population growth in port cities of the Baltic region is higher than in cities without a port: 16 versus 13 per cent. There is an interesting territorial pattern: within the 10-km coastal zone, population growth is comparable in both types of cities (with and without a port); in 10—50 km and 50—100 km zone, those without a port perform better in terms of population increase; in the 100—150 km zone, the presence of a port positively correlates with population growth in cities.

A territorial-temporal outlook on the population distribution in the Baltic region by city type points to the attractiveness of two categories of cities: millionaire and medium-sized ones, where population growth amounted to over 19 per cent. The population of cities of other types also increased in the study period, but the growth rates were significantly lower. This trend may relate to the agglomeration effect in the development of cities: people move from towns to medium-sized cities and from the latter to even larger ones. In general, 59 per cent of the total urban population of the Baltic region lived in millionaire (39 per cent)

[5] Population statistics for countries, administrative divisions, cities, urban areas and agglomerations — interactive maps and charts, 2021, *City Population*, available at: https://www.citypopulation.de/Europe.html (accessed 03.08.2021);
Database of indicators by municipalities, 2021, *Rosstat*, available at: https://www.gks.ru/free_doc/new_site/bd_munst/munst.htm (accessed 03.08.2021) (in Russ.);
The size and location of the population, 2021, *All-Russian Population Census 2002*, available at: http://www.perepis2002.ru/index.html?id=11 (accessed 03.08.2021) (in Russ.);
Population on 1 January by NUTS 2 region, 2021, *Eurostat*, available at: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/tgs00096/default/table?lang=en (accessed 03.08.2021).

and medium-sized cities (20 per cent) in 2020. For comparison, towns and major cities accounted for 14.7 per cent of all residents; large cities, for 11.6 per cent. The 10-km coastal zone was the most attractive place of residence, including by city type (Table 3). In 2020, 55 per cent of the residents of millionaire, 62.7 per cent of major, 71.1 per cent of large, 58.3 per cent of medium-size and 45.1 per cent of small cities resided within 10 km of the seacoast. The proportion of people in the 10-km zone increased in 2000—2020 for all city types (except for medium-sized cities, where it remained unchanged).

The relationship between the population growth rate in a city and its proximity to the seaport or river port with sea access is investigated as an indicator of maritime economic activity. The correlation coefficient between the distance from a city to the nearest port and the population dynamics rate is –0.19, pointing to a weak inverse relationship between these indicators (Fig. 3).



Fig. 3. Correlation between the urban population growth and the proximity of the city to a port in the Baltic region, 2000—2020

Source: prepared by the authors based on City Population, Rosstat and Eurostat data.[6]

Analysis of the distribution of urban population depending on proximity to a sea or river port (Table 4) shows that the most populated cities (millionaire, major and large ones) act as large transport and logistics hubs with developed maritime connections (except for two cities of the large group – Poland's Bydgoszcz and Finland's Espoo). With a decrease in size, the share of port cities in the group falls to 57.5 per cent amongst medium-sized and 43.3 per cent amongst small ones. Positive population dynamics are characteristic of all groups of port cities averaging 16 per cent growth over the 21 years. Amongst cities without ports, the increase was the largest in those located no further than 30 km from port infrastructure (Table 4).

[6] Ibid.

Table 4

Distribution of the urban population in the Baltic region by proximity to a port

City type	Number of cities/ population size	Total	With port	Proximity to port, km						
				under 10	10—30	30—50	50—100	100—150	150—200	200—250
Millionaire	Number	4	4	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
	In 2000, people	10.29	10.29	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
	In 2020, people	12.25	12.25	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
	2020 to 2000, %	19.1	19.1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
major	Number	7	7	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
	In 2000, people	4.09	4.09	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
	In 2020, people	4.64	4.64	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
	2020 to 2000, %	13.5	13.5	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
large	Number	10	8	—	1	—	—	1	—	—
	In 2000, people	3.33	2.74	—	0.21	—	—	0.38	—	—
	In 2020, people	3.66	3.02	—	0.29	—	—	0.34	—	—
	2020 to 2000, %	9.7	10.2	—	35.9	—	—	-8.4	—	—
medium	Number	40	23	—	4	1	6	5	—	1
	In 2000, people	5.22	3.14	—	0.41	0.09	0.70	0.76	—	0.10
	In 2020, people	6.24	3.65	—	0.59	0.16	0.92	0.79	—	0.13
	2020 to 2000, %	19.7	16.2	—	43.6	74.7	31.1	2.9	—	25.3
small	Number	67	29	1	10	9	9	5	2	2
	In 2000, people	4.28	1.73	0.050	0.55	0.64	0.67	0.34	0.11	0.19
	In 2020, people	4.61	1.94	0.055	0.69	0.63	0.66	0.37	0.13	0.15
	2020 to 2000, %	7.7	12.3	10.5	24.1	-1.7	-2.6	8.4	11.5	-18.8
total	Number	128	71	1	15	10	15	11	2	3
	In 2000, people	27.20	21.98	0.050	1.18	0.73	1.37	1.48	0.11	0.29
	In 2020, people	31.40	25.50	0.055	1.57	0.79	1.57	1.50	0.13	0.28
	2020 to 2000, %	15.4	16.0	10.5	33.0	8.1	14.6	1.3	11.5	-3.2

Source: developed by the authors based on City Population, Rosstat and Eurostat[7].

The principal attractors of the population and maritime activity in the Baltic region are four cities with a population of over one million: St. Petersburg (Russia) and København (Denmark), which have seaports, and Hamburg and Berlin (Germany), which have river ports. With that, whilst the main specialisation of St. Petersburg and Copenhagen, located within 10 km of the seacoast, is passenger transport, Hamburg and Berlin, located in the 50—100 and 100—150 km coastal zones respectively, concentrate on cargo operations (Fig. 4). The correlation between the distance between the port city and the seacoast and the share of Tanker and Cargo vessels specialisation is positive (0.47); for Passenger and High speed, Pleasure

[7] Ibid.

and Sailing, Fishing, Craft, Tug and Search, it is negative (–0.53). In other words, the construction of river ports deep inland (up to 150 km away from the seacoast) is often due to industries' need for cargo transportation (this also holds for towns, for example, Germany's Lingen), whilst ports located within 10 km of the coast use their natural proximity to the sea and often specialise in marine economic activities such as sea passenger transport, sea tourism, fishing, etc. (Table 5).



Fig. 4. Distribution of cities in the Baltic region by port specialisation

Note: the share of Passenger and High speed, Pleasure and Sailing, Fishing, and Craft, Tug and Search below 50 per cent in a port's specialisation means that it specialises in the transportation of goods. The circle diameter reflects the population size in 2020.

Source: calculated by the authors using Rosstat, Eurostat, and Marine traffic databases.[8]

Table 5

Specialisations of sea and river ports of the Baltic region countries by city types, %

City type	Tanker	Cargo	Passenger and High speed	Fishing	Pleasure and Sailing	Special Craft, Tug and Search
Seaports						
Small	0.8	13.1	11.9	0.0	24.9	12.8
Medium	2.5	11.9	23.7	0.2	29.5	15.9
Large	3.0	8.1	15.6	0.0	21.0	15.0
Major	1.3	5.5	66.4	0.1	20.3	13.5
Millionaire	4.8	11.0	45.2	0.2	28.3	9.8
Total	1.8	10.6	23.0	0.1	22.8	14.2

[8] Database of indicators by municipalities, 2021, Rosstat, available at: https://www.gks.ru/free_doc/new_site/bd_munst/munst.htm (accessed 03.08.2021) (in Russ.); Population on 1 January by NUTS 2 region, 2021, *Eurostat*, available at: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/tgs00096/default/table?lang=en (accessed 03.08.2021); *Marine Traffic*, 2021, available at: https://www.marinetraffic.com (accessed 01.09.2021).

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River ports						
Small	3.2	13.5	28.6	0.0	27.8	5.4
Medium	2.6	45.5	0.6	0.0	9.8	2.4
Large	11.1	45.7	3.1	0.1	19.2	10.5
Major	6.4	65.6	2.4	0.0	7.9	5.7
Millionaire	9.1	34.4	16.1	0.0	13.2	15.6
Total	5.8	29.5	3.1	0.0	14.9	6.1

Note: the table shows average median values of the share of each shipping category.

Source: calculated by the authors using the Marine Traffic database, 2021, available at: https://www.marinetraffic.com.

We made a comparative assessment of macroregional changes in the urban population against national and regional trends to examine the specifics of coastalisation in the Baltic region. The correlation coefficient between the population change rates in cities and across the country is higher than between cities and their regions: 0.636 versus 0.595 (Fig. 5).



Fig. 5. Distribution of Baltic region cities by population growth rate against the country average, 2000—2020

Source: calculated by the authors based on data from Eurostat, Rosstat and City Population.[9]

[9] Population on 1 January by age groups and sex — cities and greater cities, 2021, *Eurostat*, available at: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/urb_cpop1/default/table?lang=en (accessed 03.08.2021); Population statistics for countries, administrative divisions, cities, urban areas and agglomerations — interactive maps and charts, 2021, *City Population*, available at: https://www.citypopulation.de/Europe.html (accessed 03.08.2021); Database of indicators by municipalities, 2021, *Rosstat*, available at: https://www.gks.ru/free_doc/new_site/bd_munst/munst.htm (accessed 03.08.2021) (in Russ.); The size and location of the population, 2021, *All-Russian Population Census 2002*, available at: http://www.perepis2002.ru/index.html?id=11 (accessed 03.08.2021) (in Russ.); Resident population as of January 1, 2021, *Rosstat*, available at: https://showdata.gks.ru/report/278928 (accessed 03.08.2021) (in Russ.); Population on 1 January (national level), 2021, *Eurostat*, available at: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/tps00001/default/table?lang=en (accessed 03.08.2021).

Remarkably, cities without a port are more likely than seaport cities to follow the general national trend in population dynamics: the correlation coefficient is 0.594 for port cities versus 0.692 for cities without a port.

Conclusion

Our study showed that the coastalisation effects would differ depending on the delimitation criteria used to distinguish coastal zones, especially when the distance from the coast is considered. In most cases, general coastalisation effects were visible within 10 km of the seacoast and 30 km of the nearest port. However, cities with river ports lying 150 km away from the seacoast can still have elements of the marine economy.

We constructed a typology of Baltic region countries according to the most appropriate approach to delineating the boundaries of coastal zones (Table 6).

Table 6

Distribution of the urban population of Baltic region countries within 150 km of the seacoast, 2020

Country	Distance from the seacoast, km							
	Under 10 km		10—50 km		50—100 km		100—150 km	
	Number of cities	Population, %	Number of cities	Population, %	Number of cities	Population, %	Number of cities	Population, %
Group 1								
Norway	16	100.0	—	—	—	—	—	—
Russia	4	95.7	3	3.5	—	—	1	0.8
Denmark	9	92.7	2	7.3	—	—	—	—
Estonia	2	83.5	—	—	—	—	1	16.5
Finland	10	71.2	2	5.8	4	11.9	2	11.0
Lithuania	1	37.3	—	—	—	—	2	62.7
Group 2								
Sweden	10	66.3	3	12.7	5	15.2	2	5.8
Poland	5	38.3	3	19.5	2	9.8	6	32.3
Latvia	1	9.1	2	90.9	—	—	—	—
Group 3								
Germany	9	12.0	5	10.6	4	22.1	12	55.3

Source: calculated by the authors based on data Eurostat and Rosstat.

The first group includes six countries (Norway, Russia, Denmark, Estonia, Finland and Lithuania), for which the 0—10 km approach to coastal delimitation is reasonable since over 70 per cent (100 per cent in Norway) of the urban population of the 0—150 km coastal zone reside there. Therefore, marine economic activities concentrate within the 10-km area too. This conclusion also holds for Lithuania since its only port city, Klaipeda, lies within this zone.

For the second group (Sweden, Poland and Latvia), coastalisation effects are better described when using the 0—50 km approach. In these countries, the corresponding zone accounts for more than 50 per cent of the urban population and is home to port infrastructure. Even though a third of Poland's urban population in the sample lives in the 100—150 km zone, expanding the coastal zone to 150 km is impractical since cities in that area do not have ports.

The third group includes Germany, whose urban population is distributed across the studied zones: 'up to 10 km', '10—50 km', '50—100 km' and '100—150 km'. For the country, the '0—150 km' approach to coastal delimitation is justified because it has ports actively involved in maritime activities, including cargo operations, even at a considerable distance from the seacoast.

Our findings point to differentiation in the coastal population size depending on the approach to coastal delimitation. Taking countries of the Baltic region as an example, we estimated the population in the coastal zone in three gradations: 0—10 km, 10—50 km, 50—100 km and 100—150 km. It was established that the most active marine economic processes occurred within 10 km of the seacoast and 30 km of port infrastructure. At the same time, there was significant heterogeneity across countries of the Baltic region: in Sweden, Poland and Latvia, the coastal zone can be extended up to 50 km, and in Germany up to 150 km.

Acknowledgments

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The authors

Dr Andrey S. Mikhaylov, Senior Research Fellow, Institute of Geography of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Russia.

E-mail: mikhailov.andrey@yahoo.com

https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5155-2628

Angelina P. Plotnikova, master student, Immanuel Kant Baltic Federal University, Russia.

E-mail: a.plotnikova.1416@gmail.com

https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5502-8866

MIGRATION ATTRACTIVENESS OF THE COASTAL ZONE OF RUSSIA'S NORTH-WEST: LOCAL GRADIENTS

F. Kh. Sokolova [1]
A. V. Lyalina [2]

[1] Northern (Arctic) Federal University
named after M.V Lomonosov
2 Lomonosova pr., Arkhangelsk, 163002, Russia
[2] Immanuel Kant Baltic Federal University
14, A. Nevskogo ul., Kaliningrad, 236016, Russia

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A well-acknowledged driver of change, population movement intensifies the development of coastal territories. The Russian North-West holds a vast coastal zone. Granting access to the Baltic, the White, and the Barents Seas, it is an area of geostrategic importance where much of the country's coastal economy — one of the national priorities — is located. Push and pull factors are enormously diverse in the area, as are migration flows forming attraction poles for migrants. There is little research on the issue despite its social and practical significance. Thus, research is required to examine how the coastal factor can benefit the migration attractiveness and human resources of Russian coastal territories of geostrategic importance. This study aims to delineate coastal territories and investigate local migration flows compared to those recorded in inland regions. The research draws on the concept of coastalisation, employing universal, geographical, and statistical research methods. It uses documentary sources and official 2011—2020 statistics. The findings show that the coastal position and maritime economic activity are relevant factors for migration attractiveness. Saint Petersburg and the coastal municipalities of the Leningrad and Kaliningrad regions are more attractive to migrants than more northerly territories. However, there are attraction poles farther north too, and the coastal zone of the Arkhangelsk region attracts more migrants than its inland part. The study demonstrates the growing polarisation of migration space in the coastal areas and especially agglomerations. Changes in the age structure of immigration flows have caused social factors in attractiveness to migrants to replace employment-related factors.

Keywords:
coastal zone, migration attractiveness, migration, coastalisation, attraction poles for migrants, Russian North-West, Arctic

Introduction

Opposite demographic trends in different parts of the world render migration a critical factor in the scaling-up of human resources and socio-economic devel-

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opment of territories. The literature on migration studies abounds with research on the push and pull factors [1—3]. The coastalisation concept also pays considerable attention to population growth due to migration [4—5].

A coastal position is, on the one hand, a factor in attractiveness to migrants since it creates additional economic and transport opportunities. On the other hand, it is a push factor because of the ecological risk of sea-level rise and coastal flooding [6; 7]. This study defines the attractiveness of a region to migrants as a combination of pull factors that constitutes a comparative advantage over other territories and accounts for positive net migration [8]. The attractiveness of a region is always a mixture of push and pull factors.

The following circumstances have been identified as the most significant in making a territory a prime destination.

1. Marine economy. Employment is a powerful incentive to migrate to coastal zones [9]. Research has demonstrated that regions with thriving marine recreation and tourism [10], a strong military marine economy [11] and profitable fishery [12] are extremely attractive to migrants. Jan Merkens et al. [13] emphasise that maritime transport, small-scale fishing and tourism spur coastal migration, along with good coastal management and the overall potential for coastalisation. Bernerd Fulanda et al. [12] write that, for centuries, coastal fishing has been a critical factor in migration to Eastern Africa. The military functions of coastal territories also have a considerable role in coastward migration [11].

2. Nature and climate. A mild climate, a clean environment, comfortable terrain, and water resources are crucial for lifestyle and retirement migration [14—19]. Karen O'Reilly [14] and Michaela Benson [18], the authors of the lifestyle migration concept, take the migration of affluent pensioners from Northern Europe to the coastal resorts of Spain as an example of the phenomenon. The influence of retirement migration on destination regions is manifold. It stimulates construction, the property market and services industries, such as healthcare [17].

3. Education. The internationalisation of marine education, which may be a factor in academic and research migration to coastal areas, has been the focus of few studies so far [20—22].

4.General factors. Cultural life, the ethnic and national composition, cultural standards, the size, appearance and location of the destination, urban comforts and other factors have a role in the attractiveness of coastal areas.

Identifying factors in attractiveness to migrants is an urgent task for the Russian coastal zones of the Baltic, White and Barents Seas. The Spatial Development Strategy of the Russian Federation 2025 names these areas as geostrategic territories, i.e. areas crucial for sustainable socio-economic growth, territorial integrity and national security.[1] It has been argued that the development processes

[1] Spatial Development Strategy of the Russian Federation 2025. Order of the Government of the Russian Federation of 13 February 2019. No. 207-r. 2019, *Russian Government*, available at: http://government.ru/docs/35733/ (accessed 03.06.2021) (in Russ.).

in these areas, described as the 'zone of influence' of the Baltic Sea, are closely connected [23]. In our opinion, this approach is tenable. The Marine Doctrine of the Russian Federation[2] stresses the importance of the Baltic Sea and the Arctic for the access of the Russian Navy to the Atlantic.

Unlike many other countries, Russia has never produced a legal definition of 'coastal zone'. Since the width of marine buffer zones is usually 500 m, territories with immediate access to the sea will be classified here as the coastal zone of Russia in the Baltic, White and Barents Sea areas. The zone comprises seven regions of the Northwestern federal district: St Petersburg, the Leningrad, Kaliningrad, Murmansk and Arkhangelsk regions, the Republic of Karelia and the Nenets autonomous district (AD).

Migration to these areas has received close academic attention, particularly in works comparing migration processes in the Russian and foreign parts of the Baltic region [4; 24—25]. Russian Baltic regions have different fertility rates. In some of them, migration is critical for population growth; this holds for the Kaliningrad [26] and Leningrad [27] regions and St Petersburg. In their northern counterparts, migration contributes to depopulation caused by natural population decline [28—35]. Yet, the migration situation at a microlevel may have more than one interpretation. Regions with positive net migration have areas of population outflow, whilst those with negative net migration have local poles of attraction. In the Kaliningrad region, most migrants head for the Kaliningrad agglomeration [36]. The coastal city of St Petersburg, the centre of the St Petersburg coastal region, extends its influence of an attraction pole to the neighbouring districts of the Leningrad region [37; 38]. Unfortunately, the local poles of attraction in the Russian coastal zones of the White and Barents Seas have received little attention in the literature. As a rule, the significance of coastal position for development is emphasised in works analysing the socio-economic situation in the Arctic territories of Russia at a regional level [39; 40].

Essential to the situation of these poles, along with gravitation towards agglomerations, is their coastal position. Aleksandr Druzhinin writes that Russian coastal regions (Crimea, the Caspian region, the shores of Kuban, the Rostov and Vladivostok agglomerations and the Kaliningrad region) can sustain population growth. To do so, they need to revitalise the marine economy, create attractive public and self-employment opportunities, build 'communication corridors' and unlock coastalisation potential [41]. Despite the urgent need to investigate the connection between migration and the role of the coastal factor in the economic development of local poles, this topic has only recently started to draw attention in Russia [36; 42; 43].

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[2] The Marine Doctrine of the Russian Federation. Approved by President of the Russian Federation on 26.07.2015, 2021, *Marine Collegium under the Government of the Russian Federation,* available at: http://marine.gov.ru/about/maindocs/ (accessed 11.08.2021) (in Russ.).

Therefore, it seems timely and necessary to identify local attraction poles in the Russian coastal zone of the Baltic, White and Barents Seas areas. This research will lay the groundwork for further examination of pull factors attracting migrants to these territories. Recommendations will be produced on more efficient exploitation of the coastal factor for increasing the attractiveness of Russian geostrategic territories to migrants and scaling up the human resources of these areas.

This study aims to explore differences in the attractiveness to migrants of Russian coastal regions in the Barents, White, and Baltic Sea areas. It also seeks to determine the demographic (age and sex) and spatial (areas of mutual influence) features of the migration development of attraction poles for migrants. These features will be juxtaposed with the economic-geographical situation of these territories and local marine economy components. To understand whether Russian northwestern coastal regions follow a unique or traditional path, we compare these territories to first-level administrative units of neighbouring states (ISO 3166-2). to the same end, Russian coastal municipalities are contrasted with their inland counterparts.

Methods and materials

The concept of coastalisation was central to the methodological framework of this article. The aim of the study was attained using universal and multiscale research methods. Comparative analysis made it possible to describe the migration situations in the study municipalities, the inland parts of the corresponding Russian regions and the coastal areas of neighbouring states. The satistical method was employed to measure the quantitative characteristics and structure of migration, its variation over time and the age and sex structure of migrants.

The study used a wide range of documentary sources: statistics from the websites of the Federal State Statistics Service of Russia and its departments and the national statistics services of Norway, Finland, Poland, Lithuania and Estonia. A valuable source was the Municipal Performance Database 2011—2022. Local marine economy performance was studied using strategic planning documents available at the websites of the municipalities. The attractiveness of Russian coastal territories was assessed based on the principal indicator of migration processes — net migration, as is usually done in Russian and international research [44—48].

The geographical focus of the study is 17 coastal territories[3] of the Russian part of the Baltic, White and the Barents Sea areas (excluding the closed town of Severomorsk, for which there is no data), which had continuously high positive net migration (at least ten people per 1,000 population) in 2015—2020. These are the Vsevolozhsk, Kirovsk and Lomonosov municipal districts of the Leningrad

[3] In March 2020, Druzhinin and Lyalina identified as coastal 181 municipalities (97 municipal districts and 84 urban districts) and two municipality-equivalent cities (one of them a megalopolis) granted the status of regions — St Petersburg and Sevastopol [45].

region; urban districts of the Kaliningrad region (Kaliningrad, Baltiysk, Guryevsk, Zelenogradsk, Mamonovo, Pionersky, Svetlogorsk, Svetly and Yantarny); Novaya Zemlya in the Arkhangelsk region; the closed town of Severomorsk (an urban district) and the Lovozero and Tersky municipal districts in the Murmansk region and the city of Naryan-Mar (an urban district) in the Nenets AD. Another coastal territory, St Petersburg, has the status of a region. We also analysed migration in neighbouring countries and Russian inland territories to produce a precise picture of migration in the study municipalities.

The study period is the second decade of the 21st century. This choice is explained by the changes made to the migration statistics system.

Migration in the coastal zone of Russia and neighbouring states

Migration situations in the study coastal regions of Russia and neighbouring countries share many similarities.

Firstly, regions encompassing large urban agglomerations with a population of over 500,000 have positive net migration, and a high migration efficiency ratio distinguishes them at the national level (Fig. 1). The Leningrad region outperforms all the other coastal territories of Russia and neighbouring states on relative net migration (15 people per 1,000 population) and gross migration (73 people per 1,000 population). The runner-up is Norway's Viken County, whose net migration is less than half that of St Petersburg. Two other Russian territories in the study area with positive net migration are the Kaliningrad region (ranked second in the country) and St Petersburg (third). The values close to those of the latter are recorded in Finland's capital region of Uusimaa and Åland Islands and in Norway's Vestfold og Telemark County bordering on the capital county of Viken. A counterpart of the Kaliningrad region beyond Russian borders is Estonia's Harju County.

Secondly, the northern coastal regions of Russia and neighbouring countries have negative net migration and a low migration efficiency ratio. The only exception is the Finnish region of North Ostrobothnia, where net migration has been teetering on zero. Its closes Russian counterpart is the oil-rich Nenets AD, whose net migration rate is about one person per 1,000 population. Population outflow from the Arkhangelsk and Murmansk regions is the most substantial amongst the study regions — over six people per 1,000 population. It is comparable to that from Estonia's coastal (not northern) Ida-Viru and Lääne-Viru Counties. The Arkhangelsk region stands out amongst the other northern territories in a negative way for a high migration efficiency ratio: migration losses account for one-fifth of its migration turnover. A conspicuous feature of the northern Russian regions is reduced involvement in migration, which manifests itself in low gross migration values. Only the Murmansk region has a high migration turnover, the second highest amongst the study territories. The abundance of rotation jobs explains this phenomenon.



Fig. 1. Arrivals, departures and gross migration in the coastal regions of Russia and neighbouring states, 2011—2020 average, people per 1,000 population (prepared by the authors based on data from Rosstat[4] and official statistics websites of Lithuania,[5] Poland,[6] Estonia,[7] Norway[8] and Finland[9])

Comment: data for Norway are as of 2020 because of changes in the administrative division of the country and the absence of earlier comparable data. The oval circumscribes regions with a high migration efficiency ratio (above 15 per cent). Territories above the zero net migration line are regions with migration gain. The size of the circle corresponds to the intensity of gross migration. Circles with borders represent northern regions. Regions gravitating towards large agglomerations (>500,000 people) are filled with a dot pattern: Viken (Greater Oslo), the Leningrad region and St Petersburg (St Petersburg agglomeration), Kaliningrad region (Kaliningrad agglomeration), Pomeranian voivodeship (Tricity), Uusimaa (Greater Helsinki) and Harju County (Tallinn agglomeration).

[4] Federal statistics service, 2021, availalble at: https://rosstat.gov.ru/ (accessed 06.06.2021) (in Russ.).

[5] Lietuvos Statistika, 2021, availalble at: https://www.stat.gov.lt/ (accessed 06.06.2021).

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[8] Statistics Norway, 2021, availalble at: https://www.ssb.no/en (accessed 06.06.2021).

[9] Statistics Finland, 2021, availalble at: https://stat.fi/index_en (accessed 06.06.2021).

Migration situation in Russian coastal and inland municipalities

Migration processes in the Russian northwestern coastal zone show differences when compared to each other and when contrasted with the inland municipalities.

Most of the coastal areas outperform the inland territories on migration (Fig. 2, Table 1). The exceptions are the Murmansk region and Karelia.



Fig. 2. Population change in the coastal and inland municipalities in Russian regions in the Baltic, 2011—2020, people per 1,000 population (prepared based on data from the Municipal Performance Database[10])

Comment: cumulative values were used

Analysis of average annual net migration rates over the past ten years shows that St Petersburg and the coastal zones of the Kaliningrad and Leningrad regions have become poles of attraction to migrants. At the same time, the inland municipalities are either losing population or experiencing a slight increase. In these areas, migration has the central role in population replacement, making up for natural decline. The opposite is true of the inland part of the Kaliningrad region. Multi-year data on net migration shows that the coastal zones of the Leningrad and Kaliningrad regions have been ‘booming’ since 2016, peaking in 2018—2019, when net migration values were twice those of 2011.

[10] *Goskomstat of Russia*, 2021, Municipal Performance Database, available at://rosstat.gov.ru/storage/mediabank/munst.htm (accessed 02.06.2021) (in Russ.).

Table 1

Population change in the coastal municipalities of Russian regions in the Baltic, White and Barents Sea areas, 2011—2020 average, people per 1,000 population (according to the Municipal Performance Database[1])

Region	Average annual net migration				Average annual gross migration				Average annual rate of natural increase/decline			
	municipal total		minicipal average		municipal total		minicipal average		municipal total		minicipal average	
	CM	IM	CM	IM	CM	IM	CM	IM	CM	IM	CM	IM
Kaliningrad region	13.6	–4.2	9.4	–5.4	74.1	65.7	81.9	68.0	–0.9	–3.1	–1.3	–2.6
Leningrad region	21.4	1.7	13.0	1.7	95.5	75.9	87.1	76.5	–4.3	–8.5	–4.7	–8.7
St Petersburg	9.1	—	9.1	—	76.8	—	76.8	—	0.4	—	0.4	—
Arkhangelsk region	–2.9	–10.4	–1.7	–13.4	56.6	87.9	84.8	91.2	–1.3	–4.2	–2.0	–5.1
Nenets AD	–1.0	—	–2.0	—	107.5	—	108.1	—	6.3	—	6.2	—
Murmansk region (excluding closed towns)	–9.0	–5.7	–8.7	–6.5	85.6	90.2	91.1	93.0	–2.1	–3.1	–4.1	–2.7
Republic of Karelia	–11.1	1.0	–11.3	–4.6	66.4	59.7	67.6	66.4	–9.4	–3.5	–9.6	–5.9

Comment: CM stands for coastal municipalities; IM, inland municipalities.

[1] *Goskomstat of Russia*, 2021, Municipal Performance Database, availeble at://rosstat.gov. ru/storage/mediabank/munst.htm (accessed 02.08.2021) (in Russ.).

Most coastal zones of the northern regions are experiencing migration losses. Only in the Arkhangelsk region, the process is less intensive than in the inland municipalities. In some years, migration loss was below the natural decline on the coast of the Arkhangelsk region. In 2018—2020, it comprised only 30 per cent of the total population decline (in 2011—2013, 95 per cent). A similar trend is observed in the inland part of the region, albeit on a smaller scale. In the Nenets AD, the impact of migration was less substantial than of natural population change over the study period, except for 2018. The net migration rate was irregular, teetering on zero in the last two years. In the coastal zone of the Murmansk region, where the migration situation is more serious than in the inland areas, the rate was even lower. Many closed towns, which we did not analyse in this study, saw a population outflow in some years, explained by departures of people after the end of their contracts. Migration accounts for 70 per cent of the total population decline in these areas. The surplus of migration loss over natural decline has decreased to a factor of three since 2017, compared to the earlier observed ten-twentyfold difference. In Karelia, migration outflow from the coastal zone adds to annual population losses almost as much as natural decline. The only exception, when migration losses were minimum and accounted for 20 per cent of the total decrease, was 2020. The situation in the coastal municipalities remains more alarming: migration losses there are ten times those in the inland areas.

The coastal zone of the Nenets AD, with its many rotation jobs, and the coastal areas of the Leningrad region gravitating towards St Petersburg are deeply involved in migration. Each hundredth person there is a migrant. The migration turnover is high in the Murmansk region (>85 people per 1,000 population), in the inland municipalities almost as high as in the coastal ones. The coastal zone of the Kaliningrad region, whose gross migration is 10 per cent below that in the Murmansk region, outperforms its inland municipalities. The same holds for Karelia. Only the Arkhangelsk coastal municipalities fall behind the other study territories and the inland part of the region itself on migration.

Regional and local coastal poles of attraction for migrants

The coastal zone of the Russian part of the Baltic, White, and Barents Sea areas, which is traditionally attractive to migrants,[11] underwent extensive transformations during the study period. The number and make-up of municipalities growing by migration changed, along with net migration rates (Fig. 3). The situation was changing for the worse until 2016, after which a modest growth began. The number of municipalities attractive to migrants halved by 2019. Yet, in 2020, this group of territories was joined by three municipalities of the Kaliningrad

[11] Territories with a net migration rate >10 people per 1,000 permanent population.

region (the Baltyisk, Yantarny and Mamonovo districts), which grew extremely attractive to migrants in the pre-Covid period, and the Tersky municipality in the Murmansk region. The proportion of coastal municipalities growing by migration, which fell to 18 per cent, rebounded to almost 30 per cent but did not return to the 2011 level.

As attractive coastal spaces shrink, the migration gains of traditional poles of attraction begin to grow: the migration space of the study coastal zone is polarising, especially in the Kaliningrad and St Petersburg agglomerations.



Fig. 3. Features of the attractiveness of Russian coastal zone of the Baltic, White and Barents Sea areas (prepared by the authors based on data from the Municipal Performance Database[12])

Comment: excluding closed towns

In the past ten years, only five municipalities (Table 2) have been continuously attractive to migrants and served as stable poles of attraction. These are the Vsevolozhsk municipality in the Leningrad region and the city of Kaliningrad, the Guryevsk, Zelenogradsk and Svetlogorsk districts in the Kaliningrad region. Whilst migration gains are declining and even being replaced by migration losses in some municipalities, an upward trend s observed in others. Along with the above territories, the Lomonosov and Pionersky districts have become more attractive to migrants over the past five years. The northern territories with a varying net migration rate are also classified as poles of attraction.

The coastal zones of Russian regions in the Baltic, White and Barents Sea areas have two established poles of attraction — the Kaliningrad region and St Pe-

[12] *Goskomstat of Russia,* 2021, Municipal Performance Database, available at: rosstat.gov. ru/storage/mediabank/munst.htm (accessed 16.07.2021) (in Russ.).

tersburg. They are a product of the centripetal forces provided by the large coastal agglomerations of St Petersburg and Kaliningrad. The coastal zone of these two regions is attractive to migrants at the local, interregional and international levels.

Local poles of attraction are associated with various coastal factors. Analysis of the official municipality profiles covering main socio-economic indicators shows that all the study territories have harnessed the advantages of their coastal geographical position to the benefit of their economies. Tourism and recreation are the economic specialisations of the Zelenogradsk and Svetlogorsk districts and partly the Pionersky district. The coastal Yantarny district is home to amber extraction and processing facilities. Unlocking the tourism potential — a combination of opportunities for recreational salmonid fishing and a burgeoning fishing industry — ensured substantial migration gains in the Tersky municipality of the Murmansk region in 2020. The Svetly district, lying on the banks of a ship canal, owes its success to the port and transport infrastructure, fishery and the ship repair industry. The Navy has a role in the development of the Baltyisk district, Severomorsk and Novaya Zemlya. The Kirovsk municipality is visible in the shipbuilding and ship repair industries and the administrative centre of the Nenets AD, Naryan-Mar, is Russia's largest offshore oil producer.

A coastal position is not always a factor in attractiveness to migrants. The municipalities of the Leningrad region whose rapid population growth is accounted for by migration — the Vsevolozhsk and Lomonosov districts — do not specialise in the maritime economy (although fishery is developing in both). Nor does the fish processing industry attract migrants to the Guryevsk, Mamonovo and Pionersky districts. Migration gains of the Lovozero district of the Murmansk region, whose strongest industry is mining, result from concessions granted to foreigners. Applicants can obtain a residence permit regardless of the quota if they have an asylum-seeker certificate or the status of participants in the repatriation programme. In 2017 and 2019, predominantly Ukrainian citizens (80 per cent of all arrivals in the district) took advantage of this opportunity.

The cities of Kaliningrad and St Petersburg perform many economic functions, including those relating to the marine sector. St Petersburg is the country's largest commercial and passenger port. Shipbuilding is rapidly growing in the city. Tripadvisor has named it the best destination in Russia, visited annually by over 8m tourists. Kaliningrad is home to a commercial seaport, shipbuilding facilities (the Yantar shipyard), fishing equipment manufacturers and an offshore oil producer (Likoil-Kaliningradmorneft). The city is in the top ten tourist destinations of Russia.

Table 2

Local coastal poles of attraction in Russian regions in the Baltic according to the net migration rate (>10 people per 1,000 population in at least one of the study years, based on data from the Municipal Performance Database[13])

Municipality	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	EGS and ME components								
											0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
LENINGRAD REGION	14.9	15.6	12.9	12.0	6.8	12.1	17.1	23.9	20.4	16.8									
Lomonosov district	2.4	1.7	6.6	-2.0	10.4	8.5	34.5	29.1	49.8	29.1	+								+
Vsevolozhsk district	24.2	32.9	42.9	40.1	39.1	60.9	81.9	117.3	94.9	78.7	+								+
Kirovsk district	18.7	24.4	1.9	13.9	-1.2	9.2	11.0	7.0	6.4	8.8	+					+		+	+
Sosnovy Bor district	20.5	1.4	3.1	5.4	2.3	6.6	-0.2	6.6	-6.1	-4.8								+	+
Kingisepp district	17.3	7.1	10.9	4.3	-1.3	-0.3	6.7	-27.9	-10.8	-6.9		+		+	+	+		+	+
Tosno district	29.8	31.0	18.4	13.4	-9.3	2.8	6.1	-5.7	-4.3	-17.2	+					+		+	+
Gatchina district	22.5	21.3	17.1	13.1	3.8	3.1	-0.3	1.4	-15.6	-12.9	+			+	+	+		+	+
KALININGRAD REGION	6.8	9.2	9.4	6.7	8.2	10.1	9.9	9.5	12.9	10.1									
Kaliningrad	6.7	19.0	17.2	11.9	13.5	15.9	17.3	16.6	16.3	12.4	+	+		+		+		+	+
Pionersky district	33.3	29.1	1.6	-7.1	-1.9	-0.4	1.9	16.1	65.1	38.4	+	+			+			+	+
Zelenogradsk district	5.9	4.6	20.6	28.5	17.0	29.2	20.1	20.2	33.9	37.9	+		+	+	+				+
Svetlogorsk district	14.5	9.1	29.1	30.8	28.0	42.4	41.1	47.0	59.5	56.1	+				+				+
Guryevsk district	15.0	18.3	25.5	33.9	44.7	39.9	28.6	24.9	21.9	14.0	+							+	+
Baltiysk district	3.3	-3.7	3.9	5.6	2.4	-0.2	5.4	9.8	2.8	11.0	+	+			+	+	+	+	
Yantarny district	13.2	4.5	0.2	8.5	0.6	-2.5	9.6	1.7	6.6	17.0	+				+				+
Mamonovo district	28.5	-3.5	9.4	-4.7	-0.6	-2.5	-10.7	5.0	7.6	12.9	+								
Bagrationovsk district	29.0	14.3	-4.7	-32.7	-2.3	-3.7	1.4	-11.3	4.8	-0.1	+							+	
Ladushkino district	17.6	5.3	13.5	30.6	-13.6	-4.1	-16.3	-13.0	3.3	-11.9	+							+	
Svetly district	15.1	10.0	12.3	8.3	6.3	5.1	-4.5	-4.5	5.0	1.1	+	+		+		+		+	+
ST PETERSBURG	11.9	14.8	19.7	10.2	4.9	8.5	12.1	5.2	2.7	0.8	+	+			+	+	+	+	+
ARKHANGELSK REGION	-7.7	-8.5	-8.2	-6.5	-6.8	-5.6	-6.9	-6.2	-2.6	-2.1									
Novaya Zemlya district	175.4	-101.1	-36.9	115.4	62.1	-31.2	23.2	61.9	49.3	60.2									
NENETS AD	3.2	1.2	-0.3	0.1	2.3	-7.3	-5.3	-8.9	1.8	2.9									
Naryan-Mar	25.3	17.5	13.6	15.2	14.0	-7.0	-2.7	-4.8	6.6	10.3		+	+						
MURMANSK REGION	-7.7	-10.1	-12.9	-6.5	-5.7	-5.7	-4.6	-5.9	-6.5	-6.9									
Severomorsk district	7.0	8.0	9.0	10.0	11.0	3.0	18.7	26.5	12.9	15.9	+					+	+		
Lovozero district	-26.1	-12.0	-15.9	-9.4	-4.3	-0.5	10.7	-1.5	11.2	-5.4									
Tersky district	-26.8	-26.1	-22.8	-11.2	-19.8	-13.6	-3.0	-0.4	-1.4	16.5				+	+				

Comment: * no data. *Vsevolozhsk district*: inland municipalities classified as coastal s gravitating towards a coastal agglomeration. EGS stands for the economic and geographical situation; ME, maritime economy. 0: part of an agglomeration or conurbation; 1: the municipality has a seaport and logistics facilities; 3: exploitation of marine bioresources; 4: marine recreation and tourism; 5: shipbuilding and ship repair; 6: a navy municipality; 7: marine industries; 8: high quality of life in the coastal zone. Cells with net migration exceeding ten people per 1,000 population are highlighted.

Source: prepared by the authors.

[13] *Goskomstat of Russia,* 2021, Municipal Performance Database, available at: rosstat.gov.ru/storage/mediabank/munst.htm (accessed: 20.08.2021) (in Russ.).

The age and sex structure of migrants at main attraction poles: territories of cooperation

At first sight, the 17 most attractive coastal municipalities of the Russian Baltic, White and Barents Sea areas differ substantially in size, population and administrative-legal status. Amongst them are a federal city (St Petersburg), a regional centre (Kaliningrad) and urban and municipal districts. Migration trends impact differently on these territories.

As to absolute values, the undisputed leader is St Petersburg. Each year, several hundred thousand people arrive in and depart from the city. With migration flows numbering tens of thousands, the Vsevolozhsk district of the Leningrad region and Kaliningrad rank second. The outsiders, with about 1,000 migrants, are the Pionersky, Svetly, Yantarny and Mamonovo districts (Kaliningrad region), the Lovozero and Tersky districts (Murmansk region) and the Novaya Zemlya district (Arkhangelsk region).

If arrivals and departures are considered separately, the picture changes dramatically. The Vsevolozhsk and Novaya Zemlya districts have the highest arrival rate — about 100 migrants per 1,000 population (Fig. 4). They are followed by the Svetlogorsk and Guryevsk districts. St Petersburg, Kaliningrad and the other municipalities welcome fewer than 50 migrants per 1,000 population.

Departure rates account for less considerable differences. Only in the Baltiysk and Mamonovo districts, the variance between the arrival and departure rates is below five people per 1,000 people. These figures point to a low migration efficiency rate. The Lovozero and Tersky district, although attracting migrants in some years, had more departures than arrivals throughout the 2010s.

Analysis of year-on-year changes in migration flows during the study period shows that they were increasing annually. There was a 2.2-fold increase on municipal average; an almost sevenfold, in the Tersky district; fourfold, the Lomonosov district; threefold, the Vsevolozhsk and Zelenogradsk districts. Amongst the study territories, the average departure rate grew by a factor of 1.9, with maximum values observed in the municipalities of the Leningrad region, Kaliningrad and the Pionersky district (2.6—2.8-fold).



Fig. 4. Arrivals in and departures from the main poles of attraction, 2011—2020 average (based on data from the Municipal Performance Database[14])

Analysis of data on migrant destinations in the study municipalities draws a variegated picture (Fig. 5). The municipalities can be grouped as follows depending on the flow contributing the most to migration gains.

Pure poles of attraction (types 1—4) were dominated by:

• inflows from other Russian regions (type 1). This group includes St Petersburg and the Vsevolozhsk, Kirovsk, Lomonosov, Novaya Zemlya and Pionersky districts;

• migrants from this and other Russian regions (type 2) — the Zelenogradsk and Svetlogorsk districts;

• migrants from this region (suburbanisation) and CIS countries — the Guryevsk district;

• migrants from other Russian regions and CIS countries (type 4) — Kaliningrad.

[14] *Goskomstat of Russia*, 2021, Municipal Performance Database, available at: rosstat.gov. ru/storage/mediabank/munst.htm (accessed 22.08.2021) (in Russ.).

Centres of attraction, where in-migration compensates for out-migration. Types 5—8 are identified depending on the source of arrivals and destination of departures:

• in-migration from other Russian regions offsetting intraregional out-migration (type 5) — the Baltiysk and Yantarny districts;

• arrivals from other Russian regions and CIS countries compensating for intraregional out-migration (type 6) — the Mamonovo and Svetly districts;

• intraregional in-migration counterbalancing out-migration to other Russian regions (type 7) — Naryan-Mar;

• an inflow from CIS countries against the background of intra- and interregional out-migration — the Tersky and Lovozero districts, respectively (type 8).

Intraregional mobility is characteristic of the Kalinigrad municipalities: there are job opportunities in the industrial west and the agricultural east; another advantage of the territory is its good transport links. St Petersburg and the rapidly developing districts of the Leningrad region, part of the city's zone of influence, attract interregional migrants. Sixty-five per cent of the population of Novaya Zemlya are military personnel relocating between regions.

A distinct feature of border territories geographically gravitating towards European countries and yet heavily involved in Eurasian migration is the considerable proportion of international migrants (13 per cent of all arrivals and 9 per cent of all departures across all the municipalities). In the Kirovsk and Guryevsk districts, average annual international arrivals and departures have exceeded 20 per cent of all mobility. In St Petersburg, Kaliningrad and the Vsevolozhsk, Svetly and Lovozero districts, they comprise 10 per cent of all movements; in others, above 5 per cent. The exceptions are the Tersky municipality, where international migrants account for barely 2 per cent, and Novaya Zemlya, where international migrants are absent because of the special regime of access to the territory housing military facilities. International net migration is positive in all the other municipalities.



Fig. 5. Sources of arrivals and destinations of departures, 2011—2020 average (based on data from the Municipal Performance Database[15])

Comment: A — arrivals; *D* — departures.

International mobility was not the same throughout the study period. It was declining in most of the municipalities in 2015—2017 (apparently because of the economic sanctions linked to the incorporation of Crimea by Russia and

[15] *Goskomstat of Russia*, 2021, Municipal Performance Database, available at: rosstat.gov. ru/storage/mediabank/munst.htm (accessed: 22.08.2021) (in Russ.).

the political processes in Ukraine). In some other study areas, however, the trend was contrary. The proportion of international migrants was growing in most municipalities of the Kaliningrad region, the Lovozero and Tersky districts and Narayan-Mar. This proportion, however, declined in all the municipalities in 2020 in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic and associated restrictions on international travel.

Most international migrants are nationals of CIS countries. They account for over 90 per cent of international mobility in the study municipalities of the Leningrad region, the Guryevsk and Tersky districts and Naryan-Mar. In many other study territories, this proportion is as high as 80 per cent. Nationals from neighbouring and other foreign states comprise 20 per cent of the migration turnover in the Svetlogorsk district, whilst over 20 per cent of emigrants from Kaliningrad and the Pionersky, Zeleogradsk, Baltiysk and Yantarny districts head for the so-called 'far abroad' (countries beyond the former borders of the USSR).

Analysis of data on the age and sex structure of migrants points to the feminisation of the process (Fig. 6). The trend towards a rise in the proportion of women was evident in 2011—2020. According to the average annual values, women accounted for over 50 per cent of arrivals and departures in 12 out of 17 study municipalities. The trend is particularly visible in St Petersburg, the Tersky district and the municipalities of the Kaliningrad and Leningrad regions. In most cases, it led to an increase in the female population of destinations. An even sex balance is achieved through migration in Naryan-Mar and the Lomonosov, Svetlogorsk, Svetly and Yantarny districts.

Migration is predominantly male in the municipalities with a chiefly 'masculine' employment structure or a high proportion of 'masculine' industries. The male-dominated districts are Novaya Zemlya, Lovozero and Kirovsk, the latter being the only municipality where gender-specific employment does not affect the structure of the population. The sex-ratio skew is disappearing in the Kirovsk and Lovozero districts, whilst becoming more pronounced in Novaya Zemlya and the Baltiysk municipality.



Fig. 6. The proportion of women in the population and migration flows, 2011—2020 average (based on the Municipal Performance Database[16])

The age structure of migrants in the study coastal area is traditional. The main cohort is people aged 25—59, accounting for 45 to 65 per cent of migrants across the municipalities. Over the study period, this percentage decreased in almost all of the study areas. Only in Novaya Zemlya, the age group became more visible: the increase in the proportion of 25—59-year-olds in the arrivals was 117 per cent compared to 2012; in the departures, 120 per cent.

The proportion of the second-largest migrant cohort, 0—14 years old, grew in 2012—2020 to reach 16—24 per cent. This rise testifies to the success of the national population policy. Yet, only in few municipalities, the percentage of this cohort in the arrivals increased substantially to exceed its share in the departures. Amongst these territories are Kaliningrad, Naryan-Mar and the Kirovsk, Lomonosov and the Zelenogradsk districts. In all the other regions, the departures are growing younger, whilst the number of children amongst the departures is constantly higher than amongst the arrivals.

The third-largest cohort is people aged 20—24, who relocate to study or find employment. The average annual data demonstrate a decline in the proportion of people aged 20—24 amongst migrants to an average of 6—8 per cent in 2020. The maximum migration mobility of this group was recorded in the Baltiysk district, where the cohort accounted for 20 per cent of the arrivals and 10 per cent

[16] *Goskomstat of Russia*, 2021, Municipal Performance Database, available at: rosstat.gov. ru/storage/mediabank/munst.htm (accessed 22.08.2021) (in Russ.).

of the departures. The situation was similar in Novaya Zemlya, Naryan-Mar, St Petersburg and the Lovozero and Tersky districts: 20—24-year-olds comprised 10—15 per cent of all migrants there. In Kaliningrad and St Petersburg, there were more departures than arrivals in this age group.

The 15—19-year-old cohort accounts for a mere 7 per cent of mobility. Its proportion was above this level only in St Petersburg — a major national destination for university applicants. The percentage of 15—19-year-olds was relatively high amongst the departures in the northern municipalities.

Only five to six per cent of migrants were aged above 65 years. The exceptions were the Arctic municipalities — Naryan-Mar and the Lovozero district, where this proportion was even lower. Pensioners are leaving this area to spend retirement in a better climate. This is especially true of Novaya Zemlya, with very few people of this age amongst the migrants. At the same time, many towns of the Kaliningrad region are welcoming people above 65. The proportion of seniors amongst the arrivals is well above that amongst the departures in the Zelenogradsk, Mamonovo, Pionerksy and Svetlogorsk municipalities.

Conclusion

The Baltic, White and Barents Sea coastal areas of Russia and neighbouring countries differ in the degree of attractiveness to migrants. The same trend is seen in Russian, Norwegian and Finnish regions at the macrolevel: gravitation towards a major urban agglomeration is the crucial pull factor. Population outflow is the most substantial in Russian and Norwegian northern territories. As to the microlevel, an interesting case is the Arkhangelsk region, where a coastal position is associated with less significant migration losses. Moreover, migration makes up for the natural decline in the most attractive coastal municipalities of the Kaliningrad and Leningrad regions.

The Russian part of the Baltic, White and Barents Sea areas has two main attraction poles for migrants — the St Petersburg and Kaliningrad agglomerations. There are also coastal poles of attraction in the northern regions. The attractive coastal space has shrunk over the past ten years, whilst the migration gains of traditional attraction poles have been growing. Thus, the migration space of the study zone is polarising, especially in the Kaliningrad and St Petersburg agglomerations.

Amongst the 17 study areas distinguished by attractiveness to migrants (excluding the closed town of Severomorsk), the prime destinations are St Petersburg and the Leningrad and Kaliningrad regions. These areas boast a variety of pull factors — a large labour market, a low unemployment rate, high salaries and ample education opportunities. These advantages result, to a degree, from the coastal position and federal support, particularly the measures to encourage investment. The Arctic municipalities have only one pull factor — high salaries (employees receive the so-called northern allowance, which is 100 per cent of the base salary). Thus, total remuneration in the north is twice that in the other Russian regions. The significance of the northern allowance, however, decreased over the study period. In 2019, the average monthly salary of employees in Naryan-Mar (small businesses were not considered) was only 15 per cent above that in the Lomonosov district; 20 per cent, St Petersburg; 55.5 per cent, Kaliningrad. The average monthly salary in Novaya Zemlya was only 5 per cent above that in the Lomonosov district, whilst in the Lovozero municipality, it was lower than in St Petersburg, the municipalities of the Leningrad region and the Yantarny district.[17] Measures to encourage investment into Arctic regions were first introduced in 2021.

In the closed town of Severomorsk (home of the Northern Fleet), the Baltiysk district, where the Baltic Fleet is stationed, and Novaya Zemlya (a territory housing many military facilities), critical factors reducing the inflow of migrants were limited access to the territories and restrictions on economic and business activities. Economic activities are also tightly regulated in the Lovozero district, classified as a protected site of traditional settlement and trades of Russia's small-numbered indigenous peoples.[18]

Although migration usually diversifies the receiving society, newcomers from other Russian regions and abroad (chiefly those of the CIS) are replacing locals in seven poles of attraction. What is remarkable is that the study territories are deeply involved in international migration.

Feminisation recorded in most of the attraction poles adds to gender disproportions in the study areas. The predominance of men amongst migrants accounted for by the 'masculine' structure of the economy in some municipalities requires regional population redistribution efforts, such as the creation of traditionally 'female' jobs.

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[17] Calculated by the authors based on data from the Municipal Performance Database. *Rosstat*, 2021, available at: https://www.gks.ru/dbscripts/munst/ (accessed 22.08.2021) (in Russ.).

[18] On the approval of the list of sites of traditional economic activities of small-numbered indigenous peoples of the Russian Federation and the list of traditional economic activities of small-numbered indigenous peoples of the Russian Federation. Order of the Government of the Russian Federation No. 631-r of 08.05.2009 (as amended on 11 February 2021), 2021, *Electronic Repository of Legal and Research-and-engineering Documents*, available at https://docs.cntd.ru/document/902156317?marker=1ODAS0I (accessed 22.08.2021) (in Russ.).

The dramatic decrease in the proportion of the most economically active migrant cohorts (20—59 years), especially amongst the arrivals, indicates an overall change in the population structure. It also means that social factors in attractiveness, sought by older age groups, are replacing employment-related ones. Migration flows are not growing younger, as it might seem, because younger cohorts tend to emigrate and not vice versa. The ageing of arrivals across the study municipalities is a hard fact confirmed by earlier studies [49]. The exceptions are Novaya Zemlya and the Vsevolozhsk district.

In our opinion, tourism may increase the attractiveness and economic performance of many of the study municipalities, as well as give a boost to small and medium enterprises. With their vast natural beaches, the Baltiysk, Pionersky and Yantarny districts are likely to benefit from a developed tourist industry. The Guryevsk and Mamonovo districts are potential centres for agricultural, heritage and even tourism, whilst the Zelenogradsk municipality is a prospective destination for wellness, agricultural, environmental, nautical and heritage tourism. All the northern and especially Arctic municipalities have enormous potential for Arctic, sports and extreme tourism. Ethnocultural tourism may develop at the sites of the traditional settlement of small-numbered indigenous peoples (Naryan-Mar and the Lovozero district).

The reconstruction of the Northern Sea Route and its new infrastructure may offer an economic advantage to the Arctic territories and create additional pull factors. The Murmansk and Arkhangelsk seaports also await reconstruction, along with the port of Naryan-Mar and its terminal in Amderma. Hopefully, the plans for the Indiga port on the coast of the Barents Sea in the Nenets AD, part of the Northern Sea Route, will be implemented. Come what may, the federal law on support for entrepreneurship in the Russian Arctic, which equates the area to special economic zones, brings hope for further positive changes in the northern coastal municipalities.[19]

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[19] On Governmental Support for Entrepreneurship in the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation. Federal law No 193-FZ of 13.07.2020, 2020, *Consultant Plus,* available at: http://www.consultant.ru/document/cons_doc_LAW_357078/b6a66c38be962d3c8a290a889ef73e8df5d4bbbb/ (accessed 18.08.2021) (in Russ.).

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The authors

Prof. Flera K. Sokolova, Northern (Arctic) Federal University named after M.V Lomonosov, Russia.

E-mail: f.sokolova@narfu.ru

https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3063-6128

Dr Anna V. Lyalina, Immanuel Kant Baltic Federal University, Russia.

E-mail: anuta-mazova@mail.ru

https://orcid.org/0000-0002-8479-413X

MIGRATION STUDIES

MIGRATION FROM POST-SOVIET COUNTRIES TO POLAND AND THE BALTIC STATES: TRENDS AND FEATURES

V. V. Vorotnikov
A. Habarta

MGIMO University
76 Vernadskogo pr., Moscow, 119454, Russia
Institute of Europe Russian Academy of Sciences
11/3 Mokhovaya ul., Moscow, 125009, Russia

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This article aims to analyse migration from the post-Soviet space to the north-eastern periphery of the EU (Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia) and examines the hypothesis about these states, once countries of origin, turning into destinations for migrants. A change in the socio-economic paradigm and accession to the EU sped up economic development in the Baltics and Poland. Despite growing welfare and income levels and a decline in the unemployment rate, further economic growth was hampered by the outflow of skilled workforce and resulting labour shortages. In response, the governments of the Baltics and Poland drew up programmes to attract international labour. Soon these countries transformed from exporters of labour into importers. Unlike Western European countries, Poland and, to a lesser extent, the Baltic States are trying to attract migrants from neighbouring nations with similar cultural and linguistic backgrounds. In the long run, this strategy will facilitate migrant integration into the recipient society. The Polish and Lithuanian governments are devising measures to encourage ethnic Poles and Lithuanians to repatriate from post-Soviet republics. To achieve the aim of the study, we investigate the features of migration flows, trends in migration, migration policies of recipient countries, and the evolution of diaspora policies.

Keywords:
EU, Poland, Baltic States, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, post-Soviet space, international migration, diaspora, Karta Polaka, repatriates, diaspora policy

Introduction

International migration is the natural process of human movement between countries for temporary or permanent residence [1]. As restrictions on the movement of goods, services and capital were removed at the turn of the 21st century, labour movement principles liberalised too. This phenomenon has many causes: some people seek a better life, and some jump at the only opportunity to sur-

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vive. Researchers have recently shown an increased interest in the theoretical aspects of international migration and especially its social effects at the macro- and microlevel. This interest may explain the rapt attention this topic receives from economists, sociologists, political scientists and even cultural studies experts. There has been a growing number of publications analysing the causes of migration and its impact on labour markets, including competitiveness in the domestic market, salaries and the shortage or surplus of certain professionals. A strong contribution to the study of these pattern has been made by Jagdish Bhagwati [2], George Borjas [3; 4], Donald Davis and David Weinstein [5], Riccardo Faini [6], Rachel Friedberg and Jennifer Hunt [7], Daniel Hamermesh [8], Jörn-Steffen Pischke and John Velling [9], Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen and Ninna Nyberg Sorensen [10], Olga Potemkina [11; 12], and Sergey Ryazantsev [13; 14]. The literature on migration looks at various aspects of this phenomenon, and the academic significance of this increasingly multidisciplinary topic is growing. Not only does international migration have economic consequences, but it also has social and cultural dimensions. It results in both adaptation and social conflicts, both integration and disintegration. Migration adds to the cultural diversity of the receiving society through new forms of entertainment and new models of consumption, professional ethics, communication, and management. Migration also influences relationships in the family: either the family culture of receiving society imposes new behaviour models and social roles on newcomers or the existing norms change under new influences. Another prominent object of research is society's expectations and concerns, which go hand in hand with migration.

Thus, we are dealing with a phenomenon that is playing a growing role in the life of the society. As a social phenomenon, migration is intrinsic to social reality. Ignoring this fact may lead to the incomprehension of what drives people to move to a different country to pursue a better life.

This article aims to analyse the features of migration flows from post-Soviet states to the north-eastern periphery of the EU. The study focuses on four post-Socialist countries of Central and Eastern Europe: Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. There is evidence that these states are turning from labour exporters, which they have been for the last 30 years, into an attraction pole for migrants. To prove this hypothesis, we attain several objectives. Firstly, we analyse migration flows from post-Soviet countries to Poland and the Baltics and relevant trends. Secondly, we investigate the characteristic features of migration policies of destination countries and the evolution of diaspora policies. The article examines Polish and Baltic regulatory acts and statistics. It also explores research publications and survey results from the four countries.

Factors in migration

For most of their recent history, Poland and the Baltics have been labour exporters [15]. The last two hundred years of the countries' migration history have resulted in the emergence of large diasporas beyond their borders. The Polish diaspora is estimated at 20m people; Lithuanian, at least 1.3m; Latvian, at least, 370,000; Estonia, from 120,000 to 200,000 [16].

A change in the socio-economic paradigm, accession to the EU and ensuing economic growth improved citizens' well-being in these countries, which far outperformed other post-Soviet states (see Table 1). Salaries grew, unemployment rates fell, labour shortages occurred in agriculture, construction, and other industries. These trends put on the public agenda the need to facilitate foreign access to national labour markets.

Table 1

GDP per capita in 2011—2020, 1,000 USD

State	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
Poland	13.9	13.1	13.7	14.3	12.6	12.4	13.9	15.5	15.7
Latvia	13.9	13.9	15.1	15.7	13.8	14.3	15.7	17.9	17.8
Lithuania	14.4	14.4	15.7	16.6	14.3	15.0	16.9	19.2	19.6
Estonia	17.6	17.5	19.2	20.4	17.5	18.4	20.5	23.2	23.7
Azerbaijan	7.2	7.5	7.9	7.9	5.5	3.9	4.1	4.7	4.8
Armenia	3.5	3.7	3.8	4.0	3.6	3.6	3.9	4.2	4.6
Belarus	6.5	6.9	8.0	8.3	5.9	5.0	5.8	6.3	6.7
Georgia	4.0	4.4	4.6	4.7	4.0	4.1	4.4	4.7	4.7
Kazakhstan	11.6	12.4	13.9	12.8	10.5	7.7	9.2	9.8	9.8
Kyrgyzstan	1.1	1.2	1.3	1.3	1.1	1.1	1.2	1.3	1.3
Moldova	2.9	3.0	3.3	3.3	2.7	2.9	3.5	4.2	4.5
Russia	14.3	15.4	16.0	14.1	9.3	8.7	10.7	11.4	11.6
Tajikistan	0.8	1.0	1.0	1.1	0.9	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.9
Turkmenistan	5.6	6.7	7.3	8.0	6.4	6.4	6.6	7.0	7.0
Uzbekistan	1.9	2.1	2.3	2.5	2.6	2.6	1.8	1.5	1.7
Ukraine	3.6	3.9	4.0	3.1	2.1	2.2	2.6	3.1	3.7

Source: based on World Bank statistics. URL: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD (accessed 10.08.2021).

The main economic factor that impels citizens of one country to move to another to improve their lot is income inequality, which is usually measured using GDP values. However, the four factors below have also been described as critical in the literature [17].

1. *The age structure of society.* A significant factor is the percentage of young people in the country of origin. Generally inclined to risk, youngsters are more

likely to migrate than their older compatriots. Since the real benefits of migration become apparent years after the relocation, it is much easier for those who have their lives ahead of them to take this step.

2. *Financial resources of potential migrants*. Resettling may be expensive: migrants bear both direct costs of legal or illegal travel to another country and those relating to settling into a new place and relocating the family. Many less fortunate people, although willing to move, cannot afford migration. Thus, moving to another country remains a prerogative of middle-income groups [18].

3. *Education*. Better educated migrants have greater aspirations and a stronger awareness of economic and social opportunities abroad. They have a much better idea of their prospects in the destination country.

4. *Community in the destination country*. The readiness to migrate grows as the amount and quality of information about the destination country increases. A potential migrant must be aware of the economic and social situation in the area they want to settle. In most cases, this information is provided by people with migration experience, chiefly the community in the destination country.

Analysis of migration from post-Soviet countries to Poland and the Baltics shows that the above factors did affect the decisions of migrants to relocate. Another considerable influence is the political instability in 'frontier' states. In Ukraine, political factors aggravated the economic well-being of citizens. They also redirected the flow of labour migrants, most heading westward now. This way, migration to the West has become much more substantial than before.

The potential effect of the 2020 events in Belarus is limited, estimated at several thousand people. Most new migrants come from two social groups — students and intellectuals. Young entrepreneurs (under 45) engaged in innovative industries, chiefly IT, accounted for another sizable proportion of the emigrants.

Trends in migration to Poland and the Baltics

According to Polish statistics, the number of foreigners living legally in the country increased fivefold in the second decade of the 21st century, from 91,000 to 452,000 people (Table 2). Moreover, Poland has become an EU leader in residence permit issuance. Since 2014, the largest group of foreigners issued a Polish residence permit has been Ukrainian citizens. In 2011—2020, this number rose more than 18.5-fold — from 13,000 to 241,600 people. Ukrainian citizens comprised 53 per cent of all foreigners in Poland in 2020. Belarusians and Russians are also in the top five.

The number of Belarusians residing in Poland increased by 7.5, from 3,600 to almost 28,000 people; Russians, 1.6, from 7,500 to 12,200.

Table 2

Number of foreigners with a Polish residence permit (2011—2020, people, by country of origin)

State	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020
Total	91,258	105,067	115,413	128,620	165,369	218,775	272,269	320,569	391,234	452,091
Ukraine	13,026	15,529	16,970	22,242	45,157	78,451	114,974	147,903	195,606	241,612
Belarus	3,668	4,072	4,263	4,660	5,602	7,042	9,991	14,651	21,787	27,915
Moldova	369	405	394	477	508	749	1,001	1,194	2,300	3,660
Russia	7,586	7,978	7,804	7,509	7,397	8,192	8,966	9,803	11,105	12,279
Georgia	252	321	411	448	654	981	1,323	2,535	5,194	7,828
Armenia	1,503	1,951	2,004	1,840	2,088	2,454	2,611	2,772	3,013	3,131
Azerbaijan	131	165	185	175	320	559	713	895	1,142	1,545
Kazakhstan	524	550	604	681	759	951	1,039	1,122	1,468	1,700
Uzbekistan	215	240	276	348	536	1,079	1,543	1,650	1,477	1,835
Turkmenistan	33	46	49	48	61	87	85	103	123	133
Kyrgyzstan	45	43	69	66	108	166	261	345	371	0
Tajikistan	30	57	47	53	72	140	322	458	476	607

Source: based on statistics *Mapy i dane statystyczne imigrantów i służb migracyjnych Polski*, 2021, available at: https://migracje.gov.pl/statystyki/zakres/polska/?x=1.3064&y=1.5202&level=1 (accessed 10.08.2021).

As mentioned above, the single most significant group of immigrants in Poland is Ukrainians. The strongest motive for Ukrainian emigration to Poland (along with the geographical, cultural, and linguistic proximity) is the economic conditions in the country of origin: the situation in the domestic labour market is far from perfect, whilst successive governments have failed to improve the country's economic performance. Moreover, Ukrainians are concerned about poor employment prospects and pervasive corruption at home. Substantial wage inequality and the devaluation of the hryvnia after 2014 urge Ukrainians to look for a stable source of income abroad. In the late 2010s, each tenth Polish company employed Ukrainian nationals (39 per cent of large companies; 21 per cent, medium; 6 per cent, small). Most of these businesses are engaged in manufacturing and services.

Since 2019, Belarusians have been the second-largest group of foreigners living in Poland. In 2020, 63 per cent of Belarusians obtained a work residence permit. Substantial groups of the country's nationals stated family reunion (22 per cent) and education (5 per cent) as the purpose of relocation. Since 2020, the number of Belarusians applying for international protection in Poland has increased. A total of 405 applications was submitted in 2020. The applicants declared the political tension building up in their homeland after the 2020 presidential election the reason to seek protection.[1]

[1] Raport dot. obywateli Białorusi, 2021, *Urząd do Spraw Cudzoziemców*, available at: https://udsc.gov.pl/statystyki/raporty-specjalne/raport-dot-obywateli-bialorusi (accessed 06.08.2021).

Most migrants in Poland are medium- and highly qualified Ukrainian, Belarusian, Armenian, and Russian citizens looking for a rewarding well-paid job. A survey of citizens of post-Soviet states staying in Poland with a residence permit was conducted in the first quarter of 2019 [19]. Seventy per cent of the respondents said that moving to Poland was beneficial for them, adding that they were planning to stay in the country.

Almost 60 per cent of the respondents admitted that they did not see a future for them in their native land, whilst 95 per cent were not satisfied with salaries and the level of economic development at home. About 30 per cent came to Poland seeking excellent medicine, good education, and efficient social security services. Over half of the respondents were convinced that they could earn much more in Poland than in their home country while doing less prestigious work (see Fig. 1).



Fig. 1. Motives for economic migration to Poland from post-Soviet countries

Source: [19, p. 125].

Over 50 per cent of the respondents found it impossible to continue living in a country that flouted the law and cherished corruption. About 60 per cent were concerned about the volatile political situation in their homeland. Foreigners in Poland said they felt safer away from home and had better career opportunities there, mentioning the simplified company registration procedure as the much-needed boost to migrant entrepreneurship [19].

Accession to the EU made Poland more attractive to foreigners as a transition country and a place to study, work and live. Another advantage of the state is that it is a Schengen area country, and people coming there for a mid- or long-term stay can move freely across the Schengen Area.

The above holds for the Baltics, which have yet another advantage to migrants from the former USSR: Russian remains lingua franca in everyday life and, to a degree, business communication. The absence of a language barrier simplifies employment and the adaptation of potential migrants and their families.[2] This

[2] Į Lietuvą jie važiuoja su džiaugsmu: priežastys, kurios lietuviams nešauna į galvą. 2021, *Delfi.lt,* 2017.04.30, available at: https://www.delfi.lt/news/daily/lithuania/i-lietuva-jie-vaziuoja-su-dziaugsmu-priezastys-kurios-lietuviams-nesauna-i-galva.d?id=74469650 (accessed 08.08.2021).

circumstance, however, is a grave concern for Latvian and Estonian nationalists and populists (the National Union and EKRE), who see the Russian language and culture as a threat to national identity. Still, job listings from these countries point to a strong interest in the arrival of qualified specialists (for instance, IT experts) and skilled workers.

Information on immigration to the Baltics from the states of the former USSR does not abound with recent statistical and sociological data, as it does in the case of Poland. Nevertheless, the available information helps identify trends. Table 3, which contains data on the issuance of residence permits of all types to non-EU citizens, shows that the principal labour suppliers to the three states are Ukraine, Belarus, and Russia. Undocumented labour migration from Ukraine to Lithuania (and probably Latvia) may also be substantial since Ukrainian citizens have the right to short-term stays in the EU, during which they can find employment and continue to work informally. Although it is impossible to estimate the number of such migrants statistically, the official Lithuanian website Migracija skaičiais contains some useful information. Whilst 23,923 Ukrainians (32 per cent of all foreigners registered in the country) lived in the country officially as of 1 January 2020, the undocumented stay of another 724 people (37 per cent of the total number of undocumented migrants) was confirmed at the time.[3]

Table 3

The number of first-time residence permits issued in the Baltics 2017—2019

Destination country	2017			2018			2019		
	Country of origin	Number	%	Country of origin	Number	%	Country of origin	Number	%
Latvia	Russia	1,625	24.4	Ukraine	2,292	25.9	Ukraine	2,555	25.2
	Ukraine	1,528	23.0	Russia	1,837	20.8	Russia	1,827	18.0
	India	809	12.1	India	1,360	15.4	India	1,342	13.2
	Belarus	484	7.3	Belarus	633	7.2	Uzbekistan	1,040	10.3
	Uzbekistan	384	5.8	Uzbekistan	565	6.4	Belarus	768	7.6
	Other	1,817	27.4	Other	2,165	24.3	Other	2,611	25.7
Lithuania	Ukraine	4,725	46.3	Ukraine	6,041	49.2	Ukraine	10,218	47.7
	Belarus	2,874	28.2	Belarus	3,472	28.3	Belarus	7,121	33.3
	Russia	720	7.1	Russia	817	6.7	Russia	1,202	5.6
	India	371	3.6	India	381	3.1	India	368	1.7
	Syria	218	2.1	Moldova	143	1.2	Moldova	324	1.5
	Other	1,299	12.7	Other	1,413	11.5	Other	2,182	10.2
Estonia	Ukraine	1,336	30.5	Ukraine	1,649	32.1	Ukraine	1,909	32.1
	Russia	881	20.1	Russia	1,058	20.6	Russia	1,306	22.1
	Belarus	171	3.9	Belarus	220	4.3	India	291	4.7
	India	165	3.7	India	194	3.8	Belarus	281	4.5
	USA	155	3.5	Nigeria	180	3.5	Nigeria	236	3.8
	Other	1,672	38.3	Other	1,842	35.7	Other	2,096	33.8

Source: Eurostat, 2021, availalbe at: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat (accessed 28.07.2021).

[3] *Migracija skaičiais,* 2021, availalbe at: https://123.emn.lt/ (accessed 08.08.2021).

The main reason why people apply for a Lithuanian residence permit is employment (74.2 per cent in 2017, 77.5 per cent in 2018, 85.9 per cent in 2019), whilst in the other two countries, this and two other motives (education and family reunion) were stated almost equally frequently (see Table 4). This fact testifies to the success and consistency of Lithuania's policy to attract labour migrants from the post-Soviet space.

Table 4

Prevalent motives for first-time residence permit applications in the Baltics, 2017—2019, per cent of the total number of applications

State	2017 [4]	2018 [5]	2019 [6]
Latvia	Family, 31.0 Education, 24.1 Employment, 32.5	Family, 25.3 Education, 26.4 Employment, 40.4	Family, 23.8 Education, 25.4 Employment, 43.8
Lithuania	Family, 9.8 Education, 9.7 Employment, 74.2	Family, 8.2 Education, 9.7 Employment, 77.5	Family, 5.3 Education, 6.2 Employment, 85.9
Estonia	Family, 29.0 Education, 27.2 Employment, 35.0	Family, 34.3 Education, 24.7 Employment, 34.8	Family, 38.9 Education, 22.2 Employment, 33.9

Source: Eurostat.URL: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat (accessed 28.07.2021).

Migrants from the post-Soviet space are not the only ones interested in moving to Poland and the Baltics, and the geography of recruitment by companies from these four states is also much broader than the countries of the former USSR. Migration satisfies the demand for human resources in the national labour markets. Most migrants from the post-Soviet space, especially Ukrainians and Belarusians, are qualified specialists with a good education, a fluent command of languages, strong work experience, and often special skills needed in the EU. Employers do not have to invest in the training of such new employees. It is assumed that migrant workers from post-Soviet states have high work motivation and take their jobs seriously. Employers often mention the readiness of nationals

[4] Residence permits for non-EU citizens. First residence permits issued in the EU Member States remain above 3 million in 2017, 2018, Eurostat, 25 October 2018, available at: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/2995521/9333446/3-25102018-AP-EN.pdf/3fa5fa53-e076-4a5f-8bb5-a8075f639167 (accessed 08.08.2021).

[5] Residence permits for non-EU citizens. First residence permits issued in the EU Member States remain above 3 million in 2018. 20218, Eurostat, 25 October 2019, available at: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/portlet_file_entry/2995521/3-25102019-AP-EN.pdf/95e08bc8-476d-1f7d-a519-300bdec438cb (accessed 08.08.2021).

[6] First residence permits issued, by reason, 2019, Eurostat, available at: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=File:Tab1_First_residence_permits_issued,_by_reason,_2019.png (accessed 08.08.2021).

of these countries to work for a lower wage as a good motive to employ them (and reduce business costs as a result). Migrants do not expect a high salary, and it is easier to persuade them to work weekends and holidays. Nevertheless, what they earn in Poland is several times as much as they would at home.

Analysis of the Polish and Baltic labour markets and the migrant impact demonstrates that most foreign workers play a supporting role: they take low-paid jobs scoffed at by locals. Migrants are monopolising the market of second-rate jobs. Polish experts, however, believe that maintaining the current employment rate in the country in 2050 will require an 8 per cent increase in the proportion of migrants in the Polish workforce.[7] In the Baltics, this percentage must be higher to make up for the ongoing depopulation.

The legal framework

Labour shortage prompted the Polish Ministry of Labour and Social Policy to liberalise labour and migrations laws. The process took place in 2006—2011. The new rules allowed foreigners to take temporary jobs without obtaining a work permit. At first, deregulation concerned citizens of neighbouring countries — Belarus, Russia, and Ukraine. Later, the more liberal regime applied to nationals of post-Soviet states participating in the Eastern Partnership programme — Armenia, Georgia, and Moldova.

Lithuania is also striving to modify its migration laws towards more employment opportunities and easier adaptation of newcomers from third countries. Although the Interinstitutional Action Plan for the Strategy for the Demographic, Migration and Integration Policy 2018—2030[8] targeted the diaspora and Lithuanian labour migrants returning to their homeland, it also emphasised the need for integrating third-country immigrants into society. On 1 March 2021, employment rules were simplified for final-year graduate and postgraduate students and qualified specialists.[9]

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[7] *Polityka migracyjna Polski*, 2019, Projekt z dnia 10 czerwca 2019 r. Departament Analiz i Polityki Migracyjnej MSWiA, p. 7, 11.

[8] Dėl Demografijos, migracijos ir integracijos politikos 2030—2018 m. strategijos įgyvendinimo 2021—2019 metų tarpinstitucinio veiklos plano 2.1.10 priemonės 2019 m. detaliojo plano patvirtinimo, 2019, *Dokumentų paieška — Lietuvos Respublikos Seimas,* availalb eat: https://e-seimas.lrs.lt/portal/legalAct/lt/TAD/c4eee772978011e9aab6d8dd69c6da66?jfwid=-rwipzde7s (accessed 08.08.2021).

[9] Declaration of the place of residence will be easier for aliens, 2021, *Migracijos departamentas prie Lietuvos Respublikos,* 01.03.2021, available at: https://migracija.lrv.lt/en/news/declaration-of-the-place-of-residence-will-be-easier-for-aliens (accessed 08.08.2021).

The latter category is a priority for the Latvian and Estonian migration policies. Nevertheless, despite the officially recognised demand for immigrants, these policies are not entirely successful. Estonia has launched a programme to attract migrants to the benefit of the national economy (see the *Work in Estonia*[10] website aiding migrants in job search and obtaining documents necessary for relocation). However, in the wake of the Covid-19 crisis, amendments were made to the Alien's Act and the Obligation to Leave and the Prohibition on Entry Act, tightening up stay rules for non-EU citizens.[11] Various sources[12] stress that attempts to improve immigration laws encounter stiff opposition from society, whilst this whole domain remains highly bureaucratised.[13]

Policies on repatriation of Soviet-time resettlers and expellees

A specific feature of Poland's migration policy is the ambition to bring home descendants of Poles who, for various reasons, ended up in the USSR after World War II. (Lithuania's similar attempts will be discussed below.) This initiative mainly concerns offsprings of people who held Polish citizenship before September 1939 and those who lived outside the Polish borders established by the Treaty of Riga of 1921.

Repatriation has garnered much attention from all post-1989 Polish governments. Negative demographic trends, population ageing, and labour shortages have put repatriation on the governmental agenda. The collapse of the USSR spurred the return of former Soviet citizens, including those who declared Polish origin.

The political and social changes in Poland and in what once was the USSR called for working out the principles of a national policy towards Poles residing

[10] Estonia. #1 country in the world of digital life, 2021, *Work in Estonia: Why Estonia?* available at: https://www.workinestonia.com/ (accessed 08.08.2021).

[11] Foreigners from third countries who lose their jobs must leave Estonia, 2020, *ERR*, 02.04.2020, available at: https://news.err.ee/1072360/foreigners-from-third-countries-who-lose-their-jobs-must-leave-estonia (accessed 08.08.2021); The rules of foreigners staying, studying and working in Estonia are being rearranged, 2020, *Ministry of the Interior*, 17.09.2020, available at: https://www.siseministeerium.ee/en/news/rules-foreigners-stayingθ -studying-and-working-estonia-are-being-rearranged (accessed 08.08.2021).

[12] This thesis was central to the presentation given by Inta Mieriņa, the director of the project Well-being, Integration and Liquid Migration run at the Institute of Philosophy and Sociology University of Latvia, at the workshop of the Immigration into Eastern Europe: new challenges held at the London School of Economics. See the video: Immigration into Eastern Europe: new challenges, 2020, *Migrācija LV,* 27.07.2020, available at: https://migracija.lv/en/posts/2020—07-lse-immigration-eastern-europe/ (accessed 08.08.2021).

[13] Latvia — Immigration, Emigration, Diaspora, 2020, *Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung*, 20.05.2020, availalb eat: https://www.bpb.de/gesellschaft/migration/laenderprofile/northerneurope/308824/latvia (accessed 08.08.2021).

in post-Soviet states. The first acts regulating this field emerged as early as the mid-1990s. According to the Constitution of the Republic of Poland, 'anyone whose Polish origin has been confirmed under the statute may settle permanently in Poland' (Article 52, 5). Therefore, any person of Polish descent, regardless of their citizenship, has the right to live in Poland without limitations.

The Repatriation Act of 9 November 2000 identifies the territorial borders of repatriation, limiting its geographical scope to Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and the Asian part of the Russian Federation. The law targets people of Polish origin who did not have an opportunity to return to Poland after World War II. It also sets the procedure for obtaining Polish citizenship by repatriating and governs how the authorities treat such people and their families.

The Repatriation Act was amended in 2017. The institution of the Government Plenipotentiary for Repatriation was established to coordinate the repatriation efforts of the authorities. Furthermore, tools were developed to support repatriates during relocation to Poland. Now those willing to repatriate could choose one of the three paths:

— to arrive in Poland, use the services of the repatriate adaptation centres, and receive financial support from the government for purchasing or renting accommodation;

— to arrive in Poland on the invitation of a municipality (gmina); the municipality will provide the family of the repatriate with accommodation fully furnished for living; in return, the gmina may receive a subsidy from the government;

— to arrive in Poland on the invitation of a Polish citizen or legal person providing the repatriate with accommodation for at least 24 months; repatriates coming to the country this way could count on financial help from the government for satisfying their accommodation needs.

According to Polish statistics, 8,665 applications for repatriation visas were submitted in 1997—2019. Approval was granted in 6,239 cases. Citizens of Kazakhstan submitted most applications (53.3 per cent). Ukrainians accounted for 17.5 per cent; Russians, 11.9 per cent; Belarusians, 11.3 per cent.[14]

After the 2017 amendments to the Repatriation Act, the number of applications from ethnic Poles willing to relocate to Poland, using the apparatus of the law, increased — from 486 in 2017 to 2,545 two years later. There was also a rise in the number of repatriation visas issued during the period — from 298 to 870.[15]

[14] *Sytuacja demograficzna Polski do roku 2019*, 2020, Migracje zagraniczne ludności. GUS. Warszawa, p. 189—190.

[15] *Rocznik Demograficzny*, 2020, Warszawa, 2020, p. 466, availalble at: https://stat.gov.pl/obszary-tematyczne/roczniki-statystyczne/roczniki-statystyczne/rocznik-demograficzny-2020,3,14.html (accessed 06.05.2021).

In 2007, the government adopted the law on the Pole's Card initially meant to strengthen ties between Poles residing in the post-Soviet space and their historical homeland. The card was to grant its holders certain privileges, such as the right to enter Poland without limitations, study at Polish universities and use emergency medical services. In reality, the Pole's Card turned into leverage in migration and diaspora politics.

A holder of the Pole's Card has the right to apply for a permanent residence permit and financial support to cover living costs in Poland. On 12 April 2019, the Sejm adopted an amendment to the law on the Pole's Card, which extended the geographical scope of the instrument to the whole world. According to preliminary estimates, 70 per cent of all permanent residence permits were issued to holders of the Pole's Card in 2017—2019.[16] In 2008—2019, about 143,900 Belarusians, 120,000 Ukrainians, 8,400 Lithuanians, 7,100 Russians, 3,370 Kazakhs, 2,070 Latvians, 1,800 Moldovans, 619 Uzbeks, 208 Georgians, 180 Azerbaijanis, 136 Armenians, 53 Turkmens and 23 Estonians obtained the Pole's Card. The rest of the world accounted for 636 documents.[17]

Repatriating descendants of political prisoners and deportees and their families is a priority of Lithuania's diaspora policy. In the post-Soviet space, most people of Lithuania origin live in Russia (see Table 5). Still, other countries also have the diasporas: about 25,000 Lithuanians live in Latvia; about 10,000, Ukraine; 7,000, Kazakhstan; from 5,000 to 30,000, Belarus (as estimated by Belarus and Lithuania respectively); about 2,000, Estonia.

Table 5

The number of Latvians, Lithuanians, and Estonians in the RSFSR/Russia, people

Nationality	1959	1970	1979	1989	2002	2010
Latvians	74,932	59,695	67,267	46,829	28,520	18,979
Lithuanians	108,579	76,718	66,783	40,427	45,569	31,377
Estonians	78,566	62,980	55,539	46,390	28,113	17,875

Source: census data.

Lithuanian researcher Rafael Muksinov cogently notes that most deportees and political prisoners returned to Lithuania in 1956—1959, and many of them resent Russians and Russia. 'Those returning to Lithuania after the 1990 inde-

[16] *Polityka migracyjna Polski. Projekt z dnia 10 czerwca 2019 r.,* 2019, Departament Analiz i Polityki Migracyjnej MSWiA, p. 7, 11.

[17] *Rocznik Demograficzny. 2020,* 2020, Warszawa, 2020, p. 466, availalbe at: https://stat.gov.pl/obszary-tematyczne/roczniki-statystyczne/roczniki-statystyczne/rocznik-demograficzny-2020,3,14.html (accessed 06.05.2021).

pendence are better, and even favourably, disposed to Russia and Russians,' the son of a Lithuanian deportee told us in an interview. 'We survived in Siberia because common Russian people helped us.' Recent research has brought to light a weighty circumstance: not Moscow, but Vilnius represented by Antanas Sniečkus impeded the return of Lithuanian exiles. The reason was the fear of unrest that might have broken out because the houses, flats, and lands of deportees had been occupied by someone else [20].

The political prisoner and deportee repatriation programme has been running since 1992. 2,500 families from Russian and post-Soviet states expressed their desire to relocate to Lithuania. As of 2015—2017 (the 2018—2020 data have not been released yet), 2,052 families were provided with accommodation; over 5,000 people received financial support.[18] In 1992—2018, 32m euros was allocated to the construction and purchase of accommodation for repatriates; in 2018—2020, the government earmarked 1.17m euros for the purpose; the 2021—2023 expenditure is estimated at 1.3m euros.[19]

Conclusion

The labour markets of Poland and the Baltics suffer from a shortage of both qualified and low-skilled labour. These states give preference to immigrants from post-Soviet, mainly European, countries. The laws of Poland and the Baltics aim to attract qualified specialists, who nevertheless comprise a modest proportion of immigrants from the post-Soviet space. The four countries have been competing for IT specialists from Belarus and Latvia. Latvia is losing this competition to Lithuania, whilst both countries a less successful than Poland, which offers the best conditions for innovative small and medium enterprises.

As to low-skilled workers, the regulation in Poland and Lithuania is less strict than in Latvia and Estonia. The former countries seek to attract long-term migrants and eventually integrate them into society. The other two states, while recognising the inevitability of this measure, are apprehensive of attracting labour from the states of the former USSR: migrants from these countries speak Russian.

[18] Politinių kalinių ir tremtinių bei jų šeimų narių sugrįžimo į Lietuvą programos įgyvendinimas. 12/2019, 2019, *Ministry of Social Security and Labour*, availalbe at: https://socmin.lrv.lt/uploads/socmin/documents/files/veiklos-sritys/socialine-integracija/Tremtiniu%20informacija_2019—12.docx (accessed 05.04.2021).

[19] Įsakymas dėl politinių kalinių ir tremtinių bei jų šeimų narių sugrįžimo į Lietuvą 2021—2023 metų veiksmų plano patvirtinimo. 2020 m. rugpjūčio 26 d. Nr. A1—777, 2020, *Teisės aktų registras — e-tar.lt*, availalble at: https://www.e-tar.lt/portal/lt/legalAct/1c1b98b0e79711ea9342c1d4e2ff6ff6 (accessed 15.03.2021).

They are immersed in the Russian culture, which the local political classes consider a threat to national identity. During the Covid-19 crisis, Russophone immigrants proved the most vulnerable category in Latvia and Estonia.

The features of the immigration processes suggest that the four states have been turning from countries of origin into countries of destination. Whilst Ukrainian immigration into Poland and the Baltics is mainly for economic reasons (seasonal work, long-term employment in services), some newcomers from Belarus, Russia, and Central Asia look for political asylum. In the case of Russia, these are people associating themselves with the opposition to the federal authorities and members of North Caucasian ethnic groups.

Since August-September 2020, Poland and Lithuania have been aiding Belarusians who have lost their jobs for political reasons or cannot continue working and studying in their homeland (most of these people are not asylum seekers). The Polish plan ‘Solidarity with Belarus’ is an example of such assistance. Most of these programmes target students and researchers. They seek to attract younger audiences (about 10,000 Belarusian students study in Poland[20] and from 1,500 to 2,000 in Lithuania). In the long run, these programmes may result in a brain drain from Belarus, albeit over 80 per cent of Belarusian students studying in the EU used to return home before autumn 2020.

Finally, Poland and Lithuania have yet another immigration policy priority, which has a solid political and legal framework: diaspora repatriation. The Polish approach is the broadest. It targets hundreds of thousands of people and has both socio-economic and cultural-expansionist dimensions. The Pole’s Card is used to expand the influence zone in the ‘Eastern Borderlands’ and accomplish the cultural and religious consolidation of the former lands of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth around today’s Poland.

The trends described above mean that Russia has to be more active in the competition for attracting qualified labour from the European part of the post-Soviet space, especially Ukraine and Belarus, since migration from other countries to the Baltics and Poland is insignificant.

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The authors

Dr. Vladislav V. Vorotnikov, Director, Centre for European Studies of the Institute for International Studies, MGIMO University, Russia; Leading Research Fellow, Institute of Europe Russian Academy of Sciences, Russia.

E-mail: vorotnikov.vladislav@gmail.com

https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3374-5677

Dr. Andrzej Habarta, Leading Research Fellow, Centre for European Studies of the Institute for International Studies, MGIMO University, Russia; Leading Research Fellow, Institute of Europe Russian Academy of Sciences, Russia.

E-mail: a.habarta@inno.mgimo.ru

https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4236-3777

LABOUR MIGRANTS FROM THE MIDDLE EAST ARAB COUNTRIES IN SWEDEN: A PARADIGM SHIFT

A.V. Sarabiev

Institute of Oriental Studies Russian Academy of Sciences
12/1, ul. Rozhdestvenka Moscow, 107031, Russia

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Middle East Arab diasporas, primarily the Iraqi and Syrian ones, are playing an increasing role in the economy and demography of Sweden. This study aims to describe the formation of economically active diasporas in Sweden over the past three decades. There has been a paradigm shift in the immigration and business activity of people from the Middle East Arab countries in Sweden. Diaspora leadership changes depending on the situation in the countries of origin and migration phenomena driven by political and military shocks. This change affects the migration process and the role of communities in the economic life of the country. The study draws on the work of top research centres and data from leading Swedish and international statistical agencies. The rise and subsequent decline in Syrian immigration, which included labour migrants, refugees, and asylum seekers, did not restore the unconditional leadership of the Iraqis among the Arab communities of Sweden. The significant business activity of Syrian immigrants, their professional skills, level of education, and broad business ties make the diaspora a likely leader in the Arab community. These four factors also contribute to easier migrant integration into Swedish society.

Keywords:
labour migration, Arab immigrants, Syrian diaspora, Iraqi diaspora, migration waves, Sweden

Introduction

In the second half of the 20th century, against the background of the rapid economic growth, Sweden started to accept many immigrants seeking employment, safety and refuge. Labour immigration was of decisive importance for national development and contributed enormously to the emergence of Sweden as a welfare state. Today, when the demographic age has become a factor in the economic aspect of social development, one of Sweden's central social problems is the lack of local working-age population, due to ageing and a low fertility rate [1, p. 30].

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The World Bank data for Sweden demonstrate a steady increase in labour resources during the 'migration boom': before 1994, there was a landslide decline in the workforce; until 2000, it remained at a relatively stable low level (4,514 thousand in 2000); since 2004, there has been a gradual growth, up to 5,477 thousand in 2020.[1] This rise is due to the influx of labour from abroad.

To increase the share of the working-age population, the government set out to change the demographic makeup by encouraging immigration. At the core of the migrant inflow to Sweden were immigrants from the Arab countries of the Middle East (in the broad sense: from the Levant, Iraq and even Egypt). Middle Eastern immigrants make up 4 per cent of the total population of Sweden, the Iraqi and Syrian diasporas being the largest in numbers [2, p. 1].

Many authoritative authors admit that labour migration and refugee integration into the receiving economy have an undoubtedly positive effect on the host country [3, p. 117]. For example, the website of the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs published a statement that 'the large number of refugees in Sweden did not collapse the Swedish economic system: on the contrary, youth unemployment dropped significantly, remaining at the lowest level in 13 years, while Sweden generally needs immigrants to compensate for the decline in the birth rate and restore human potential' [4].

Arab immigration to Sweden has attracted the attention of scholars from many research centres around the world. Various aspects of it have been highlighted, including those relating to the economic effect of immigration and the problems of the social and economic integration of Arab immigrants. The religious identity of Arab immigrants, refugees and asylum seekers in Sweden has also been explored in the literature [5—9].

Many European and Eastern researchers have investigated the social integration of Arab immigrants into Swedish society. Attention has been paid to social isolation, discrimination and the positive aspects of immigrant involvement in culture and business in the host country, along with cooperation in Arab diaspora communities and work teams [10—13]. Other studies provide a general account of the problem, focusing on the long-sought theoretical comprehension of the Swedish multiculturalism policy or summarising its evolution [14].

Relevant information is available from official sources. Comparing it with non-economic data (the degree of adaptation, cultural and religious ties of diasporas, business competition, etc.) seems sufficient to draw conclusions and track the evolution of Middle Eastern diaspora participation in the Swedish economy. The principal sources of the data are the World Labour Organization (ILO), the Swedish Statistical Bureau (SCB), influential international statis-

[1] Labor force, total — Sweden, 2021, *The World Bank*, 15 June 2021, available at: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.TLF.TOTL.IN?locations=SE (accessed 04.09.2021).

tical agencies (KNOMAD, Statista), etc. Other sources used in the study are messages of social organisations, polls and interviews with individuals participating in this process.

Our study aims to track trends in the formation of economically active Middle Eastern Arab diasporas in Sweden, which occurred over the past three decades against the backdrop of a rapidly changing world agenda and migration phenomena caused by political and military shocks. Our research hypothesis is that the paradigms of Arab immigration and business activity of Arabs in Sweden are shifting. This change concerns principal countries of origin and the visibility of communities in the economy and culture of Sweden.

General situation and figures for Sweden

The Swedish authorities make substantial efforts to popularise their vision of immigrants as a welcome addition to the workforce and a solution to the national socio-economic problems. Nevertheless, social changes caused by the influx of migrants unsettle the population of Sweden, home to 10,330 thousand people. [15]. Even small inflows of immigrants, refugees and other groups arriving from abroad are noticeable in Sweden because of its small native population. And although the absolute figures below might seem very low (for example, the number of work permits issued), they are substantial for Swedish society.

The problem of refugees (and asylum seekers) is inextricable from the issue of labour migration since Sweden's reformed employment legislation considers immigrants, regardless of whether they are looking for safety or employment, as a potential addition to the workforce. During the 2015 European refugee crisis, '… Sweden reached a historical high in the number of asylum seekers: almost 163 thousand applications were made in that year. Afterwards, the government took action to limit the influx of asylum seekers and to minimize the potential negative impacts of the refugee crisis on Swedish society. … Notwithstanding these restrictive measures, Sweden agreed in 2017 on the relocation of 2,800 refugees who applied for asylum in Italy or Greece. … The population composition of the asylum-seekers and refugees in Sweden resembles that of Belgium to a very large degree. The greatest numbers of refugees in Sweden are of Syrian, Afghan, and Iraqi origin. … Overall, about 60 percent of the applicants were male and some 40 percent were female. The majority of asylum seekers are young: more than half of them were below the age of 25' [1, p. 28—29]. Of course, some of them may quickly find employment, formally replenishing the workforce and effectively participating in business and production processes.

As of 2021, 26,172 people born 'in Asia' (13,411 males and 12,761 females) had immigrant status in Sweden. According to the same 2021 data, 813,086

'Asian-born people had Swedish citizenship (418,295 males and 394,791 females).[2] Immigration to Sweden, according to this source, will amount to about 81,850 people in 2021.[3]

An indirect indicator of the economic activity of immigrants is remittances (usually, money sent home to support relatives or a family business). The KNOMAD data below, from 1993 to 2020, show surges in the amount of remittance, coinciding with changes in the Swedish internal migration policy and periods of turbulence in the Middle East.

Table 1

Remittances of labour migrants from Sweden, 1993—2020, million USD

1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007
260	231	336	429	411	503	484	539	578	508	568	660	729	930	1 056

2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020
1 206	1,071	1,160	1,390	1,387	1,624	1,591	1,460	1,633	2,046	2,084	1,917	1,766*

* 0.3 per cent of Sweden's GDP.

Source: Global Knowledge Partnership on Migration and Development, 2021, *Remittance outflows*, May 2021, available at: https://www.knomad.org/sites/default/files/2021—05/Outward%20remittance%20flows%20May.2021.xlsx (accessed 06.24.2021).

According to the World Bank Sweden received 131,888 immigrants from Iraq in 2021; 98,216, from Syria; 26,159, Lebanon; 3,898, Jordan; 6,256, Egypt.[4]

A study comparing how immigrants integrate into society in Sweden and Belgium (another European country with a large Arab population) concludes that Sweden has a very high rate of labour market mobility, especially compared to Belgium. 'Key aspects in this regard are the fact that in Sweden migrants can look for employment from the day they arrive as there are no distinctions made between Swedish and non-Swedish citizens in labour market regulations. … Access to general support is high in both countries, but it is in terms of targeted support for newcomers that Sweden distinguishes itself from Belgium. In particular, the 2009 Labor Market Introduction Act in Sweden laid out a framework which made it easier for newcomers to learn Swedish and find jobs that match their skills' [1, p. 31].

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[2] Population size, number of deaths, immigrants, emigrants and average population size by region of birth, sex and age. Year 2021—2120, 2021, *Statistics Sweden (SCB)*, September 2021, available at: https://www.statistikdatabasen.scb.se/pxweb/en/ssd/START__BE__BE0401__BE0401A/BefProgOsiktDetNb/table/tableViewLayout1 (accessed 9.09.2021).

[3] Ibid.

[4] Bilateral Migration Matrix — 2017, 2018, *The World Bank*, April 2018, available at: https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/migrationremittancesdiasporaissues/brief/migration-remittances-data (accessed 5.05.2020).

The reform sought to reduce state involvement in labour migration management and delegate the decision on who can join the workforce to employers, best informed about what skills are in demand in the labour market. The bill did not spell out the goal of the new policy. Yet, the short-term objective was apparently to compensate for the labour shortage and the long-term to counter demographic challenges by increasing labour supply [16, p. 2].

A likely factor in the attractiveness of Sweden to migrants may be the working conditions in the country far surpassing those in the place of origin. For example, the working week in Sweden averaged 27—27 hours for females and 33—34 hours for males in 2008—2013 [17, p. 13] (according to a different source, it reached 36 hours in 2017: 38 hours in production and 34 hours in hospitality). In the Middle East, the figure was much higher: 44 hours in Egypt (48 in production and 51 in hospitality); 46 hours in Turkey (including 48 and 55 respectively) [18, p. 23].

Waves of Iraqi Immigration

A report from the Institute for the Study of Migration (Malmö, Sweden), compiled for the World Labour Organisation, shows that Iraq was the main country of origin of labour migrants in the Arab East until 2011. In 1993—1997, Iraqis accounted for 7 per cent of labour immigrants in Sweden, comparable to the share of labour immigrants from the rest of Asia combined (8.5 per cent) [19, p. 5].

Table 2

Labour immigration from Iraq to Sweden, 1997—2011

Period	Number of immigrants	Per cent in immigration flow
1993—1997	11,775	6.9
1998—2002	7,837	5.4
2003—2007	27,005	10.5
2008—2011	22,000	9.2

Prepared based on [19].

Significantly, the report did not contain data on any other country of the Arab East. The reason was the low figures. Yet, information on ‘the rest of the Middle East’ is given for 2008—2011 when the influx of immigrants from the Arab East was substantial, probably in the backwash of the Arab Spring (65,548 people came from the region, comprising 27.5 per cent of all migrant arrivals in the country) [19, p. 5].

These data point to a close relationship between emigration from Iraq to Sweden and political events in the former country. Several years of high emigration numbers, from 1993, can be explained by the heavy economic sanctions imposed against the government of Saddam Hussein after the 1991 Gulf War and the US-led Desert Storm operation. In addition, Iraq was weakened economically by the eight-year war with Iran, which ended in 1988. Both factors were responsible for the sharp decline in the Iraqi economy, taking their toll on human resources and the capabilities of the state.

The 2003 surge in Iraqi emigration was also a consequence of military unrest. The intervention undermined the country's economy even further and once again brought chaos into social relations. The fear of violence or the loss of income, the feeling of uncertainty and the severance of economic ties spurred the next wave of Iraqi emigration. Sweden, a country with a substantial Iraqi diaspora, has become a favoured destination.

The following years of instability, bitter internal conflicts, operations of the Western forces (for example, the armed crackdown on the al-Sahwa tribal militia project, party to the civil war) [20, p. 109] and the spread of terrorist networks (Al-Qaeda and ISIS[5]) induced emigration from Iraq. Iraqi immigration to Sweden soared. In 2011, turbulence swept the region in the wake of the Arab Spring; emigration peaked again. These factors accounted for the substantial Iraqi immigration to Sweden in 2008—2011.

Table 3

Immigration from Iraq to Sweden, 2012—2020, people

Sex	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020
Males	1,673	1,326	1,469	1,897	2,328	3,640	2,337	1,637	1,002
Females	1,555	1,223	1,433	1,628	1,954	2,897	1,883	1,449	875

Prepared based on: Population size, number of deaths, immigrants, emigrants and average population size by region of birth, sex and age. Year 2021—2120 // Statistics Sweden (SCB), September 2021. Available at: https://www.statistikdatabasen.scb.se/pxweb/en/ssd/START__BE__BE0401__BE0401A/BefProgOsiktDetNb/table/tableViewLayout1 (accessed 09.09.2021).

According to other 2020 data, 2,271 people who gave Iraq as their place of birth immigrated to Sweden.[6]

At the time, Iraqi newcomers faced competition from Syrian immigrants and refugees. But, as the situation in Syria stabilised, Iraqi labour immigration began to increase again. Indirect evidence for this is data on the number of temporary work permits issued in Sweden to Iraqis.

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[5] Both are banned in the Russian Federation.

[6] Number immigrants to Sweden 2020, by country of birth, 2021, *Statista Research Department*, Feb 22, 2021, available at: https://www.statista.com/statistics/522136/sweden-immigration-by-country-of-origin (accessed 24.08.2021).

Table 4

Temporary work permits issued in Sweden to immigrants from Iraq, people

2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020
363	556	424	257	223	352	243	342	670	639	520

Prepared based on: Beviljade uppehållstillstånd översikter. Statistik 2010—2020 // Migrationsverket, Sept 2021. Available at: https://www.migrationsverket.se/Om-Migrationsverket/Statistik/Beviljade-uppehallstillstand-oversikter.html (accessed 11.09.2021).

Many Iraqis in Sweden are self-employed. Performing better than the locals, they are far outstripped by the Syrian or Lebanese diaspora in this respect.

Some Muslim newcomers from the countries of the Arab East received social support within multireligious cooperation programmes. Such a programme seeking to establish communication between members of different religious and national Swedish communities and new immigrants has been examined in a study from the University of Winchester. Some of the meetings analysed in the research took place in mosques [21]. The authors conclude: ‘ [i] n a predominantly Christian host community, Muslim migrants felt welcomed and assisted as they sought asylum and established new lives in Sweden’ [21, p. 173].

A specific feature of Sweden as a destination for migrants from the Middle East is its established diaspora of Middle Eastern Christians, which has existed in the country for many decades. Perhaps it would be incorrect to refer to this community as an Arab diaspora since the identity of these Christians remains ambiguous despite their coming from Iraq, Syria and Lebanon and being, for the most part, Arab. Many Middle Eastern Christians link their identity to the Aramaic past, some to the Assyrian heritage and others to Phoenician tradition. Various cultural and non-profit organisations are deeply involved in the study of ancient Syriac preserved by some Eastern Churches as the liturgical language. Upon arriving in Sweden, Muslim labour migrants find themselves surrounded by local, albeit highly secularised, Christians and face business competition from Christian compatriots, many of which are well integrated into Swedish society. Most of Middle Eastern Christians come from the north of Iraq (Assyrians) and Syria (Jacobites) [22; 23]. Not so much the absolute numbers of the Arab Christian diaspora in Sweden as its visibility in the information landscape of their homelands conduces to the integration of newly arrived migrants and refugees from Syria and Iraq into Swedish society.

While recognising that the Middle Eastern Christian diasporas in Sweden are only nominally Arab, it is crucial to bear in mind that Christianity may be the common ground between the diaspora and the ethnic Swedes. Still, the identity of this part of the Arabic-speaking diaspora has a significant national and historical component: not considering themselves Arabs or feeling historically connected to the Arabic language and culture, many of them actively promote the 'common ground' idea. This naturally isolates them from the rest of the Arabs, Arab business networks and work relations.

Swedish communities sharing an Assyrian or Syro-Jacobite cultural and linguistic identity are relatively young. They became visible in the early 1970s: the first Assyrian immigrants arrived from Iraq in 1967 [24, p. 12].

In work or business, they rarely get involved with their Muslim compatriots. At the same time, they actively promote their culture (for example, through the Suryoyo Aramaic language TV channel).

Syrian immigrants as the passionaries of the Middle Eastern diaspora in Sweden

Just like the Iraqi Christians, about 50 thousand Jacobite Christians arrived in Sweden from 'historical Syria' (from the Turkish Tur-Abdin) at the end of the 1960s. The Polish researcher Martha Wozniak writes that these immigrants were handled by the Swedish Labour Market Commission (Arbetsmarknadsstyrelsen, AMS), which distributed them to the cities of Eskilstuna, Märsta, Nyköping and Södertälje, having provided them with work permits [25, p. 123—124].

Everyone arriving from Syria to Sweden realises that they have come to a country of many Arabic speakers, where numerous Arabs have made their way in life, becoming famous actors, musicians and athletes. The Syrian diaspora, just like the Iraqi and Lebanese ones, performs well economically, and the business ties of the Syrian-Swedish businesspeople usually span several states. Thus, immigrants or refugees have a fair chance of finding employment. Intense competition in the Swedish labour market and rivalry with other Arab diasporas encourage many to start a business.

A member of the Syrian diaspora in Sweden called integration 'a personal matter': 'everything depends on your personality — whether you're open to European society or uncommunicative and withdrawn'. She added that Swedes were sympathetic towards her and many others like her, and there was a good opportunity to integrate into the local society[7].

The influx of Syrians into Sweden was far from uniform: migration waves fluctuated depending on the political and economic situation at home and in the destination country.

[7] The results of the author's survey of immigrants from the Middle East living in various European cities, August 2020 (in Arabic).

Table 5

Immigration from Syria to Sweden, 2012—2020, people

Sex	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020
Male	3,246	7,996	14,130	14,619	26,516	7,465	4,022	2,280	1,121
Female	2,382	5,951	8,721	9,944	17,496	7,601	5,088	1,845	928

Compiled from: Population size… 2021–2120…

According to the Statista agency, more Syrians (3,293 people) immigrated to Sweden in 2020 than shown in the table above.[8]

Moreover, 2000—2014 data demonstrate that Syrian labour migrants found it hard to receive permits to work and stay in the country.

Table 6

Temporary work permits issued to immigrants from Syria in Sweden, people

2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
72	61	39	39	38	32	35	36	58	199

2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
435	645	534	727	780	—	—	—	138

Prepared based on: Population size… 2021—2120…

The dramatic increase in Syrian applications for permits to work in Sweden might be a result of how Syria responded to the 2008 global economic crisis, whilst the following 1.5-fold rise occurred as a devastating war broke out in the Middle Eastern country. As mentioned above, the Swedish authorities simplified the procedure under the 2009 Labour Market Introduction Act. The inflow of migrants and refugees grew. Many Syrians, who usually have relatives in Lebanon, emigrated to Europe officially via the port of Beirut. Probably, most work permits were issued at the time to the ‘official’ immigrants and not asylum seekers. Many Syrians successfully integrated into the business environment of the host country; those who had had business experience and some initial assets achieved even more.

The German media outlet Deutsche Welle tells stunning Syrian success stories. Now residing in Sweden’s Malmö, two Syrian families (Abu Rukba and al-Sabbagh) managed to build on their prior experience and business ties across the world. (The trademark business pattern of Syrian entrepreneurs is to start a business at home and expand it to several countries simultaneously.) The enterprises of the two families once flourished in Damascus: the Sabbaghs owned

[8] Number of immigrants to Sweden 2020…

five nut roasting factories, and Abu Rukba's father ran a company that imported medical equipment to Syria. Likewise, the family owning the Jasmin al-Sham restaurant in Malmö's main pedestrian street ran four paper tissue factories in the Syrian city of Homs [26].

Deutsche Welle writes these Syrian immigrants are encouraging relatives and neighbours in Damascus to join their business. They also hope for a large sales market with their immigrant compatriots at the core, namely '112,000 Syrians who have fled to Sweden since the civil war began five years ago'. Delicious Rosteri, a shop selling Arabian nuts opened in Möllevaangen Square, the centre of the city's immigrant population. This reportedly caused some resentment (or envy) from Iraqi immigrants who do not always welcome new Arab competition [26].

Abu Rukba plans to export freshly roasted nuts to Austria, promote the business in the capital of Germany and possibly go as far as roasting 'Arab' coffee. According to the businessman, Syrians like him do not want to spend years receiving benefits while studying Svenska för Invandrare (SFI, Swedish for Immigrants), the official first step towards integration into Swedish society. They are already there, ready to contribute to the economy [26].

The Euractive pan-European media network located in 'ten European capitals' tells more stories: a 24-year-old Palestinian (arrived from Damascus in 2014) who started as a cashier and now studies computer science at Halmstad University; a dentist from Damascus who has a practice in the Swedish town of Mariestad; a 38-year-old mother (her family arrived in Skogas, a suburb of Stockholm, in 2013) who got a stable income and obtained Swedish citizenship. These people epitomise different paths to professional success and the economic integration of immigrants and refugees.9 Nevertheless, there are obstacles to the full integration of Syrians into the host society, and this is not always the locals' cautious attitude towards people of a different culture. Settling in like-ethnic communities (for example, in the vicinity of Malmö or Sørdetelier) rather than in the northern regions, where the Swedish authorities are ready to provide them with accommodation, Syrian immigrants often find themselves isolated from the general society. This circumstance was emphasised by the head of the Syrian Association of Sweden, Theodora Abdo: Syrian integration 'failed' due to the lack of housing and limited social contacts with the Swedes.[10]

[9] Syrians still finding their way in Sweden, five years on, 2020, *Euractiv*, 31 Aug, 2020, available at: https://www.euractiv.com/section/justice-home-affairs/news/syrians-still-finding-their-way-in-sweden-five-years-on (accessed 4.08.2021).

[10] Ibid.

There is also the tolerance problem. The immigration expert from the University of Gothenburg, Joakim Ruist, argues that ' [i] t is an analytical mistake to think that the attitude of Swedes towards immigration was friendly before 2015 and that it changed after the wave of immigration: this tolerance was always fragile — everyone knew that most of the population did not want refugees in the country' (In 2015, Sweden received the highest number of asylum seekers amongst the European Union — 163 thousand people, about a third of which identified themselves as Syrians).[11] In 2016, the authorities had to pass a temporary law expiring at the end of 2021. The law complicated family reunification and the issuance of permanent residence documents, offering a three-year residence permit instead. As a result, the number of Syrian arrivals in the country fell sharply, to 5.5 thousand people in 2016 and even fewer in subsequent years[12].

The number of Syrian asylum seekers in Sweden also declined: 2,656 females and 2,803 males falling into this category entered the country in 2016; 1,296 females and 1,353 males, in 2019; 565 females and 644 males, in 2020[13].

Syrians, however, are becoming increasingly visible in the Swedish business community. The protracted multilateral conflict in Syria has forced ordinary citizens and educated professionals to leave the country. Unable to find employment at home, highly-qualified Syrians are looking for a decent job elsewhere. The industrial infrastructure of the country lies in ruins: the economic ties have been severed; fuel and energy, the staples of production, are unprocurable. There are serious problems with administration and law enforcement. Amid the turmoil, experienced entrepreneurs and active and educated youth are trying to make the most of their talents abroad; Sweden, a relatively tolerant country with a historical Syrian diaspora, is the clear choice for many. Syrians starting a business in the country often have a support net in different countries. This gives them undeniable advantages, for instance, over the Iraqis, who have much fewer opportunities in this regard.

Another prominent category of immigrants is the self-employed. The Syrians and the Lebanese are usually more active than other Middle Eastern immigrants in Sweden; 12.5 per cent and 11.1 per cent amongst them, respectively, are self-employed. In some areas, up to 60 per cent of Syrian and Lebanese immigrants work for themselves [27, p. 6].

In the past few years, the inflow of Syrian labour migrants to Sweden has begun to decline, at least compared to that from Iraq, Egypt and Lebanon. The pro-

[11] Ibid.

[12] Ibid.

[13] Population size… 2021—2120…

portion of Syrians amongst labour migrants has decreased and almost equalled the percentage of Iraqis in 2015. Judging by the number of work permits issued, the contribution of Syria was falling rapidly; in 2020, it was already 7.5 times smaller than that of Iraq.

Table 7

Comparison: work permits issued in Sweden by country of origin

Year	Iraq	Syria	Egypt	Lebanon
2010	363	369	141	91
2011	556	570	306	102
2012	424	483	183	61
2013	257	657	87	42
2014	223	688	116	54
2015	352	358	166	39
2016	243	113	106	39
2017	342	128	220	57
2018	670	138	268	86
2019	639	102	274	77
2020	520	72	239	66

Prepared based on: Beviljade uppehållstillstånd översikter. Statistik 2010—2020…

These figures, of course, do not mean that the Syrian diaspora has become less economically active. They only point to changes in the immigration flow and the readiness of the Swedish authorities to issue work and residence permits to Syrians. Moreover, a substantial shadow sector of the economy and massive self-employment give Syrians opportunities to harness their entrepreneurial spirit and prove their business acumen.

Conclusion

Migrants from the Arab East are represented in Sweden by different national diasporas, of which the Iraqi and Syrian ones are the largest. Both have developed unevenly, with surges and recessions in the immigrant influx caused by several factors. Firstly, these are changes at home, which have caused periodic bursts of emigration. Secondly, migration intensity depends on the situation in Sweden, namely: (1) the degree to which the Swedes are willing to accept people of a foreign culture and language; (2) Swedish labour and immigration laws. Researchers from Malmö note that the reform of the legislation and 2009 changes to the migration employment policy caused the relative number of labour immigrants from the Middle East to increase significantly: from 0.5 to 5.5 per cent from Iraq; from 1 to 4.5 per cent, Syria [16, p. 14, 16].

Waves of immigration from Iraq reflect the periods of socio-political unrest in the region: the Iran-Iraq war, the Gulf War and Operation Desert Storm, severe economic sanctions, the military occupation of Iraq, etc. The Iraqi diaspora in Sweden is relatively well-integrated economically. The Iraqis outnumbered Syrian immigrants until the end of the 2000s. But in the wake of the Arab Spring, immigration from Syria far outstripped that from Iraq. Overall, the influx of refugees from war-torn Syria has provided Swedish society with significant labour and human resources. The inflow of labour migrants with professional qualifications continues to this day. And, most importantly, the safety net of business ties and material support from relatives living and doing business in other countries has not disappeared.

Despite the current decline in Syrian immigration to Sweden, the diaspora remains extremely active economically. Their business passionarity suggests that this Arab diaspora will soon become the most numerous in the country. A strong community of Syrian and Iraqi Christians in Sweden, albeit often still isolated from the general society, creates a bridge between all Arab immigrants in Sweden (including Muslims [28]) and the host society as regards economic (labour, trade, etc.) relations [29; 30].

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The author

Dr Alexey V. Sarabiev, Leading Research Fellow, Centre of Arabic and Islamic Studies, Institute of Oriental Studies Russian Academy of Sciences, Russia.

E-mail: alsaraby@ivran.ru.

https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9796-2411

SWEDISH ISLAMISM AS A SOCIAL AND POLITICAL ASPECT IN THE FORMATION OF AN ETHNO-CONFESSIONAL PARALLEL SOCIETY

E. Yu. Talalaeva
T. S. Pronina

Pushkin Leningrad State University
10 Petersburgskoe shosse, Pushkin, St Petersburg, 196605, Russia

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A new actor in the European geopolitical space — an ethno-religious "parallel society" - is transforming the social and political fabric of Sweden. An institutionalised Muslim parallel society is emerging in vulnerable areas, such as marginalised immigrant districts of Swedish cities, through the efforts of Islamist political, social, and economic structures adhering to the religious and political doctrine of the Muslim Brotherhood (this organization is banned in the Russian Federation). Committed to maintaining the Muslim identity, these organisations seek gradual Islamisation of the Swedish population through ideological influence on immigrants with a Muslim background. These efforts thwart cultural assimilation attempts and hinder the implementation of Swedish integration policy. The lack of research into the peaceful Islamisation of Swedish society and the related problems of Islamophobia, anti-Muslim racism, and radicalisation of Muslim youth lends urgency to investigating the influence of Islamist organisations on the Swedish Muslim immigrant community. This study analyses the literature, sources, and statistics on the essential aspects of Swedish Islamisation to provide a holistic picture of the formation of an ethno-religious parallel society in Sweden. The findings help evaluate the effectiveness of the national policy on confronting parallel societies, as well as of measures to promote democratic values as the foundation of a united Swedish society.

Keywords:
Islamism, political Islam, parallel society, vulnerable area, Muslim identity, immigrants, Muslim Brotherhood, national security of Sweden

Introduction

Religion is a factor that significantly contributes to the transformation of the modern world order. Ideological influence of Islamist organizations on ethno-religious immigrant communities leads to the formation of Muslim "parallel societies" on the territory of European national states. As a political ideology, Islamism,

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or political Islam, bases its legitimacy on a particular interpretation of Islam. According to Sara Khan, the Lead Commissioner of the British Commission for Countering Extremism, Islamism is a modern politicized movement that is ideologically based on religion as a guide for political action and a certain system of belief in God [1, p. 52]. The wide range of diverse Islamic political parties, social organizations and movements spells the need to study them in the context of their social and political environment.

In Sweden, Islamist organizations focus on the formation of “Muslim identity” as a way to protect and preserve the cultural and religious traditions of Swedish Muslims. At the same time, this contributes to the development of an opposition between the positive image of “Swedes” and the negative image of immigrants with “Muslim background”; the latter are associated with Muslim radicalization and are thus perceived as a source of threat to Swedish democratic society and national security. Thus, the desire of Islamist organizations to increase their influence on the Swedish Muslim community and preserve the religious aspect of the identity of its members leads to such negative consequences as Islamophobia, the enclavization of immigrant areas in Swedish cities and the formation of a “parallel” social and political sector. The lack of sufficient knowledge of these processes in the context of Swedish social and political system as well as the need to find solutions to political, cultural, social and economic problems of the segregated Swedish immigrant suburbs (“vulnerable areas”)[1] determine the relevance of this research.

Theory and Method

A significant share of contemporary research focuses on the activities of the Muslim Brotherhood, an umbrella Islamist organization, in Europe. Despite this, there is a lack of studies of Islamism as a phenomenon of Swedish social and political reality. In the Swedish security policy discourse, “Islamism” as a concept is strongly associated with extremist activities. According to a report of the Swedish Ministry of Justice on violent political and Islamist extremism, “In most cases, the word “Islamism” is used to describe the view of Islam as an all-encompassing and ideological model of a country’s governance, in contrast to the view where Islam is seen as a religion”[2]. This has led to the recommen-

[1] *Rätt* insats på rätt plats–polisens arbete i utsatta områden, 2020, *Startsida Riksrevisionen,* S. 16, available at: https://www.riksrevisionen.se/download/18.7546977617592429b913d517/1604927340756/RiR%202020_20%20Anpassad.pdf (accessed on April 7, 2021).

[2] Våldsbejakande extremism i Sverige, nuläge och tendenser. Justitiedepartementet, 2014, *Startsida Riksrevisionen,* S. 22, available at: https://www.riksdagen.se/sv/dokument-lagar/dokument/departementsserien/valdsbejakande-extremism-i-sverige--nulage-och_H2B44 (accessed on April 7, 2021).

dation to replace the term “Islamism” with the term “Muslim extremism”[3] in order to shift the emphasis from Islam as a religion in manifestations of Islamic radicalization.

According to Aje Karlbom, a Swedish anthropologist and an expert on Islamism and multiculturalism, Islamism as the social and political phenomenon should be distinguished from violent extremism of the neo-fundamentalist Salafi movements [2, s. 7]. Due to terrorist attacks by radical Muslims in Swedish society over the past few years, modern Swedish social and political discourse has begun to differentiate “peaceful” Islamism from radical extremist activities. This position in relation to Swedish Islamist organizations determines their non-involvement in terrorist acts in Europe. These Islamist organizations do not officially recognize their membership in the Muslim Brotherhood, but they are guided by its ideological principles and follow a “peaceful” political course in a European democracy like any other social democratic actors [3, p. 3; 4, p. 30]. At the same time, such religious and political structures regard the “peaceful” Islamization of the Western world as a way to radically reorganize the global world order on the principles of political Islam [5, c. 194]. Therefore, Islamist organizations in Sweden are focused on the long-term gradual introduction of their religious and political ideology into the Swedish society. This becomes possible mainly through their work with the immigrant Muslim communities.

In this study, we have used data from the following sources:

1. Swedish university-based and state-funded research projects on Islamism and extremist activities;
2. police reports on the “vulnerable areas”;
3. studies of Islamophobia and Muslim racism in Swedish society commissioned by the Swedish Muslim organizations;
4. research projects on the activities of the Islamist organization the Muslim Brotherhood in Europe;
5. charters of Swedish Islamist organizations;
6. Danish and Swedish legislation on “parallel societies”;
7. statistics on the composition of the Swedish Muslim population.

The research methodology involved a comprehensive analysis of the literature and sources, which helped identify specific features of the formation of the Muslim “parallel society” in Sweden. Thus, the paper focuses on the study of the impact of public and political activities of Swedish Islamist organizations on the Muslim immigrant community in Sweden. The research reconstructs the factors

[3] Våldsbejakande islamistisk extremism i Sverige, 2010, *CVE — Center mot våldsbejakande extremism,* S. 28. available at: https://www.cve.se/download/18.62c6cfa2166eca5d70e2160/1547452379244/S%C3%A4po%20V%C3%A5ldsbejakande%20islamistisk%20extremism%202010.pdf (accessed 07.04.2021).

of the formation of an ethno-religious "parallel society" in Sweden. Based on these data, the article assesses the prospects for the Swedish state policy to counter the "parallel society" as a potential threat to national security.

Religious and political ideology of Swedish Islamist organizations

The Muslim Brotherhood first began to ideologically influence Swedish society and the immigrants arriving in Sweden from Muslim countries in the 1980s through propaganda leaflets about Islam [6, s. 8]. These contained a call to "submit" to religion as a comprehensive system of values and norms of everyday life. The system was setup in such a way that it would separate Muslims from secular society and oblige them to further disseminate these ideas under the guise of religious duty. Thus, the strategic approach of the Muslim Brotherhood to the formation of an Islamic state relies on the gradual indoctrination of the population. According to the group's beliefs, the personal life of Muslims should be subordinated to the state and governed by the Sharia law [6, s. 7]. This approach has alienated the Muslim Brotherhood from the Western society and contributed to a negative perception of Western social norms and democratic values in Muslim communities.

The Islamic Association in Sweden was established in Stockholm in the mid-1990s. This organization denies its affiliation with the Muslim Brotherhood, but some researchers believe that the Islamic Association in Sweden controls the activities of Swedish Muslim organizations[4] and promotes the ideological principles of the Muslim Brotherhood [6, s. 14]. Those who study Islamism often note that the followers of religious and political ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood refuse to openly admit their involvement in this organization [For example: 7, p. 137]; the reason being the reluctance to provoke rejection of Islamist ideas among the non-Muslim European population who often associate Islam with negative manifestations of religious extremism. The Muslim Brotherhood has adapted its social and religious structures to the Swedish social and political system and organized a multifaceted economic structure [6, s. 10] with access to financial resources. This allows it to spread and strengthen its ideological influence among Muslims as well as to teach them about the features of Swedish society and ways of interacting with it. With the Muslim Brotherhood being a "clandestine network", organizations under its auspices can exist without disclosing their membership to the Swedish public.

[4] According to the 2016 *Muslimska Brödraskapet i Sverige* (the Muslim Brotherhood in Sweden) research project, the most influential Swedish Islamist organizations are the Islamic Association of Sweden, the Islamic Aid, Ibn Rushd Study Association and the Young Muslims of Sweden [6, s. 12—14].

Another strategic aspect of the Muslim Brotherhood's activities in Europe is that it assumes leadership over all European Muslims. In other words, it has arbitrarily taken the role of a representative, or a "gatekeeper" between the "Muslim civil society" and the European political elite [6, s. 18]. The Swedish expert on Islam Jan Hjärpe posits that, unlike Islam with its "personal religiosity and experience <…> the religious tradition in all its complexity", Islamism is an "invocation of the religious tradition to political actions. The assertion of religion as a social order" [8, s. 12]. Hjärpe's opinion echoes the argument of political scientist Bassam Tibi on the importance of distinguishing Islam as a religion from political Islamism: "Islamism grows out of a specific interpretation of Islam, but it is not Islam: it is a political ideology that is distinct from the teaching of the religion of Islam" [9, p. 1]. While Tibi does not deny the relationship between these two concepts, he sees Islamism as an "invention of tradition" which has been the result of social and political changes in the Middle East over the last century [9, p. 1].

One of the most famous "inventors" of Islamist ideology is Hassan al-Banna, the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood. He generalized the understanding of Islam as a unified system of values and norms for the state and civil society. Khalil al-Anani, an Islamist movements expert, describes al-Banna's views on religion as "a comprehensive creed that should encompass all aspects of human life" [10, p. 56]. According to the University of Malmö professor Anne Sophie Roald, the fact that al-Banna's ideas have spread so widely in Europe since the 1970s is a consequence of the Muslim Brotherhood missionary activities [11, p. 260]. These have contributed to the consolidation of Islamic understanding of Islam in the public perception. Al-Anani notes that this strategy is still employed by the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, "the Brotherhood does not differentiate between religion and politics. It [MB] views Islam as an inclusive system, it extends to all life's spheres, it encompasses politics, economics, society, culture, and so on." [10, p. 65].

Al-Banna's religious and political position has served as the ideological basis for the development of political views of Islamist organizations in Sweden [12, s. 20]. This fact is confirmed by the Swedish expert on Islam Jonas Otterbek in his study of the journal "Salaam" publications in the 1986—1998. Otterbek notes that the authors contributing to the journal often referred to the Muslim Brotherhood visionaries, specifically — to Hasan al-Banna [13, s. 179]. Therefore, Swedish Islamists borrowed the concept of Islam as a religious and political ideology covering all spheres of life from authoritative Islamist ideologists. One of the most widely circulated guidelines for Swedish Muslims on how to understand Islam is

Att förstå islam (“To understand Islam”)[5]. The document has been drafted under the leadership of the chairman of the Federation of Swedish Muslims Mahmoud Aldebe with the support of the Swedish Immigration Service. According to the guidelines, “Islam provides people with the specific instructions for all life situations. These instructions are comprehensive and include moral, spiritual, social, political and economic aspects of being”[6].

This approach contributed to the development of discussions in the Swedish social and political discourse about the possibility of the emergence of an institutionalized Islamist “parallel society” [14, p. 500] acting similarly to the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. Still, the Muslim Brotherhood and its affiliated organizations have faced a significant obstacle to building a Muslim civil society in Europe. In Egypt, the “parallel” social and political sector has become an alternative source of welfare for those deprived of the state support; a promise that is rendered ineffective in the context of the democratic European states. Thus, in “non-Muslim countries, the public narrative of the Muslim Brotherhood is focused more on Islamising the individual and community than the state”[7]. The call for immigrants to preserve “Muslim identity” and religious traditions is not a sufficient reason to avoid assimilation into the Swedish civil society in modern social and political realities. The development of “Muslim identity” in the Swedish society is an ambiguous and multi-vector process. This is one of the key factors in the segregation of immigrant residential communities and their transformation into the ethno-religious “parallel societies”.

Features of the “Muslim identity” development in the Swedish society

Sweden lacks statistics on religious self-identification of its citizens. Moreover, “in Sweden there is a strong reluctance if not an outright hostility to asking about and to measuring and collecting data on anything that has to do with religion, ethnicity, language and race” [15, p. 14]. *Utländsk bakgrund*, or “foreign

[5] Att förstå islam, 2002, Docplayer.se, available at: http://docplayer.se/4787087-Att-forsta-islam-2002—06—04-www-islamiska-org-2—81.html (accessed 07.04.2021).

[6] Ibidem. S. 9.

[7] Muslim Brotherhood Review: Main Findings, 2015, *Reuters News Agency,* available at: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/486948/53163_Muslim_Brotherhood_Review_-_PRINT.pdf (accessed 07.04.2021).

background", is the only term used in Sweden to officially describe immigrant populations.[8] The category encompasses anyone who was born outside Sweden or whose parents were both born in other countries.

In Sweden, such population groups as "Swedes" and "immigrants" are juxtaposed in the massive public debate concerning the officially published documents on countering the ethno-religious immigrant "ghettoes" in the neighboring Denmark. In the context of this social and political discourse, the notions of "immigrant" and "migrant" have become synonymous with "problems" or "threats" to the Swedish nation [16, s. 60]. In public opinion, an image of an "immigrant" is associated with crime, unemployment, social problems and undemocratic authoritarian values, whereas a positive image of a "Swede" represents a law-abiding, trustworthy and democratic citizen.

In 2018, representatives of the Swedish Muslim community prepared an alternative report in response to rising racism and Islamophobia in the state. The report emphasized promotion of the stereotype of Swedish Muslims as a threat to "Swedish" values and the idea of "Swedishness" [15, p. 8]. The social and political discourse of "Swedish" values mainly focuses on newly arrived migrants from countries with the predominantly Muslim population and Muslims who have already settled in the Swedish suburbs. Based on this situation, the representatives of the Swedish Muslim community have stated the inability of the Swedish government to effectively solve the problem of Islamophobia and anti-Muslim racism against the Swedish Muslims [15, p. 8].

In recent years, the concept of "diversity" has dominated in the Swedish social and political discourse [6, s. 24]. This term replaced the European policy notion of "multiculturalism" discredited in relation to migration problems. Postmodern connotations of "diversity" mean that it brings more "identities" into the picture of cultural and religious pluralism in the Swedish society. These identities form a unified society and include not only immigrants, but also, for example, sexual minorities. Therefore, social "diversity" implies the existence of a well-established value system and defines the attitude of the Swedish citizens towards minorities. This means a tolerant attitude towards representatives of minorities and respect for their rights to a different way of life.

[8] Hur många i Sverige är födda i ett annat land? 2020, *Migrationsinfo.se*, available at: https://www.migrationsinfo.se/fragor-och-svar/hur-manga-utrikes-fodda-sverige/ (accessed 07.04.2021).

These democratic values contribute to successful integration of various population groups into the unified society. At the same time, they constitute an ideological "structure of opportunities" for Islamist organizations. In secularized Europe, the Muslim Brotherhood and its affiliated organizations cannot openly proclaim the building of a state based on religious and political ideology, but they can and do advance their Islamist project within the framework of multiculturalism focused on social "diversity" and the recognition of Muslims as a "European religious community" [6, s. 24]. Within this approach, those sharing the Muslim Brotherhood ideas identify themselves with the "global Muslim ummah", but not with any nation [6, s. 14]. This complicates the process of integrating Muslim immigrants into the Swedish society significantly. In the context of globalized Islam, the term "Muslim" has acquired a "neo-ethnic" meaning and implies identity rather than religious affiliation. This has constructed a new generalized "ethnic group" [17, p. 124—143] that also embraces the concept of "cultural Muslim", understood as a "secular (non-religious) person who, having a Muslim origin (and living in a non-Muslim country), still identifies with Muslim culture or religion, while not practicing Islam" [18, p. 144]. Thus, European understanding of this new "Muslim identity" implies that all people who are in any way associated with Islam also share Muslim culture regardless of their background or social status.

Based on this neo-ethnic discourse, the Islamist organizations construct their modern identity politics as representatives of ethno-religious communities of immigrants "with Muslim background". In connection with this, the political sociologist Hazem Kandil recalls the al-Banna's seven-step model for various phases of social changes [19, p. 110], which details the initial steps of gradual Islamization — the creation the Muslim individual, the Muslim family and the Muslim government that reflects the perfect Muslim society. Therefore, the process of Islamization in modern Swedish society is based on the Muslim identity.

The proclamation of the Muslim Association of Sweden is an example of an Islamic project in the context of a multicultural discourse ("all people as a single whole despite their differences in race, religious beliefs and language") and its desire "for a multicultural society based on the cornerstones of human values, equality, respect, tolerance, mutual integration, objectivity and welfare"[9]. At the same time, the Association aims "to promote, protect, preserve and strengthen

[9] Sveriges Muslimska Förbund, 2020, *SMF Islam — Sverige Muslimska Förbund*, available at: http://smf-islam.se/vision/ (accessed 07.04.2021).

the members' religious identity"[10]. In this context, the political sphere is an "important source of knowledge" that calls for more active participation of the Muslim minority in the Swedish society. However, the emphasis on preserving and strengthening the religious identity of immigrants contributes to the political and social polarization of the Swedish society and reinforces the opposition between "us" (Muslims) and "them" (Swedes).

In modern Sweden, the concepts of "Islam" and "Muslim" are simplified and interrelated. This has contributed to the emergence of new term "racism without races", meaning racism based on cultural and religious affiliation rather than race [20, s. 20—21]. These simplifications have caused the emergence of such concepts as "cultural clash" and "religious dialogue" in the social and political discourse, wherein both culture and religion are perceived as something monolithic and static [21, s. 78—79]. Thus, any attempt to protect Muslims from the influence of Western society values (freedom of conscience, gender equality, modern views on "non-traditional" sexual orientation) by creating a "parallel" institutionalized Islamic sector in the form of "Muslim civil society" can have a negative impact on the integration process of segregated Muslim communities into the unified Swedish society. Moreover, it can lead to the radicalization of Muslims who will move to Sweden in the years to come.

From a "vulnerable area" to an ethno-religious "parallel society": transformation factors

Migration flows from the Middle Eastern and African Muslim countries to Sweden will keep their intensity in the coming years due to the new refugee and family reunification programmes. At the same time, the "parallel" immigrant sector in Sweden will be able to expand and function as a competitive social and political structure. Therefore, cultural Islamization of the Swedish population by Muslim social structures can provoke an escalation of socials and political tensions within the state. This raises the question of the actual number of Muslims in Sweden and of their ability to really pose a threat to the welfare of the Swedish society and the state's territorial security.

Modern Sweden lacks research on the number of Muslims, but the number of people with "Muslim background" in 2014 was estimated at 450,000 people, 110,000 of whom were members of the six most reputable Swedish Muslim organizations [22, p. 144]. According to other estimates, the number

[10] Ibid.

of Muslims reached 1,022,850 or 10.2% of the Swedish population in 2017[11], and 8.1% in 2016[12]. However, these estimates only consider immigrants and refugees from countries with predominantly Muslim population and disregard Muslims with Swedish background or immigrants from the EU, the former USSR and the Americas. Looking further back, "over the period from 1990 to 2018, the share of Muslims in Sweden's religious population increased by 4.6 times. Today Muslims account for almost 14% of the religious population in the country, and according to our calculations, Sweden is home to 950,000 Muslims" [23, p. 92].

Researching Swedish social services' work with immigrants from disadvantaged areas has revealed the persistence of many "colonial stereotypes"; thus, immigrants with "Muslim background" are often labeled as "traditionalist", "irrational", and "authoritarian" [24, p. 558—560]. This model of perception of immigrants with non-European background by their cultural identity is one of the factors in the growth of Islamophobic sentiments in society. This significantly complicates the integration of Muslim population into the Swedish society.

Among the Nordic states, only Denmark and Sweden officially publish government reports on disadvantaged immigrant areas. The Danish position is based on statistical data [25, p. 64—65], while the Swedish system is focused on the generalized experience in the perception of these areas. For example, the Swedish police reports[13] refer to the "parallel" social structures and violent religious extremism in segregated Muslim areas, but they do not indicate the source of their data.

Swedish social and political discourse often labels segregated Muslim Immigrant areas (where up to 95% of residents may have foreign background) as "suburbs" (*förorter*), "immigrant areas" (*invandrarområden*), "excluded territories" (*utanförskapsområden*) or "vulnerable areas" (*utsatta områden*) [15, p. 20]. This reinforces the negative perception of the residents of such areas in the Swedish society.

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[11] Hübinette, T. 2017, Hur många muslimer finns det i Sverige? *Aktuellt Fokus — Oberoende nyheter för vanligt folk,* available at: https://aktuelltfokus.se/hur-manga-muslimer-finns-det-i-sverige/ (accessed 07.04.2021).

[12] Europe's Growing Muslim Population, 2016, *Pew Research Center: Religion & Public Life*, available at: https://www.pewforum.org/2017/11/29/europes-growing-muslim-population/ (accessed 07.04.2021).

[13] Utsatta områden — sociala risker, kollektiv förmåga och oönskade händelser. Nationella operativa avdelningen, Underrättelseenheten, 2015, *Polisen,* S. 19—20, availalb at: https://polisen.se/siteassets/dokument/ovriga_rapporter/utsatta-omraden-sociala-risker-kollektiv-formaga-och-oonskade-handelser.pdf (accessed 07.04.2021).

According to a report by the Swedish National Police Operations Directorate, "vulnerable area" (*utsatt område*) is "a geographically isolated area with a low social and economic status, where the criminals have an impact on the local community"[14]. At the same time, an "especially vulnerable territory" (*särskilt utsatt område*) implies the existence of parallel social structures, extremism, persons who are leaving the country to participate in hostilities in conflict areas, and high concentration of criminals. A "vulnerable area" that does not meet all these special criteria is considered a "risk zone".

Most of the Swedish suburbs that fall under the definition of "vulnerable areas" emerged in 1965—1975 due to the Million Programme (*Miljonprogram*)[15]. This programme was designed to solve the housing shortage in Swedish cities. However, already in the early 1970s the lack of housing in such residential areas turned into its oversupply. Gradually, their population changed to include socially marginalized residents and immigrants with low financial resources. According to the Swedish National Board of Housing, Building and Planning, today these areas are predominantly populated with the youth, people with "foreign background" and families with low income[16]. In addition, closed-off layout of these territories helped create internal residential areas with local social infrastructure and no carriageway. Around the perimeter, these areas are "fenced" by apartment buildings and the adjacent roads. Closed layout, overpopulation, social and economic issues characteristic of the Million Programme suburbs contribute to the criminalization of these areas and hinder effective police work.

Today in Sweden, there are 60 areas classified as "vulnerable areas"; 32 of which are "especially vulnerable" or "risk zones"[17]. The number of "especially vulnerable areas" increased from 15 in 2015 to 22 in 2019[18]. In 2020, criminal groups in these areas were able to organize a curfew in the Stockholm suburb of Tensta and establish checkpoints for entering cars in the Gothenburg districts of Hammarkullen and Hjällbo [26, p. 1]. In addition, "especially vulnerable areas"

[14] Kriminell påverkan i lokalsamhället — En lägesbild för utvecklingen i utsatta områden. Nationella operativa avdelningen, Underrättelseenheten, 2019, *Polisen,* S. 4, availalb at: https://polisen.se/siteassets/dokument/ovriga_rapporter/kriminell-paverkan-i-lokalsamhallet.pdf (accessed 07.04.2021).

[15] *Utsatta områden — sociala risker, kollektiv förmåga och oönskade händelser*, 2015, Nationella operativa avdelningen, Underrättelseenheten, S. 8.

[16] Trångboddheten i storstadsregionerna, 2016, *Boverket*,. S. 15, available at: https://www.boverket.se/globalassets/publikationer/dokument/2016/trangboddheten-i-storstadsregionerna.pdf (accessed 07.04.2021).

[17] Åtgärder för utsatta områden, 2019, *Riksdagens öppna data,* available at: https://data.riksdagen.se/fil/1CC11ADE-EE49—410A-9AB3-A71FB162C76A (accessed 07.04.2021).

[18] Ibid.

contribute to the strengthening of Islamist radicalization [27, s. 40]. This trend is most pronounced in the Stockholm districts of Rinkeby and Angered, as well as in the Malmö suburb of Rosengård [28, s. 213]. Most of the people subject to radicalization are immigrants in the first and second generation, but radicalization can also affect "ethnic Swedes" with no previous relationship with Islam. [29, s. 85]. In Sweden, the number of people involved in various aggressively-minded extremist groups has increased from several hundred to three thousand over the past few years [30, s. 35].

The political vector of fighting terrorism in Sweden has put the problems of social, economic and political marginalization of the Muslim population in the same category with the fight against violent extremism. As a result, the Swedish social and political discourse has begun to consider almost all Muslims as "suspects" [31, p. 71]. According to one study on racial and ethnic profiling as a method of combating crime in Sweden, "as a Muslim, it is enough to be in the same place as a supervised person to raise suspicion" [32, p. 25]. On the other hand, the Italian expert on radical Islam Lorenzo Vidino believes that European agents of the Muslim Brotherhood are spreading this anti-Muslim narrative focused on emphasizing and exaggerating Islamophobic incidents [3, p. 3]. This is done to strengthen the conviction of Islamophobia and hostility of the surrounding society among Muslims. Thus, a combination of Islamist ideology with an anti-Muslim narrative can contribute to radicalization of some Muslims. Nevertheless, the Swedish National Police Operations Directorate believes that "currently, there is no area in Sweden where a parallel social system fully exists, but vulnerable areas have elements of this"[19].

Swedish liberal integration policy is aimed at countering "parallel societies" and strengthening democratic values. As in Denmark [25, p. 61], in Sweden the integration of Muslim immigrants into the unified Swedish society is focused primarily on children and school as the main social institution for their socialization. In this regard, "independent religious schools" are especially dangerous: "We want to put an end to new independent religious schools. <…> Instead of becoming a bridge to society, the school risks to turn into an enclave that isolates children from the rest of society and opposes equality and equal treatment of girls and boys"[20]. Political, social and economic problems associated with immigration and the emergence of Muslim independent schools have been widely discussed since the early 2000s [33, s. 267], which has led to several issues related to Islamist activities and Islamophobia.

[19] *Utsatta områden — sociala risker, kollektiv förmåga och oönskade händelser*, 2015, Nationella operativa avdelningen, Underrättelseenheten, S. 19.

[20] Avci, G. 2019, Liberal integrationspolitik. Stärk individen — motverka parallellsamhällen, *Riksdagens öppna data,* S. 4, available at: https://data.riksdagen.se/fil/575BDE5E-4DF0—4F77-A6BC-664AE949D94C (accessed 07.04.2021).

At present, there are 7,000 schools in Sweden; 66 schools are religious and only 11 of those are Muslim[21]. These Muslim schools have been heavily criticized and presented as "religious schools" in the Swedish social and political discourse, even though such category of schools is prohibited by Swedish law for non-compliance of their curriculum with the Swedish educational standards. Nevertheless, the opponents of religious Muslim schools regularly demand their closure. A case broadcasted on the largest TV network in Sweden concerning separate seating for boys and girls on a school bus in Stockholm provides an example of negative treatment of such schools in Swedish public discourse [15, p. 37]. On the part of Swedish society, this situation is a violation of the democratic order, while the Muslim community considers this to be an instance of Islamophobia in Sweden.

Swedish integration policy aims to "reduce segregation and create equal conditions for growing up and living and good life chances for all"[22]. However, one of the most serious stumbling blocks on the road to understanding between the government and the Swedish Muslim community is the issue of removal of children from Muslim families recognized as disadvantaged. According to the statistics from the child protection system in Sweden, annually about 30,000 children live under the care of various government institutions[23]; 65% of them as well as 83% of children from boarding houses have foreign background. At the same time, the children and youth with foreign Muslim background account for 35% of the total number of the Swedish young generation [15, p. 16—17]. Thus, the representatives of the Swedish Muslim community believe that this system covers an unjustifiably wide audience. This increases the dissatisfaction of the Swedish Muslim population with government activities and contributes to polarization between the Swedish society and the Muslim immigrant community.

These facts indicate the need for urgent measures by the government to prevent further development of an unfavorable situation. The Swedish authorities are seeking to prevent the development of a Muslim "parallel society" on the territory of the state. For example, in December 2020 the National Board for Health and Welfare received an annual budget of 250 million Swedish kronor for the period 2021—2023 in social initiatives to prevent crime in the "vulnerable territories"[24].

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[21] Lista: Sveriges religiösa friskolor. Skolvärlden, 2017, *Skolvärlden*, available at: https://skolvarlden.se/artiklar/lista-sveriges-religiosa-friskolor (accessed 07.04.2021).

[22] Lagercrantz, H. (Red.) 2019, Segregation i Norden — om inkludering, unga och politik, *Nordens välfärdscenter,* S. 19, available at: https://nordicwelfare.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/Segregation-i-norden-webb1.pdf accessed 07.04.2021).

[23] Statistik om socialtjänstinsatser till barn och unga 2019. Socialstyrelsen, 2020, *Socialstyrelsen: Startsida,* S. 1, available at: https://www.socialstyrelsen.se/globalassets/sharepoint-dokument/artikelkatalog/statistik/2020—8—6871.pdf (accessed 07.04.2021).

[24] Sociala insatser i utsatta områden, 2021, *Regeringskansliet*, available at: https://www.regeringen.se/pressmeddelanden/2021/02/sociala-insatser-i-utsatta-omraden/ (accessed 07.04.2021).

However, the current situation in Sweden indicates that these measures are insufficient to effectively counter increasing segregation of immigrant Muslim communities. On the one hand, Islamist organizations promoting the formation of "parallel societies" in Sweden do not have ideological instruments to oppose the radicalization of Muslim youth in "vulnerable areas". Moreover, the tendency of the Muslim Brotherhood to adapt its religious and political ideology to the democratic structure of European states leads to a discrepancy between its practice and the general message of the Quran. This causes intensification of Salafi extremist activities [34, s. 60]. On the other hand, state integration policy uses rather contradictory methods of cultural assimilation of Muslim youth and provokes the Swedish Muslim community into discontent.

Conclusion

Despite the wide coverage of the social and political activities of the Islamist movement in Europe, there is still no sufficient knowledge of the phenomenon in Sweden. However, the actions of "Muslim extremists" over the past decade and, consequently, the Islamophobic and anti-Muslim discourse in the Swedish society have contributed to the rising relevance of research into the problems of Islamism and the segregation of Muslim immigrant communities.

Based on the religious, political and social ideas of the Muslim Brotherhood, Swedish Islamist organizations are exerting an increasing ideological influence on immigrants with "Muslim background". This has largely predetermined the territorial enclavization of immigrant residential areas. Today, this group of Swedish residents constitutes from 10 to 14% of the population. In order to prevent polarization of the Swedish society, the authorities have attempted to rehabilitate the discredited policy of multiculturalism by introducing a new concept of 'diversity'. However, Islamist organisations have used the policy of 'diversity' as a structure of opportunity to adapt the ideological attitudes of the Muslim Brotherhood to the specifics of the Swedish democratic society. The formation of the religious identity of representatives of Muslim minorities has hindered external criticism towards social and political activities of these organizations.

As an intermediary between the Muslim community and the state, Islamist organisations counter cultural assimilation of Muslim immigrants through the formation of a special "Muslim identity". This neo-ethnic approach prevents the effective integration of immigrants from Muslim countries into the unified Swedish society. In addition, within the immigrant communities it contributes to the development of a "parallel" political, social and economic sector with its own "parallel" structures: schools, social services and economic infrastructure that function in accordance with Islamic norms and values. At the same time, the growing influence of the Danish rhetoric about the need to counter the "parallel" immigrant "ghettos" on the Swedish social and political discourse gives rise to the "anti-Muslim racism" in society.

Inability of the Swedish state integration policy to regulate the current situation has been reflected in the Swedish police reports on the emergence of new 'especially vulnerable areas' since 2015. This is further confirmed by low efficiency of the Swedish social services' work with immigrants, and the contradictory state policy in relation to children with "Muslim background". The lack of effective countermeasures to "parallel" structures in "vulnerable areas" is a concomitant factor in the rise of violent extremism as a threat to national security. At the same time, the situation is exacerbated by the activities of Islamist organizations. Despite the desire of the Muslim Brotherhood to isolate itself from violent extremism, widespread dissemination of a politicized version of Islam in Muslim European society contributes to radicalization of young people who consider the methods of "peaceful" Islamization insufficient for qualitative changes in the European society. Therefore, violent Muslim extremism is a problem for both the Swedish state and Islamist organizations, despite their different social and political impact on the Swedish Muslim community. Both sides joining effort in solving this problem would be possible by constructing a new identity of Swedish citizens with "foreign Muslim background". This identity must be consistent with both the ideas of a democratic Swedish society and the aspirations of Islamist organisations to preserve the cultural traditions and religious identity of immigrants from Muslim countries.

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The authors

Ekaterina Yu. Talalaeva, Research Fellow, Centre for Religious and Ethnopolitical Studies, Pushkin Leningrad State University, Russia.

E-mail: aikatarin@mail.ru

https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6007-5202

Prof. Tatiana S. Pronina, Senior Researcher, Centre for Religious and Ethnopolitical Studies, Pushkin Leningrad State University, Russia.

E-mail: tania_pronina@mail.ru

https://orcid.org/0000-0002-8902-9154

DEVELOPMENT OF RURAL SETTLEMENTS IN THE BALTIC REGION

THE EFFECT OF GEOGRAPHICAL POSITION AND EMPLOYMENT FLUCTUATIONS ON RURAL SETTLEMENT TRENDS

G. M. Fedorov[1]
S. Kinder[2]
T. Yu. Kuznetsova[1]

[1] Immanuel Kant Baltic Federal University
14, A. Nevskogo ul., Kaliningrad, 236016, Russia
[2] Eberhard Karls University Tübingen
Geschwister-Scholl-Platz, Tübingen, 72074, Germany

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Structural changes in the economy and spatial and inter-settlement differences in living standards and quality of life lead to fundamental alterations in the national settlement system. Settlement polarisation is gathering momentum, along with the movement of rural population from Russia's east and north to its southern and metropolitan regions. These processes benefit urban agglomerations. Typological differences between regional settlement systems, still poorly understood but essential for strategic and spatial planning, are growing. This article draws on the concept of the geographical demographic situation; it uses official statistics on Russian regions and Kaliningrad municipalities and settlements to explore the connection between rural settlement trends and employment fluctuations caused by structural shifts in Russian regional economies. It is shown how settlement polarisation affects differences in settlement trends of meso- and microdistrict levels. Regions are identified that have a capacity for rural-urban migration and corresponding rural employment structure and trends.

Keywords:
rural population, Russia, Kaliningrad region, population density, settlement pattern changes, employment rate

Introduction

There are much fewer studies into rural settlements in Russia than into urban ones. However, they do exist. For instance, Sergey Kovalev undertook extensive research into rural settlements as early as the 1960s [1]; Kazys Šešelgis proposed the concept of a unified settlement system [2], which was further elaborated by

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Boris Khorev [3]. Tatyana Zaslavskaya led a comprehensive study of rural migration, focusing on changes in rural settlement [4]. Geographical research into Russian rural areas continues, along with the identification of factors in migration, its patterns, and territorial features [6; 7]. The literature pays attention to the characteristics of rural migration processes [8—10] that change the structure of employment [11; 12] and lead to shifts in the economy [13—15]. A theoretical framework for the development of rural settlement systems is lacking, along with a typology of such systems and visions of future for each type, save for postulations of settlement polarisation and proposals to bridge the gap between standards of living in rural and urban areas, strengthen the role of smaller towns, diversify incomes, etc.

The economic and social conditions of rural development changed as the administrative-command system collapsed. Although villages require a new ekistic concept, the primary focus is on geourbanism, which has replaced population and settlement geography in the geography and regional studies curriculum. This article explores factors affecting rural settlement and some of its meso- and microdistrict features, placing them in the context of rural economic development. We believe that our findings will be of broad use when conducting feasibility studies for the general principles of urban settlement concepts suiting the new socio-economic conditions.

Methods

This study draws on the concept of the regional geographical-demographic situation [16; 17], which links demographic processes to socio-economic factors such as employment fluctuations in the agrarian sector — agriculture, hunting, forestry, logging, and fishery. Methodologically, we attempt to identify qualitative characteristics of rural settlement, using a meso- and microdistrict typology. We employ data from Rosstat on Russian regions and from Kaliningradstat on changes in the average village population. Two-way classification, economic mapping, and graph-based methods were used to process the data.

Meso-district differences in rural settlement

Population density is a principal factor affecting rural settlement trends. Although a high population density is naturally a result of earlier rapid growth, the distribution of regions according to natural increase and net migration has changed in the new socio-economic conditions. The coefficient of correlation between the population density in 2020 and the population change in 1989—2020 is 0.65 (a strong correlation is the absolute value of above 0.7). Another measure directly connected to rural population change is the average annual temperature in the region; the correlation coefficient is 0.63.

Grouping Russian regions by population density and change (Table 1, Fig. 1) sheds light on the spatial features of rural settlement.

Table 1

Russian regions by rural population change and density

People per sq. m.б 2020	2020, % of 1989 values			
	79.9 and fewer	80.0—99.9	100.0—109.9	110.0 and more
30.0—64.9 people per sq. m.	—	—	Moscow region	Republic of Ingushetia, Chechnya, Crimea, Dagestan, Kabardino-Balkaria, Adygeya, North Ossetia-Alania; Krasnodar region
10.0—24.9 people per sq. m.	Republic of Mordovia and Chuvashia; Voronezh, Bryansk, Kursk, Tambov regions	Republic of Tatarstan; Belgorod, Lipetsk, Tula, Vladimir regions	Republics of Bashkortostan, Udmurtia; Stavropol krai; Rostov, Samara regions	Republic of Karachay-Cherkessia; Kaliningrad region
5.0—9.9 people per sq. m.	Penza, Kaluga, Ulyanovsk, Ryazan, Smolensk regions	Oryol region; Republic of Mari El; Altai krai; Ivanovo, Chelyabinsk, Yaroslavl, Saratov, Volgograd regions	Leningrad, Astrakhan, Orenburg regions	—
1.0—4.9 people per sq. m.	Kurgan, Omsk, Tver, Pskov, Kirov, Novgorod, Kostroma, Vologda regions; Jewish autonomous region	Republic of Kalmykia; Perm, Primorsky krais; Kemerovo, Novosibirsk, Tymen (excluding the autonomous region) regions	Republics of Khakassia, Altai; Sverdlovsk region	—
0.01—0.99 people per sq. m.	Republics of Karelia, Komi; Zabaikalsky, Khabarovsk, Krasnoyarsk, Kamchatka krais; Sakhalin, Amur, Arkhangelsk (excluding the Nenets autonomous region), Murmansk, Magadan regions; Yamal-Nenets, Nenets, Chukotka autonomous regions	Republics of Tyva, Sakha (Yakutia); Irkuts, Tomsk regions	Khanty-Mansi autonomous region — Yugra	—

Comment: 82 Russian regions were considered, excluding Moscow, St Petersburg, and Sevastopol.

Prepared by the authors based on data from Boldyrev, B.A. Itogi perepisi naseleniya SSSR [USSR census records]. Moscow: Finansy i statistika, 1990; *Regiony Rossii. Sotsialno-ekonomicheskie pokazateli 2020 [Russian regions. Socio-economic indicators]*. 2020. Moscow: Rosstat.

In the top right-hand cell of the table, there are regions of the North Caucasian and Southern federal districts distinguished by a high population density and a rapid population increase. Their situation is a product of the traditionally high replacement rate in the republics of North Caucasus and positive net migration in the Republic of Crimea and the Krasnodar krai. The rural population is growing, albeit at a slower pace, in the Moscow region. Regions with the lowest population density are in the bottom cells. These territories are located in the east of the country and its European north, where the rural population is declining. In most regions, the rural population decreased by 20 per cent in 1989—2020.

The rural population grew in only three regions with a population density of 1.0—4.9 and 10.0—24.9 people per sq. km. Territories with a high density (10.0—24.9 people, all in the European part of the country) are more evenly distributed according to population change. Still, there are more rural population losers (eleven regions) than gainers (seven regions).

In 1989—2020, the rural population decreased by 7.4 per cent nationwide and by more than 20 per cent in 34 regions. Nefedova and Mkrtchyan carried out a careful analysis to identify the reasons behind this decline [6, 11]. There are two chief reasons for rural migration. The first one is the striving for better living and social conditions often found in cities or milder climates. The other is the lack of jobs in rural areas — a result of the organisational and technological transformations brought about by the market transition.

Let us now turn to the effect of fluctuations in agricultural employment on rural-urban migration. Bychenko and Shabanov [18] cogently note that an increasingly smaller proportion of the rural population is employed in agriculture. Yet, their thesis that ‘agriculture has gradually ceased to be the principal industry in rural areas’ seems questionable: we believe that agriculture has lost some, but not all, of its significance. The main reason for a decrease in agricultural employment among the rural population is not the increase in the share of the working-age population in rural areas (which rose by 15 per cent in 1990—2009 [18]), but changes in the structure of agricultural producers (large companies, farmsteads, and smallholdings).

The main factor is the decrease in the number of people employed in agriculture; the decline was 31 per cent[1] from 1990 to 2004. This process continues. Employment in agriculture, hunting, forestry, and fishery decreased by 36 per cent in

[1] Prepared by the authors based on data from *The economy of the RSFSR in 1990*. Moscow: Republican Information and Publishing Centre. 1991. P.109; *Regiony Rossii. Sotsialno-ekonomicheskie pokazateli 2005 [Russian regions. Socio-economic indicators 2005]*. Moscow: Rosstat. 2006. P. 84.

2005—2019.[2] The number of people employed in crop and livestock production and hunting decreased by 6 per cent from 2017 to 2019, just as it did across the agrarian sector.

These changes are a consequence of the diminishing role of farmsteads in agricultural production and the growing contribution of highly mechanised enterprises requiring less manual labour. New non-agricultural jobs are few because of competition from towns and cities offering higher profit margins. Alternative activities that cannot be pursued in cities, such as eco-tourism, are slow to develop. Commuting is flourishing on the outskirts of cities, whilst rural-urban migration continues in the periphery.

Although the exhaustion of resources for rural-urban workforce redistribution was postulated as early as the beginning of the 2000s (and the process is gaining speed), this statement seems to require verification by calculation. In 2017, rural-urban migration in Russia achieved 97.9 thousand people; in 2018, 101.3 thousand. However, the rural population of Russia grew through international arrivals: net migration was 50.6 thousand in 2017 and 31.8 thousand in 2018.[3]

Although, when 2020—2021 become available, the quantitative characteristics of migration will change (the Covid-19 restrictions are to blame), the general rural-urban migration patterns are likely to persist. The ratio between the proportion of people employed in the agrarian sector (including agriculture) and the share in the rural population supports this assumption. Across the country, this ratio is 26.5 per cent for the agrarian sector and 23.4 per cent for agriculture. The differences between federal districts are substantial (Table 2). The proportion is the highest in North Caucasus (35.2 per cent), with most agrarian workers employed in agriculture, as is the case in the Southern federal district. The North-West, Siberia, and the Far East specialise in forestry and logging, whilst fishery is the principal industry in many villages in the Far East and, to a lesser extent, the North-West.

[2] Prepared by the authors based on data from *Regiony Rossii. Sotsialno-ekonomicheskie pokazateli [Russian regions. Socio-economic indicators]* 2006. Moscow: Rosstat. 2007. P. 106; *Regiony Rossii. Sotsialno-ekonomicheskie pokazateli 2020 [Russian regions. Socio-economic indicators 2020]*. Moscow: Rosstat. 2020. P. 142.

[3] *Demografichesky ezhegodnik Rossii [The demographic yearbook of Russia]*. 2019. Moscow: Rosstat, 2019. P. 219.

Table 2

Employment in the agrarian sector, per cent of the rural population, 2019

Russia, federal districts	Employed individuals as % of the share in the rural population			
	Agrarian sector	Including		
		Crop production, animal husbandry, hunting and related services	Forestry and logging	Fishery
Russia	26.5	23.4	2.4	0.7
Central	24.4	22.3	1.8	0.3
Northwestern	24.7	15.0	7.6	2.1
including Kaliningrad region	21.1	17.1	1.5	2.5
Southern	28.7	27.7	0.3	0.7
North Caucasus	35.2	34.6	0.3	0.3
Volga	27.2	24.9	2.1	0.2
Ural	20.8	17.0	3.3	0.5
Siberian	29.1	23.7	5.0	0.4
Far Eastern	26.0	16.0	5.3	4.7

Prepared based on data from *Regiony Rossii. Sotsialno-ekonomicheskie pokazateli 2020 [Russian regions. Socio-economic indicators 2020]*. Moscow: Rosstat. 2020.

Rural employment becomes more diverse when viewed at the level of regions (Fig. 1). This diversity should be taken into account when forecasting rural settlement trends. Below we examine the situation in regions with a rate of employment in the agrarian sector above 40 per cent.

In the Republic of Mordovia and the Tambov and Volgograd regions, over 50 per cent of the rural population works in the agrarian sector. In the Republic of Kabardin-Balkaria and the Omsk and Voronezh regions, this proportion is 40 per cent. In the Magadan region, it is 71 per cent, with fishery being the principal industry. This proportion is so substantial because local economically active individuals reside primarily in the urban areas. The fishery is a major employer in the Kamchatka krai, where the ratio in question is above 40 per cent, just as it is in the Kirov and Astrakhan regions. In the two latter territories, agriculture prevails, with a focus on forestry and logging in Kirov and fishery in Astrakhan.

If agriculture develops through an increase in workforce productivity, regions with a high rate of employment in agriculture will boost rural-urban migration, as more people will head to cities looking for a job. Regions where a small proportion of the rural population is involved in the agrarian sector and other employment opportunities are few may also contribute to the movement to cities. This does not apply to the Krasnodar krai and the Republic of Crimea, whose rural residents may take jobs in tourism and agriculture.



Fig. 1. Employment in the agrarian sector as a per cent of the share in the rural population

Prepared based on data from Regiony Rossii. *Sotsialno-ekonomicheskie pokazateli 2020 [Russian regions. Socio-economic indicators]*. Moscow: Rosstat. 2020.

Microdistrict rural settlement trends in the Kaliningrad region

Nefedova points out that suburb-periphery differences are the key to the organisation of rural areas [19]. These variations cause the intra-regional gap between the suburbs of large cities and their peripheries to grow. Affected by many factors, the average village population changes differently in suburbs and peripheries. Let us look at the processes taking place in the Kaliningrad settlement system. An exclave, the region provides a good model for investigating a settlement system.

Ekistic processes and their link to economic development have been studied in the Kaliningrad region since the 1970s, and research into rural settlement and population continues in the 21st century [21—25]. Special attention has been paid to regional agricultural development [26—30], which heavily influences settlement. Although the literature has identified general polarisation trends in rural settlement and agricultural production, the features of population change in villages remain poorly understood. Moreover, the maps below and their analysis aimed at an accurate reflection of changes in rural settlement constitute the first attempt of its kind.

Rural settlement trends in the Kaliningrad region have similarities with those in Central Russia, but the situation in the exclave has distinctive features. A marked difference between suburban and peripheral areas is a clear similarity, whilst the mild climate, a high urban and rural population density, closely packed settlements, and the abundance of paved roads make up the uniqueness of the region. Kaliningrad has positive net migration figures, with many arrivals in rural areas, where housing costs are lower than in cities. In 2020, the rural population was growing almost as fast as the urban population.

The urban and rural population of the Kaliningrad region increased in 1992—2020 (Fig. 2), whilst both declined across the nation, rural areas suffering the heaviest losses.



Fig. 2. Rural and urban population change in the Kaliningrad region, 1950—2020

Prepared by the authors based on *Demografichesky ezhegodnik 2010 [The demographic yearbook 2010]*. Kaliningrad: Kaliningradstat, 2010; *Demografichesky ezhegodnik 2018 [The demographic yearbook 2018]*. *https://kaliningrad.gks.ru/population (accessed 10.02.2021); Kaliningradskaya oblast v tsifrakh [Kaliningrad region in digits]. 2020. 1. Kaliningrad: Kaliningradstat. 2020.

The number of people employed in the agrarian sector of the region remained practically unchanged in 1990—2005, reaching 48.8 thousand people in 2005. By 2019, it more than halved to 22.5 thousand people (or 46.1 per cent of the 2005 level, compared to the national average of 63.6 per cent; the rural population decline in the Kaliningrad region was more rapid than across the country[4]). In 2017—2019, the reduction was 12.5 per cent, compared to the Russian average of 5.8 per cent.[5] The number of individuals employed in agriculture fell by 10.1 per cent; in forestry and logging, 24.6 per cent; in fishery, 19.3 per cent.

[4] *Regiony Rossii. Sotsialno-ekonomicheskie pokazateli 2002 [Russian regions. Socio-economic indicators 2020]*. Moscow: Goskomstat. 2002. *Regiony Rossii. Sotsialno-ekonomicheskie pokazateli 2020 [Russian regions. Socio-economic indicators 2020]*. Moscow: Rosstat. 2020.

[5] Average annual size of the economically active population (calculated based on data integration) since 2017. URL: https://fedstat.ru/indicator/58994 (accessed 13.04.2021).

Although fishery provides more agrarian jobs in the region than it does on average across the country, it is rapidly losing its significance as a principal employer. Once a leader in the Soviet fishing industry, the region is becoming less and less visible in trade.

The decline in the number of people employed in agriculture is due to a growing concentration of production at large mechanised enterprises, which need fewer workers than farmsteads do. This process is more pronounced in Kaliningrad than across the country (Table 3). The rate of agricultural production growth in the region is above the national average: the territory accounted for 0.54 per cent of Russian agricultural output in 2005 and 0.70 per cent in 2019.

Table 3

Changes in the structure of agricultural output by the type of producer, 2005—2019

Type of produce	Type of producer					
	Agricultural enterprises		Smallholdings		Farms	
	2005	2019	2005	2019	2005	2019
Livestock and poultry						
Russia	46.2	79.8	51.4	17.1	2.4	3.1
Kaliningrad region	67.6	92.8	28.8	5.7	3.6	1.5
Milk						
Russia	45.1	54.1	51.8	37.4	3.1	8.5
Kaliningrad region	38.4	59.5	57.1	35	4.5	5.5
Grain						
Russia	80.6	70.1	1.1	0.7	18.3	29.2
Kaliningrad region	78.9	90.1	0.4	0.7	20.7	9.2
Potatoes						
Russia	8.4	21	88.8	65.7	2.8	13.3
Kaliningrad region	11.9	27.9	72.2	50	16	22.1
Vegetable						
Russia	18.7	28.1	74.4	51.7	6.9	20.2
Kaliningrad region	5.5	14.1	83.1	54.1	11.4	31.8

Prepared by the authors based on data from *Regiony Rossii. Sotsialno-ekonomicheskie pokazateli 2020 [Russian regions. Socio-economic indicators]*. 2020. Moscow: Rosstat. 2020.

Intra-regional differences in settlement trends are substantial and correspond to the polarisation patterns. In 2010—2020, the population growth rate was high in the regional centre and even higher in its suburbs (Table 4, Fig. 3). People migrated from remote suburbs and especially the periphery. A distinctive feature of the territory is a higher rate of population change in rural areas than in towns and cities across all the three zones — near and remote suburbs and the periphery.

Table 4

Rural population change in the Kaliningrad region, 2010—2020

Zone of Kaliningrad region	Population, people, as of 01.01.2020	2020, % of 2010	
		Urban	Rural
Kaliningrad region, total	1012.5	107.6	107.1
Kaliningrad	489.4	113.3	—
Near suburbs	257.7	113.4	114.9
Remote suburbs	65.8	93.9	97.5
Periphery	191.7	91.9	95.1

Prepared by the authors based on *Demografichesky ezhegodnik 2010 [The demographic yearbook 2010]*. Kaliningrad: Kaliningradstat, 2010; Population of the Kaliningrad region as of 01.01.2020. URL: https://kaliningrad.gks.ru/population (accessed 10.02.2021)



Fig. 3. Population of towns and cities at the beginning of 2020; urban and rural population change, 2020,% of 2010

Prepared by the authors based on *Demografichesky ezhegodnik 2010 [The demographic yearbook 2010]*. Kaliningrad: Kaliningradstat, 2010; Population of the Kaliningrad region as of 01.01.2020, URL: https://kaliningrad.gks.ru/population (accessed 10.02.2021).

All villages and rural municipalities of the near suburban zone have a high rate of employment outside the agrarian sector; residents commute to Kaliningrad and nearby towns. Economically active individuals work primarily in the villages where they live — at service enterprises or local industrial facilities. Agriculture accounts for most jobs in the other municipalities. A similar conclusion can be drawn from data in Table 5 showing the ratio between the contribution of a municipality to regional agricultural output and its share in the rural population.

Table 5

Municipal districts*	Share in the rural population, %	Contribution of the municipality to regional agricultural output, % of its share in the rural population
Near suburbs		
Bagrationovsk**	11.84	45.9
Baltiysk	0.68	62.8
Zelenogradsk	9.59	52.1
Guryevsk	22.52	59.0
Svetly	3.09	15.2
Svetlogorsk***	2.40	17.0
Remote suburbs		
Gvardeysk	7.01	67.8
Polessk	4.96	150.5****
Pravdinsk	6.43	191.1
Periphery		
Gusev	4.00	184.7
Krasnoznamensk	3.78	97.0
Neman	3.35	156.2
Nesterov	4.78	233.9
Ozersk	4.17	158.0
Slavsk	6.60	151.1
Chernyakhovsk	4.80	120.5

* Excluding Kaliningrad, Pionersky, and Sovetsk (no rural population).

** Including the Ladushkin and Mamonovo districts.

*** The Yantarny district.

**** Values above 100 per cent are shown in semibold.

Prepared by the authors based on data from *Demografichesky ezhegodnik Kaliningradskoy oblasti 2018 [The Demographic Yearbook of the Kaliningrad region 2018]*. Kaliningrad: Kaliningradstat. 2018. URL: https://kaliningrad.gks.ru/population (accessed 10.02.2021); *Munitsipalnye obrazovaniia Kaliningradskoi oblasti. Sotsialno-ekonomicheskoe razvitie v 2015—2019 godakh [Municipalities of the Kaliningrad region. Socio-economic development in 2015—2019]*. Kaliningrad: Kaliningradstat. 2020.

Table 6, Figs. 4 and 5 demonstrate the spatial features and trends in rural settlement in the suburbs and periphery of the Kaliningrad region.

Table 6

Rural population in the suburban and periphery municipalities of the Kaliningrad regions, 2010—2020

Average village population	Population, 2020, % of 2010	
	Guryevsk and Zelenogradsk suburban municipalities	Krasnoznamensk and Nesterov periphery municipalities
2000–5999	132.8	—
1000–1999	125.2	102.3
500–999	130.1	90.8
200–499	105.6	89.8
100–199	107.4	91.5
50–99	104.6	91.8
0–49	102.3	86
Total	121.4	91.9

Prepared by the authors based on data from *The urban and rural population of the Kaliningrad region as of 1 January 2020*. Kaliningrad: Kaliningradstat. 2020. URL: https://kaliningrad.gks.ru/population (accessed 25.02.2021).



Fig. 4. Rural settlement trends in the Guryevsk and Zelenogradsk municipal districts of the Kaliningrad region, 2010—2020

Prepared by the authors based on data from *The urban and rural population of the Kaliningrad region as of 1 January 2020*. Kaliningrad: Kaliningradstat. 2020. URL: https://kaliningrad.gks.ru/population (accessed 25.02.2021).



Fig. 5. Rural settlement trends in the Krasnoznamensk and Nesterov municipal districts of the Kaliningrad region, 2010—2020

Prepared by the authors based on data from *The urban and rural population of the Kaliningrad region as of 1 January 2020.* Kaliningrad: Kaliningradstat. 2020. URL: https://kaliningrad.gks.ru/population (accessed 25.02.2021).

Settlement trends are qualitatively different in the suburban (Fig. 4) and periphery (Fig. 5) zones. In the suburbs, all villages became more populous in 2010—2020. As expected, larger settlements grew more impressively than smaller ones. In the periphery, only the '1,000—1,999' group witnessed a population increase; decline occurred in one village in each district; a settlement at the Russian-Lithuanian border checkpoint Chernyshevskoe-Kybartai gained residents. All four villages of the '2,000—5,000' group and eight out of the nine settlements of the '1,000—2,000' category saw a population increase in the suburban Guryevsk district. In the Zelenogradsk district, both '1,000—2,000 people' villages gained residents (Fig. 4). All the larger settlements are within 25 km from the regional centre, many bordering the city.

Location in the suburban zone does not automatically guarantee population growth. A decline was observed in many villages in the west of the Zelenogradsk district, which have poorer transport links than settlements along the thoroughfares linking Kaliningrad with the seaside resorts. Lying far from the regional centre, the villages of the Curonian Spit are losing population.

Bordering Kaliningrad, the Guryevsk district has a smaller proportion of villages losing population than the Zelenogradsk district. Such settlements are usually small and located far from main roads and Kaliningrad.

In 2010—2020, the population declined in many periphery villages — 38 out of 53 in the Krasnoznamensk district and 42 out of 53 in the Nesterov district. The administrative centres of the districts also lost residents. Most villages with a growing or stable population are located in the northern parts of the territories, which have better infrastructure and lie closer to the administrative centres.

The Kaliningrad regional policy has prioritised support for the economic development of periphery municipalities. A soft-loan programme, Vostok, was launched in 11 eastern municipalities in 2020.[6] Investment projects eligible for the programme can receive 50m roubles for seven or ten years (the latter applies to agrarian operations) at an interest rate of 1 per cent per year. The region allocated 150m roubles to support the initiative. It is hopefully the first of many measures that will comprise a comprehensive periphery development programme for Kaliningrad. Similar programmes should be launched in other Russian regions suffering from economic and settlement polarisation.

Conclusion

Many districts have sufficient workforce to fuel ongoing rural-urban migration replenishing urban human resources. Settlement polarisation will continue until working and living conditions in rural areas can rival the city lifestyle (and surpass it in ecological terms). Without turning into towns, villages should develop unique and appealing environments.

Better working and living conditions can be attained in rural areas by taking advantage of the scientific and technological revolution, which mostly has benefitted cities so far. Rural development strategies will depend on the socio-economic type of the region, its geographical location, and natural resources. Further research is needed to provide a scientific rationale for rural development proposals. It is essential to devise a theoretical and methodological framework for georuralism, which remains poorly developed compared to geourabanism, in line with the new socio-economic conditions. Concepts for settlement improvement

[6] The Vostok soft-loan programme resumed in the Kaliningrad region. URL: https://xn—90aifddrld7a.xn — p1ai/novosti/news/v-kaliningradskoy-oblasti-vozobnovlyaetsya-programma-lgotnogo-finansirovaniya-vostok/ (accessed 23.04.2021).

in rural areas should be worked out for various types of regions with different natural resources, socio-economic performance, and ecology. This article examined some typological differences between Russian regions and Kaliningrad microdistricts. It is crucial to draw on the experience of Russian and international territories that have made progress in solving rural development problems. Today's ecological agenda should encourage research into rural areas as a healthier alternative to urban environments.

The focus of strategic and spatial planning should be shifted to the periphery in the Kaliningrad region and most of Central Russia. It is vital to encourage and support local businesses while prioritising the development of social, transport, and utility infrastructure. However, migration from the rural periphery to the Kaliningrad agglomeration will continue, and measures for accommodating migrants will be requisite.

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The authors

Prof. Gennady M. Fedorov, Director, Centre for Baltic Geopolitical Studies, Immanuel Kant Baltic Federal University, Russia

E-mail: GFedorov@kantiana.ru

https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4267-2369

Prof. Sebastian Kinder, Head of Department of Economic Geography, Eberhard Karls University Tübingen, Germany

E-mail: sebastian.kinder@uni-tuebingen.de

Dr Tatyana Yu. Kuznetsova, Leading Research Fellow, Centre for Baltic Geopolitical Studies, Immanuel Kant Baltic Federal University, Russia

E-mail: TIKuznetsova@kantiana.ru

https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1523-2280

TRANSPORT CONNECTIVITY AS A FACTOR IN OVERCOMING CHALLENGES OF THE PERIPHERY: THE CASE OF RURAL AREAS IN THE KALININGRAD REGION

I. S. Gumenyuk
L. G. Gumenyuk

Immanuel Kant Baltic Federal University
14, A. Nevskogo ul., Kaliningrad, 236016, Russia

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Quality of life in rural areas is increasingly dependent on transport links to nearest towns and regional centres. In this article, we examine transport connectivity between villages and towns in the Kaliningrad region. We use the travel time access parameter to investigate the influence of transport connectivity on the population size and the prospects of socio-economic development in rural areas with different transport and geographical situations. Although the overall transport connectivity is high in the region, up to 10 per cent of villages score low on this parameter. We conclude that the demographic saturation of the Kaliningrad agglomeration has not been completed. Moreover, the smallness of the local consumer market impedes the formation of subregional centres in the eastern part of the region. The most alarming trend is the incipient concentration of population in peripheral border areas.

Keywords:
transport connectivity, settlement system, rural areas, Kaliningrad agglomeration, local centres, periphery

Introduction

The literature on settlement systems and population geography focuses primarily on the development of cities. This research emphasis results from the objective process of cities growing as centres for socio-economic development, which also aggregate human, economic, financial and political resources. This process could not but spark a surge of academic interest. Moreover, the influence of cities extends far beyond their geographical borders. Although rural areas and populations have received much less research attention, the economic and social

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transformation is changing the functions of villages. Many rural localities are no longer part of the modern production system, as they have lost their function of primary processors of agricultural produce. Now they are just places of permanent residence. Functioning enterprises or an agricultural specialisation are not determining factors in rural development any more. In the new socio-economic conditions, Russia cannot support the equal development of all its settlements by building infrastructure and opening enterprises where necessary on a top-down initiative, as was the case during the planned economy period. The decisive factor now is the economic-geographical position, remoteness from the city and the transport-geographical situation.

Suburbanisation and reurbanisation are transforming rural localities situated in catchment areas of large cities into suburban zones whose residents live a spatially dispersed lifestyle [1]. Rural areas lying farther from cities no longer participate in the economy and suffer from locational socio-economic space compression [2; 3]. All the above trends are visible in the small Kaliningrad region, where transport penetration levels are well above the national average. Rural localities in the regional periphery, lying far from cities, require a new development incentive. And better transport accessibility may provide this much-needed stimulus.

State of knowledge

Various aspects of rural transformations in Russia have been considered by Aleksandr Alekseev [4; 5], Tatyana Nefedova [6; 7], Andrey Treyvish [8; 9] and Nikita Mkrtchyan [10]. Other studies have looked at individual Russian regions (for example, Tver [11] and Volgograd [12]) or federal districts [13—15]. There are also investigations at a local level, considering in detail the relationship between cities and rural settlements [1; 16]. Rural areas of the Kaliningrad region have also been examined in the literature [17—21].

Most Russian publications analyse transport accessibility at the national or interregional levels. Amongst the most recent works are studies exploring transport accessibility as an indicator of regional development [22] and investigating transport connectivity in the eastern regions of Russia [23].

International studies consider both theoretical [24; 25] and practical [26; 27] aspects of transport connectivity. Geographically relevant to our research are investigations of transport connectivity across the Baltic region[1] and in some of its countries (for instance, Finland [28] and Poland [29]).

[1] *Accessibility* of the Baltic Sea Region Past and future dynamics. Final Report, November 2018 URL: https://vasab.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/VASAB_Accessibilty_Report_2018.pdf (accessed 11.09.2021).

An interesting insight into transport connectivity, particularly accessibility to various social services, is the publication by Mert Kompil et al. [30]. They summarise earlier findings on maximum admissible distances and travel times between settlements and cities as central places providing various services, i.e. measure accessibility to basic services, such as schools, hospitals, public libraries, railway stations etc. Moreover, the authors justify their criterion-based approach to identifying maximum accessible distances to central places (Table 1).

Table 1

Typology of service centres and relevant population and distance criteria

Service centers	Optimal population of a catchment area, people	Ideal distance to a central place, km	Minimum population of a catchment area, people	Maximum admissible distance to a central place, km
Local central places providing access to primary schools, small medical practices, childcare and sports facilities, small markets etc	10,000	2.5	5,000	5
Subregional (municipal) central places providing access to secondary schools, hospitals, theatres, cultural organisations, supermarkets, specialised markets etc	100,000	10	50,000	25
Regional central places providing access to specialised educational and healthcare institutions, large sports and cultural institutions, public organisations, high-tech services etc	1,000,000	50	500,000	100

Source: [30].

This approach succeeds in measuring the quality of life in the catchment areas of central places of different levels, as well as in identifying the potential of central places themselves. The overpopulation of a catchment area will adversely affect the quality and accessibility of services for all. Yet, the underpopulation of a catchment area will render its facilities inefficiently and impede the socio-economic development of central places. Different parameters can be used to assess transport accessibility. The most frequently used criteria are distance (between a settlement and the central place), time (time of travel between a settlement and the central place), fare (the average cost of travel between a settlement and the central place), quality (satisfaction with the quality of public transport services and infrastructure), and organisation and infrastructure (frequency of bus services between a settlement and the central place). The criteria are usually chosen according to the research objectives or the specialisation of the researcher. Most economic geographical studies use the criteria of distance and time.

Methods

Our study used the time interval as the basic criterion for assessing transport accessibility. It measures the total travel time from a settlement to a city via a public road, with speed limitations taken into account. The distance was assumed as covered by a private car rather than a public bus. The travel time was computed without considering traffic congestion, which is a variable. Including the traffic situations into a calculation requires a series of experimental measurements at different times of the day and on many days. Doing so would have been problematic within this study. The time criterion was chosen over distance because the latter is a quantitative parameter of transport accessibility, whilst time is a qualitative one, allowing for the standard condition of the road infrastructure. GIS tools were used to prepare maps showing isochronous lines for towns of the Kaliningrad region. Drawing on earlier research and the working papers of the European Commission,[2] we selected optimal time intervals for towns of different hierarchical levels. For Kaliningrad, the regional centre, the access time interval was 60 minutes. For all the other towns, almost all of which[3] are centres of municipalities offering a variety of services, this interval was 30 minutes. All the calculations were performed from the centres of the towns.

[2] Dijkstra, L., Poelman, H. A harmonised definition of cities and rural areas: The new degree of urbanization. *Regional Working Papers* WP 01/2014. URL: http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/sources/docgener/work/2014_01_new_urban.pdf (accessed 19.08.2021).

[3] Exceptions are the town of Primorsk, which does not have the status of a municipality, and the village of Yantarny, which is the centre of a municipality but not a town. Isochrones, however, were calculated for Yantarny as well.

The study used statistical data on population change from 2010 (census results) to 2020 (population statistics as of 1 January 2020) for 1068 settlements of the Kaliningrad region (excluding the towns and the village of Yantarny).[4]

Although settlement population statistics are often imperfect (they record registrations in a settlement, whilst the registered people may live elsewhere), we have to use these data because of their availability and extensive coverage. A more informative source could be mobile phone data [31] or survey results. The former, however, are not in open access, whilst the latter require significant time to be collected, analysed and interpreted.

The distance and time of travel using public roads to the municipal centre and Kaliningrad were calculated for each settlement. The GIS calculations were calibrated using the Yandex.Maps and Google Maps web mapping platforms.

Results

According to the statistics as of 1 January 2021, the 1,018,624[5] strong population of the Kaliningrad region was distributed across settlements of different types as follows: 493,256 people (49 per cent of the total number) lived in Kaliningrad, the administrative centre; 298,814 (29 per cent), in the 22 towns of the region; 226,554 (22 per cent), in its rural areas.

As of 1 January 2020, there were 1,068 settlements in the Kaliningrad region, of which 467 (43.7 per cent) had fewer than 50 residents. The 2010 census recorded just 444 settlements with such a small population (41 per cent). Over half the regional settlements (559) were losing population in 2010—2020. There were only 36 settlements (3.3 per cent) with a population of over 1,000 and 112 (10.5 per cent) over 500. The most populous settlements were Vasilkovo (4,257 people), Maloe Isakovo (3,266) and Bolshoe Isakovo (3,262). All three border the administrative centre, Kaliningrad, and attract a substantial number of people. In 2020, 19 villages did not have any popu-

[4] Official statistics on the number of settlements are different from the official data provided by the authorities (Appendix No. 1 to the Order of 5 February 2020 No 12—3p On Compiling a List of Rural Settlement s of the Kaliningrad Regin and a List of Rural Agglomerations of the Kaliningrad Region, signed by Governor of the Kaliningrad region Anton Alikhanov. The regulation lists 1042 rural settlements. This discrepancy is most probably explained by differences in methodological approaches to cataloguing settlements. Since we used population statistics in our study, we opted for the qualitative assessment from the official statistics services.

[5] Rosstat. Population estimate as of 1 January 2021 and the 2020 average. URL: https://web.archive.org/web/20210319185917/https://rosstat.gov.ru/storage/mediabank/wJkrbrPg/Popul2021_Site.xls (accessed 27.09.2021).

lation; most were located in the periphery — the Krasnoznamensk, Ozersk, Pravdinsk and Chernyakhovsk municipalities. Along with deserted villages, whose official population is zero, there are settlements with fewer than ten people as of 1 January 2020. Thus, ghost villages may account soon for as much as 10 per cent of all settlements.

The largest city in the region, Kaliningrad, provides access to services and facilities befitting a regional central place. The time interval used in the diagram map was 60 minutes. This is the optimal time people are ready to spend commuting to Kaliningrad or travelling to the city to get regional-level specialised services. The 60-minute zone includes 11 towns, one urban-type settlement (Yantarny) and 510 villages (almost half of all regional settlements) (Fig. 1). The total population of the latter was 131,500 people as of 1 January 2020. In 2010—2020, their official population increased by 13,500 people (unofficial estimates put the figure as high as 50,000). The population of the 60-minute zone, including that of the regional centre, is almost 700,000 people. The typology of central places proposed by Kompil et al. (Table) views Kaliningrad as a regional centre with potential for further population increase. Such growth is usually accounted for by intraregional migration from the periphery to central municipalities bordering the agglomeration and extra-regional migration to the same districts [32].

The 60-minute travel time is also a viable criterion to identify the boundaries of the Kaliningrad agglomeration, whose development has received attention from many Russian researchers [33; 34].

If the transport accessibility of all settlements in the Kaliningrad region to municipal central place is considered, the optimal time interval is 30 minutes of travel via a public road. Most transport flows from any settlement are directed towards the municipal centre, which provides various public and municipal services. Yet, there are emerging but steady flows towards the nearest town offering services that do not require an administrative status (those of sports and recreation clubs, specialised stores and markets, cultural organisations etc.).

To visualise the transport accessibility of municipal central places, we drew a diagram map (Fig. 2) of 30-minute accessibility to each town, including Kaliningrad and Yantarny, the administrative centre of its municipality, albeit without an urban status. The 30-minute zone encompasses 940 out of the 1068 regional settlements and has a total population of 208,000 people (92 per cent of all regional rural residents).



Fig.1. Transport accessibility to Kaliningrad, the administrative centre (60-minute accessibility via public roads)

On the one hand, these results point to good connectivity across the region: almost all regional residents can reach the nearest town in 30 minutes to get municipal services and visit various organisations. On the other hand, if the sustainability of the region's municipal centres is viewed from the perspective of the catchment area population, there is a risk that these centres will decay because of their sparse populations. For example, the second-most populous town in the region, Sovetsk, has a catchment area of 50,000 people, including its own residents (38,500 people) and those of the nearby towns of Slavsk and Neman. Since 50,000 is the minimum threshold for a subregional centre, Sovetks does not have the resources needed to function as one — its consumer market is rudimentary. The situation in the towns of Chernyakhovsk and Gusev is even worse: none of them has a sufficient population within the 30-minute catchment area (it does not exceed 40,000 people). Another problem is that the two towns are just 28 minutes away from each other, and their functions of municipal central places overlap. As a result, neither has a large enough customer market to generate demand commensurate with a subregional status.



Fig.2. Transport accessibility to the local central places of the Kaliningrad region
(30-minute accessibility via public roads)

The other towns in the regional periphery, albeit enjoying the status of municipal centres, perform the functions of local central places. For instance, the 10-minute catchment area of Ozersk, the town included, has a population of about 5,000 people, which is the minimum threshold for local central places. In Krasnoznamensk, this figure is 4,200 people; in Nesterov, 7,500. Thus, a small consumer market limits the opportunities for development in these towns, whose urban status is nominal, divorced from the functions they perform.

The prospects are the bleakest in settlements lying beyond the 30-minute catchment area of any town. There are almost 188 of them in the region (about 10 per cent). Approximately 18,000 people are registered there, although much fewer people live in these villages. Twenty-two have below ten residents, which renders them ghost villages. The most populous rural localities in the category are Korenevo in the Bagrationovsk district (1956 people) and Komsomolsk in the Gvardeysk district (1352 people). All these villages can be divided into two subcategories. The first comprises those located in central municipalities (the Cherenyakhovsk, Gvardeysk, Guryevsk and Zelenogradsk districts) but away from principal regional transport corridors. Despite their location in the vicinity of the main centres, their transport connectivity is poor because of the inferior quality of the regional transport infrastructure. Komsomolsk, lying at a distance of 26 km from both Kaliningrad and the municipal centre, makes an interesting case. Despite this proximity, the village is situated far from the motorway linking Kaliningrad and Gvardeysk, and the travel time to either centre is 35 minutes. Overall, there are 31 such villages; 14 of them have a population of over 100 people. Their prospects will brighten if their transport connectivity to the nearest towns improves. This condition can be met by modernising the transport infrastructure (reaching higher design speeds).

The second subcategory includes villages in the border periphery of the region, remote from central places and suffering from poor transport connectivity (the few roads they have are of inferior quality). These are villages of the Polessk, Slavsk, Krasnoznamensk, Nesterov, Ozersk, Pravdinsk and Bagrationovsk districts. They are home to 11,000 people living in substandard conditions. The settlements were losing residents (in 2010—2020, their total population decreased by 500 people according to the official data), becoming invisible in the socio-economic space of the region. This state of affairs is further aggravated by the border position of most of these settlements. The local compression of the socio-economic space along the national border of the Kaliningrad region complicates control over the boundary (this problem, however, is becoming less acute as remote monitoring methods are improving and border services are growing more mobile). At the same time, local compression contributes to illegal activities across the border (locals violate the border). Precluding locational compression of the socio-economic space along the state border requires prompt measures to improve transport connectivity between settlements and nearby towns, such as launching road infrastructure projects and increasing the frequency of public transport services. Until these actions have been taken, comprehensive projects giving these areas new functions (for example, turning an agricultural municipality into a tourist destination) cannot be run.

Conclusion

The small Kaliningrad region, most of whose territory is involved in economic activities, has transport connectivity above the national average. Still, trends towards population concentration in the Kaliningrad agglomeration, towns incapable of normal functioning as municipal centres, the decay of the rural settlement system and the compression of regional socio-economic space are present in the region, albeit at a smaller scale than throughout the country.

The Kaliningrad has not exhausted its potential for growth as a regional centre. Its 60-minute catchment area, whose optimal population size is 1,000,000 people, has now 700,000 residents.

Regional towns, which should perform the functions of subregional central places in the periphery and semi-periphery, lack necessary human resources. The most successful town is Sovetsk, whose 30-minute catchment area is home to 50,000 people — the minimum threshold for a subregional centre. Yet, the demographic trends of the past ten years show that the area's population tends to decline, and a decreasing population is a threat to Sovetsk as a subregional centre. Nor do the other two large towns in the east of the region, Chernyakhovsk and Gusev, do not have a sufficient consumer market. Moreover, their geographical proximity makes them compete for the same market and impede each other's development. Smaller towns in the periphery, although having a status of municipal centres, perform local functions and have bleak prospects.

The 30-minute catchment area of regional towns encompasses 940 of the 1068 settlements; they have a total population of 208,000 people or 92 per cent of the region's rural residents. Thus, transport connectivity is high in the region. Still, about 18,000 people live in 118 villages located beyond the 30-minute catchment area. On the one hand, these figures are not critical for the Kaliningrad regional settlement system. On the other, the current situation contributes to socio-economic compression in the periphery, i.e. the border zone along the national border of Russia. The socio-economic decay of the border area impedes cross-border cooperation, such as running joint transboundary projects supported by Russia and the EU.

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The authors

Dr Ivan S. Gumenyuk, Associate Professor, Immanuel Kant Baltic Federal University, Russia.

E-mail: IGumeniuk@kantiana.ru

https://orcid.org/0000-0002-8477-5342

Dr Lidia G. Gumenyuk, Associate Professor, Immanuel Kant Baltic Federal University, Russia.

E-mail: LOsmolovskaya@kantiana.ru

https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6186-350X

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