ISSN 2079-8555
e-ISSN 2310-0524

Immanuel Kant
Baltic Federal
University

BALTIC REGION

2022 || Vol. 14 || № 2

KALININGRAD

**Immanuel Kant
Baltic Federal University
Press**

2022

12+

BALTIC REGION

2022
Volume 14
№ 2

**Kaliningrad :
I. Kant Baltic Federal
University Press, 2022.
159 p.**

**The journal
was established in 2009**

Frequency:

**quarterly
in the Russian and English
languages per year**

Founders

**Immanuel Kant Baltic
Federal University**

**Saint Petersburg
State University**

Editorial Office

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www.journals.kantiana.ru

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RUSSIA AND ITS REGION IN THE BALTIC REGION

ANALYSING THE DYNAMICS OF THE BALTIC STATES'S PRODUCTION LINKAGES WITH RUSSIA

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Received 23.09.2021
doi: 10.5922/2079-8555-2022-2-1

Russia and the Baltic States have a long-standing relationship of industrial specialisation, cooperation, division of labour and trade exchange, all dating back to the Soviet Union. Today, this relationship is facing a tough test amid political and ideological challenges and risks. The last two years have seen a profound and large-scale crisis caused by the global COVID-19 pandemic. Overall, the production linkages between Russia and the Baltic States have adapted in response to the existing problems, remaining resistant to the geopolitical and pandemic shocks. This article examines the production linkages between Russia and the Baltic countries, investigating the export-import flows of consumer and intermediate goods in 2003—2020. A comparative study of the Baltic States' production linkages with Russia and their main partners in the EU — Germany and Finland — is carried out. It is concluded that, before the introduction of sanctions in 2014 and the world trade crisis of 2015—2016, Russia was a more promising market than Germany and Finland for the Baltic States' companies trading in intermediate goods.

Keywords:
production linkages, Baltic States, Russia, Germany, Finland, export, import, intermediate goods

Introduction

While Russia and the Baltic states have been developing rather tense political relations over the recent years, thanks to several factors, production and trade linkages between numerous economic entities on both sides remain stable and mutually beneficial. First, it was not so long ago (from a historical perspective) that all the countries in question were part of the same whole, the Soviet Union. Second, political concerns and even sanctions are often inferior to the pragmatics of profit, economic expediency and the need to maintain economic growth in conditions of intensified competition, rising global economic crises and increasing

To cite this article: Varnavskii, V.G. 2022, Analysing the dynamics of the Baltic States's production linkages with Russia, *Balt. Reg.*, Vol. 14, no 2, p. 4—22. doi: 10.5922/2079-8555-2022-2-1.

uncertainty of development prospects. Third, Russian companies and their peers from the Baltic states have a perfect operational understanding of their business environment, so they strive to keep mutually beneficial production linkages and remain important bilateral trade partners even though their respective countries may experience political disagreements or discord in mutual relations. This applies to ensuring the sustainability of established production relations, supply chains (SC), and global value chains (GVC) where Russia and the Baltic states serve as important links.

This paper aims to analyze the dynamics of production linkages between Russia and the Baltic states between 2003 and 2020 by using comparable data on bilateral trade in intermediate goods and to conduct a comparative study of the aforementioned linkages between the Baltic states and their most prolific intermediate goods import-export partners, Germany and Finland. Thus, in 2020 intermediate goods trade turnover between Estonia and Finland amounted to \$2,414 million (with Germany as a runner-up with \$1,283 million); the same indicator between Latvia and Germany reached \$1,382 million (for Latvia and Poland, \$944 million); and \$2,858 million between Lithuania and Germany (\$2,796 million for Lithuania and Poland)[1]. Adding more countries to the analysis would not affect the results in any significant way, and, given wordcount restrictions, would only detract from a detailed cross-country comparison.

The study confirms the hypothesis that since the moment the Baltic states ascended to the EU and up until the introduction of sanctions against Russia, our country presented a much more perspective intermediate goods export market for the Baltic states than Germany or Finland. Sanctions and the world trade slowdown of 2015—2016 hampered the expansion of production linkages between Russia and the Baltic states. In 2017 the situation started to recover; and, while not straightforward, the general trend is that of progressive development.

State of Research

Over the last decade, analysis of international production linkages based on the data on intermediate goods trade has become an important feature of academic, applied and statistical research. Such studies are needed to assess the level of industrial cooperation; to determine priority areas for boosting competitiveness of industrial sectors, activities or manufacturing initiatives; and to develop measures ensuring sustainable growth of trade and access to new resources, primarily to innovations and investments. It is thus significant that the Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) specifies intermediate goods as a statistical category in both imports and exports sections of its BTDIxE Bilateral Trade in Goods by Industry and End-use, ISIC Rev. 4 dataset[2].

[1] Calculated on the basis of the OECD statistics, URL: https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=BTDIXE (accessed 22.09.2021).

[2] STAN Bilateral Trade Database by Industry and End-use category, 2012, *OECD Statistics*, URL: https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=BTDIXE (accessed 22.09.2021).

At the end of the 1990s, at the peak of globalization, in-depth studies on the role of intermediate goods in international trade and economic development picked up. At the time, the global economy saw a rapid increase in transborder flows of goods and services, and bilateral trade expansion was significantly (roughly 2.1—2.3 times[3]) more intensive than the growth of the global gross domestic product (GDP) [1, p. 53]. Thus, the need arose to calculate import-export flows not only by gross value, as it had been traditionally done, but also by the value-added. One result of this situation was a sharp increase in the volume, quality and depth of economic research on the topics specified above, as well as advances in relevant scientific and methodological approaches.

Since then, several terms and concepts that characterize different aspects of the international division of production and evaluate international trade by value-added have been introduced to the economic discourse: *international fragmentation of production*, *global value chains*, *vertical specialization*, *trade in value-added*, *trade in operations* (functions, tasks), etc. (see, for example [2—10] and major methodological papers published by international organisations[4]).

As the Baltic states became more integrated into the global economy after joining the EU, they triggered the emergence of studies into their role and place in global value chains (GVCs) [11—14]. Some major studies analyze intermediate goods, among other things. Thus, one study uses the example of Latvia to demonstrate how a more active participation of hi-tech manufacturing in GVCs creates possibilities for faster output growth thanks to intensified use of intermediate imports [15, p. 10].

Another study shows that Latvian companies starting to export intermediate goods or knowledge-intensive services have significantly bigger performance gains than those exporting final goods or transportation services [16, p. 27].

With the COVID-19 pandemic, the number of papers dedicated to GVCs skyrocketed[5], papers analyzing the Baltic states being no exception to this trend (see, for example: [18; 19]). This analysis relies on the data on volumes of international intermediate goods trade and confirms some previously made conclusions; specifically, it shows that neither the Baltic states' accession to the EU nor the sanctions imposed against Russia in 2014 have led to "value chain shrinkage between Russia and the Baltic states" [19, p. 128].

Method

Imports and exports play different roles in economic reproduction. The same value of imported goods can bring about different economic effects depending on the category and type of imports as well as on their place in the reproduction cycle.

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[3] Author's estimate.

[4] Trade in Value-Added: Concepts, Methodologies and Challenges (Joint OECD-WTO Note). OECD and WTO, 2012, *OECD*, URL: https://www.oecd.org/sti/ind/49894138.pdf (accessed 22.09.2021); Measuring and Analyzing the Impact of GVCs on Economic Development, 2017, *World Bank*, URL: https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/gvcs_report_2017.pdf (accessed 22.09.2021).

[5] See, for example, a 2021 WTO paper on the subject listing more than 130 sources [17].

Thus, goods supplied through international trade can go directly to final consumers. In this case, there is no added value, and the total effect of such imports may not be so significant in terms of economic reproduction.

However, if the imported goods are intermediate, that is, if they are to be further processed by the importing country, they become a part of the reproduction cycle. Such goods have a much greater positive impact on the economy by adding value and creating jobs. At the same time, intermediate imports are also an important factor in joining GVCs and introducing new technologies. Value-added products may: a) go to final consumption in the importing country; b) be exported to third countries as part of the GVCs; and c) return to the country of origin with value-added.

International trade of intermediate goods and *global value chains* are methodologically similar concepts since import-export flows of intermediate products are formed within global, regional, bi- and multilateral supply chains. The joint OECD-WTO report on global value chain development states that "GVCs' are basically 'trade in intermediate products"[6].

However, nobody really trades in value-added; goods are traded at the price formed by the market, and the market equilibrium of supply and demand is determined by gross value. At the same time, calculating international flows of goods and services in value-added remains a useful tool for economic analysis, reproduction cycle research and trade policy development. The emergence of a new methodological approach to evaluating and studying international trade in value-added, Trade in Value Added, or TiVA, does not take away from the importance of traditional gross value indicators for economic analysis, policy-making and international cooperation.

The term *global value chains,* or GVCs, also requires some clarification. The word "global" here is a hyperbole, an exaggeration, in other words, a trope. Globalization, by definition, requires participation of the entire world, so a value chain can only be truly global if it involves, in its production linkage, all the world's countries. Such value chains simply do not exist. Typically, a value chain for a particular product consists of only a few links (i.e., countries). Dozens of publications cite the example of Apple iPod, which boasts six countries participating in its production: the USA, China, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Singapore and Taiwan [20, p. 6]. This is a lot: an average value chain, depending on the sector, of course, will only include two or three countries [21, p. 9, Fig. 4]. Such low-level fragmentation of production is optimal for most goods manufactured at the current stage of economic development and globalization. It is also highly unlikely that a value chain with links in 200 countries can be at all efficient. Thus, each value chain is localized, but together they produce a global value-added network. The concept of *global value chains* should be understood in this context, in our opinion (see [22] for more details).

[6] *Global Value Chain Development Report 2019: Technological Innovation, Supply Chain Trade, and Workers in a Globalized World (English),* 2019. Washington, D. C., World Bank Group. P. 42. URL: https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/trade/publication/global-value-chain-development-report-2019 (accessed 22.09.2021).

This paper relies on the country's Index of Production Participation (proposed by the author). This indicator represents the share of intermediates in a country's total commodity exports and is calculated by the formula:

$$I_t = P_t/E_t \cdot 100, \quad (1)$$

where I is the index of production participation; P is the volume of intermediate exports, E is the value of exports, and t is years.

This indicator is used to analyze GVCs by OECD, European Central Bank (ECB) and other international organisations (see, for example, [23, p. 13]).

When making calculations with the formula (1) specified above, we must also make sure that the initial statistical data is correct; this methodological issue is of principle importance for the current study. The problem is that official country-issued statistics for any two countries will differ in their reporting on bilateral import and export flows[7]. In other words, exports from country A to country B (as reported by country A) will differ from imports to country B from country A (as reported by country B), often by several orders of magnitude[8]. This is particularly true for statistics on trade flows between Russia and the Baltic states.

To minimize calculation errors, all the data were cross-referenced with comparable OECD statistics, including data for Russia. OECD, WIOD, Rosstat and other databases were used in the preparation of this article.

The OECD database (OECD DB), BTDIxE Bilateral Trade in Goods by Industry and End-use, ISIC Rev. 4, was used as a source for country-level statistics on bilateral imports and exports, including that of intermediate goods.

The World Input-Output Database, WIOD[9], was commissioned by the EC and developed by a consortium of 11 European universities and research centres. It covers 56 industrial sectors, 43 countries (28 EU member states, 15 non-EU countries, including Russia, and "the rest of the world", for balance), and a time period from 2000 to 2014. In this study, dynamic series of output, imports and exports of both intermediate and final goods are used for calculations. The WIOD database is quite often used for other economic calculations (see, for example: [25; 26]).

The Russian Statistical Yearbook (by Rosstat) and reviews of Russian foreign trade published by russian-trade.com based on the data provided by the Federal Customs Service of Russia were used as the sources of information on Russia's foreign trade flows and their sectoral structure.

[7] For more, see, for example: Statistical Insights: Merchandise trade statistics without asymmetries, 2017, *OECD,* URL: https://www.oecd.org/sdd/its/statistical-insights-merchandise-trade-statistics-without-asymmetries.htm (accessed 22.09.2022).

[8] The reasons behind this phenomenon are detailed in [24].

[9] World Input-Output Database: Intercountry Input-Output Table 2014, 2014, *World Input-Output Database,* URL: http://www.wiod.org/database/wiots16 (accessed 22.09.2022).

Results

Since the accession of the Baltic states to the EU, two stages can be distinguished in the dynamics of their production linkages with Russia: before and after the introduction of sanctions against our country in 2014. The first stage, spanning from 2004 to 2013, is characterized by accelerated growth of trade in intermediate goods compared with Germany and Finland, the main trading partners of the Baltic countries. The second stage, which started in 2014, showed a slight decline in export-import flows of intermediates in 2014, followed by a serious drop in 2015—2016, prompted by the synergy of the world trade slowdown and the sanctions. In 2017—2020, production linkages between the Baltic states and Russia were gradually recovering from the turmoil, and there was even a prospect of reaching the level of the early 2010s in some areas (e.g., exports from Lithuania to Russia).

Exports

Joining the EU gave a powerful impetus to the economic development of the Baltic states; it opened new channels of free trade with other members of the Union and boosted trade with Russia. Commodity export was doing particularly well in terms of growth pace (Fig. 1).



Fig. 1. Dynamics of exports of goods of the Baltic states, including intermediates, USD billion, current prices

Source: compiled by the author on the basis of OECD DB.

Exports were growing at an unprecedented rate: from 2003 to 2008, annual commodity exports from the Baltic states almost tripled, having risen from $ 15.7 billion to $ 46.8 billion, while exports of intermediate goods more than doubled, going from $ 8 billion to $ 22.2 billion. Annual exports from the whole group of countries were growing at a double-digit rate, and amounted, in % to each preceding year, to 28.9 for 2004; 26.8 for 2005; 17.4 for 2006; 22.4 for 2007; and 27.1 for 2008. The indicators of exports of intermediate products displayed the same trend, with the following growth rate, in % to each preceding year: 25.1 for 2004; 21.8 for 2005; 12.2 for 2006; 35.5 for 2007; and 19.9 for 2008.

That was the period when Russia *de facto* reopened its market for intermediate goods from the Baltic states. The rate of annual growth of the Baltic states' exports to the Russian market exceeded all other macroeconomic indicators of these countries, including those of general economic development, industrial output, and foreign trade. As a result, from 2003 to 2008, the flow of intermediate products into the Russian market increased 2.7-fold for Estonia, almost 7-fold for Latvia and 4.3-fold for Lithuania (Table 1)[10].

Table 1

Exports of intermediates from the Baltic states to Russia, Germany and Finland, USD million, current prices, 2003—2013

Country	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
Commodity exports to Russia											
Estonia	351	354	347	480	684	954	743	936	1283	1453	1467
Latvia	60	131	194	221	334	411	292	363	456	454	468
Lithuania	277	409	629	636	894	1192	806	1076	1451	1705	1961
Total	688	893	1170	1337	1912	2557	1841	2375	3191	3611	3896
Share of exports to Russia in all commodity exports from the Baltic states, including intermediates, %											
Exports to Russia, total	9.7	9.5	10.3	11.0	12.8	14.5	13.5	14.3	15.1	16.9	17.6
Of them, intermediates	8.6	8.9	9.6	9.8	10.3	11.5	12.1	12.3	12.6	13.6	14.1
Exports to Germany											
Estonia	327	332	248	250	305	305	283	364	460	412	411
Latvia	291	269	278	326	404	391	356	515	611	588	543
Lithuania	358	405	441	521	859	1000	777	1008	1199	1204	1140
Total	976	1005	967	1096	1568	1696	1415	1887	2271	2203	2094
Exports to Finland											
Estonia	617	718	833	877	1071	1239	762	987	1286	1077	1091
Latvia	53	78	104	120	232	271	145	223	276	246	219
Lithuania	41	28	41	47	114	176	119	113	182	182	228
Total	711	824	978	1045	1416	1686	1026	1323	1744	1505	1538

Source: calculated on the basis of OECD DB.

[10] In Table 1, data for Finland and Germany are provided for the purposes of comparative analysis.

The 2008—2009 global financial crisis brought about a short-lived decrease in intermediate goods exports from the Baltic states to Russia, followed by a swift bounce-back to pre-crisis indicators. Thus, the crisis did not reverse the general trend that characterized the Baltic states' presence in the EU: that of extreme growth of exports of intermediates to Russia. Thus, between 2003 and 2013, the volume of exports under discussion increased 4.2-fold for Estonia; 7.8-fold for Latvia; and 7.1-fold for Lithuania.

Table 1 shows that the growth of exports from the Baltic countries to Germany was significantly slower than that to the Russian Federation: thus, in 2003—2013, the volume of exports in intermediates from Estonia to Germany grew 1.3 times, from Latvia — 1.9 times, and from Lithuania — 3.2 times. Similar dynamics was characteristic for exports to Finland in the reported period: 1.8-fold growth for Estonian exports, 4.1-fold for Latvian and 5.6-fold for Lithuanian.

Thus, in 2003—2013, the vector of exports in intermediate goods from the Baltic states was mainly directed towards Russia: over the entire period under discussion our country represented a market that was 2 to 3 times more perspective for the Baltic states than that of Germany or Finland.

Exceeding growth of production linkages in 2003—2013 significantly increased the Russian share in the gross commodity exports from the Baltic states, including exports in intermediates (see Table 1). While in 2004 Russia accounted for only 9.5 % of all commodity exports, and for 8.9 % of intermediates exports, in 2013 the Russian share grew to 17.6 % and 14.1 %, respectively.

These trends are largely substantiated by our calculations based on the WIOD DB (Table 2).

Table 2

Growth of macroeconomic and international trade indicators in the Baltic states in 2003—2013, times

Country	GDP	Gross output (WIOD)*	Commodity esports to Russia		
			OECD DB		Intermediate exports (WIOD)
			Total	Of them, intermediates	
Estonia	2.1	2.7	5.1	4.2	7.3
Lithuania	2	2.7	10.0	7.8	3.4
Latvia	1.9	2.8	8.9	7.1	7.9

Note: *WIOD for 2014.

Source: calculated by the author on the basis of OECD DB, WIOD.

Table 2 shows that after the Baltic states joined the EU and until 2013, their GDP, on average (depending on the calculation method), doubled, while their gross output increased around 2.7—2.8 times. The export of intermediate goods from Estonia to Russia saw a 4-to-7-fold increase, Latvian exports grew 3 to 8 times, and Lithuanian — 7 to 8 times.

Since 2014, trade dynamics between the countries under consideration changed dramatically. Sectoral sanctions introduced against Russia in July 2014 together with countermeasures implemented by our country hampered bilateral trade flows. Although suffering less than imports, overall, the Baltic states' exports to Russia stagnated, with each country showing its own trend: Estonian exports shrunk by 25 %, Latvian — by 6.8 %, while Lithuanian export flows increased by 10.5 % (Table 3).

Table 3

Exports of intermediates from the Baltic states to Russia, Germany and Finland, USD million, current prices, 2013—2020

Country	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020
Exports to Russia								
Estonia	1467	1100	681	617	813	768	713	750
Latvia	468	436	297	288	358	384	364	391
Lithuania	1961	2370	1307	1402	1728	1993	2099	1950
Total	3896	3905	2286	2307	2900	3145	3176	3091
Exports to Germany								
Estonia	411	442	367	393	444	480	472	473
Latvia	543	571	472	531	585	605	550	644
Lithuania	1140	1088	886	848	934	1065	1089	1266
Total	2094	2101	1726	1771	1963	2151	2112	2383
Exports to Finland								
Estonia	1091	1050	886	974	1101	1324	1238	1329
Latvia	219	168	120	116	131	206	205	194
Lithuania	228	227	210	210	232	281	274	302
Total	1538	1445	1216	1299	1463	1812	1717	1826

Source: calculated by the author on the basis of OECD DB.

In 2015, total exports of intermediate goods from the Baltic states to Russia dropped by 41.5 % compared to the preceding year. Sanctions were to blame, as well as a significant global trade decline. As Table 3 shows, export flows to Germany and Finland also dwindled in 2015, shrinking by 17.9 % and 15.9 %, respectively.

The years 2015—2016 brought about a global slowdown in commodities trade, which resulted in a 13.2 % decline in global exports (from $ 19.0 billion in 2014 to $ 16.6 billion) in 2015, and in 15.8 % decline (to $ 16.1 billion) in 2016, as compared to 2014[11]. Experts believe that the drop in prices of oil and other mineral fuels and raw materials was responsible for the crisis (see, for example: [27—31]). However, there were other reasons, such as: slower economic growth; sluggish increase in global investment; a slowdown in Chinese economic

[11] *The World Trade Organisation (WTO)*, 2022, URL: https://data.wto.org/ (accessed 22.09.2022).

development; increased protectionism; shrinking volume of global trade in intermediates within GVCs; decreasing demand for imported goods in developing countries; and so on[12].

This sharp decrease in global markets became the chief factor that influenced the decline in bilateral trade between the Baltic states and Russia in that period. Further on, in 2017—2019, total exports from the Baltic states to Russia steadily increased, having led to a 37.7 % growth in commodities export against the crisis-ridden 2016, which was indicative of recovering production linkage.

The COVID-19 pandemic and global recession of 2020 had practically no effect on intermediate exports from the Baltic states to Russia: Estonia and Latvia slightly increased such exports to our country, while Lithuanian indicators went down (Table 3).

Imports

Overall, in terms of intermediate imports, the development of production linkages with Russia displayed similar trends for all Baltic states, although there were some country-specific features. In 2003—2013, it was true for all the countries under consideration that their commodities imports from Russia, including incoming trade in intermediates, had a slower growth pace than exports to our country. The gains in intermediate imports were different: for Estonia, the growth was 2-fold, for Latvia, 3.2-fold, and for Lithuania, 4.8-fold (Table 4).

Table 4

Commodity imports and imports of intermediates from Russia to the Baltic states, USD million, current prices, 2003—2013

Country	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
Total commodity imports											
Estonia	808	1099	1298	2368	2019	1753	1170	1382	2133	2330	1873
Latvia	455	680	781	894	1275	1679	1003	1115	1318	1513	1405
Lithuania	2160	2854	4323	4701	4401	9406	5482	7637	10185	10401	9784
Total	3423	4633	6402	7963	7695	12838	7655	10134	13636	14244	13062
Of them, intermediate goods											
Estonia	506	701	705	826	1002	936	560	640	824	931	1023
Latvia	390	557	565	733	1017	1352	825	939	1122	1364	1262
Lithuania	1977	2675	4146	4452	3669	8907	5306	7374	9978	10160	9474
Total	2873	3933	5416	6011	5688	11195	6691	8953	11924	12455	11759

Source: calculated by the author on the basis of OECD DB.

[12] See, for example: [1, p. 133; 2, p. 15]; *Economic Report of the President*, 2017, Washington, D. C. The White House, January 2017, URL: http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/economic_reports/2017.pdf (accessed 22.09.2022). *Global Economic Prospects*, 2016, January, Spillovers amid Weak Growth, World Bank. Washington, DC, URL: https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/23435 (accessed 22.09.2022).

On the one hand, higher growth rate demonstrated by Lithuania can be explained by substantial deliveries of Russian oil to the only oil refinery in the Baltic states located in the city Mažeikiai. On the other hand, it was stimulated by a spike in the global oil prices: in some years during the period under review oil traded at $ 150 per barrel.

At the peak of trade relations (in 2011—2013), the Baltic states imported about $ 11—13 billion worth of intermediate goods from Russia each year, which roughly translated into a third of all annual intermediate imports into the Baltic states. As in the case of exports, this shows that without sanctions or restrictions of non-economic type, in a situation of free competition, the Baltic states saw Russia as an important partner in bilateral trade in intermediates.

Sanctions against Russia made the Baltic states seek alternative suppliers of intermediate goods, and the volumes of such exports from Russia drastically decreased (Table 5).

Table 5

Commodity imports and imports of intermediates from Russia to the Baltic states, USD million, current prices, 2013—2020

Country	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020
Total commodity imports								
Estonia	1873	2161	1544	1163	1349	1937	1784	1613
Latvia	1405	1356	1192	1051	1201	1558	1209	1067
Lithuania	9784	7621	4597	3793	4059	5386	5190	2936
Total	13 062	11 137	7333	6007	6610	8880	8183	5616
Of them, intermediates								
Estonia	1023	994	754	635	800	1208	1105	1134
Latvia	1262	1173	985	860	1050	1409	1014	859
Lithuania	9474	7157	4222	3363	3779	5117	4874	2676
Total	11 759	9324	5961	4859	5629	7734	6993	4669

Source: calculated by the author on the basis of OECD DB.

Compared to 2013, in 2014 imports of intermediate products from Russia to the Baltic states decreased by 20.7 %. In 2015, there was a 2-fold decrease in this indicator compared to 2013, and in 2016, the numbers fell by another 9.4 %. Such a fall, however, as has already been indicated above, is associated not only with the introduction of sanctions but also with the general situation in the commodity markets during the global trade slowdown of 2015—2016.

The share of Russian companies in the supply of intermediate goods to the Baltic states' industries decreased 2.5 times between 2012 and 2020, amounting only to 14.3 % in 2020 against 35.1 % in 2012, the highest value since the Baltic states' accession to the EU. Russian share in the total volume of commodity imports into the Baltic states decreased 2.6 times and amounted to 8.2 % in 2020, compared to 21.2 % in 2010.

There were 8—10 times more intermediate goods than final products in the structure of commodity exports from Russia to the Baltic states, which would make this one of the highest proportions in the world. Over the entire analyzed period, the Russian index of production participation in the Baltic states' economic reproduction, understood as the share of intermediates in each country's total commodity exports from Russia and calculated by formula (1), steadily exceeded 80 % for Latvia in Lithuania, reaching 90 % for the former and 98 % for the latter in some years (2011—2012), and rose to 70 % in 2020 for Estonia (Fig. 2).



Fig. 2. Russian index of production participation in the Baltic states' economic reproduction, %

Source: calculated by the author using formula (1) and data from Tables 4 and 5.

Figure 2 shows that the sanctions and a significant decline in the volume of Russian imports into the Baltic countries had little impact on its structure and the Russian index of production participation in the Baltic states' economy.

Discussion

What is the reason, then, for the rapid development of trade and, more importantly, production linkages between Russia and the Baltic states in the first decade after their accession to the EU; a trend especially pronounced in exports as compared to the Baltic states' traditional trade partners, Germany and Finland?

Political and ideological talk aside, our analysis of import-export flows between the Baltic states, Russia and the two EU countries, Germany and Finland, does indicate that the main vector of bilateral production linkages of the Baltic states was directed at Russia.

In 2003, the levels of trade relations in terms of exports of each of the Baltic States to Russia, Germany and Finland were, on average, comparable to each other (Table 1). Latvia and Lithuania, for example, supplied fewer intermediate goods to Finland than to Russia, while Estonia supplied more. At the same time, Estonia exported fewer intermediates to Germany than to Russia, and so on. In 2013, the state of bilateral trade between the Baltic states and Russia reached such a high level that the volume of intermediate goods exported to Russia *exceeded that of intermediate exports to Germany and Finland combined*. The sum of the three Baltic states' exports of intermediate products to Russia increased 5.7 times between 2003 and 2013, while exports to Germany and Finland saw only a 2.2-fold increase.

We believe that there were several factors explaining intensified export relations between the Baltic states in Russia, especially compared to a more modest progress of export links development with Germany, Finland and other EU members.

1. More profitable production linkages with the Russian enterprises. Profits being the end goal of any business, buying Russian intermediates turned out to be more cost-efficient for Baltic companies than purchasing similar goods from European — Finnish or German — manufacturers. Relatively low cost of production equipment used in Russia coupled with the comparable quality of the resulting product allowed the Baltic enterprises to increase their profit margin.

2. Unsaturated Russian market was characterized by unsatisfied demand, while access to Western European and Scandinavian markets was restricted for many companies from the Baltic states. These markets have their own competition, suppliers, linkages spanning decades of cooperation, so the vast Russian market was especially attractive to its relatively small neighbours. The Russian demand for imported intermediates, including those coming from the Baltic states, was growing over the entire period under consideration, mainly due to accelerated growth of the national economy and purchasing power of the population and enterprises.

3. Advanced level of Russian manufacturing facilities, comparable with that of the developed countries. With the sharp depreciation of the ruble after the 1998 default and the spike in the global oil prices at the beginning of the 2000s, Russia was able to launch an update of its production base: not only in the energy and extractive sectors but also in the processing industry. According to Rosstat, in 2000—2013, the country's total imports increased 9.3 times (from $ 34 billion to $ 315 billion). Specifically, the import of machinery, equipment and transport grew 14-fold (from $ 11 billion to $ 153 billion); the share of non-CIS countries in imports rose from 66 % in 2000 to 88 % in 2013; the number of advanced production technologies used increased from 70,000 in 2000 to 192,000 in 2013; finally, of 2,842 production technologies imported by Russia in 2014, 1,910 were used in processing and only 103 in mineral extraction[13].

[13] *Russian Statistical Yearbook.* 2015, Rosstat, Moscow, p. 521, 523, 626, 631, 633, 634.

4. Spatial linkages and production technologies comparable to those of the Baltic countries. Already at the beginning of the 21st century, many Russian industrial enterprises would purchase modern western technologies and machinery to revamp their manufacturing and processing bases, develop production linkages, both global and regional ones, and win against Finnish and German competitors in open markets, including those of the Baltic states.

5. Established production linkages and personal connections going back to the Soviet times; joint regional and trans-border value streams; familiar business environment; connected infrastructure; clear and understandable logistics.

In the highly competitive global markets for intermediate goods, Russia remains an important partner to the Baltic states. The introduction of anti-Russian sanctions had a relatively little negative impact on the Baltic-Russian trade in intermediates, which was more affected by the global trade slowdown of 2015—2016.

For their internal development as well as for incorporation into the GVCs, the Baltic states need strong links with the Russian industry built through importing minerals, crude iron ore, semi-finished products and other intermediates. Their proximity to the Russian raw materials and primary processing products, the ability to take advantage of a well-developed infrastructure connected with the Russian territory, the similarity of technical and technological approaches, and other factors allow the Baltic states to import Russian intermediates, further process them and export value-added, in other words, to participate in the GVCs.

After 2014, despite political and ideological problems, sanctions, restrictions and other negative factors, there was no sign of Russian-Baltic business communication halt; the countries' trade and production linkages remained unbroken. In 2017—2020, in some spheres, these connections became even stronger.

Conclusion

Historically and technologically, industrial production of the Baltic states has been largely oriented towards Russia. Even after the Baltic states joined the EU, the newly created market conditions and open competition have not managed to reroute export flows of intermediates from the Baltic states into other members of the Union, such as Germany or Finland. Instead, their exports to Russia intensified thus reaffirming the trend that had already existed. This pattern was especially pronounced from 2004 to 2013. This entire decade saw an unprecedented in its pace and duration growth of Russian demand for intermediate goods supplied from the Baltic states, a growth unhampered even by the global financial crisis of 2008—2009.

Our cross-country comparison revealed that, in that period, Russia was a more perspective market for the Baltic intermediates than Germany or Finland: while in 2003 the Baltic states exported similar volumes of intermediate goods to Russia, Finland and Germany, in 2013 the total exports of intermediate goods from the Baltic states to Russia exceeded the total of intermediate exports to Germany and Finland combined. Thus, in a market situation, devoid of administrative barriers, sanctions or restrictions, some Russian enterprises turned out to be highly competitive compared to the producers from the leading European economies. Russian industrial companies would often win in open competition.

By sharply increasing its intermediate imports, Russia gave a huge additional impetus to the economic development of the Baltic states and their inclusion into the GVCs. While in 2003 they supplied Russia with intermediate goods worth $0.7 billion, in 2013 Russian intermediate imports increased to almost $3 billion. As a result, Russia's share in total exports from the Baltic states grew from 9.7 % in 2003 to 16.9 % in 2013 for all commodities and from 8.6 % to 13.6 % for intermediate products.

The global trade trends of 2003—2013 specified in our study created favorable conditions for the active inclusion of the Baltic states in the production cooperation with Russian companies. Further on, it might allow for the creation of sustainable regional production linkages, supplemented by cross-border production cooperation with possible access to other EU countries. However, this scenario did not play out.

The period was also characterized by enhanced possibilities for the Baltic states to build long-term strategic relations with Russia, including the development of GVCs through increased industrial cooperation and joint manufacturing with the possibility to enter European and Asian markets in the future. This didn't happen either. Political and ideological ambitions trampled over common sense and economic expediency. The ten-year trend, positive for the economic development of both the Baltic states and Russia, was broken by the introduction of sanctions and the subsequent global trade slowdown of 2015—2016, which further exacerbated the decline in bilateral trade between the Baltic states and Russia.

In 2017—2019, production linkages of the countries in question stabilized, began to gradually recover, and even develop, yet this was not a linear trend, and it did not affect all countries equally over the reported period. Thus, in 2018 and 2019 Lithuania managed to exceed the 2013 volume of intermediate exports to Russia, and Estonia and Latvia were able to supply, respectively, 5.2 % and 7.4 % more intermediate products to Russia in 2020 than in 2019, which translated into increased support to the Baltic states' economies from the Russian industrial buyers in the time of the global economic crisis.

That trade flows from the Baltic states shifted structurally in favor of Russia during the first decade of the Baltic states' membership in the EU and in more recent years, can be accounted for by the higher profitability of the huge Russian market and by difficulties the Baltic companies have been experiencing when entering already established, well-balanced and highly competitive markets of the European Union (at the same time, Russian markets were in their earlier stages of development and had good prospects of growth). Historic connections with Russian enterprises, well-established infrastructure, logistics, transport accessibility and other institutional factors were also of great importance for the Baltic enterprises.

Overall, the results obtained in this study point to the fact that production linkages between companies in the Baltic states and Russia within the framework of bilateral relations, as well as those built within global and regional value chains are characterized by significant resistance capacity to shocks of geopolitical (sanctions or trade restrictions) or economic (global trade slowdown of 2015—2016; global economic crisis of 2020) nature. Mutually imposed sanctions and restrictions introduced after 2014 caused a decline in commodity flows but did not lead to a complete wipe-out of Russia's industrial ties with the Baltic states or to the destruction of manufacturing infrastructure; nor were they able to stop bilateral business activity. For the Baltic states, Russia remains an important foreign trade partner.

Significant differences in the structures of economies of the Baltic states and Russia, as well as access to resources and the sufficiency of these resources to ensure the uninterrupted economic reproduction translate into intensive trade in intermediate goods between the countries in question and into their mutual interest to further develop already established production linkages. Economic considerations and comparative competitive advantages of both the countries themselves and their business entities will continue to have a stronger influence on the formation and preservation of their production ties than geopolitical factors. While this can only continue until a certain line is crossed, our study shows that this point has not been reached by either party.

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GEOECONOMIC RISKS FACED BY THE RUSSIAN BALTIC REGION AMID A DETERIORATING GEOPOLITICAL SITUATION

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Received 03.10.2021
doi: 10.5922/2079-8555-2022-2-2

This article is a conceptual theoretical-empirical study of the geopolitical risks the Baltic Russian regions have faced amid the deteriorating geopolitical situation observed since 2014. The Baltic Russian regions are in a vulnerable position because of their geographical vicinity to EU countries, with which they share common borders, and the dramatically worsening military and political situation. To analyse geoeconomic risks, the author employed an earlier proposed methodology, which has been tested in Russia and abroad. Four types of geoeconomics risks are examined: spatial, economic, socio-demographic, national geopolitical and regional geopolitical. Overall, five levels of geopolitical risks can be distinguished. The contribution sets out to provide a conceptual picture of the geoeconomic risks which the Baltic Russian territories — St. Petersburg, the Republic of Karelia and the Leningrad, Kaliningrad, Novgorod, Pskov and Murmansk regions faced in 2014—2021 as the geopolitical situation changed for the worse in the wake of the Ukraine political crisis (2013—2014). The objectives of the study included selecting economic, social and international trade indicators and analytics matching each type of the geoeconomic risks. To identify the geo-economic risks of the selected regions, three basic indicators are considered — population, GRP, foreign trade turnover, and changes in other indicators for 2014—2021 were tracked. Eighteen risks divided into four types were explored for the Baltic Russian regions. The geoeconomic risks were grouped into two categories: spatial/geopolitical and economic/socio-demographic. A preliminary assessment of the regional risks was obtained using a methodology proposed by the author. The risks in the spatial/geopolitical category are substantial for the Kaliningrad region, whilst the Pskov region and Karelia proved to be most susceptible to the economic/socio-demographic risks.

Keywords:
geoeconomic risks, geopolitics, geoeconomics, Baltic Russian regions, Baltic region, tensions in Europe, geopolitical risks, instability, geopolitical crisis

Literature Review and Problem Statement

The article studies geopolitical risks to the Russian Baltic regions in the context of the deteriorating geopolitical situation in 2014—2022. However, the article does not assess new geopolitical risks associated with the dramatic geo-

To cite this article: Lachininskii S. S. 2022, Geoeconomic risks faced by the Russian Baltic region amid a deteriorating geopolitical situation, *Balt. Reg.*, Vol. 14, no 2, p. 23—37. doi: 10.5922/2078-8555-2022-2-2.

political changes in Europe after February 24, 2022, brought about by the start of a special military operation of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation in Ukraine. The reason is that from February 24, 2022, to March 18, 2022, the collective West and the EU imposed more than 2,000 additional restrictions on Russia in economic, social, humanitarian, scientific-technological and media spheres. This so-called "sanctions pressure" on Russia and the Republic of Belarus is increasing. In the near future, until the end of the operation, it is expected to escalate and include measures against the border regions of Russia considered in this study. In distinguishing the Russian segment of the Baltic region (Russian Baltic), we rely on an exhaustive study [1] proposing an extensive approach to delimitating it ("expanded A" — VASAB). In this study, we consider St. Petersburg, the Leningrad, Kaliningrad, Novgorod, Pskov, Murmansk regions and the Republic of Karelia.

The article proposes to test the hypothesis that the Russian Baltic regions are in a rather vulnerable position and face high geoeconomic risks taking into account the fact that geographically they are adjacent to the EU countries bordering on them, as well as the long history of their cross-border cooperation and well-established economic relations. Clearly, a dramatic escalation in Europe will have profound socio-economic and political consequences, including restrictive measures of the Western countries against the residents of the Russian Federation and the Republic of Belarus, as well as against economic agents operating outside those states; a new migration crisis with Ukrainian refugees all over Eastern Europe, including the Russian Federation; the build-up of military infrastructure and military contingents in Eastern Europe, including in the border regions of the Russian Federation; the disruption of global value chains involving Russian regions; potential expansion of the conflict zone through the involvement of the Visegrad Group countries and the Baltic States; the exodus of Ukrainian fighters and nationalists to neighbouring states and a sharply increasing terrorist threat to Russian regions, etc.

The academic community has been discussing the concept of geopolitical risks for quite a while (since the 1950s, according to Shvets [2]). Most often it is viewed as a potentially limiting factor in the development of a territory. Topical articles on social and geographical issues ([3—9]) confirm researchers' interest in this phenomenon. Having summarized the accumulated knowledge, some authors [6] conclude that geopolitical events and the resulting geopolitical uncertainty (civil unrest, terrorism, civil conflicts, government changes, elections and political upheavals) have a profound impact on the economic performance of individual countries and regions. The political crisis in Ukraine (2013—2014) is an example of how civil conflicts and internal instability can lead to a decline and degradation of the economy. By 2018, Ukraine lost 20% of its industrial production, while the fall in GDP in 2014—2015 alone was 16.5%. The Donbas blockade incurred losses of an estimated 2 % of GDP (1.9 billion USD). At the same time, the Ukrainian crisis of 2014 has led to an increase in regional geopolitical uncertainty and tension in the European region, and its aggravation in 2022 is fraught with the deepest socio-economic and political crisis in the EU countries and serious challenges for Russia's economy (mutual sanctions and restrictions of the West and Russia; a surge in energy, raw materials and food prices; a radical drop in trade; mounting military tension on the external borders of the EU member states; escalating contradictions; a humanitarian crisis, etc.).

In [8], it is stated that geopolitical risks include both the risks of these events unfolding and the new risks associated with the escalation of the current situation. That is why market participants (businessmen, economic agents and firms, central bank officials) consider geopolitical risks as key factors in investment decisions and stock market dynamics.

Geopolitical risks have a clear regional focus. For instance, Ezhiev notes that traditionally the aim of studying risks to a particular region was to assess their degree under existing or potential political, economic, psychological and other conditions and to underpin the decisions of a particular subject on the ways to minimize risks and drive the strategic enemy out of a certain space [10]. Dzhus notes that in a narrow sense, geopolitical risks are the probability of a direct or indirect impact of political events on the activities of economic agents [11].

International research groups (for instance, Supply Wisdom-2020) publish annual analytical reviews on geopolitical risks, which confirms the importance and relevance of research into them. Supply Wisdom puts geopolitical risks among 14 others and considers them at the country level. Their studies accentuate the intrinsic properties of this phenomenon, as well as provide a link to geoeconomic risks that are the object of this study. According to Supply Wisdom experts, geopolitical risks include the greatest global business disruptions and supply chain risks that enterprises do not properly control. The experts clearly demonstrate how location risks can vary from country to country. They note that geopolitical risks are static throughout the year, rather, they are constantly changing.

A study by the Finnish Institute of International Relations (2021) understands geoeconomic risks as the ones related to the economy being used by states to achieve their political goals. The authors note that in the world of global supply chains and markets, the factor of supply reliability comes to the forefront, especially during the COVID-19 pandemic as the period (2020—2022) brought new restrictions to the world economy: sanitary control, remote delivery of goods and services, delayed deliveries, "growing securitization", etc. Geoeconomic risks are distinguished from political ones by their territorial, transnational and transboundary nature.

The context of this phenomenon explains the very nature and genesis of geoeconomics, as pointed out by Sparke who believes that geoeconomics is a surprisingly broad phenomenon encompassing many things: boundless economic zones, strategic economic instruments of foreign policy, such as neoliberalism, nationalism, etc. [13].

Wiegel emphasizes that the types of geoeconomic strategies that he has identified — neo-imperialism, neo-mercantilism, hegemony and liberal institutionalism — are implemented by a regional power and form a regional order in the region that is of interest to such a power [14].

In our conceptual study of geoeconomic risks [15], we distinguish five territorial levels of analysis of these risks (the highest, upper, middle, lower, the lowest) and four types of geoeconomic risks (spatial, economic, socio-demographic, geopolitical).

The Russian Baltic regions in the context of the aggravating geopolitical situation

The Russian Baltic is considered according to the expanded approach proposed by Klemeshev, Fedorov et al. (expanded A — VASAB) [1] comprising seven regions: St. Petersburg, Leningrad, Kaliningrad, Novgorod, Pskov, Murmansk regions and the Republic of Karelia.

To identify the geoeconomic risks to the selected regions, we consider three basic indicators: population, GRP, and international trade, as well as their changes in 2014—2021 (Table 1).

Table 1

The Russian Baltic regions in 2014—2021

Region	Population, thousand people			GRP, billion rubles			International trade, million USD		
	2014	2021	Changes, %	2014	2021	Changes, %	2014	2020	Changes, %
St. Petersburg	5.192	5.384	+ 3.7	2.652	4.800	+ 81 %	53.197	42.439	– 20
Leningrad region	1.776	1.893	+ 6.6	714	1.288	+ 80 %	20.133	8.934	– 56
Pskov region	651	620	– 4.8	121.3	179.7	+ 48 %	1.161	502	– 57
Novgorod region	619	592	-4.4	205.9	279.9	+ 36 %	2.063	1.912	– 7
Kaliningrad region	969	1.019	+ 5.1	306.2	556.3	+ 82 %	19.592	8.471	– 57
Murmansk region	766	733	– 4.3	320.3	593.8	+ 85 %	2.730	5.055	+ 85
Republic of Karelia	633	609	– 3.8	185.6	340	+ 83 %	1.219	903	– 26
Total	10.606	10.850	+ 2.3	4.505.3	8.037.7	+ 78 %	100.095	68.216	– 32

Table 1 indicates the following trends in the Russian Baltic regions in 2014—2021: population growth continued in the Leningrad region (+ 6.6 %) and St. Petersburg (+ 3.7 %), as well as in the Kaliningrad region (+ 5.1 %) with a decrease in the population in the periphery regions of Pskov (- 4.8 %), Novgorod (- 4.4 %), Murmansk (- 4.3 %) and Karelia (- 3.8 %). There was a significant increase in GDP with a group of the regions showing fast growth (the Leningrad region, St. Petersburg, the Kaliningrad region, the Republic of Karelia and the Murmansk region) and a group showing low growth (the Novgorod and Pskov regions). There also was a drop in international trade with the two groups identified: one showing a drastic reduction (the Kaliningrad, Pskov, and Leningrad regions) and the other showing a noticeable reduction (Karelia, St. Petersburg and the Novgorod region), while the Murmansk region demonstrated an increase (+ 85 %).

Based on our previous research [15], in this study, we will consider specific geoeconomic risks to the Russian Baltic regions (Table 2).

Table 2

Types of geoeconomic risks

Type of geoeconomic risks	Subtype	Risk	Code
Spatial (S)	—	The threat of depression in the EU countries and regions	S-1
		The threat of the breakdown of the transnational network in the regions	S-2
		The threat or negative impact of integration processes in the EU and EurAsEC	S-3
		The threat of geoeconomic changes in the regions	S-4
Economic (E)	Global engagement (internationalization of the economy)	The threat of outflow or withdrawal of foreign direct investment from the Russian Baltic regions	E1-5
		The threat to international trade relations and falling exports of the Russian Baltic regions	E1-6
	Economic dependence (interdependence)	The influence of world prices on regional budget revenues	E2-7
	The cyclical nature of the world economy	Monofunctionality as a threat	E3-8
		Losing positions in the world markets	E3-9

The end of table 2

Type of geoeconomic risks	Subtype	Risk	Code
Socio-demographic (SD)	—	The threat of PROTESTS as a result of salary arrears and lay-offs	SD-10
		The threat of further social stratification	SD-11
		The threat of an increase in the workforce and a decrease in their skill level	SD-12
		Threat of depopulation	SD-13
Geopolitical (G)	Hostile environment and tense relationships	Threat to foreign economic relations from the actions of third parties	G4-14
		The threat of war, invasion and local hostilities	G4-15
		Threat to external communications	G4-16
	Adverse political changes in neighbouring countries	The threat of political regime change and redistribution of property and supplies	G5-17
	Threat of hostilities	The threat of economic losses due to cross-border conflicts	G6-18

Table 2 presents 4 types and 18 geoeconomic risks to the Russian Baltic regions. Next, we will consider geoeconomic risk in detail.

Spatial type of geoeconomic risks

The seven Russian Baltic regions border the EU regions of Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland.

As noted earlier [15], the spatial type of risks is associated with a region's position in the geoeconomic space determined by its links with the major elements of the globalized space, including its position regarding world cities, integration associations, international infrastructure, etc.

In this regard, it is appropriate to recall the EU report which notes that the richest regions of this integration group are eight times richer than the poorest ones, which is a key challenge for the cohesion of Old and New Europe[1]. In addition, the existing and growing regional socio-economic asymmetry is aggravated by internal political, cultural, humanitarian and geopolitical contradictions (migration and gender policy, relations with Russia and with the United States, new migration and humanitarian crisis, the radicalization of European politics and society, the "Ukrainian crisis", etc.). This creates risks of the EU disintegration and increasing negative processes in its peripheral areas. This indicates that there is no single cohesive EU space, which makes the Russian regions under consideration more prudent in choosing benchmarks and partners.

The report states that the regions of Finland are in a rather advantageous position due to their human potential (a large proportion of a highly-educated workforce), as well as the development of advanced industries (a large share of employment in them). Consequently, Karelia, the Leningrad, Murmansk regions and St. Petersburg are less susceptible to S-type risks, but they cannot compete with them for investments in advanced sectors.

The regions of Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and partly Estonia are at higher risk of globalization due to their great vulnerability in low-value-added and low-skilled sectors. These regions experience difficulty in attracting investment and creating or retaining jobs. For the border regions of Pskov and Kaliningrad, as well as the internal Novgorod region, this means the competition for limited investment resources, while it also creates opportunities for industries and businesses with high added value.

The threat of geoeconomics changes in the regions does not pose a significant risk to most of the regions under consideration, especially after the completion of the EU enlargement and the preservation of the status quo in the Republic of Belarus (after the events of 2020—2021). The exacerbation of geopolitical risks in the region will lead to a deterioration of the geoeconomic situation in the Kaliningrad region, up to the restriction of export/import and land transportation, and a blockade of the region. This risk can be partially mitigated by expanding maritime communication with the Leningrad region and St. Petersburg, as well as increasing air transportation, including through the Republic of Belarus. At the same time, in the context of the Ukrainian crisis, Lithuania and Latvia face a serious choice: the "ukrainianization" of their policies with a subsequent fatal challenge to their security or the gradual normalization of their relations with Russia and the Republic of Belarus and a stable socio-economic and political situation. The current political elites of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia seem to be unable to comprehend this simple choice and will most probably continue their deadlock.

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[1] Regions 2020: An Assessment of Future Challenges for EU, 2008, *Commission of the European Communities*. Available at: ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/sources/docoffic/working/regions2020/pdf/regions2020_en.pdf (accessed 05.01.2022).

Risks associated with the threat or negative impact of integration processes in the EU and EurAsEC primarily affect border regions.

Economic type of geoeconomic risks

As stated above, all types were identified by the author in [15] and have been extensively tested in geographic research both domestically and internationally. This type consists of five geoeconomic risks, with the subtype of "Global engagement (internationalization of the economy)" being the major. It includes the threat of outflow or withdrawal of foreign direct investment, the threat to international trade relations and falling exports of the Russian Baltic regions. Table 1 indicates that from 2014 to 2021 the trade of the seven regions under consideration decreased from 100 to 68 billion USD, i.e. by 32 %. The most dramatic decline was in the most open and globalized regions with significant foreign investment and dependence on integration into global value chains: the Leningrad (-56 %) and the Kaliningrad regions (-57 %), as well as the border Pskov region (-57 %) due to a decrease in commodity exports, the embargo, and the pandemic.

Foreign economic relations with Finland can serve as an illustrative example. In Russia, there are more than 900 companies with Finnish capital with the investments ranging from 12 to 15 billion euros[2]. However, in 2014—2021, there were no new projects in 30 leading in revenue Finnish companies in Russia. In 2014—2015, Finnish companies operating in the Russian market were hit several times: by anti-Russian sanctions, which made banks less eager to lend for development in Russia, by the food embargo, which stopped food imports, and by the collapse of the ruble, which made Finnish goods more expensive, and therefore less competitive. The withdrawal of five major players from the Russian market (Kesko, Neste, Stockmann, Ruukki and Scanfert) was symptomatic. Their total annual turnover at the time of the cessation of their activities in Russia was 56 billion rubles. On the bright side, against the background of mutual sanctions and restrictions, as well as the import substitution policy, there was a noticeable growth in the manufacturing industry in Russia after 2014 as the revenue of the Top 30 increased from 62 % in 2015 to 70 % in 2019[3].

Interestingly, foreign investors highly appreciate the opportunities and potential of Russia but note the highest geopolitical and geo-economic risks limiting investment opportunities. Matthias Schepp, Chairman of the Board of the Russian-German Chamber of Commerce (AHK Russland), noted at the end of

[2] Leaders of Finnish business — 2020. Research, *2020*, Fontanka.Ru. Available at: https://www.fontanka.ru/longreads/69553493/ (accessed 05.01.2022).

[3] Leaders of Finnish business — 2020. Research, *2020*, Fontanka.Ru. Available at: https://www.fontanka.ru/longreads/69553493/ (accessed 05.01.2022).

2021: "The Russian market is one of the most attractive in the world, with its profitability being one of the highest, but it is, of course, one of the most volatile markets regularly exposed to external shock[4]."

As for the risk of the influence of the world prices on regional budget revenues, it is less noticeable in the Russian context. The reason is that the major producers are registered in Moscow (236 out of 500 with 50 % of the total revenue) and pay taxes in this region, which means that they do not directly affect the revenues of the budgets of the regions under consideration. The RBK-500 list (2021) companies[5] located in the regions under consideration and depending on foreign markets include Gazprom (St. Petersburg, fuel and energy complex), Rusal (the Kaliningrad region, metallurgy), Sodruzhestvo Group (the Kaliningrad region, agriculture), Ilim Group (St. Petersburg, wood industry), Transoil (St. Petersburg, transport), Segezha (Karelia, wood industry), Artis-Agro Export (St. Petersburg, agriculture), Ust-Luga Oil (the Leningrad region, transport).

The risk of monofunctionality as a threat can be grave for St. Petersburg after the final transition of Gazprom from Moscow, as well as for the Novgorod region due to the sharp deterioration in the world markets of chemical fertilizers (PJSC Akron employing 2 % of the region's population) and, partially, for the Murmansk region, whose economy is based on the mining industry.

Socio-demographic type of geoeconomic risks

Here, we distinguish four geopolitical risks, with the risk of the threat of depopulation being the major in this group. Table 1 shows that the population in the regions under consideration increased by 2.3 %, while in the Leningrad region in 2014—2021 it increased by 6.6 %, primarily due to the districts and towns within the agglomeration of Greater St. Petersburg (Vsevolozhsky, Kirovsky, Tosnensky, Lomonosovsky, Gatchinsky districts). The Kaliningrad region also shows population growth (+ 5.2 %).

Table 3 shows four social indicators applied in the analysis of this risk-type. The most alarming situation is in the Pskov region and the Republic of Karelia, reflected in a high proportion of the poor (more than 15 %) and unemployment rate (from 5 to 8 %). The situation is somewhat better in the Novgorod, Kaliningrad and Murmansk regions due to a more diversified structure of the economy

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[4] Firms from Germany in 2022 expect business growth in Russia, but fear shocks, 2022, *Deutsche Welle*. URL: www.dw.com/en/firmy-iz-frg-v-2022-godu-ozhidajut-rosta-biznesa-v-rossii/a-60071687 (accessed 07.02.2022).

[5] RBC Pro presents the rating of Russia's largest companies by revenue, 2021, *RBC*. URL: pro.rbc.ru/rbc500?utm_source=rbc.ru&utm_medium=inhouse_media&utm_campaign=rbc_500_2021&utm_content=6193fe2a9a794700cad2ab0b (accessed 05.01.2022).

and the presence of large export-oriented industries. The most stable situation is in St. Petersburg and the Leningrad region, whose economy is diversified and has a huge consumer potential.

Table 3

Social indicators of the Russian Baltic regions

Region	Unemployment rate, %		Share of population with an income below the subsistence level, %		Cost of a fixed set of consumer goods and services (at the end of the year), % to the Russian Federation		Consumption of potato and bread per capita, kg	
	2014	2019	2014	2019	2014	2019	2014	2019
St. Petersburg	1.4	1.4	8.3	6.5	107	109	161	150
Leningrad region	4.5	3.9	10.4	8.8	105	103	205	202
Kaliningrad region	5.4	4.4	12.1	13.6	102	102	220	204
Pskov region	6.5	5.1	16.1	16.2	97	94	186	189
Novgorod region	3.7	3.6	12.2	13.9	91	91	243	231
Murmansk region	6.7	5.4	10.9	10.6	122	118	155	151
Republic of Karelia	8.1	7.4	14.2	15.7	107	106	231	197

Geopolitical type of geoeconomic risks

This type includes five geoeconomic risks and is discussed in detail in [16]. This type is present at a higher national level.

It is necessary to say here that the Baltic Sea Region is of profound, even crucial, importance in the geostrategic confrontation between Russia (and allied Belarus) and the West, which requires the reevaluation of the US and NATO strategy in it. Khudoley points out that the Ukrainian crisis has led to a sharp deterioration in political relations between Russia and other states of the Baltic Sea Region. He also rightly notes that the political rift between them, beginning to take shape in previous years, has become a reality [17]. It is no coincidence that in Russia, not only political and military circles but also the academic community [18] increasingly accept the idea that Russian geostrategy should aim primarily at transforming the geopolitical environment, forming friendly geopolitical shells around Russia, at making the country's space functional in terms of pursuing fundamental national interests and advancing socio-economic modernization. This idea was embedded in Russia's demands for security guarantees from the US and NATO at the end of 2021.

In this case, specific types of geoeconomic risks are determined by military-strategic and political decisions that the capitals of partner countries might take.

In December 2021, a new coalition government led by Chancellor Olaf Scholz came to power in Germany. The posts of Vice-Chancellor and Minister for Foreign Affairs were occupied by the representatives of the Union 90/Greens party pursuing the most anti-Russian and Euro-Atlantic policies and threatening sanctions against the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline.

In the post-socialist period, in the Baltic States and Poland, anti-Russian and Russophobic regimes have long been in power. Their short-sighted policy led to the fact that in the 2000s—2020s Russia created substitute port and logistics facilities in the eastern part of the Gulf of Finland with a cargo turnover of more than 250 million tons and built new gas pipelines under the Baltic and Black Seas. At the same time, Russia was forced to strengthen its military group in the Kaliningrad region.

The change of political regime in Finland can result in a reconsideration of the neutral status of this country and the deterioration of bilateral Russian-Finnish trade and economic relations. Suffice it to recall here that in her last New Year's address the new Prime Minister of Finland, Sanna Marin, on December 31, 2021, said: "We retain the opportunity to apply for NATO membership. We need to cherish this freedom of choice, as it concerns the right of each state to decide on its security solutions[6]." She added that Finland was strengthening its cooperation with the European Union in defense. Yet another cause for concern is third countries in every possible way pushing Finland to change its status. It is worth recalling here that, despite the Treaty of Paris (1947), after the conclusion of the Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany, on September 21, 1990, Finland unilaterally declared that the military restrictions of the Treaty of Paris (except for the deployment of nuclear weapons) were no longer relevant and no longer in force [19]. It is no coincidence that as early as in 1995, the Government of Finland removed the notion of neutrality from the security report[7], and the 1997 report states the possibility of receiving military assistance from outside[8].

The major risk is the threat to foreign economic relations from the actions of third parties. It is worth mentioning here the sanctions imposed by Congress and the US Administration not only on major Russian energy projects (Nord Stream 2), but also on leading Russian companies and banks that carry out foreign economic activities in Europe[9], including in the Baltic region.

[6] The Prime Minister of Finland announced the possibility of the country joining NATO, 2021, *Vedomosti*, January 2. Available at: www.vedomosti.ru/politics/news/2022/01/02/903583-premer-ministr-finlyandii-vozmozhnosti-vstupleniya-strani-v-nato (accessed 10.01.2022).

[7] Turvallisuus muuttuvassa maailmassa Suomen turvallisuuspolitiikan suuntalinjat Valtioneuvoston selonteko eduskunnalle 06.06.1995, 1995. Available at: www.defmin.fi/files/246/2513_2143_selonteko95_1_.pdf (accessed 07.02.2022).

[8] Euroopan turvallisuuskehitys ja Suomen puolustus Valtioneuvoston selonteko eduskunnalle 17.03.1997, 1997. Available at: www.defmin.fi/files/245/2512_2142_selonteko97_1_.pdf (accessed 07.02.2022).

[9] Review of the US, EU and Russian sanctions regime, 2019, Danilov and partners. URL://danilovpartners.com/en/publikacii/obzor-sankcionnogo-rezhima-ssha-es-i-rossii-2/ (accessed 22.02.2022).

Thus, the geoeconomic risks to the Russian Baltic regions fall into four types: spatial, economic, socio-demographic, and geopolitical. Despite the small number of the regions considered, their potential, capabilities and positioning in the region are clearly very different. Below we will consider specific geoeconomic risks of two groups: "spatial and geopolitical type" (Table 4) and "economic and socio-demographic type" (Table 5).

Table 4

Spatial and geopolitical type of geo-economic risks to the Russian Baltic regions

Risk	SPb	LR	PR	NR	KR	MR	RK
S-1	+	+ +	+ +	0	+ + +	+ +	+ +
S-2	+	+ +	+	+	+ +	0	+
S-3	+	+ +	+ +	0	+ + +	+	+ +
S-4	0	0	0	0	+ + +	0	+
G_4-14	+	+ +	+	+	+ +	+	+
G_4-15	+	+ +	+ +	0	+ + +	+ +	+
G_4-16	0	+ +	+	0	+ + +	+ +	+
G_5-17	0	+	+	0	+	+ +	+ +
G_6-18	0	+ +	+	0	+ + +	+ +	+

Note: SPb — St. Petersburg; LR — the Leningrad region; PR — the Pskov region; NR — the Novgorod region; KR — the Kaliningrad region; MR — the Murmansk region; RK — the Republic of Karelia;

+ + + — the risk is substantial; + + — the risk is significant; + — the risk exists; 0 — the risk is absent or hardly visible.

Table 5

Economic and socio-demographic type of geoeconomic risks to the Russian Baltic regions

Risk	SPb	LR	PR	NR	KR	MR	RK
E_1-5	+ +	+ + +	+	+ +	+ + +	0	+ +
E_1-6	+ +	+ + +	+ + +	+	+ + +	0	+ +
E_2-7	+ + +	+ +	0	+ +	+ +	+ +	+
E_3-8	+ + +	+	0	+ + +	+	+ + +	+ +
E_3-9	0	+	0	+	+	+ +	+
S-10	0	+	+ + +	+ +	+ +	+	+ + +
S-11	0	+	+ + +	+ +	+ +	+	+ + +
S-12	0	+	+ + +	+ +	+ +	+	+ + +
S-13	0	+	+ + +	+ + +	+	+ + +	+ + +

Note: SPb — St. Petersburg; LR — the Leningrad region; PR — the Pskov region; NR — the Novgorod region; KR — the Kaliningrad region; MR — the Murmansk region; RK — the Republic of Karelia;

+ + + — the risk is substantial; + + — the risk is significant; + — the risk exists; 0 — the risk is absent or hardly visible.

Conclusion

The author's methodology was used to analyse the geoeconomic risks of seven Russian Baltic regions. Many Russian and international researchers characterize the study period, 2014—2021, as that of increasing geopolitical turbulence, and since the end of 2021 — a sharply aggravated geopolitical situation. The geopolitical turbulence in Europe is provoked by the internal political crisis in Ukraine (2013—2014) and the events that followed it (the 2014 coup in Ukraine, the Crimean Spring, the armed conflict and civil war in eastern Ukraine, increased NATO military activity in Eastern Europe, the special military operation of the Russian Armed Forces in Ukraine, etc.). The dramatic geopolitical deterioration is accompanied by a marked worsening in the geoeconomic situation caused by reciprocal restrictive measures by the countries of the West and Russia in trade and economic, investment, cultural and humanitarian, scientific and technical, and cross-border cooperation. The mass exodus of Western, including European, companies from the considered border regions of Russia is double-edged. The main objective of any company is to make a profit and increase its competitiveness in global markets. The withdrawal of these companies from the 145-million Russian market will lead not only to a drop in profits and exports but also to significant reputational losses. Sooner or later, Western companies will be replaced by local ones or investors from the Asia-Pacific region, the Middle East, Africa and Latin America.

In this regard, we have hypothesized that the Russian Baltic regions are in a rather vulnerable position. It is important that geographically they are adjacent to the EU countries, they have common borders, long history of cross-border cooperation, and well-established economic relations with the countries in the Baltic Sea Region. The study showed that the spatial and geopolitical types of geoeconomic risks are substantial for the Kaliningrad region, primarily due to its special economic and geographical position and the economic development path the region has been following last 30 years: excessive openness and dependence on the global economy and export-import operations. These risks are least significant for the Novgorod region as an internal region and St. Petersburg, a multifunctional and powerful economic centre firmly embedded in the spatial structure of Russia. The economic and socio-demographic types of risks are more complex to assess, they mostly affect the Pskov region, the Republic of Karelia. For the Novgorod and Kaliningrad regions, they are noticeable.

The hypothesis was partially confirmed, and the research tasks were completed. Future research involves providing each type of geoeconomic risk with additional indicators and expanding the set of regions to the entire North-Western macroregion of Russia, which in the 2000s—2020s became the leading foreign economic operator.

Acknowledgements

The study was carried out using the state budget funds for the state task for 2021 No. 2249-21 "Implementation of research activities on the problems of geopolitics and historical memory in the Kaliningrad direction".

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INTERNATIONAL POSITIONING OF THE REGION: THE IMAGE OF THE KALININGRAD REGION IN THE MEDIA SPACE OF THE BALTIC STATES

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Received 24.09.2021
doi: 10.5922/2079-8555-2022-2-3

The issue of international positioning is crucial to all exclaves, and the Kaliningrad region surrounded by the Baltic region countries is no exception. This contribution aims to describe a general strategic path for positioning the Russian territory in question. To produce recommendations on a positioning concept, it looks at the ties between the Kaliningrad region and the neighbouring Baltic States and how the former is perceived by the latter. Publication monitoring and media content analysis were carried out to explore the image created in the Latvian, Lithuanian and Estonian media in recent years. Avenues for positioning are proposed in line with the principles of place branding, and the interests common to the region and the Baltic States are considered through the lens of international cooperation projects. The emphasis is on the prospects for trade relations development. The main advantages of the region are identified, and the risks to be reckoned with when forming a positioning concept are determined. The findings suggest that strategic positioning is feasible in the case of the Kaliningrad region; its focal points may be investment, logistics, tourism and infrastructure. The authors also stress the possibility of developing international cooperation platforms and indicate regional problems of international concern.

Keywords:
image, positioning, strategy, cooperation, trade, Kaliningrad region, Baltic States

Problem Statement and Research Methodology

As of now, most Russian regions do not have an international positioning strategy. Suggestions by the expert and academic community mainly concern tourism, culture, economy, innovation and education. Although there have been some comprehensive proposals for Russian regions in recent years, strategic initiatives are rare. Thus, there is a need for new 'research optics' in Russian spatial imaging [1, p. 159].

To cite this article: Tarasov, I. N., Urazbaev, E. E., 2022, International positioning of the region: the image of the Kaliningrad region in the media space of the Baltic states , Balt. Reg., Vol. 14, no 2, p. 38—52. doi: 10.5922/2078-8555-2022-2-3.

The development of the Kaliningrad region's international positioning strategy is a burning issue due to its special importance for the state, the interests of other countries concentrating around it, and the potential integration into the common economic space of the Baltic Sea region [2]. In implementing the strategy, it is essential to consolidate the strengths to develop cultural, trade and other types of international ties and to obtain benefits in terms of reputation, investment or tourist exchanges. A positive place image, in turn, can favour the standing of the country in general [3]. The strategy development is important not only because of the exclave position of the region but also because of some geopolitical factors [4, p. 79]. However, giving the priority exclusively to them, focusing on "hard power", is not sufficient for developing an efficient toolkit. For instance, it seems impossible to find mutual benefits with counterparties of the neighbouring Baltic countries, whose elites have been openly supporting confrontation with Russia for many years.

Creating a positioning strategy implies, amongst other things, an assessment of a region's development level and potential, as well as the prevailing perceptions on the part of foreign actors. Analysis of the latter helps determine the features of the image and the international political brand formation. It has been noted in the literature that the Russian media space presents the Kaliningrad region as an economically and touristically attractive region, a military outpost and a region of cooperation [5]. Media analysis shows a similar picture in some countries of the Baltic region. The Polish media, for instance, creates an ambiguous image of the Russian exclave, referring to it neutrally, in the context of cooperation or as a threat [6, p. 48—49].

Electronic media materials published in 2018—2020 were monitored[1] to identify what image of the Kaliningrad region is projected in Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia. The study applied the method of media content analysis to materials dedicated to the region or making a special mention thereof. The resources were sampled using the search query 'Kaliningrad region' and 'Kaliningrad'. Publications on incidents and episodic events were excluded. The result was a total of 202 resources categorised into thematic groups (see the tables below) to characterise the references. Single references indicate low interest in certain topics and are poorly representative, still, they allow for identifying potential areas of common interest.

To determine positioning areas, the authors apply the concept of place branding. Examples of international project implementation and the state of trade relations were studied based on data from the Government of the Kaliningrad region, the Kaliningrad Regional Customs and the Joint Technical Secretariat of the 2014—2020 Russia-Lithuania Cross-Border Cooperation Program.

[1] Latvia: Skaties.lv, Lsm.lv, Diena, Latvijas Avīze, Tvnet.lv, Jauns.lv, Rīgas Apriņķa Avīze, Delfi, Bb.lv, nra.lv; Lithuania: Delfi, 15min.lt, diena.lt, LRT, Lrytas.lt; Verslo žinios, tv3.lt. Estonia: err.ee, delfi.ee, postimees.ee.

SWOT analysis allows one to comprehensively consider the strengths and opportunities of the region and fully describe its standing. It uses standard groups of internal or external factors: geographical and geopolitical situation (situation, conditions, resources, international climate), research and production factors (research potential, production potential, spatial organisation, areas of economic development, large infrastructure projects), financial system (budget, investment potential), social sphere (social infrastructure, labour and consumer resources), governance (efficiency of the region's administration, sustainability of the private sector). This paper presents the most significant factors in the context of international positioning.

This study raises, for the first time, the question of finding effective analytical tools for an international positioning strategy for a border region and tests specific methods. It is also the first research to conduct a qualitative content analysis of the Baltic States' media on the problem of international positioning of the Kaliningrad region and assess the risks and opportunities for forming an attractive image of the Russian exclave.

Perception of the Kaliningrad region in the Baltic states

The analysis shows that, during the study period, the Latvian media most often addressed the issues of transport and transit, accounting for about 45 per cent of all the publications (Table 1). The interest in the topic increased in 2020 due to a freight container train from China to the Kaliningrad region crossing the country under a contract between the Latvian Railways (lat. Latvijas dzelzceňš) and the Russian Railways. This event received mainly positive coverage as the media welcomed the cooperation between the railway companies, and they saw the transit as a new (or well-forgotten former) area of cross-border relations. It is worth noting that the majority of publications on the event were official press releases of the Latvian Railways. Other materials on this topic published in Latvia include those on possible new air and rail routes, transit business and the Baltic Transport Forum.

Table 1

Number of Latvian publications relating to the Kaliningrad region

Topic	2018	2019	2020	Total
Geopolitical role of the region	10	7	7	24
Transport links and transit	6	4	22	32
Cultural events	1	1	2	4
Energy Industry	1	0	0	1

The end of table 1

Topic	2018	2019	2020	Total
E-visas	0	3	1	4
Tourism and tourist attractions	0	2	0	2
Amber industry	0	0	1	1
Attitude towards Immanuel Kant and the German heritage	1	0	1	2
Education in the region	0	1	0	1
Total	19	18	34	71

The Latvian media discuss the geopolitical role of the Kaliningrad region sometimes neutrally and more often critically (Table 2). Almost 34 per cent of all the publications devoted to this topic mainly cover the issues of troop buildup and weapon deployment. The comments of Latvian politicians, representatives of NATO or Western experts stating that the Kaliningrad region should be perceived only as a threat to European states give them a negative tone. For example, in the context of the events in Belarus following the presidential elections in 2020, the region was described as a 'knife at the throat of NATO' if Russia gains control of the so-called hypothetical Suwalki corridor along the border of Lithuania and Poland[2].

Table 2

References to the Kaliningrad region in the Latvian media

Topic	Negative	Neutral	Positive
Geopolitical role of the region	14	10	0
Transport links and transit	2	10	20
Cultural events	0	2	2
Energy Industry	0	1	0
E-visas	2	1	1
Tourism and tourist attractions	0	1	1
Amber industry	0	1	0
Attitude towards Kant and the German heritage	1	1	0
Education in the region	1	0	0
Total	20	27	24

About 6 per cent of the publications focus on cultural events and the introduction of electronic visas for visiting the Kaliningrad region. Whilst materials on the former topic refer to the region positively, particularly due to the initiative

[2] Nazis pie NATO rīkles». Kāpēc Baltkrievija ir svarīga ASV, 2020, *LSM.lv — Uzticamas ziņas,* URL: https://www.lsm.lv/raksts/zinas/zinu-analize/nazis-pie-nato-rikles-kapec-baltkrievija-ir-svariga-asv.a370931 (accessed 17.01.2021).

of Kaliningrad institutions to open exhibitions in Latvia, those on the latter include a negative assessment of the project on the simplified entry of foreigners to Russia.

According to the monitoring results, the Latvian media have not formed a stable image of and tone of reference to the Kaliningrad region. Approximately equal shares of the sampled publications show critical, neutral and positive attitudes towards the region (Table 2).

Whilst in Latvia there were 71 publications on the Kaliningrad region, in Lithuania, there were 93. The main topic in the Lithuanian media was tourism, which accounted for 28 per cent of all the publications (Table 3). The results of the analysis clearly show that in 2019 the focus was on the simplified procedure for visiting the region using electronic visas. Within the framework of this topic, the experience of travel to the region is mainly discussed neutrally. New Year's holidays in Kaliningrad, visiting the Cathedral, the Museum of the World Ocean, the Curonian Spit, etc. are assessed positively. A negative attitude to the Kaliningrad region is observed in alternative travel reports concentrating on 'poor accessibility', 'border traffic jams', 'Soviet atmosphere', etc. However, negative references to the region in the context of tourism constitute a small proportion in comparison with neutral and positive ones (Table 4).

Table 3

Number of publications related to the Kaliningrad region in Lithuania

Topic	2018	2019	2020	Total
Geopolitical role of the region	4	7	4	15
Transport links and transit	3	0	5	8
Energy Industry	2	3	0	5
E-visas	0	25	0	25
Tourism and tourist attractions	5	20	1	26
Amber industry	1	1	0	2
Attitude towards Kant and the German heritage	5	0	0	5
Business projects and investment climate	2	0	1	3
Grocery trips	1	0	0	1
Lithuanian community in the Kaliningrad region	0	1	0	1
Water treatment facilities in the Kaliningrad region	0	1	0	1
Cross-border cooperation programme	0	1	0	1
Total	23	59	11	93

Table 4

References to the Kaliningrad region in Lithuanian media

Topic	Negative	Neutral	Positive
Geopolitical role of the region	4	11	0
Transport links and transit	1	7	0
Energy Industry	0	5	0
E-visas	9	13	3
Tourism and tourist attractions	5	12	9
Amber industry	0	2	0
Attitude towards Kant and the German heritage	5	0	0
Business projects and investment climate	2	1	0
Grocery trips	1	0	0
Lithuanian community in the Kaliningrad region	1	0	0
Water treatment facilities in the Kaliningrad region	1	0	0
Cross-border cooperation programme	0	0	1
Total	29	51	13

Another 27 per cent of the Lithuanian media coverage of the region concerns electronic visas. Most of the publications are neutral; however, the number of those with a critical tone exceeds the number of positive ones. The reason for this was the duplicated opinion of Lithuanian experts about the ‘danger’ of visiting the region becasue of the activities of the Russian special forces[3]. The positive coverage of the visa topic relates to the prospects of tourism development and cross-border cooperation in some sectors of the economy.

About 16 per cent of the Lithuanian publications discuss the Kaliningrad region in the context of geopolitics and military-political confrontation. Like in Latvia, there are no positive references to the region in this regard. Almost 9 per cent of the publications concern transport infrastructure (primarily maritime); 5 per cent, energy; 5 per cent, the attitude to the German period in the region’s history.

The Lithuanian media mostly refer to the Kaliningrad region neutrally. The second biggest group is negative publications. The reason for this is both complex Russian-Lithuanian relations and contradictions at the national level, as well as the biased position of some authors disregarding the norms of journalistic ethics.

Since 2018, there have been 38 publications on the Kaliningrad region in the Estonian media (Table 5). The majority of them are on geopolitics (about 42 per cent). But, unlike Latvian and Lithuanian resources, these publications

[3] Įspėja dėl Kaliningrado: nemokama viza — tarsi sūris pelėkautuose, 2021, *TV3 Play,* URL: https://www.tv3.lt/naujiena/lietuva/1004935/ispeja-del-kaliningrado-nemokama-viza-tarsi-suris-pelekautuose (accessed 17.01.2021).

consider the region in a more restrained manner. Most of them are news related to the deployment of weapons, including the Iskander operational-tactical missile systems.

Table 5

Number of publications related to the Kaliningrad region in Estonia

Topic	2018	2019	2020	Total
Geopolitical role of the region	12	3	1	16
Transport links and transit	1	1	2	4
Cultural events	0	2	0	2
Energy industry	0	5	1	6
E-visas	0	1	1	2
Tourism and tourist attractions	0	1	1	2
Attitude towards Kant and the German heritage	3	0	0	3
Business projects and investment climate	3	0	0	3
Total	19	13	6	38

About 16 per cent of the publications mention the region in the context of projects to ensure its energy independence, transport and transit (10 per cent). The topics of business (particularly the creation of a special administrative district in Kaliningrad for the re-domiciliation of companies from offshore zones) and attitudes to the German heritage account for 8 per cent each. The topics of cultural events, electronic visas, and tourism comprise 5 per cent of the publications each.

The tone of publications on the Kaliningrad region in the Estonian media is mostly neutral (Table 6). Negative examples are materials on the scandal over attitudes towards Kant and the publication on the position of the Lithuanian special forces on the alleged danger of electronic visas.

Table 6

References to the Kaliningrad region in Estonian media

Topic	Negative	Neutral	Positive
Geopolitical role of the region	0	16	0
Transport links and transit	0	4	0
Cultural events	0	1	1
Energy industry	0	6	0
E-visas	1	1	0
Tourism and tourist attractions	0	2	0
Attitude towards Kant and the German heritage	1	2	0
Business projects and investment climate	0	3	0
Total	2	35	1

With no clear image of the Kaliningrad region and no unambiguous tone of references to it, the media of the Baltic States mention the territory within a wide range of topics. In the Latvian media, besides the issues of geopolitical rivalry, the questions of transport and transit come to the fore; in Lithuania, it is the prospects for the development of tourism. Against this background, Estonia shows low media interest in the region, which is due to the relative remoteness of Kaliningrad and a significantly lesser degree of coherence in the economic and social ties compared to those the Estonians have with St Petersburg, for example. In general, the three countries perceive the simplification of visits to the region and joint cultural, sports and tourism projects most positively (which provides opportunities for cooperation).

Positioning areas for the Kaliningrad region

Whilst the brand implies a set of recognised unique qualities, perceptions and value characteristics, the image forms and reflects a superficial perception. Together with the reputation, the latter produces the brand [7, p. 20—21]. Originally, place branding, or geobranding, was used as a positioning tool in the development of tourism strategies. Today it is a multidisciplinary field of research with no strong theoretical and conceptual basis, on the one hand, and significant input from geography, political science, economics and urbanism, on the other [8, p. 282].

Referring to the Kaliningrad region, Berendeev notes that there have been many works on its image and promotion of its brand in the framework of various sciences, but geobranding stands out as it focuses on the search for unique ideas, their realisation in projects to increase the attractiveness of the region and the applied task of producing and disseminating positive content [9, p. 139]. At the same time, the geobrand may not have a strong historical, cultural or landscape foundation, as it may be formed around the folklore environment or local mythology. The comprehensive understanding of place branding first presented by Anholt can imply the formation of positive associations based on a competitive identity [10]. Significant contributors to the development of the theory of geobranding were Govers [11], Ashworth and Kavaratzis [12], Moilanen and Rainisto [13], Wheeler [14], Baker [15], Dinnie [16] and others.

Classically, the place brand parameters include politics and people, business and export brands, tourism and culture. Thus, the following positioning areas are propsoed based on their strengths and capabilities.

1. *Politics, diplomacy and people*. The area involves forming the brand of an open territory of cooperation. As Fedorov notes, the Kaliningrad region has a

reasonable prospect of developing as a platform for international interaction [17, p. 14]. In this regard, the interregional level is particularly promising, as this is where the geopolitical contradictions between Russia and, for example, the Baltic States are currently not so acute.

In contrast to the partnership within the framework of the Baltic Sea States Subregional Co-operation or Euroregions, which lacks large resources, joint projects within the 'Russia-Lithuania 2014—2020' cross-border cooperation programme supported by the Russian Federation and the EU have a large budget[4] totalling over 27.2m euros, of which about 15.7m come from the EU funds and 8.5m from Russia. The main beneficiaries are the government authorities and institutions [18, p. 29]. In 2018, there were 12 projects approved within the programme; in 2019, there were another 12 agreed on; in 2020, the decision was made to support 14 more projects. The results of the three calls for proposals show the following distribution of the projects by the priorities of the Russia-Lithuania programme: the promotion of culture and preservation of historical heritage (18 projects); social integration, fight against poverty (12); support for local and regional governance (8)[5]. The most costly ones focus on the restoration of cultural heritage sites; repair of museum infrastructure; adaptation of buildings and premises for cultural and tourist purposes; international tourist routes and events; combating floods and forest fires; greater openness of municipal authorities in the decision-making process; modernisation of health facilities and better quality of medical services; provision of diagnostic and rehabilitation services. The programme has garnered considerable interest amongst Russian beneficiaries running projects in Sovetsk and on the Curonian Spit and those representing cultural, educational and medical institutions, including the Museum of the World Ocean, the IKBFU, hospitals in Kaliningrad, Baltiysk, Ozersk, etc.

Initially, cross-border cooperation was hampered by unequal economic and legal conditions, asymmetry in the functioning of political institutions, the state of customs facilities, and the strengthening barrier function of the border [19, p. 132—134]. The projects launched under the Russia-Lithuania programme indicate that even in the context of a general decrease in the intensity of cooperation and additional restrictions due to the COVID-19 pandemic [20, p. 57], the development and introduction of international initiatives in the Baltic Sea region is quite possible.

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[4] Joint Technical Secretariat of the Russia-Lithuania Cross-Border Cooperation Programme for the period 2014—2020, 2021, *European Neighbourhood Instrument 2014—2020,* URL: http://eni-cbc.eu/lr/en (accessed 17.01.2021).

[5] Within the framework of cross-border cooperation programs, 69 projects are implemented in the region, 2021, the *Government of the Kaliningrad 0region*, URL: https://gov39.ru/press/237758 (accessed 20.02.2021).

2. *Tourism, culture and education*. This positioning area is closely linked to the first one. Tourism can benefit from the first achievements of the place brand development [21]. The region has many cultural heritage sites and offers prospects for improving tourist infrastructure and stimulating recreational activities. The most intensive development is expected in recreational, cultural and historical areas, primarily in coastal towns. Not only does the region have the experience in internationalising research and education, but it also has the potential for establishing a research and educational cluster through the efforts of the IKBFU and the Baltic Valley Technology Centre project, sector-specific state universities and their branches, as well as the cultural cluster on the island of Oktyabrsky in Kaliningrad.

3. *Investment, trade and export brands*. This area is associated with tconsolidating product brands and branding the region as a business place attracting investment. The conditions for capital investments in the region currently include the regime of the Special Economic Zone and the Special Administrative Region on Oktyabrsky Island in Kaliningrad. The former provides for customs and other preferences, whilst the latter grants international holding companies exemption from income tax on dividends. Researchers believe these factors to enhance cross-border cooperation [22, p. 286]. The region's integration into international transport corridors can fulfil its transit potential [23]. The major problem of positioning in this area relates to a set of unresolved issues of offsetting the costs arising from the exclave position [24].

In addition, to discuss the prospects of international positioning of the Kaliningrad region in promoting economic interests in the Baltic States, it is necessary to pay attention to its role in trade relations. The literature shows that the level of economic development achieved by the region and its neighbours creates objective prerequisites for building equitable interregional relations [25, p. 151]. The overall structure of trade with the Baltic States does not look pessimistic.

The largest trade partner is Lithuania with a value of trade of 178.3m USD in 2018, 193.2m in 2019 and 263.2m in 2020. The trade with Latvia amounted to 51.8m, 38.8m and 44.2m USD; with Estonia to 12m, 7.9m and 12.6m USD, respectively. In the last three years, the share of Latvia in Kaliningrad exports (Fig. 1) was 0.8—0.9 per cent; Estonia, 0.2—0.3 per cent. The contribution of Lithuania was more substantial. It increased from 3.2 per cent in 2018 to 8.7 per cent in 2020. For comparison, the share of the Kaliningrad region in total imports of Latvia in the same period rose to 0.1 per cent; Lithuania, from 0.2 to 0.5 per cent; Estonia, 0.02 per cent.



	2018	2019	2020
Latvia	16619	14093	15002
Lithuania	64123	74072	149187
Estonia	4849	2924	4589

Fig. 1. The total value of exports to the Baltic states in 2018—2020, 1,000 USD

Source: prepared by the author from data on the international trade of the Kaliningrad region, 2021, Kaliningrad Regional Customs, URL: https://koblt.customs.gov.ru/folder/146787 (accessed 18.01.2021).

In 2018—2020, the Kaliningrad region exported to Lithuania 33 per cent of the total timber from the commodity position, including sawn or split timber. During this period, Lithuania accounted for 22 per cent of the exports of electrical machinery, equipment and multimedia devices. Lithuania's share in the exports of petrol and petroleum products was 15 per cent, ferrous metals 15 per cent and cereals 13 per cent. The customs statistics on the region's export to its principal partner countries do not include data on the value of traded amber, which is also in demand in the Baltic states. Latvia received 11 per cent of the region's total exports of wood and wood products in this period, 3 per cent of the total volume of petroleum products and only 1 per cent of cereals, ferrous metals, and mechanical equipment. Estonia accounts for 2 per cent in the commodity groups of oil products and timber and 1 per cent in the groups of electrical machines and equipment and floating structures.

The value of trade in recent years indicates that the Baltic states are not amongst the region's major international trade partners. Yet, whilst the indicators of trade with Latvia and Estonia vary within the traditional limits, in the case of Lithuania there is a trend toward an increase in imports from the region. We can identify major goods traded between Kaliningrad and the Baltic States. The main export items are cereals, petroleum products, ferrous metals, timber and electrical and mechanical equipment. Sometimes, the countries show interest in purchasing floating structures. The export composition can influence the image of the region.

Thus, the positioning of the Kaliningrad region in the Baltic States as a participant in trade relations can be realised by factoring in the goods that are in stable demand in Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia. The territorial proximity of the Russian exclave ensures their prompt export. Official support for trade expansion and long-term agreements between foreign trade entities seems a promising way of development.

Results and findings

Having identified promising areas for positioning, we shall now identify the weakness and risks using a simple SWOT analysis (Table 7).

Table 7

SWOT-analysis of international positioning areas of the Kaliningrad region

Strengths	Weaknesses
Proximity to European development centres Cross-border cooperation Amber as a brand The presence of large private companies Industrial parks, SEZ and SAR Construction of an offshore terminal Historical and cultural heritage Sports facilities Major goods	Limited financial resources Politicisation of international interactions Administrative barriers Import-oriented economy Lack of competitive trade offers Small domestic market Unsatisfactory state of historical sites
Opportunities	**Threats**
Interaction and events platform Easy access Inclusion in transport corridors and the Baltic logistics hub Development of tourism and tourism infrastructure Research and education cluster Cultural cluster	Geopolitical contradictions Closure of cooperation programmes Better economic and investment conditions in the neighbouring countries Competition for tourists in the Baltic region

The development of the positioning strategy for the Kaliningrad region will not do without the classical stages clarifying the purpose of creating a place brand, its main idea, identification of target audiences, visualisation, selection of marketing tools, support resources, approval of the promotion program, etc. The first — analytical — stage in the analysis of geographical conditions, historical heritage and conditions for economic and political development requires the identification of the distinctive features and critical factors in place attractiveness, as well as a better understanding of its emerging image. The primary tool here is the exploration of media images of the region both domestically and abroad. In addition, there is a need to consider archetypal images and symbols.

The results of the study into the perception of the Kaliningrad region in the Baltic States and the identification of its positioning areas, strengths and weaknesses indicate that the general trajectory for the region's promotion can form and consolidate its image as a part of the international transport and logistics system, investment promotion, trade and tourism development — a territory with the potential for creating significant innovative clusters.

Geopolitical contradictions and their impact on international interactions pose certain risks. But these challenges can be addressed by strengthening business linkages and supporting mutually beneficial cross-border projects in various areas. It remains important that regional actors demonstrate an interest in the partnership in culture and tourism, healthcare and environmental safety of border areas.

Acknowledgements

The study was by the Russian Foundation for Basic Research, grant 19-411-390003 International Positioning of the Kaliningrad Region in the Promotion of Russia's Political and Economic Interests in the Baltic Region.

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DEVELOPMENT OF MUNICIPAL DISTRICTS OF SAINT PETERSBURG OVER THE LAST DECADE: AN ECONOMIC AND SPATIAL ANALYSIS

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Received 18.05.2021
doi: 10.5922/2079-8555-2022-2-4

The article analyses economic and spatial indicators to produce a typology of the economic development levels of St. Petersburg municipal districts. To normalise the city's development, it is vital to understand which territories have contributed more to the process and which have inhibited it. It is also essential to analyse the principal economic indicators of each municipal district and assess transport accessibility, street activity and transit. The study demonstrates the connection between the economy and space, which gives the answer to the question about the causes of economic growth. An economic analysis of the districts is carried out by ranking ten leading indicators obtained from the municipal databases and geoinformation services, whilst a spatial analysis is performed based on testing the Space Syntax methodology. The study made it possible to describe the city's spatial development, improve the methodology and provide recommendations for municipal administrators. The findings will enhance strategic urban planning in St. Petersburg.

Keywords:
economic development, spatial analysis, St. Petersburg, municipal district, Space Syntax

Introduction

Today, economy and space are inextricably linked in urban studies. The degree of development of urban space determines the value of the economic product. People gravitate to cities offering unique urban solutions. The success of a city depends on and is measured by the quality of urban space. The higher the quality, the better the needs of people are satisfied — housing is more convenient, transport is more accessible, and places of attraction are more varied. This directly affects labour productivity and this is how space shapes the urban economy.

Megapolises offer their residents a special quality of space. These territories have higher economic and resource potential. Over the past decade, the contribution of these cities to Russia's GDP has been 30—32 % [1]. In such cities, the demand for spatial changes is supported by financial opportunities to implement these changes. Hence, a large number of various ongoing projects and increased interest in them in recent years.

To cite this article: Smirnov, O. O. 2022, Development of municipal districts in Saint Petersburg over the last decade: an economic and spatial analysis, *Balt. Reg.*, Vol. 14, no 2, p. 53—68. doi: 10.5922/2078-8555-2022-2-4.

Moscow and St. Petersburg play an important role owing to their administratively privileged position. While Moscow's development is largely facilitated by its capital status, St. Petersburg has been developing along similar lines to other megacities. However, in the last decade, St. Petersburg has been following the global urban development trend, being a place of attraction for the population [2]. According to the data for 2016 in [3], among other Russian regions, the city ranked first in the number of enterprises per 100 thousand inhabitants, second in turnover per capita and third in the number of people employed in small businesses. In the past unstable decade, the city's economy showed a high degree of sustainability [4]. As a result, much of the research on the spatial development of St. Petersburg has appeared because of its social and economic success.

The basis of the modern study of this topic is formed by several bodies of literature. The first one is connected with the study of the St. Petersburg agglomeration, the relationship between the city and the region. Today, in the spatial structure of the agglomeration, there are three groups of 'vertebral' centres [5], a core, a population growth zone, switching sources and recipients, as well as 'backbone' centres. The influence of the agglomeration extends far beyond the administrative boundaries of the city [6], capturing most of the Leningrad region. Such a connection prompts the need for the cooperation between administrative subjects in the implementation of spatial projects [7]. The key prerequisite for the development of a dialogue between the city and the region is a single economic system [8]. The city needs to expand its spheres of influence, and the region needs investments [9]. The St. Petersburg agglomeration is characterized by a monocentric urban structure [10]. Today, there are both transport problems, hindering mobility [11] and housing problems related to the structure and location of housing [12]. This block of studies also includes works devoted mainly to the imperial period of the city's development [13; 14].

The second body of literature focuses on the study of the post-Soviet socio-spatial transformations of St. Petersburg. It is noted in [15] that the city has gone through seven key stages of development over the past period of transformation. In another work [16], when interpreting the main trends in the transformation of St. Petersburg, special attention is paid to the preserved old post-Soviet features. In [17], the calculation of indicators of well-being in the regions was carried out to identify the spatial patterns of post-Soviet differentiation. In [18], it is noted that the transformation of the city is still ongoing and separate differentiation is observed in various post-transformation urban areas. This is especially visible, for example, in retail trade, when Soviet districts now perform new functions [19].

The third body of literature is the study of the problems of the development of municipal districts, and boroughs of the city. For example, a team of researchers [20] divided St. Petersburg into subareas, examining each in detail for existing spatial problems. Similarly, they studied urban development [21] through the analysis of municipal districts, showing the existing differentiation of municipalities in terms of population well-being. In other cases, a comprehensive analysis of municipal districts and boroughs was not carried out. Many articles are of a topic-specific nature [22]. They identify prospects for the development of the primary spatial zones of the Petrodvorets district, or present a retrospective analysis of the socio-economic development of the Kolpinsky district.

The prerequisites of this study follow from the analysis of this literature. Firstly, only a few articles attempt to comprehensively analyze the economic situation in the municipal districts of the city. Secondly, the topic of the spatial development of municipal districts has not been researched enough. There are only a few studies designed to evaluate spatial indicators in certain areas of the city. This work aims to overcome these shortcomings. The study will show the level of economic development of each administrative unit of the city, as well as touch upon the topic of how urban space could affect this development.

In this paper, it is important not only to present which of the 111 districts contribute more to the development of the city but also to identify the reasons for it. As part of the hypothesis, it is argued that the structure of space directly affects economic growth — the development of municipal districts and is conditioned by their high transport connectivity, accessibility and integration into the city. Many researchers have already tried to explain the urban economy through space [24]. They identified a possible relationship between transport accessibility and economic development, a positive relationship between the polycentric structure and the level of economic development [25], and established a correlation between spatial coefficients and GRP [26]. Probably, following this logic, it will be possible to normalize the development of the city. Further research will help to propose recommendations for the future development of St. Petersburg.

Materials and methods

The material of the study was obtained from two sources. The first source is open data for the period from 2014 to 2019 for ten economic variables. The rationale for these variables is presented in Table 1. It shows indicators reflecting the economic development of a single municipality.

Table 1

Economic indicators used in the paper

Indicators	Rationale
Population	These indicators reflect the demographic potential of the territory (obtained from Rosstat)
Population density	
Salary	These are open data of economic municipal statistics. The data are used to compare the standard of living, budgetary resources, and the volume of economic activity of organisations. The data of Rosstat and reports of heads of administrations are used. Recalculated per capita for comparison
Own budget revenues	
Budget expenditures	
Volume of trade turnover	
Volume of investments	
Business profit	
Real estate, price per sq. m.,	Measure the demand for a territory. The price of real estate is taken according to CIAN. Points of interest reflect socio-economic objects — a total of 8,867 pcs. OSM data is used.
Number of points of interest	

Source: compiled by the author.

Variables used to test the claim that spatial indicators affect economic development is the second source of the material analyzed. Spatial indicators are assessed using Space Syntax. This method originated in a study of the London area [27] and, after a long period of criticism [28—30], it has become a universal tool for urban researchers. It is proposed to calculate several Space Syntax metrics — Integration, Choice and Accessibility using the QGIS geographic information system. The description of the indicators is presented in Table 2.

Table 2

Space Syntax spatial indicators used in the paper

Indicators	Description	Rationale
Integration	Reflects the number of optimal routes between streets. The busiest and most convenient streets for residents	Selected as universal in Space Syntax — reflect the economic movement of resources and population
Choice	Shows the intensity of transit traffic and the location of the most «pass-through» areas of the city	
Accessibility	Represents accessibility to points of interest located within a 30-minute walk	

Source: compiled by the author.

The methodological basis of the study is built around the transformation of economic variables into three general indicators: the Grand Total, the Grand Change, and the Grand Stability. The Grand Total (GT) is the arithmetic mean of the ranked values of the individual observation variables (1.1):

$$GT = \frac{1}{n}\sum_{i}^{n} RVV_i \tag{1.1}$$

where is RVV_i the ranked value of an individual observation variable. Calculation by formula (1.2):

$$RVV = \frac{VV_i - 0}{VV_{\max} - 0} \tag{1.2}$$

where VV_i is the average value of a single observation variable. It is taken as the average for all calendar years.

Grand Change (GC) is the arithmetic mean of the ranked dynamics of all variables of a single observation (2.1):

$$GC = \frac{1}{n}\sum_{i}^{n} RDV_i \tag{2.1}$$

where RDV_i is the ranked dynamics of an individual observation variable. It is calculated according to the formula (2.2):

$$RDV = \frac{DV_i - 0}{DV_{max} - 0} \tag{2.2}$$

where DV_i is dynamics of an individual observation variable. It is calculated uss ing the formula (2.3):

$$DV = \frac{1}{n}\sum_{i}^{n}\left(\frac{x_t - x_{t-1}}{|x_{t-1}|}\right)_i \tag{2.3}$$

where x_t is the value of a single variable in the current calendar year and — is the value of a single variable in the base (previous) calendar year.

Grand Stability (GS) is the arithmetic mean of the ranked differences in the values of the unstable and stable periods of the individual observation variables (3.1):

$$GS = \frac{1}{n}\sum_{i}^{n} RSV_i \tag{3.1}$$

where RSV_i is the ranked difference between the values of the unstable and stable periods of an individual observation variable. It is calculated according to the formula (3.2):

$$RSV = \frac{SV_i - 0}{SV_{max} - 0} \tag{3.2}$$

where SV_i is the difference in the values of an individual observation variable. It is taken as the difference between the average unstable (2014—2016) and stable (2017—2018) periods.

To determine the general level of economic development of the district, each grand value is assigned its own level from 1 to 3 points: for GT — developed, medium, backward; for GC — active, moderate, inactive; for GS — stable, restrained, unstable. In total, the district can score a minimum score of 3 points, and a maximum score of 9. Each district is then assigned a similar score for the boroughs to which it belongs. The boroughs score from 1 to 3 points according to the three overall scores. As a result, the final score of the district is in the range from 6 to 18 points. The subsequent division occurs according to 5 developmental indicators: advanced (18—16 points), high (15—13 points), average (12—10 points), acceptable (9—7 points), and weak (6 points).

Results

The drivers of the city's development were the districts of Admiralteisky (5 units) and Petrogradsky boroughs (4 units). These are advanced (= 18 — 16) territories of the centre. In addition to them, this group also included several districts of Kurortny (2 units), Vasileostrovsky (1 unit) and Kolpinsky (1 unit) boroughs — a total of 13 districts (11.7 %) moved to the advanced group. In turn, the group of districts with a low level of development (= 6) is not numerous. It includes the remote Kronstadt borough with the centre in the city of Kronstadt, which can be accessed via the city dam (only 1 municipal district (0.9 %)).

The remaining groups dispersed almost evenly throughout the remaining urban areas. Thus, districts of the acceptable (= 9 — 7) level are located in Kalininsky (5 units), Krasnogvardeisky (4 units), Kirov (2 units), Krasnoselsky (2 units), Moscow (2 units), Nevsky (2 units), Petrodvortsovy (2 units), Primorsky (2 units) and Frunzensky (2 units) boroughs — a total of 23 districts (20.7 %). Municipal districts of the medium development level (= 12 — 10) are also assigned to different boroughs — Primorsky (6 units), Krasnoselsky (5 units), Kirov (4 units), Nevsky (4 units), Frunzensky (3 units).), Vyborgsky (2 units), Kalininsky (2 units), Kurortny (2 units), Moscow (2 units), Central (1 unit), Kolpinsky (1 unit), Krasnogvardeisky (1 unit), Petrodvorets (1 unit), Pushkin (1 unit). In total, 35 municipal districts (31.5 %) belong to the group of middle-level districts. The remaining group of districts of a high (= 15 — 13) level is concentrated in Kurortny (7 units), Vyborgsky (6 units), Centralny (5 units), Vasileostrovsky (4 units), Kolpinsky (4 units), Pushkinsky (4 units), Nevsky (3 units), Petrogradsky (2 units), Admiralty (1 unit), Kirov (1 unit), Moscow (1 unit), Frunzensky (1 unit) boroughs — 39 in total units (35.1 %) of municipal districts.

In this sample, 21.6 % of the districts are the least economically developed among the others — these are the districts of Yuntolovo, Kolomyagi, Gagarinskoye, Pulkovsky meridian, Finlandsky, Severny, Piskarevka, Prometheus, district No. 21, Avtovo, Krasnenkaya Rechka, Polyustrovo, Bolshaya Okhta, Powder, Rzhevka, Uritsk, Gorelovo, Nevskaya Zastava, Rybatskoye, Peterhof, Strelna, Kupchino, District No. 75, Kronstadt. In terms of boroughs, about 22 % of such districts are located in Nevsky, 25 % — Primorsky, 28.5 % — Krasnoselsky, 28.5 % — Kirovsky, 33 % — Frunzensky, 40 % — Moscow, 66 % — Petrodvortsovoe, 71.4 % — Kalininsky, 80 % — Krasnogvardeisky, 100 % — Kronstadt boroughs.

If we project economic indicators on the map, then several patterns will be found (Fig. 1). First of all, it is possible to identify densely located and most economically developed municipal districts. Being located in such an area enhances the effect of spatial connectivity, allowing municipal districts to use each other's resources and infrastructure more efficiently.



Fig. 1. The level of economic development of the districts of St. Petersburg

Source: compiled by the author.

There are three development areas in St. Petersburg. The first area — the central one — attracts more people by the number and variety of functions and interactions per square meter. The second area — the northern one — is characterized by the presence of highly developed municipal districts-settlements located away from the city centre. The reason for their high level of economic development lies in their location on the Baltic Sea and the positioning of the area as an urban resort. Hence, one of the highest land prices in the city and the smallest number of residents in municipal districts. The third area — the southern one — is now at the stage of its active development. The high potential of this area is due to the low price of real estate which could potentially ensure the accelerated growth of its municipal districts.

Street activity in each area also differs (Fig. 2). The density of roads in the south of the central area attracts attention. It will be more convenient for the consumer to move along it, among others, to meet his needs. As for the northern area, the street activity here is one of the minimal in the city, which seems justified given the presence of a single highway passing through all municipal districts. An intermediate position is occupied by the southern area, which is characterized by a rather low degree of street activity. The transport structure here is also formed around a single highway and diverges towards municipal districts, however, the street network of microdistricts introduces relative diversity. In general, we can state "peripheral growth" — a situation where former territories, previously considered backward outskirts, today have taken on a semi-peripheral function and created an effective transport framework.



Fig. 2. Street activity by municipal districts
of St. Petersburg

Source: compiled by the author.

The functionality of the city territories can be analysed by the level of urban transit activity (Fig. 3). In the northern area, the only route performs only one function — that of transporting people. No street activity can be provided for by such a road. In the central area, there are places of attraction for the key roads and streets of the city — here their flows intersect, which makes it possible to arrange the infrastructure in such a way to attract a large number of people from other districts. In the southern area, the high transit of the main streets does not make it possible to realize the likely potential due to the lack of additional connections between these streets. So, if in the centre, the lack of street transit is picked up by the density of connections and the natural high street activity of the territory, then in the south the average level of transit is not linked to density — today these are long routes along which there is no urban environment, that is, these territories are not included in the economic turnover.



Fig. 3. Map of the transit of streets by municipal districts of St. Petersburg

Source: compiled by the author.

The result associated with the availability of points of interest is also logical (Fig. 4). If the northern and southern areas, due to their poorly developed network of streets and high transit, are characterized by the absence of a large number of points of interest and access to them, then the central area acts as the most accessible territory for visiting and maintaining activities. At the same time, one should not forget about the population of the areas under consideration. For the northern area, everything that was said earlier applies in full — the absence of people does not imply a developed grid of streets. In the southern area, the situation is reversed — more people live here than in the central area, however, the development of the road network is minimal and in some cases even comparable to the northern area. On the other hand, the infrastructure is simply not keeping up with the increase in population, which causes such results. At least now it is possible to detect accessibility cores within the southern range, which cannot be said about the northern one. It depends on the subsequent actions in what capacity it will be possible to develop the future centre in the south of the city, create new points of activity there and improve their transport links.



Fig. 4. Map of accessibility of objects by districts of St. Petersburg

Source: compiled by the author.

Discussion

The logic of the economic development of St. Petersburg over the past decade has been subordinated to the development of its administrative units. Only 13 districts out of 111 made a significant contribution to the development of the city. 76.9 % (or 10 out of 13) of these territories are municipal districts of the city centre — the Admiralteisky and Petrogradsky districts. Therefore, the monocentric nature of urban development should be affirmed, that is, the city's economy directly depends on the activity of the centre. On the one hand, this makes it possible to unify economic processes, and increase the agglomeration effect from each district. On the other hand, the territory of these districts is much more limited in the economic sense than the periphery.

First of all, there are practically speaking no weak districts in the city. The exception is the Kronstadt borough having only one administrative unit. At the same time, other districts that conditionally pull the economic development of the city down much more today are 23 districts that are acceptable in terms of development, that is, about 12 (52.2 %) peripheral (located directly at the edge of the administrative boundaries of the city) and 11 (47.8 %) semi-peripheral districts (between peripheral districts and the centre). In other words, 100 % of the districts that contribute one of the most negative values of economic development are on the periphery and semi-periphery. As expected, the central municipal districts of St. Petersburg turned out to be the most cost-effective, while the periphery and semi-periphery ranked last in terms of economic development — they made the least contribution to the city's economy.

As a result, when planning the future development of the city, the process of decentralization of economic resources to the urban periphery or semi-periphery begins. Given the annual population growth, the pressure on the centre is also increasing and is likely to reach its limit in the near future. A logical solution is polycentric development, that is, the dispersal of economic resources from the centre to the semi-periphery, as the place of the largest number of inhabitants, and reducing the load on the central districts of the city.

Of course, here it should be taken into account that the functional roles of different boroughs in the life of the city differ markedly — it is not entirely correct to compare "bedroom" boroughs, administrative boroughs and business boroughs, therefore the results obtained should not be considered a universal typology of St. Petersburg boroughs and this should be taken into account when making strategic planning decisions for the development of the city.

As far as spatial analysis is concerned, the situation here is not so unambiguous. Firstly, the division of St. Petersburg into three separate spatial blocks is visually traced, which were called the northern, central and southern areas within the framework of the study. The first is a place of concentration of municipal districts with high economic development, the basis of the economy of which is the provision of guest services and recreation for residents. The second area is the basis of the economic framework, the place of concentration of goods and services. In turn, the third area is a new actively developing part of the city. All three areas today are territories that are economically separated from each other, that is, there is a certain dysfunction of between WHSD and the Ring Road, which do not involve many exits to most of the underdeveloped districts. The unification of areas with additional transport links, the modernization and compaction of the street grid, would probably allow semi-peripheral districts to achieve high growth rates and increase the number of districts in the areas.

Secondly, the results obtained were not unambiguous, and there is an explanation for this — here the relationship between the studied variables should be taken into account (Table 3). First of all, the length to the centre (LC) is only significant in determining the most active streets (INT) and the accessibility of the district (ACC). The dependencies are direct — the smaller the length from the district to the centre, the greater the accessibility and activity. This does not affect economic performance. A comparison of the general level of economic development (GL) and the Grand Total (GT) of the districts showed no significant results — there is only a weak correlation between the Grand Change (GC) and Grand Stability (GS). In turn, all of them are also not associated with spatial indicators.

Table 3

Correlations of spatial and economic indicators

Indicator	LC	GL	GT	GC	GS	POI	INT	CHO	ACC	POP
LC	1.00	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
GL	0.04	1.00	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
GT	0.30	0.09	1.00	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
GC	0.02	0.46	0.00	1.00	—	—	—	—	—	—
GS	0.04	0.47	0.00	0.87	1.00	—	—	—	—	—
POI	0.40	0.03	0.23	0.04	0.09	1.00	—	—	—	—
INT	0.75	0.06	0.06	0.03	0.06	0.28	1.00	—	—	—
CHO	0.12	0.05	0.05	0.00	0.00	0.13	0.00	1.00	—	—
ACC	0.69	0.01	0.35	0.01	0.03	0.85	0.40	0.20	1.00	—
POP	0.11	0.19	0.00	0.18	0.18	0.52	0.37	0.10	0.41	1.00

Source: compiled by the author.

In a situation with the number of points of interest (POIs), there is a direct correlation: the more there are, the higher the accessibility of the territory (ACC) and its population (POP). At the same time, accessibility (ACC) is also likely to be directly related to the size of the population — the larger it is, the more people live in this area. It should be argued that indicators of economic development are in no way interconnected with spatial indicators — transit, street activity, and accessibility. In other words, the thesis that the economic development of territories determines, first of all, their integration, transit and accessibility turns out to be incorrect in the framework of the study of the economy and space of St. Petersburg.

The thesis is also refuted that the most active and accessible territories of municipal districts for residents are at the same time the most economically developed of all. As part of the search for relationships, it turns out that these coincidences are random. On the contrary, most of the semi-periphery areas have more street activity than the centre. Probably, the potential for the future development of the city is associated with it, and these territories require an integrated approach if there is an interest in the development of urban space.

Conclusions

The study resulted in the following empirical data on the districts: firstly, 21.6 % of the city's districts are poorly developed economically. These are mainly peripheral and semi-peripheral territories, and it is they that are pulling urban development down. Secondly, 11.7 % of districts are highly developed; 76.9 %

of them are located in the central boroughs of the city. If, in addition, high-level developed districts (35.1 %) are added to them, then about half (46.8 %) of the city's districts should be considered economically developed territories. Thirdly, there are several spatial areas — the northern, central and southern, which are economically isolated from each other.

The study has identified several characteristic features of the spatial development of the city in the last decade, which is characterized by monocentricity (the development of the city directly depends on economic activity in the central districts); centralization of resources (economic activity decreases from the centre) to the periphery and semi-periphery of the city, which also confirms the thesis of monocentricity; discontinuity of space (economic areas of the city are separated from each other by semi-peripheral districts, which weakens the agglomeration effect); the growth of the periphery (territories that decades ago were considered backward outskirts now perform a semi-peripheral function and their further development will lessen the discontinuity of space). Finally, semi-periphery is becoming more active; the highest street activity has been registered in the areas bordering on the centre. It is obvious that St. Petersburg's economic activity is clearly moving from the central districts towards the southern, which is a clear sign of decentralization.

The Space Syntax methodology made it possible to identify the interdependencies of indicators. Firstly, there are no links between the selected economic and spatial indicators — transit, activity and accessibility do not affect the economic development of the territory and vice versa. Secondly, the study has shown that the number of people and points of interest does not affect economic performance. There is only a non-significant correlation between the level of economic development and population numbers. Thirdly, the correlation between some of the spatial indicators shows that the shorter the distance from the territory to the centre, the higher its activity and accessibility, the more points of interest, the higher the availability of services and the higher the population numbers. Accessibility, with a small probability, is interconnected with the number of population — the larger it is, the more people live in the territory.

The main recommendation of this study is to ensure the economic connectivity of the central parts of the city with those located in the north and south. Is it also essential to identify common economic interests to better integrate different areas of the city. As of today, some areas are poorly integrated into the urban system since semi-periphery territories are still weak. Measures are already being taken to rapidly develop them. In this matter, special attention should be paid to the formation of several nuclei in the city — future centres of activity. The highest economic indicators are typical of the southern part of the city. However, a full-fledged urban infrastructure has not yet been created there. In this sense, given the identified potential of these territories, it seems appropriate to continue the development of infrastructure. Another important finding is that the periphery becomes the most geographically advantageous place for residents to live, while other areas perform production, trade, office and cultural functions. It is also important to enhance this trend.

The city authorities are well aware of the problem of the connectivity of areas — the recommendation is consistent with the idea of polarized development set out in strategic documents. For example, the Strategy for the Spatial Development of St. Petersburg adopted for the period until 2030 presupposes the formation of territorial economic zones (TEZ). An important aspect of the implementation of the idea of TEZ is their connection with the Master Plan of the Development of the City, Regulations for Land Use and Development, and Regional Urban Planning Standards, which, however, do not emphasize the importance and functions of particular areas of the city. At the same time, the results of the study demonstrate that in the spatial development of the city emphasis should be placed on three areas — Kurortnaya, Central and Southern TEZ.

The results of the study raise questions that need further research. There is a discrepancy between the selected economic indicators and the spatial features of the territory, although in the studies mentioned in this paper their interdependence is obvious. In addition to the selection of indicators, this result is associated with their generalization and ranking — there is no doubt that with each separate comparison of all the individual variables that make up the overall economic indicators, it will be possible to find connections. In this study, there was a need for more generalization, which at the same time, could be its main drawback. In addition, the identified intracity differences should not be absolutized and the proposed typology of districts is still disputable.

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NON-EXPANSIONIST VARIANTS OF POLAND'S STRATEGIC CULTURE: A RETROSPECTIVE OF IDEAS AND CURRENT IMPLICATIONS

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Received 03.12.2021
doi: 10.5922/2079-8555-2022-2-5

This article examines how non-expansionist types of strategic culture emerged and gradually developed in Poland. The study aims to identify the features of non-expansionist types of Polish strategic culture for a more objective analysis of the country's modern foreign and security policy. The article begins by describing the emergence and use of the concept of strategic culture, offering a typology of strategic cultures based on the work of the 'cultural realist' Alastair Johnston. Then it employs a qualitative method of process tracing to outline the sequence of events and the ideological constructs that led to the emergence or degradation of the corresponding types of strategic culture. The strategic culture of neutrality, exposed to external influences and revised republicanism ideas, is shown to have laid the foundation for a strategic culture of political fortification (or an outpost) in Poland. This strategic culture has its origins in the idea of the ethical superiority of the Polish state, although the details of this superiority may differ dramatically in specific situations. At the same time, none of the types of the accommodation culture has yet emerged in Poland, albeit accommodation seems to be a promising lead for the further development of the country's strategic culture.

Keywords:
strategic culture, Poland, culture of neutrality, political fortification culture

Introduction

The term 'strategic culture' emerged in research in the 1970s. The Cold War demonstrated that attributing rational models of behaviour to opponents and partners leads to inaccuracies in the analysis of international interactions.

To cite this article: Loshkariov, I. D., Parenkov, D. A. 2022, Non-expansionist variants of Poland's strategic culture: a retrospective of ideas and current implications, *Balt. Reg.*, Vol. 14, no 2, p. 69—82.
doi: 10.5922/2079-8555-2022-2-5.

As Jack L. Snyder, who coined the term, noted, rationalistic interpretations of the behaviour of states produced two scientific problems: validity and ambiguity. The former concerns the relationship between rationalistic models and the inaccessibility of vast arrays of data: since the military sphere was and traditionally remains closed to most researchers and laypersons, models had to be built on a limited or even insufficient amount of information. Even when obtaining or extrapolating adequate data was possible, facts had to be ranked according to significance to establish multi-level and multi-temporal causal relationships, and this resulted in the latter problem. Therefore, it became necessary to place facts and decisions made by actors in a political, historical and organisational context, so that this context would somehow streamline available interpretations and data. Accordingly, strategic culture served as an intermediate variable helping explain the reaction of countries to certain actions of their counterparts. This variable included necessary indicators, the concepts and notions used to describe the present and the past, and the main nodes of the discussion on national security issues. It also prompted some characteristics of reality to be recognised as problematic [1, p. 7—9].

Beliefs, ideas and language for describing own actions and those of other states come from different sources and are based on the experience of different historical periods; this makes the description of the strategic culture itself an extremely subjective exercise. As Colin Gray writes, one should not forget that, in strategic culture, '[t]here is vastly more to strategy and strategic behaviour than culture alone', although it is difficult to establish the specific ratio [2, p. 130].

Therefore, sources for collective ideas about the past and present are the experience of participation in armed conflicts, fundamental political and philosophical works on issues of war and peace, as well as the mystical, religious and ethical attitudes prevalent in society [3]. The obvious impossibility of presenting a narrow positivist or neo-positivist interpretation of strategic culture led to a new turn in research [4].

An expanded interpretation of strategic culture has emerged as a result, which places emphasis on the mobility and processuality of social phenomena. But this comes at a cost since strategic culture itself has to be recognised as an independent variable rather than specific events and trends triggering a response from actors [5]. The main consequence of this change is the acknowledgement that a strategic culture may contain different complexes or sets of ideas about the available and preferred behaviour and response options [6].

From a methodological point of view, the extended interpretation renders strategic culture the very context of foreign policy and military-political activity rather than an element (level) of that context. This cuts off unequivocally the possibility of a complete solution to the problem of statement validity, for achieving which, amongst other things, the concept in question was coined. Despite the potential threat of introducing a term for the sake of a term, this situation gives researchers access to more complex and nuanced models describing the relationship between material and ideological factors [7]. Crucial to these models is a focus on the mobility, complexity and interdependence of strategic cultures and their elements [8; 9].

For a long time, the study of strategic cultures and their 'ideal types' focused on large states, where it is relatively easy to examine past conflicts and track debates between politicians, thinkers, military strategists and diplomats about possible and acceptable ways to solve the previously untackled foreign policy problems. Only in recent decades, the emphasis has gradually shifted to medium-sized states, including regional leaders and countries functionally specialising in modern international relations [10; 11]. Considering that, the interest in Poland's strategic culture seems logical. This topic is of great research significance since the country is one of the leaders in today's Eastern Europe today and has a wide historical experience of armed conflicts and shifts in political development paradigms [12; 13]. Although Poland is a member of the EU and NATO, the discussion in the country on the current global and regional challenges is not the same as in other Euro-Atlantic states. Nor are Warsaw's ways of overcoming the difficulties. Even a preliminary and approximate identification of the main types of strategic culture will provide a fuller historical, cultural and ideological context for Polish foreign policy and shed new light on its most likely trajectories and swings in the future.

Further clarification is due here. The few works on Poland's foreign policy and its international identity underscore the country's assertiveness and even expansionist intentions rooted in the historical imperial experience [15—17]. Although it is difficult to disprove such conclusions, the past of this country included dynastic unions with other states, projects of broad international coalitions (against the Ottoman Empire, for example), and the reception of the political philosophy of the Antiquity and Renaissance. This article proposes to look at the layers and dimensions of Polish strategic culture associated with not so much the expansion and leadership ambitions of Poland as the attempts to protect and strengthen what has already been achieved.

The works of Alastair Johnson, a representative of 'third generation' strategic culture studies, have laid the groundwork for a detailed classification of the ideal types of strategic cultures. If we examine only non-expansionist types of strategic cultures, possible mainstream preferences will be reduced to the desire to cooperate intensively (accommodation) or become isolated in one form or another. At the same time, external restrictions and the ability to overcome them (especially by force) will also play a significant role here. And these two groups of factors help single out the following types of non-expansionist strategic cultures (Table 1):

— the culture of unlimited internationalisation, which implies a positive vision of the external environment (or its significant part) by the actor, a desire to control negative processes and phenomena by collective effort and a focus on the most constructive relations with other actors cemented by detailed agreements and contracts;

— a culture of limited internationalisation, which involves a positive vision of the external environment (or a significant part of it), a desire to contain negative processes and phenomena through informal and personal agreements, and a focus on balanced (partly equidistant) relations with other actors;

— the culture of normative unification, which includes the actor's positive vision of the external environment (or its essential part), awareness of own potential to bring about a transformation of the external environment and pursue its own global or regional political project;

— the culture of neutrality, within which the actor has a negative vision of the external environment (or a significant part of it), a desire to contain negative processes and phenomena with the help of internal resources and a focus on transferring relations with other actors to non-military spheres, including through statutory expression and political agreements;

— the culture of isolationism, which comprises the actor's negative vision of the external environment (or its significant part), a desire to contain negative processes and phenomena with the help of internal resources, a focus on reducing relations with the outside world and equidistant relations with other actors;

— the culture of political fortification (depending on the size of the country, it can take the form of fortification 'gigantism'[1] or the outpost mindset), which embraces the actor's negative vision of the external environment (or a significant part of it), a desire to restrain negative processes and phenomena by maximising the costs of any opposition during an attack and awareness of self-sufficiency in international relations.

Table 1

Non-expansionist types of strategic culture (according to Johnson)

Type	**Significance of external restrictions (~ inability to destroy the enemy)**		
	High (formalisation of all actions)	Medium (transition to less formal interactions)	Low (transition to unilateral and demonstration actions)
Maintaining the status quo (accommodation)	Unlimited internationalisation (idealpolitik)	Limited internationalisation	Normative unification ('international society')
Changing the status quo (defence)	Neutrality	Isolationism	Political fortification: fortification 'gigantism' / outpost mindset

[1] The cited monograph by Johnson painstakingly analyses the set of ideas and beliefs leading to the construction of large-scale fortifications, such as the Great Wall of China. Yet, small and medium-sized states tend to perceive their entire territory as a defence space: hence the concept of 'outpost'.

None of the selected ideal types of strategic culture has to be present in any state at any time. The formation of each type is a long and historically contingent process. A country's historical experience involving a range of armed conflicts with an unsatisfactory outcome or severe domestic political consequences renders unlikely the formation and dominance of strategic culture types associated with expansion and demonstration actions (punitive campaigns, sanctions, imposition of indemnities). Below we will discuss strategies of waiting and preparing for an attack, as well as the ideas associated with such strategies [18, p. 147—152].

An important reservation to make is that third-generation strategic culture studies consider the phenomenon in question in isolation from current events and other processes constituting and challenging collective identity. This means, among other things, the rejection of theses put forward by the other generations of researchers who emphasised the link between strategic culture and political-military variables: the level of technological development, military planning, biases towards certain branches and types of troops [2].

Which type of strategic culture could be in demand in Poland? As Robert Frost notes, the constant threat coming from the south (from the Ottoman Empire and the Crimean Khanate) was a scourge afflicting the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth[2]. Thus, the state was forced to create permanent armed units at the beginning of the 16th century (Polish: *obrona potoczna)*. In addition, the geographical distribution of the population deprived Eastern European countries of any opportunity to maintain large contingents of troops over a long time: medium-sized dispersed settlements could not feed thousands of infantry and cavalry units during military campaigns [19, p. 48—62]. These factors were crucial for forging Poland's international identity. In 960—1795, Poland was involved in 247 armed conflicts, approximately one per three years. During the Second Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, this pattern persisted (seven conflicts in 1918—1939). Along with the constant threats from the south and, apparently, the east and west, there were short-term menaces relating to territorial, dynastic, religious and commercial conflicts. These factors made the formation of full-fledged strategic cultures of accommodation impossible (a focus on long-term coalitions with adaptation to the interests of partners and certain interstate altruism).

This article is devoted to non-expansionist types of strategic culture in Poland, mainly defensive cultures. It also assesses the prospects of the formation of accommodation cultures since, after 1945, Poland has not been directly involved in conflicts. This circumstance adjusts the long-term trajectories along which the country's ideas about its place in the world and the external environment of interactions develop.

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[2] The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and Poland are used here as synonyms, albeit the first Commonwealth was an asymmetric association of several polities, including the vassal duchies of Prussia (until 1657) and Courland (until 1795).

Outlines of the evolution of non-expansionist ideas in Poland

One of the key features of Polish social and international political thought in the 16th—18th centuries was looking for ways to prevent the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth from losing its territories and influence. Ideas about the election of rulers and the restoration of justice even by extreme means were widely popular at the time, and it was quite logical to turn to the *Chronicles of the Kings and Princes of Poland* by Bishop Wincenty Kadłubek (written in the early 13th century). Perhaps, that work was the first to formulate the idea of Poland as an ethical (not ethnic and religious) community was clearly formulated. Kadłubek almost literally transplanted Cicero's ideas about the virtues of citizens and their self-organisation to the Polish realities of his time. This led to the uncritical borrowing of ideas about moral actions as acts of self-preservation and calls for some types of self-restraint. The conclusion was made that Poland needed to limit itself in terms of territory to avoid blurring its identity and reduce external threats by improving the country's internal structure, that is, relations between the 'citizens' of the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth [20, p. 311—313]. The following excerpt from Kadłubek's *Chronicles* is very indicative in this sense (it offers a seemingly laudatory account of the reign of King Bolesław the Brave and points out a reason for indignation at the lower strata): 'while the king spent a long time either with the Russians or at the borders of the Zapolovtsian regions, the slaves persuaded the wives and daughters of their masters to [satisfy] their desires' [21, p. 100].

In medieval and early modern Poland, of course, not all the country's inhabitants, but only the gentry, were considered participants in the ethical republican community. In the early 16th century, however, priest Stanisław Zaborowski, who was close to the royal court, raised the question of establishing institutions for representing the interests of all population segments. Yet, Zaborowski deemed representation necessary for the sake of uninterrupted financing of troops and protection of borders rather than social equality [22].

The international situation at that time was characterised by the strengthening of the Habsburgs, who were striving to obtain and secure the Czech and Hungarian thrones. At the same time, the threat from the Ottoman Empire was rising, spreading towards the territories beyond the Danube. Although the Jagiellonian dynasty also had a claim to the crowns of Bohemia and Poland, the then Polish king Sigismund I, perhaps for the first time in Polish history, refrained from directly participating in a power conflict in those countries. Whilst the Habsburgs prevailed in Bohemia (1527), the Hungarians put up an alternative candidate, who enjoyed the support of Turkey. Sigismund I remained neutral, offering mediation to the conflicting parties. In the future, the neutrality of Poland on the Hungarian question allowed to avoid direct conflict with the Ottoman Empire for almost 100 years and slow down the Habsburgs' expansion into Central and Eastern Europe. In Polish historiography, this unusual line of foreign policy behaviour is usually attributed to the advisers of Sigismund I: Primate Jan Łaski and Krakow Bishop Piotr Tomicki, both well acquainted with ancient Roman works and their late medieval interpretations [23, p. 204—206].

Subsequently, the legacy of Kadłubek and the ideas of republicanism were extensively used to justify the gentry's liberties and limit the power of the king. This powerful strand of thought, however, sometimes tended to revisit ancient primary sources, invoking the early Roman values of restraint and self-control. It is quite natural that thoughts about improving the state system and the ethics of past ideals transformed in Poland, just like they did in Rome, into an ethical activism doctrine: moral and political superiority was no longer so much a status as something needed to be constantly confirmed and proved in fact [24; 25]. In most cases, ethical activism defended the republican system and 'old liberties' [26].

As early as the 18th century, ex-Crown Chancellor Stanisław Jan Jabłonowski and talented priest-teacher and publicist Stanisław Konarski advanced arguments about self-sufficiency, everyday viability and, ultimately, independence of the state as the ultimate goals of domestic and foreign policy. In his *Letters to Friends written during the Interregnum* (Latin: *Epistolae Familiares sub tempus Interregni)* (1733), Konarski wrote that the country's internal structure should be so superior that foreigners would admire it more than locals did. This positive attitude from neighbouring states and their residents could form the basis for independence and sovereignty. But this applied only to those states that had created necessary conditions within. Konarski was perhaps the first Polish thinker to produce the idea of striking a balance in foreign policy decisions: on the one hand, the negative characteristics of the external environment can be transformed by force or diplomacy; on the other, they can be ignored altogether should more fundamental domestic tasks emerge [20, p. 346—349]. To put it simply, republicans, such as Jabłonowski and Konarski, called for ethically motivated strategic patience and a focus on long-term priorities.

As the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth declined, republican thought took a dramatic turn in the works of publicist and educator Stanisław Staszic. Without going into details, he can be credited with changing the basic equation of Polish political philosophy. Before Staszic, the republican structure and its preservation were considered the highest priority: the interests of individuals and the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth as a state could be easily sacrificed for its sake. But Staszic, somehow anticipating the spread of nationalist ideologies in Europe, reasoned differently: if there is no Polish state per se, even the best political system will become of no consequence. Staszic believed that the community of citizens of the republic could and should, if necessary, reduce their needs and surrender their rights in the name of collective necessity ('the true good of each is no different from the whole society'). Although these arguments were only one step away from summoning a political strongman, they by no means rejected the idea of an ethical republican community: the republic was now perceived not as a regime, but as an interest of its citizens [27, p. 39—46; 28, p. 239—243; 29].

The latter thesis drew on not only the philosophical heritage of antiquity but also the internal alignments in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth: similar (albeit less clearly formulated) thoughts were expressed in his pamphlets by one of the leaders of the pro-French party and the exiled king Stanisław Leszczyński [30, p. 164—169].

The description of Poland as an ethical community, which had not had time to complete its mission, permeated Polish romanticism. Joachim Lelewel, a leader of the November Uprising (1830), and poet Adam Mickiewicz after him compared their country with an anthill: 'everyone seemed to act aimlessly, but in fact, they were working towards one goal: together they rebuilt their destroyed dwelling, together they threw themselves at the enemy' [31, p. 409]. Since the domestic resources were not enough to restore Poland after its three partitions, discussions would break out within insurgent organisations about the need for a strongman (a dictator, at least, in the initial period of the struggle for sovereignty) and the absence of alternative assistance from without (primarily from France and Great Britain, but could vary). Late Polish romanticism put forward the idea that Polish political organisations had to support the many oppressed peoples of Eastern Europe and, if possible, launch a movement opposing the states that participated in the partitions [32, p. 353—361].

Józef Piłsudski, the leader of the revived Second Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, perceived the legacy of Wincenty Kadłubek in the vein described above. Piłsudski was very sympathetic to the ideas of the strongman (which had a romantic revolutionary halo), the supra-ethnic nature of the state and relying on the support of other peoples in difficult situations. As Andrzej Nowak notes, the concept of ethical activism and the teleology of a long path to the perfect order were convenient political constructs employed in different eras centuries after Kadłubek [20, p. 311—314]. In line with Piłsudski's interpretation, one might say that the above ideas led to the vision of a strategic buffer between Russia/the RSFSR/the USSR and Poland. This buffer was supposed to include territories with a non-Polish population annexed by Warsaw and the states of 'non-historical peoples' (in Piłsudski's terminology) (Lithuanians, Latvians and so on). The events, however, were unfolding rapidly, and the above ideas were, more often than not, mere convictions of the Polish leadership rather than practical steps. Piłsudski himself, in a letter to Ignacy Paderewski written in May 1919, claimed that he had tried to evade answering the questions about the future structure of the country since this led to 'arguing cases' [33, p. 23—24, 39—40, 52—54, 63; 34, p. 68—73]. One way or another, Staszic and Polish Romantics laid the intellectual groundwork for the transition from a culture of neutrality, somewhat overloaded with ethics, to a culture of political fortification (outpost). But only Piłsudski was lucky enough to put this transition into practice, albeit with hesitation and miscalculations.

This brief review of the long transformation of antique works and Kadłubek's legacy in the first and second Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealths makes it possible to draw several conclusions. Firstly, the principal advocates of the strategic culture of neutrality throughout Poland's history were the intellectual class, which was not numerous under the later Jagiellons. Secondly, the debate on the optimal structure of the state gradually led the supporters of this type of strategic culture to think about the need for accelerated development, political and economic (Szymon Konarski). Thirdly, the way the external environment changed at the time prompted Kadłubek's intellectual followers to abandon his fundamental ideas little by little. This was due to the partial and later complete loss of statehood (sovereignty) by Poland. Internal self-improvement, which was almost impossible in the 19th century, was at the core of Kadłubek's reflection. New ideas, flowing logically from this circumstance, became woven into the general fabric of ideas about Poland as an ethical community. Fourthly, the sum of these events and factors formed a new type of strategic culture — a culture of political fortification (outpost). This type, in many ways, embodies a break with the Polish republican tradition since it implies a benevolent attitude towards the authoritarian rule of a 'strongman', reliance on external assistance and the search for potential allies at any level, including amongst non-state actors. Finally, these types of strategic culture, just like the expansionist types of culture in Poland, never came to full fruition as there was often a gap between the ethical ideal and political practice.

Conclusions for modern Poland (Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth)

Modern Poland's foreign and security policy is at least partly guided by historical experience imperatives. A good example here is the generally accepted ways of conceptualising and responding to threats and risks. Traditionally, this historical experience has been distilled into the 'Jagiellonian' and 'Piast' traditions. And our preliminary analysis reveals at least two distinct ways to evaluate and construct the international 'self' and the external environment for Poland.

Undoubtedly, the identified non-expansionist varieties (subcultures) of strategic culture are 'ideal types'. The political reality partially meets the parameters of such subcultures, being comprised of their interweavings and intersections. Almost every educated member of the gentry in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth considered it his duty to propound his views before the Diet on the social structure and the ways to reproduce and reinforce achievements. This held especially true in the case of electoral Diets. Accordingly, the ideas underlying certain types of strategic cultures constantly clashed with opposing viewpoints. Today, social communication has become even more intense, contributing to the competition and interfusion of different perspectives on the nature of the external environment, and the risks and threats faced by Polish society.

The types (subcultures) of Poland's strategic culture remain relevant due to two circumstances. Firstly, in socialist Poland, publications analysing state interests and strategies were not allowed for a long time since they could stir criticism of the country's close relations with the USSR. Only after 1981, the ruling party made attempts to encourage discussion along these lines; the debate proceeded strictly according to the wishes of the party [35, p. 261—266]. Secondly, since 1990, the Polish literature and political thought have largely rejected the historical experience of socialism. Socialist Poland is traditionally called 'no Republic', situated chronologically between the Second and Third Republics. In search of inspiration, Polish strategic thought leaps over socialism to more distant periods.

On the whole, contrary to the popular opinion about Poland's expansionism, the identified non-expansionist types of strategic culture are also conspicuous in the country's experience of armed conflicts, as well as in fundamental political and philosophical works on war and peace (Table 2). Moreover, the culture of political fortification (outpost mindset) turned out to be in great demand by virtue of Piłsudski's authority and a more modern vision of the world. On the contrary, those who had emphasised the ethical norms of the 'beleaguered fortress' and neutrality cultures remained on the sidelines, having a less far-reaching impact on Poland's foreign policy behaviour.

Table 2

The main non-expansionist types (subcultures) of Poland's strategic culture

Strategic culture types	Culture of neutrality	Outpost culture
Nominal founder(s)	Wincenty Kadłubek	Stanisław Staszic, Józef Piłsudski
Prevalence	Medium, but closer to low	High
Of what risks and threats is the state apprehensive?	Internal weakness leading to failures beyond the state's borders	Loss of independence/sovereignty
What are the beliefs and discussions relating to various security aspects?	Politics vs economy	Sovereignty vs internal structure
How is the external environment assessed?	Depends on the case	Very dangerous
How does Poland compare to other countries?	Poland as an ethical model	Poland as an outpost (often that of Catholicism)
What should Poland inspire in its neighbours?	Admiration for its republican system	Reasonable fear
The basis of Poland's behaviour towards other countries	Mediation, building bridges between conflicting parties	Active reconnaissance, proactive play
Relationship to military and political alliances	Neutral	Positive when it comes to upholding supreme values

Depending on the time of their formation, different types of Polish strategic culture have differently reflected the vision of the principal risks and threats to the state. Sometimes they mixed foreign and domestic policies, abstract ethical ideals and harsh political practices. The early receptions of Kadłubek's ideas did not interpret the external environment as dangerous and in need of constant monitoring and adjustment. This is an important consideration since Polish social and historical thought is characterised by the perception of Poland as a victim of external forces, whilst external risks and threats are routinely exaggerated [16; 36].

An important conclusion is that the gradual change in external conditions led to the formation in Poland of a strategic culture (subculture) of political fortification (outpost mindset). However, external restrictions were reduced not because of the strengthening of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, but because of the complete dismantling of its statehood and a delayed reset of political institutions. In other words, several generations of the Polish intellectual elite had laboratory conditions where a whole range of possibilities could be analysed for a state that was absent at the time. Remarkably, when reinterpreting the achievements of the strategic culture of neutrality, Polish political thought effectively ignored the ideas of isolationism, such as equidistance in relations with neighbours. Probably, this factor had a role in the discussion on NATO expansion to Poland in the early 1990s.

The analysed types of strategic cultures point to both the high self-esteem of Poland/the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and the awareness of the possibility and necessity of close relations with other states. The strategic culture (subculture) of neutrality continues to be in demand in Poland as it legitimises Warsaw's intermediary services. Hence, numerous initiatives for negotiating platforms with neighbouring and large states (the Eastern Partnership, the Geneva format of negotiations on the situation in Ukraine and the Weimar Triangle). In turn, the outpost culture (subculture) provides logical and historical-cultural grounds for intensifying cooperation within NATO and the countries of the Visegrad Group. This consideration is important because, with the long-term use of these ideological constructs, the negative assessment of Poland's external environment can be smoothed out, launching the formation of strategic cultures of accommodation — primarily, that of limited internationalisation.

In general, the rich intellectual history of Poland leaves room for other interpretations and classifications of the national strategic culture, as well as for the emergence of any new 'hybrid' phenomena. Yet, the strategic culture of the third republic has a layer of ideas that d imply neither military and political expansion, nor the restoration of the imperial past.

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GERMAN PARTICIPATION IN THE THREE SEAS INITIATIVE: OPPORTUNITIES FOR RUSSIA

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Received 12.01.2022
doi: 10.5922/2079-8555-2022-2-6

The Three Seas Initiative was launched in 2016 by the Polish and Croatian leaders to bridge the gap between Southeast, Central and Eastern Europe, on the one hand, and Western Europe, on the other. This article aims to show how German policy on the Three Seas Initiative has changed and what risks and opportunities it represents for Russia. The official data on the Three Seas Initiative was used to explore the specifics of the concept and the impact of its most promising projects on the Southeast, Central and Eastern European markets. The analysis of materials from German think tanks and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was used to demonstrate the changes in Germany's attitude towards the Initiative. Although the participating countries have not received sufficient funding to fulfil all the ambitious goals of the Three Seas Initiative, some of its most promising projects could still diminish Russian role in the EU energy market. Since 2018, the Federal Republic of Germany has increased its participation in the Initiative, yet Berlin's growing focus on the concept should not be perceived critically since German participation could mitigate anti-Russian sentiment underlying the Three Seas Initiative. Moreover, ideas voiced by the members of the German Free Democratic Party, namely those concerning a joint hydrogen project with Russia to be run as a part of the Three Seas Initiative, deserve special attention.

Keywords:
Three Seas Initiative, Central and Eastern Europe, Poland, Germany, Russia, natural gas, hydrogen

On September 26, 2021, Germany held regular parliamentary elections, during which the Social Democratic Party (*SPD, Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands*) achieved unexpectedly high results. Russia just as the USSR bee fore had high expectations about the Party because of so called *Ostpolitik* of Chancellor Willy Brandt. Yet, although the Social Democrats rely on Brandt's heritage, we cannot truly speak of turning back to the past. Historical conditions have changed — in 1970s, Ostpolitik and bilateral meetings between politicians from West Germany and the USSR were expected to provide rapprochement with all countries of the Warsaw Pact, but now Berlin's interaction with Moscow,

To cite this article: Khorolskaya, M. V. 2022, German participation in the Three Seas Initiative: opportunities for Russia, *Balt. Reg.*, Vol. 14, no 2, p. 83—97. doi: 10.5922/2078-8555-2022-2-6.

otherwise, raises concerns in Central and Eastern European countries [1, p. 74]. In their policy paper, "Dialog — Vertrauen — Sicherheit", detailing the policy towards Russia, the Social Democrats stated that relations with Moscow shall be incorporated into the European framework and that Berlin shall support the interests of its Eastern neighbors in the EU and NATO[1]. It seems that other centre-left and centre-right German parties share this view.

German attitude to the position of Central and Eastern European countries critical of Russia is bothering Moscow. As a long-term characteristic of Berlin's foreign policy, it cannot be ignored. It is therefore important to assess German policy toward the "Three Seas Initiative" (3SI), which is considered by some analytics to be a Polish anti-Russian project. It is also critical to define how Germany could influence the Initiative and what prospects this might entail for Russia.

The Three Seas Initiative has attracted attention of some Russian scholars with the position of the informal leader of this forum, Poland, arousing particular interest. In their book, "Asymmetries of Regional Integration Projects of the 21st Century", researchers from the Ural State University analyze both scientific and political Polish discourse on integration projects in Central and Eastern Europe [2]. In [3], Skvortsova argues that, for Warsaw, 3SI is a geopolitical rather than an economic project and demonstrates the importance Poland has placed on involving the United States in the Initiative. While some works published in Germany look at 3SI from a Euroscepticism perspective[2], in 2021 a senior fellow of the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, K.-O. Lang published a paper discussing Berlin's gains from joining the Initiative [4].

Much research has been done on Russian-German relations. Basov, Belinskij, Vasilev, Maksimychev, Sokolov, and Pavlov have all demonstrated how significant cooperation between the two countries is for both Moscow and Berlin, at the same time drawing attention to a number of serious problems and the lack of conceptual strategy for the development of bilateral relations [5—15]. The European dimension of German foreign policy has been the focus of the papers by Timoshenkova and the book "EU Strategic Autonomy and Prospects for Cooperation with Russia" published by the Department for European Political Studies of the IMEMO RAS. These authors have pointed out that Berlin is striving to build its bilateral cooperation into the European framework [16—18]. Timofeev and Khorolskaya explore the approaches to relations with Russia practiced within the

[1] Dialog — Vertrauen — Sicherheit. Voraussetzungen und Impulse für eine zeitgemäße sozialdemokratische Entspannungspolitik. Beschluss der SPD-Bundestagsfraktion vom 09.10.2018, 2018, URL: https://www. spdfraktion.de/system/files/documents/positionspapier-spdfraktion-dialog-vertrauen-sicherheit-20181009.pdf (accessed 30.11.2021).

[2] Riedel, R. 2020, Analyse: Das «Intermarium» und die «Drei-Meere-Initiative» als Elemente des euroskeptischen Diskurses in Polen. URL: https://www.bpb.de/internationales/europa/polen/analysen/303999/analyse-das-intermarium-und-die-drei-meere-initiative-als-elemente-des-euroskeptischen-diskurses-in-polen (accessed 30.11.2021).

French-German tandem and conclude that while the positions of Berlin and Paris coincide on political issues, they diverge when it comes to economics affecting the interests of either of the countries [19]. In their paper, Salikov, Tarasov, and Urazbaev specifically analyze the Baltic vector of German foreign policy and show how it affects Berlin's relations with Moscow [20].

Belov claims that economic cooperation between Russia and Germany remains robust and is developing, political disagreements notwithstanding [21—23]. Another paper worth mentioning is the article "New Hydrogen Strategies of Germany and the EU: Prospects for Cooperation with Russia". Its author concludes that while there are good chances for large-scale Russian-German cooperation in the production and transportation of hydrogen, as well as joint R&D in this field, Brussels could hamper this development [24, p. 74]. Some issues of economic cooperation are also discussed in research by Ivanova and the book "The Limits of German Leadership in Europe" [25; 26].

Two leading German think tanks, Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik and Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, have also published on the current developments and prospects for Russian-German relations. Thus, Fischer and Meister analyze the differences between Berlin and Moscow and criticize Russian foreign policy [27—29]. Westphal, Zabanova, and Shagina point out to areas of possible energy cooperation between the two countries, including those in hydrogen production [30; 31].

Another study that needs mentioning is the report focusing on 3SI prepared by the Polish Economic Institute, "Building Closer Connections. The Three Seas Region as an Economic Area". While lacking a critical approach, the report provides data essential for a better understanding of the issue [32].

Although there seems to be an abundance of literature surrounding the topic, the Initiative and its current development, its possible impact on the Russian Federation, the essence of undergoing projects, as well as Germany's participation in 3SI have so far lacked proper analysis.

The article purports to look at the German policy toward the Three Seas Initiative and identify the risks and opportunities that it could entail for Russia.

Background and the concept of the Three Seas Initiative

The Three Seas Initiative was launched at the suggestion of the Polish President Andrzej Duda and the Croatian President Kolinda Grabar-Kitarović at the summit in Dubrovnik (Croatia) in 2016. The Initiative unites 12 countries[3], of which 11 (except Austria) are former socialist states and current members of NATO.

[3] Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia.

3SI is both an economic and political project. Its economic objective is to reduce the gap between the countries of Central and South-Eastern Europe, on the one hand, and Western Europe, on the other, by "expanding the existing cooperation in energy, transportation, digital communication and economic sectors"[4].

The participating countries seek to overcome two problems. The first one is low productivity: the 12 countries take up 29 % of the EU's territory, accommodate 25 % of its inhabitants, but produce only 19 % of its GDP [32, p. 4]. The second one is the fact that while historically established networks of infrastructure, transport, and energy communications go along the East-West axis, the North-South axis is underdeveloped.

The economic objectives of all 3SI participants are quite similar, but their political goals differ. As a geostrategic project, the Three Seas Initiative is deeply rooted in Poland. Its historic forerunner, attributed to a Polish nobleman Czartoryski, is the concept of "the Intermarium", a confederation of countries located between the Baltic, Black and Adriatic seas. Some researchers have gone even further back and found roots of the Initiative in the time of the Jagiellonian dynasty, the "golden age" of Poland and Rzechpospolita spanning the 15th and 16th centuries. The Intermarium reemerged on the Polish agenda around the beginning of the 20th century under Marshal Josef Piłsudski who believed that a Union or a Federation of peoples of Central and South-Eastern Europe would counterbalance Russia and Germany [2, p. 162—163][5].

While the current concept is fundamentally different from its historical predecessors, Poland seeks to increase its economic and political influence in the region using the Three Seas Initiative to become a major distributor of energy resources. As a secondary objective, Warsaw believes that the project should counter the influence of Moscow and help gain energy independence from Russia. The goal of such anti-Russian rhetoric lies partly in attracting US investment and US political support to the Initiative. For Poland, Washington is not just an economic partner, but also the only reliable guarantor of security under deteriorating relations with the Russian Federation. Polish sources emphasize that 3SI was a collaborative proposal put forward by the Polish (Central European Energy Partners) and American (Atlantic Council) think tanks[6]. Another Polish

[4] The joint Statement on the Three Seas Initiative (the Dubrovnik Statement), 2016, Media sets in Voog, URL: https://media.voog.com/0000/0046/4166/files/DUBROVNIK_deklaratsioon_2016.pdf (accessed 08.12.2021).

[5] Riedel, R. 2020, Analyse: Das «Intermarium» und die «Drei-Meere-Initiative» als Elemente des euroskeptischen Diskurses in Polen, *Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung,* URL: https://www.bpb.de/internationales/europa/polen/analysen/303999/analyse-das-intermarium-und-die-drei-meere-initiative-als-elemente-des-euroskeptischen-diskurses-in-polen (accessed 08.12.2021).

[6] *Completing Europe: From the North-South Corridor to Energy, Transportation, and Telecommunications Union*, 2014, Washington, 83 p.

objective, albeit not an officially articulated one, is to reduce German influence in CEE and, possibly, in the long run, to create an alternative centre of influence in the EU.

The Baltic States and Romania support policies to reduce Russian influence in the region, but do not want to see Poland as the leader of Eastern Europe. They also reject the anti-German or anti-European orientation of the project.

Some countries also find the anti-Russian orientation of the Initiative unacceptable. For example, Hungary, Austria, and Croatia do not want their relations with Moscow to deteriorate and are not likely to favor Atlanticist rhetoric of the "Russian threat" in the military and non-military spheres [4].

Six summits have been organized under the Initiative. During the first summit, participating countries signed a declaration of economic cooperation in energy, transport and communications infrastructures. It was interesting that amongst the summit guests were representatives from China and the United States, as 3SI is of economic and political interest for both countries. Since the early 2000s, Washington has been paying special attention to CEE countries committed to traditional Atlanticism. After Brexit, CEE countries became die-hard supporters of the USA in the EU. It also helps that the Initiative's infrastructure projects may contribute to increasing sales of American liquefied natural gas (LNG). Beijing considers the transport infrastructure of 3SI as a potential part of the One Belt One Road, which is further reinforced by the participation of all 3SI countries in the Chinese "16 + 1" Initiative.

The second summit in Warsaw saw the visit of the American President Donald Trump, a move enthusiastically supported by Poland. Participants of the summit approved the first list of projects and agreed to establish the Three Seas Initiative Business Forum[7].

One of the objectives of the third 3SI summit was getting support from the EU. Among the distinguished guests were the President of the European Commission Jean-Claude Juncker, German Foreign Minister Heiko Maas and the US Secretary of Energy Rick Perry. The summit did help the Initiative by lifting accusations of Euroscepticism and of attempts to split the European Union, and European financial assistance has led to an increase in the number of major projects. As of 2018, Germany has become one of the partner countries participating in the projects.

In 2019, the Initiative established its own financial governing body. During the fourth summit in Ljubljana, the Polish and Romanian national banks announced the establishment of an investment fund with an initial capital of €500 million.

[7] The joint Statement on the Three Seas Initiative (the Dubrovnik Statement), 2016, *Media sets in Voog,* URL: https://media.voog.com/0000/0046/4166/files/DUBROVNIK_deklaratsioon_2016.pdf (accessed 08.12.2021).

Estonia joined the fund during the fifth summit[8]; and in 2021, Bulgaria, as the host country of the sixth summit, announced that 9 countries pledged to contribute to the Three Seas Initiative Investment Fund[9].

Three Seas Initiative projects

Currently, Three Seas Initiative encompasses 90 projects, 49 % of which are dedicated to the transport infrastructure, 37 % — to the energy sector and 14 % — to digitalization. Hungary and Croatia enjoy the largest number of projects (17), followed by Poland, Lithuania, Latvia with 12, 11 and 10 projects, respectively[10].

Despite such ambitious plans, it seems unlikely that all projects will be completed, their main problem being the ever-lacking funds. Currently, all projects of the Initiative taken together are worth €180.9 billion, and only 53 % of them are funded[11]. According to the IMF, the region needs €570 billion worth of investments for successful development[12]. The above-mentioned Investment Fund upped the budget to €1 billion by the end of 2020 and is working to increase it to 3—5 billion. The contribution of third countries is also insufficient. In 2020, the US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo pledged to invest $1 billion in the program, while the US International Development Finance Corporation approved investments of $300 million[13]. With China demonstrating relatively low interest and not rushing to invest in the Initiative, the EU money is still the main source of funding for 3SI[14].

Within five years only two projects were completed, and both were exclusively Croatian national projects (Compressor station 1 at the Croatian gas transmission system and Rijeka — Zagreb Deep Sea Container Terminal). 15 projects are in the "Substantial Progress" category, "Activity Reported" on another 15, while 58 projects remain in the status of "Registered".

Given the uncertain progress of most projects, let us consider the projects that have earned the "Substantial Progress" status badge (Table 1).

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[8] Past Summits, 2020, *Three Seas Initiative (3SI),* URL: https://3seas.eu/about/past-summits (accessed 08.12.2021).

[9] Bulgaria's Vision 2020, *Three Seas Initiative (3SI),* URL: https://3seas.eu/about/bulgaria-s-vision (accessed 08.12.2021).

[10] Status Report of 2021, 2021, *Three Seas Initiative (3SI),* URL: https://projects.3seas.eu/report (accessed 08.12.2021).

[11] Status Report of 2021, 2021, *Three Seas Initiative (3SI),* URL: https://projects.3seas.eu/report (accessed 09.12.2021).

[12] The Three Seas Initiative Investment Fund officially established, 2019, *Biuro prasowe BGK,* URL: https://media.bgk.pl/61041-the-three-seas-initiative-investment-fund-officially-established (accessed 09.12.2021).

[13] The Three Seas Initiative, 2021, *FAS Project on Government Secrecy (1991—2021),* URL: https://sgp.fas.org/crs/row/IF11547.pdf (accessed 09.12.2021).

[14] Overall, in the period from 2014 to 2020, almost €80 billion were transferred from the EU funds to the 3SI region.

Table 1

3SI Projects with "Substantial Progress" label

Project	Type	Year registered	Participating countries	Cost and secured funding
BRUA. Development on the territory of Romania of the National Gas Transmission System along the corridor Bulgaria-Romania-Hungary-Austria (BRUA Phase 1 and 2); Enhancement of the bidirectional gas transmission corridor Bulgaria-Romania-Hungary-Austria (BRUA Phase 3); Development on the territory of Romania of the Southern Gas Transmission Corridor for taking over gas from the Black Sea shore (Black Sea-Podisor)	Energy	2018	Romania, Austria, Bulgaria, Hungary[15]	€1.455 billion[16] 43 %
Commissioning of the regional LNG terminal in Paldiski, Estonia	Energy	2018	Estonia, Latvia Partner countries: Finland	€400 million 0 %
Construction of the 2nd railway track between Koper and Divača	Transport	2018	Slovenia, Austria, Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary, Slovakia Partner countries: Belarus, Germany, Russian Federation, Ukraine	€1.2 billion 87 %
Digital Platform on monitoring hydrographic bases in the 3SI region	Digital	2018	Romania, Austria, Czech Republic, Latvia, Bulgaria, Lithuania, Poland, Croatia, Estonia, Hungary, Slovakia, Slovenia Partner countries: Albania, Turkey, Ukraine, Moldova, Serbia	€2.5 million 0 %

[15] Countries proposing the project appear in bold.

[16] The website information about 14.55 billion appears to be incorrect.

The end of table 1

Project	Type	Year registered	Participating countries	Cost and secured funding
Diversification of gas supply sources and integration of gas infrastructure in the Three Seas Region The Baltic Pipe — infrastructure connecting Poland with the Norwegian Continental Shelf through Denmark. Republic of Poland — Slovak Republic Interconnection. Republic of Poland — Ukraine interconnection. FSRU project near Gdańsk and LNG Terminal in Świnoujście Expansion Program	Energy	2018	Poland, Slovakia Partner countries: Denmark, Norway, Ukraine	€1.563 billion 100 %
FAIRway Danube. The elaboration of coordinated action plans for the implementation of the Master Plan for the Fairway Rehabilitation and Maintenance on the Danube River and its navigable tributaries	Transport	2018	Romania, Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia, Hungary, Slovakia	€21.72 million 100 %
GIPL. Interconnector Republic of Poland-Republic of Lithuania (submitted by Poland)	Energy	2018	Poland, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia Partner countries: Finland	€21.72 million 100 %
GIPL. Interconnector Republic of Poland-Republic of Lithuania (submitted by Lithuania)	Energy	2018	Lithuania, Poland, Latvia, Estonia	136 million 100 %
Integration and synchronization of the Baltic States' electricity system with the European networks	Energy	2018	Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Poland	€1.625 billion 64 %

Purchase and Expanding of the FSRU INDEPENDENCE. Klaipėda LNG terminal	Energy	2018	Lithuania	€16 million 0 %
Rail Baltica submitted by Lithuania	Transport	2018	Lithuania, Latvia, Poland, Estonia	€2.5 billion 16 %
Rail-2-Sea Modernization and development of railway line Gdansk(PL) — Constanța (RO)	Transport	2018	Romania, Poland, Hungary, Slovakia	€13.83 billion 42.5 %
SINCRO.GRID A smart grid project that enhances links between the electricity grids of the Republic of Slovenia and the Republic of Croatia	Energy	2018	Croatia, Slovenia	€88.6 million 51 %
Transportation stock exchange in 3SI region	Transport	2018	Romania, Austria, Czech Republic, Latvia, Bulgaria, Lithuania, Poland, Croatia, Estonia, Hungary, Slovakia, Slovenia Partner countries: Albania, Turkey, Ukraine, Moldova, Serbia	€4.5 million 0 %
Via Carpatia submitted by Romania Transport corridor between Northern and Southern Europe	Transport	2020	Romania, Bulgaria, Lithuania, Poland, Hungary, Slovakia Partner countries: Greece, Ukraine	€11.31 billion 85 %

Source: Compiled by the author on the basis of [17].

[17] Projects, 2021, *Three Seas Initiative,* URL: https://projects.3seas.eu (accessed 08.12.2021).

The two most expensive projects, both initiated by Romania, are Rail-2-Sea connected ports in Gdansk and Constanța and Via Carpatia between Northern and Southern Europe. However, only Via Carpatia has secured sufficient funding (85 %). The railway track constructed between the port of Gdansk and the port of Constanta has been allocated only 42,5 % of the total funds necessary. Other major transport infrastructure projects are the modernization of the railway network between the Baltic States and Poland, as well as the construction of the second railway track between the port city of Koper and Divača, an important Slovenian railway junction. These projects are designed to increase freight transport along the North-South axis, as well as to enhance the relevance of the port cities of Slovenia and Poland.

The most significant energy projects shall diversify gas supplies, and their completion will have a major impact on the regional situation. First, Poland will enhance its role as a gas distributor in Central and Eastern Europe (The Baltic Pipe, Poland — Slovakia Interconnection, Poland — Ukraine interconnection, FSRU project near Gdańsk and expansion LNG Terminal in Świnoujście). Second, the Baltic States and Finland will further integrate into the European energy market (GIPL, integration of the Baltic States' electricity system with the European networks). Finally, the supply of pipeline gas from Norway (The Baltic Pipe), Azerbaijan and Romania (BRUA), as well as LNG from the USA, Qatar and Norway (LNG Terminal in Świnoujście, LNG terminal in Paldiski) will be increased. All these factors may reduce Russian role as an energy supplier to the European market.

German participation in the Three Seas Initiative

After the launch of the Initiative Germany mostly evaluated it in critical terms. Berlin was concerned with the position of Poland, which initially made no secret of its Eurosceptic views toward the Initiative[18]. Furthermore, Germany realized that by using 3SI Poland sought to limit not only Russian, but also German influence in the region.

With other participating countries having resisted Polish stance, Germany began to participate in 3SI summits at the insistence of the Czech Republic and the Baltic countries. However, Polish pushback still made Germany joining the Initiative unlikely.

Berlin has been gradually changing its position towards the Initiative. For one, Germany has been trying to contextualize 3SI as a concept aimed at strengthening European integration (through infrastructural development and joint energy projects); it has also been showcasing its interest in the Initiative. Thus, the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, a think tank with close ties to the Office of the Federal Chancellor, has published an article calling for Germany to participate in energy and digital projects, and for the Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau state bank to join 3SI Investment Fund [4].

As shown in Table 2, Berlin's involvement in 3SI cannot be called extensive. As a partner country, Germany only participates in 4 projects, of which only one (Construction of the 2nd railway track between Koper and Divača) has been allocated sufficient funding and is listed under the "Substantial Progress" category.

[18] Riedel, R. 2020, Analyse: Das "Intermarium" und die "Drei-Meere-Initiative" als Elemente des euroskeptischen Diskurses in Polen, *Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung,* URL: https://www.bpb.de/internationales/europa/polen/analysen/303999/analyse-das-intermarium-und-die-drei-meere-initiative-als-elemente-des-euroskeptischen-diskurses-in-polen (accessed 08.12.2021).

Table 2

Projects involving Germany

Project	Type	Main objectives	Year registered	Participating countries	Cost and allocated funding
Construction of the 2nd railway track between Koper and Divača	Transport	Construction of the 2nd railway track to assure capacity and reliability of traffic from/to Port of Koper	2018	Slovenia, Austria, Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary, Slovakia Partner countries: Belarus, Germany, Russian Federation, Ukraine	€1.2 billion 87 %
Development of High-Performance Computing (HPC) infrastructure, establishment and operation of HPC ecosystem in the CEE-n region	Digital	Project will substantively contribute to the competitiveness of Hungary and the region in the science, — including e. g health sciences, climate change modelling, etc. — innovative development, and high-tech fields	2020	Hungary, Austria, Czech Republic, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia Partner countries: Italy, Germany	Estimated €50 million 0 %
Improvement of railway links between main Polish cities and neighboring countries	Transport	Improvement of rail connectivity for Poland, neighboring countries and other CEE countries. The Project will also advance military mobility capacity	2020	Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia Partner countries: Germany, Ukraine	€22 billion 0 %
Interoperability solutions for a digitized and sustainable energy sector in the 3SI area in the field of energy storage	Energy, Digital	Defining and developing a Roadmap for the transition to a digitized and sustainable energy sector. Defining and creating an intelligent digital platform in the field of energy storage (electricity and natural gas) in the region 3SI	2018	Romania, Austria, Czech Republic, Bulgaria, Poland, Croatia, Hungary, Slovakia Partner countries: Germany, Sweden, Moldova	€10 million 0 %

Source: Compiled by the author on the basis of [19].

In 2020, Germany joined another major project, the development of railway communication in Poland. The €22 billion initiative has not yet secured funding; however, significant monetary contributions from the EU are expected. The main goal of this project is to increase the volume of passenger and freight traffic in

[19] Projects 2021, *Three Seas Initiative,* URL: https://projects.3seas.eu (accessed 08.12.2021).

Poland and the CEE countries (Slovakia, Czech Republic). At the same time, it may present a concern for Russia that transport corridors (one of which extends to the Ukrainian border) could be used for military transportation.

A new round of German interest in 3SI is related to Nord Stream 2. Ukraine and USA criticized the pipeline across the Baltic Sea because it threatens to divert the transit of the Russian gas through Ukrainian territory. With Kyiv and Washington demonstrating their dissatisfaction, the German Chancellor Angela Merkel and the US President Joe Biden signed the "Joint Statement of the US and Germany on Support for Ukraine, European Energy Security, and our Climate Goals" at the meeting on July 21, 2021. By this document, German leadership reaffirmed their support to Kyiv, guaranteed uninterrupted transit of the Russian gas through the Urengoy-Pomary-Uzhgorod gas pipeline and took on an obligation to establish and manage a Green Foundation for Ukraine, designed to promote the shift to renewable sources energy. Following that, Naftogaz, Ukranian national oil and gas company and RWE (Rheinisch-Westfälisches Elektrizitätswerk), a German multinational energy company, signed a memorandum of understanding on hydrogen[20].

So as to reduce Polish criticism, Germany has promised to render financial support for 3SI projects on regional energy security and renewable energy sources, as well as to contribute to EU budget funding for energy projects in the sum of up to $ 1.77 billion in the period 2021—2027[21].

To further advance the process, the Free Democratic Party (FDP), currently part of the ruling coalition, has proposed a green energy development project that could become a link between Germany and 3SI countries, on the one hand, and Ukraine and Russia, on the other. In their request to the Bundestag in May 2021, the party noted the significant capacity that Ukraine and the countries involved in the Three Seas Initiative had to produce green and blue hydrogen. FDP suggested the possibility of using gas supplied from Russia for blue hydrogen[22]. This supported some conclusions about possible cooperation on hydrogen production with our country previously published by the German experts [30]. In April 2021, representatives of the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy of Germany and the Ministry of Energy of the Russian Federation signed the "Joint Declaration of Intent on Sustainable Energy Cooperation", which included, among others, hydrogen issue[23].

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[20] Ukraine and Germany signed a memorandum of cooperation on the production of "green" hydrogen, URL: https://day.kyiv.ua/ru/news/220821-ukraina-i-germaniya-podpisali-memorandum-o-sotrudnichestve-v-napravlenii-proizvodstva (accessed 09.12.2021).

[21] Joint Statement of the US and Germany on Support for Ukraine, European Energy Security, and our Climate Goals, URL: https://germania.diplo.de/ru-ru/aktuelles/-/2472194 (accessed 09.12.2021); Having intended to reduce Poland's dissatisfaction with the lifting of US sanctions on the operator company Nord Stream-2, Germany supported 3SI in the Statement.

[22] Antrag. Wirtschaftliche Perspektive eröffnen, Energieversorgung sichern — Ukraine zum Partner einer Europäischen Wasserstoffunion machen. Deutscher Bundestag, URL: https://dserver.bundestag.de/btd/19/294/1929426.pdf (accessed 09.12.2021).

[23] Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy of Germany and the Ministry of Energy of the Russian Federation signed Joint Declaration of Intent on Sustainable Energy Cooperation, URL: https://minenergo.gov.ru/node/20562 (accessed 09.12.2021).

The Three Seas Initiative is an ambitious but also a vague concept suffering from consistent lack of funding that reduces the likelihood of completing all of its projects. However, even those projects that are currently labelled as having "Substantial Progress" could diminish the role of Russia in the European energy market.

Russia has been traditionally concerned with German's emphasis on the CEE countries, and it would seem that Moscow prefers bilateral cooperation. Another concern is that some of the former Eastern Bloc countries are spreading anti-Russian agenda and amplifying anti-Russian sentiment in Germany and the EU.

At the same time, we should take into account several important factors. Firstly, Berlin's attention to the positions of its eastern neighbors appears to be not a temporary trend, but a stable factor in German foreign policy. Thus, Russia would be better off not complaining about Germany's shift to multilateralism, but rather by adapting to the current reality. Secondly, German involvement in 3SI may soften the anti-Russian focus of this initiative. Berlin wants to take the position of a mediator between Russia and the West[24] and, therefore, does not seek to exacerbate our country's concerns about increasing numbers of NATO troops stationed along the Russian border. Finally, Russia needs to pay close attention to Germany's projects within the Initiative. While the cooperation between 3SI countries, Ukraine, and Russia in hydrogen energy seems undefined at the moment, and the development prospects of this energy source are unclear, with the possibility of transporting hydrogen through gas pipelines being controversial from a technological perspective, Russia still needs to be open to such initiatives and be prepared to partake in new projects. By participating in the production of hydrogen, Russia could reduce the risk of losing its positions as an important supplier of energy resources to the CEE countries, as well as that of being excluded from the energy transition.

Acknowledgements

The article was prepared within the project "Post-crisis world order: challenges and technologies, competition and cooperation" supported by the grant from the Ministry of Science and Higher Education of the Russian Federation program for research projects in priority areas of scientific and technological development (Agreement No 075-15-2020-783).

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[24] Address of the Chairman of the Board of the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, URL: https://www.imemo.ru/news/events/text/vistuplenie-predsedatelya-pravleniya-fonda-im-fridriha-eberta (accessed 09.11.2021).

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IMMIGRATION POLICY AND INTEGRATION OF MIGRANTS IN THE KINGDOM OF DENMARK AT THE BEGINNING OF THE XXI CENTURY

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Received 30.04.2021
doi: 10.5922/2079-8555-2022-2-7

Denmark upholds high standards of human rights as long as the interests of its citizens are concerned but erects barriers for migrants of a different cultural background who might threaten the security of the national community. The Danish tradition of liberalism, humanism and the welfare state coexists with one of Europe's most restrictive policies towards third-country immigrants. The article traces the evolution of management approaches to developing the immigration policy and integrating foreign cultural migrants in Denmark. It describes the value determinants of these changes. Using the neo-institutional methodology, the authors analyse the evolution of the value determinants of Denmark's immigration policy and look at the national norms and practices of integrating migrants from a different cultural background. A restrictive immigration policy became possible due to a consensus between the main political forces, the left Social Democratic Party and the right Liberal Party Venstre, both willing to keep in check electoral support for the radical right-wing parties (the effect of 'contagion from the right' in Maurice Duverger's terms). The object of Denmark's restrictive integration policy is migrants from a different cultural background (mainly from Muslim countries). The government takes systematic measures to restrict their access to the country. As to migrant integration, the focus has shifted to 'hard' assimilation of civic democratic values, benefits linked to employment, and deportation of migrants who have committed crimes.

Keywords:
immigration policy, Denmark, integration of migrants, refugees, political parties, securitisation of migration, identity

To cite this article: Kapitsyn, V. M., Magomedov, A. K., Shaparov, A. E., 2022, Immigration policy and integration of migrants in the Kingdom of Denmark at the beginning of the XXI century, *Balt. Reg.*, Vol. 14, no 2, p. 98—114. doi: 10.5922/2079-8555-2022-2-7.

According to many authoritative international ratings, the Kingdom of Denmark is a highly developed country, one of the top 10 countries globally in terms of political and socio-economic development. Denmark ranks 5th in 2020 in terms of security in the Global Peace Index which includes 23 qualitative and quantitative indicators assessing the attitudes, institutions and structures that contribute to the security of a society. It ranks high in the Gender Inequality Index (Gender Inequality Index) holding the 2nd place (2019). In the Freedom House ranking of the countries by people's access to political rights and civil liberties, it is in the 8th place (2020), and in the Human Development Index, it is in the 10th place (2020)[1].

Like other developed countries in Europe, Denmark is attractive to immigrants. The share of refugees is constantly increasing. This prosperous country with a population of 5.8 million has been unique in the EU in its restrictive immigration policy towards migrants from other cultures for almost 20 years. Unlike Sweden and some other countries, Denmark did not choose multiculturalism as the basis of its migrant integration policy. Its course toward toughening the policy towards migrants from other cultures from the beginning of the 21st century remains unchanged in the politics of both centre-left and centre-right governments. As of July 1, 2021, there were 825 thousand immigrants and their descendants in Denmark (14.1 % of the total population), of which 526.7 thousand come from non-Western countries (9 %), of which 286.7 (4.9 %) come from Muslim countries[2]. Since 2020, migrants from MENAPT countries (the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), Pakistan and Turkey, which includes countries with a predominantly Muslim population — Syria, Kuwait, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Somalia, Iraq, Qatar, Sudan, Bahrain, Djibouti, Jordan, Algeria, United Arab Emirates, Tunisia, Egypt, Morocco, Iran, Yemen, Mauritania and Oman, Afghanistan, Pakistan and Turkey. At the same time, countries with a predominantly non-Muslim population (Israel, Ethiopia, Eritrea) are not in the MENAPT list.

The article aims to compare the evolution of Denmark's managerial approaches to immigration policy and integration of migrants from different cultures, as well as the political determinants of changes in its immigration regulation. The motivation for choosing Denmark is the fact that the country is at the forefront of the pan-European trend to limit the migration of refugees, successfully combining the provision of opportunities for integration with the tightening of immigration control and requirements for migrants of other cultures.

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[2] *Integrationsbarometeret*, 2021, available at: https://integrationsbarometer.dk/tal-og-analyzer/INTEGRATION-STATUS-OG-UDVIKLING (accessed 11.11.2021).

Literature review

The immigration policy of the Scandinavian countries is the focus of interest of many scientists who consider its various aspects. Their similar climate, culture, politics, labour market and social security systems, and close ties in the historical past, led to the application of a comparative approach [1—3]. Sweden has traditionally been the most liberal country for migrants, allowing cultural diversity [4; 5]. Danish immigration policy since the end of the 20th century, although focused on integration, has become restrictive [6]. Norway has occupied an intermediate position in terms of restrictions in immigration policy [7]. Compared to their studies of Sweden, Russian scientists have paid less attention to the immigration policy of Denmark. However, over the past year, the situation has begun to change [8—12].

The public discourse on immigration issues in Scandinavian countries is very different [7; 13]. The Danish media use the 'threats' frame more often when covering migration issues than the Swedish media that usually use the 'victims' frame. According to Madsen, the viewpoint of the Danish media has undergone drastic changes. In the 1970s, they saw migrants as a labour force necessary for the developing Danish industry, while from the late 1980s, they more often associated the topic of immigrants with crime, racism and social problems [14]. The migration crisis of 2015 exacerbated this discourse and became the subject of detailed scientific study [15—18].

The methodology is based on neo-institutionalism. This allows studying the evolution of immigration policy as a reaction of institutions to a change in the value bases for making political decisions when the challenges posed by foreign cultural migration have exacerbated the contradictions between international obligations in the field of human rights and the interests of the Danish nation. The authors also apply a constructivist approach to analyze the discourse of migration, as well as comparative, discourse and index approaches.

The Genesis of Political and Management Approaches to the Regulation of Migration

A labour shortage in Denmark in the 1960s and 1970s led to a boom in labour immigration from Turkey and Pakistan. The compact accommodation of workers with families and refugees from Chile and Southeast Asia, with a significant cultural gap between them and the Danes, launched the processes of ghettoization and the formation of segregated communities, which became the topic of political debate already in the 1980s. In the 1987 elections, the major political parties called for stopping the formation of such compact territorial concentrations of immigrants. In the mid-1990s, a wave of refugees from the territory of the former Yugoslavia came. By that time, the leading political forces and society had realized that migrants from other cultures required not only the labour market adaptation and the language acquisition but also cultural and social integration. Denmark became one of the first EU countries to adopt a law on the integration of migrants.

The main characteristic of Danish immigration legislation is a differentiated approach, i.e. preferences for migrants of similar cultures and specific barriers for migrants from other cultures. According to Danish statistics, an immigrant is a person who has acquired citizenship (excluding those who have at least one Danish citizen parent born in Denmark). The statistics uses the concepts of "immigrant" and "descendant of an immigrant", classifying them into migrants from Western and non-Western countries. The Aliens Act[3] states that citizens of Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden can enter Denmark without any residence or work permit. Standard rules apply to citizens of EU and Schengen countries.

In its first edition in 1983, the Danish Aliens Act was one of the most liberal laws on aliens in Europe in terms of the legal status of asylum seekers. "De facto" refugees (not included in the Geneva Convention of 1951) received the right to asylum (§ 7) and the right to family reunification (§ 9). This, as expected, led to an increase in the influx of humanitarian migrants in the 1990s. Later, there was a tightening of legislation with the grounds for family reunification limited and the number and size of benefits reduced.

Debates around the issues of migrant integration, refugee acceptance and citizenship were the main topics of the election campaigns in 1998, 2001 and 2005. Adaptation and integration of migrants are now an integral part of the national political agenda. Table 1 shows statistics on asylum seekers and persons granted refugee status.

Table 1

Number of asylum seekers and persons granted refugee status in Denmark, 2011—2020 (pers.)

Years	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020
Applied	3.806	6.184	7.557	14.792	21.316	5.717	3.500	3.559	2.716	1.015
Granted	2.249	2.583	3.889	6.104	10.849	7.493	2.750	1.652	1.783	601

Source: International Migration Denmark: Report to OECD, The Ministry of Immigration and Integration Denmark 2017—2020 (https://uim.dk/publikationer/international-migration-denmark-2020).

[3] Udlændingeloven, nr. 1022 af 2. oktober 2019, 2019, *Retsinformation*, available at: https://www.retsinformation.dk/eli/lta/2020/1513 (accessed 11.11.2021).

Significant milestones in the institutionalization of Danish immigration policy occurred in 1999 (the law on the integration of migrants from different cultures came into force) and 2001 (the Ministry for Refugees, Immigrants and Integration was created — Ministeriet for flygtninge, indvandrere og integration). Until 2001, immigration and integration policy was the responsibility of eight ministries. Each of them had its area of responsibility. The Ministry of the Interior was responsible for integration, the Ministry of Justice for naturalization, the Ministry of Education for teaching Danish, the Ministry of Finance for engaging employers in the integration of migrants, the Ministry of Housing and Cities for segregation and resettlement, the Ministry of Social Affairs for social assistance to immigrants and refugees, the Ministry of Labour for adaptation for the labour market, and the Ministry of Business for immigrant business [19, p. 2]. Since 2001, the integration of migrants has become an independent area of immigration policy with its legislation, goals and objects of regulation.

The law on integration adopted by the government of the Social Democrats[4] states that it aims at the social adaptation of refugees and migrants through family reunification and does not apply to migrants from Scandinavian countries and the EU. According to it, the integration policy should promote the participation of migrants in society on an equal basis with citizens, the self-sufficiency of migrants, and the acceptance of the culture of Danish society. The integration of migrants provides for language training, vocational training for participation in the labour market, and benefits to migrants who cannot provide for themselves. Municipalities play an important role here. Once a refugee acquires a residence permit, the immigration service directs them to one of the municipalities, in contrast to Sweden, where the refugee has freedom of choice [20, p. 2563]. From this point on, the responsibility to develop and implement their integration programs passes to the municipalities. At the municipal level, there were Integration Councils, which included representatives of migrant associations, created.

The restrictive tendencies in legislation intensified in 1998 with the arrival of the far-right Danish People's Party (DNP) in the Folketing. They demanded a stricter immigration policy with a clear anti-Muslim bias. In 2001, an amendment to the Aliens Act abolished "de facto" refugee status introducing the "status of protection", which meant that individuals were not granted asylum unless it was proven that their lives were in danger in their home country. The length of stay in the country for foreigners to obtain an indefinite residence permit was increased from three to seven years.

According to the Danish researcher Lagaard, since 2001, anti-multiculturalism has de facto become the dominant ideology in Denmark [21, p. 172]. The reason is the debate around the "politics of values" initiated by the prime minister of the centre-right government Anders Fogh Rasmussen and focusing on immi-

[4] Lov om integration af udlændinge i Danmark (integrationslov), 1998, *Retsinformation*, available at: https://www.retsinformation.dk/eli/lta/1998/474 (accessed 11.11.2021).

gration and multiculturalism. The government advocated restrictive ("hard and fair") immigration laws and condemnation of multiculturalism. Muslims have been at the centre of political discourse as a minority that is most difficult to integrate into Danish society. Muslim practices were often perceived as a cultural barrier to successful integration. Influenced by the DNP, the centre-right government focused on issues of national identity, including migrants' knowledge of Danish history. In 2006, a guide to teaching history in elementary schools was introduced, followed by the introduction of a Danish citizenship test based on knowledge of Danish history in 2007. In 2009, the government supplemented the citizenship test with questions testing the knowledge of democracy.

Immigration laws were once again tightened in 2010, when the NPD demanded the abolition of voting rights for non-citizens, except those from the Scandinavian countries. In 1981, Denmark was one of the first countries in Europe to grant resident foreigners the right to participate in municipal and regional elections. In 2010, the minimum residence in the country for that increased from three to four years (only Danish citizens could participate in elections to the Folketing).

The next stage in the evolution of immigration policy is associated with the centre-left government coming to power in 2011, as it decentralized the integration policy at the national level. The Ministry of Refugees, Immigrants and Integration was abolished, with its functions divided between the Ministry of Justice (immigration control, asylum and naturalization), the Ministry of Employment (integration of migrants and refugees), the Ministry of Children and Education (integration of children and youth) and Ministry of Social Affairs and Integration (leadership of the general integration policy). The need for decentralization was explained by the desire to exclude from management practice the dichotomy in relation to migrants based on the "we-them" principle, making the policy of migrant integration a part of the national social policy. The reform critics, on the contrary, saw shortcomings in the absence of a single body responsible for the final result of integration. The former three-year residency requirement for foreigners to participate in elections was also reinstated.

The 2013 amendment to the Integration Law required municipalities to invite all newly arrived refugees to sign a binding integration agreement and a declaration of integration and active citizenship. The integration agreement states the goals and stages of integration, along with tools and measures to achieve the goals. Municipalities must ensure that the agreement is respected and impose sanctions if it is violated (§ 19, 20). The sanctions, in particular, include restrictions on acquiring a permanent resident status and access to citizenship. In the declaration of integration and active citizenship, refugees must confirm their readiness to comply with Danish law, respect democratic principles, learn Danish, recognize gender equality, respect freedom of conscience and freedom of speech, and refrain from terrorism. The integration agreement and the declaration of integration and active citizenship apply to refugees and members of their families and not to labour migrants and overseas students.

Thus, as a result of over 30 years of evolution of political and managerial approaches in immigration policy in Denmark migrants from non-Western countries have become the object of restrictive regulation, and priorities have shifted to limiting their influx into the country and integrating those who have already arrived. Currently, Danish law considers migrants seeking asylum to be exclusively temporary. The process of integration has acquired a reciprocal character, i.e. it suggests the efforts of both migrants and the host society, the self-sufficiency of migrants through the labour market and the assimilation of civic values by them through participation in the affairs of local communities at the municipal level.

Reaction to the migration crisis

The migration crisis of 2015 was driven by a sharp increase in the influx of asylum seekers. Among the Scandinavian countries, the most significant influx of migrants was registered in Sweden (156 thousand people). In Norway and Denmark it was much lower (30 thousand and 21 thousand, respectively). Proportionately, Denmark also looks less affected by the influx of asylum seekers: 43 % compared to 2014 (3679 people per million population), Sweden — 108 % (16016 people per million population) and Norway — 179 % (5898 people per million population)[5]. Experts explain these values by the fact that even before the crisis, Denmark had the image of a country with a restrictive immigration policy, which scared away potential migrants. However, Denmark further tightened its measures against asylum seekers during the crisis. Sweden and Norway followed it in late 2015 — early 2016 by strengthening border controls and adopting legislative restrictions due to the overload on national social services.

Unlike other Scandinavian countries, Denmark did not have to change its immigration laws radically. Even against this background, the new changes in asylum laws were harsh. This drew criticism from the EU leadership, especially regarding the January 2016 amendment to the Aliens Act (bill no. 87[6]) that gave the police the right to confiscate the property of asylum seekers to cover the costs of their stay in Denmark. Under the amendment, asylum seekers entering the country with assets worth more than 10,000 crowns (about $ 1,450) must help finance their stay in asylum centres and cover medical expenses. The period of access to family reunification of refugees increased from 1 year to 3 years, and for obtaining an indefinite residence permit to 6 years for all immigrants. Moreover,

[5] *Eurostat*, 2021, available at: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/2995521/7203832/3-04032016-AP-EN.pdf/ (accessed 11.11.2021).

[6] L 87 Forslag til lov om ændring af udlændingeloven, 2015, *Forside / Folketinget,* available at: https://www.ft.dk/samling/20151/lovforslag/L87/index.htm (accessed 11.11.2021).

the parliament adopted these amendments by an overwhelming majority (81/27), which indicated a strong consensus between the main political parties over the goals and methods of immigration policy. Despite criticism from the UNHCR and the EU leadership over alleged violation of international legal norms, liberalization in immigration law did not follow. Denmark was not included in the Common European Asylum System (CEAS) created by the EU in 1999 to develop common standards and rules for the treatment of asylum seekers.

The Danish government further restricted access to social benefits for newly arrived migrants. A change in September 2015 introduced a new integration allowance (integrationsydelse), replacing social assistance for people who have been out of the country for at least seven of the past eight years. Payments to other recipients would reduce if the total amount of benefits (social assistance plus housing and child benefits) exceeded the amount determined by the government. To be entitled to integration allowance or social assistance such migrants had to be refugees or persons who arrived through family reunification and had to work at least 225 hours a year (25 days, including Sundays, a month). Families of migrants and refugees with children now had an income below 50 % of the average national income [22]. There was a guide on integration education (integrationuddannelsesydelsen, IGU) introduced. It is a two-year program for newly arrived refugees and those reunited with their families. They are assigned to municipalities where their qualifications correspond to the demand in the labour market and where they study Danish. In 2020, 37 % of refugees aged 21—64 and their reunited family members with three years of residence in Denmark had a paid job[7]. The most serious problem in the labour participation of migrants in the workforce is the low demand for migrant labour (as of May 2020, only 56 % of male migrants and 49 % of female migrants of non-Western origin were employed[8]).

In 2018, the centre-right government banned the wearing of the veil. The law obliges migrants living in the ghetto to send their children to civic education. From January 2019, the naturalization ceremony must be accompanied by a handshake for new citizens, regardless of gender. According to experts, the innovation is aimed at conservative Muslims.

In February 2019, the Danish parliament passed a bill (L 140[9]) shifting the focus from integration to repatriation, including for those without a permanent residence status, and refugees under the UN quota. In 2019, the Danish government announced the Lindholm Island project to accommodate rejected asylum seekers who were convicted of crimes and served their sentences but cannot be deported for various reasons.

[7] Hvor mange er i arbejde? 2021, Det nationale integrationsbarometer — Integrationsbarometer, available at: https://integrationsbarometer.dk/aktuelt/7 (accessed 11.11.2021).

[8] Beskæftigelse, 2021, *Det nationale integrationsbarometer — Integrationsbarometer,* available at: https://integrationsbarometer.dk/tal-og-analyser/beskaeftigelse (accessed 11.11.2021).

[9] L 140, 2021, *Forside / Folketinget,* available at: https://www.ft.dk/samling/20181/lovforslag/l140/index.htm (accessed 11.11.2021).

The International Migrant Integration Index (MIPEX)[10] in 2020 ranked Denmark (48 points, 32nd place) in the third group of countries (four in total) providing temporary integration[11]. Immigrants in these countries enjoy fundamental rights and opportunities but face barriers to a long-term residence because they are not considered potential citizens. At the same time, Sweden (86 points) is in the top 5 countries whose governments perceive migrants as potential citizens. Norway is in 14th place (69 points).

Political discourse around immigration

Researchers believe that the analysis of the relationship between the discourse of migration problems and the development of immigration policy helps to understand changes in the regulation of migrant integration. The reaction to the refugee crisis in the Scandinavian countries took the path of tightening the requirements for asylum seekers, but these decisions were based on differing motivations of political forces. Sweden and Norway initially proceeded from humanitarian obligations and a readiness to accept refugees. According to Hagelund from the University of Oslo, unlike the political establishment of other Scandinavian countries, Denmark did not need to legitimize a stricter immigration policy based on the communicative discourse of the public, since it already had significant public support [23]. A study of media discourse in the Scandinavian press conducted by scientists from the SCANPUB project during the immigration crisis of 2015—2016 showed strong fluctuations in attitudes towards asylum seekers. The media perceived the situation with refugees in the Scandinavian countries during the crisis first as a humanitarian tragedy, then as a kind of "invasion" [24, p. 352].

In 2017, the European Public Opinion Service Eurobarometer conducted a unique study on the attitudes of Europeans towards the integration of immigrants from non-Western countries[12]. The proportion of those who agree that the integration of immigrants is successful at the national and local levels in Denmark (70 %) is higher than in Sweden (46 %) and the EU (54 %). At the same time, most Danes surveyed (73 %) believe that immigrants exacerbate the problem of crime (Swedes — 61 %; EU residents — 55 %). At the same time, 39 % of Europeans, 23 % of Danes and only 12 % of Swedes agree that immigrants take away jobs from citizens. The respondents in all EU countries (62 %) consider it essential for the integration that immigrants participate in the social security system by paying taxes, while the share of the Scandinavian respondents agreeing

[10] MIPEX 2020, *Migrant Integration Policy Index,* available at: https://www.mipex.eu/key-findings (accessed 11.11.2021).

[11] "Temporary Integration" 2021, *Migrant Integration Policy Index,* available at: https://www.mipex.eu/denmark (accessed 11.11.2021).

[12] Special Eurobarometer 469. Integration of immigrants in the European Union. Fieldwork October 2017, 2018, 271 p., *European Migration Law,* available at: http://www.europeanmigrationlaw.eu/documents/EuroBarometer-IntegrationOfMigrantsintheEU.pdf (accessed 11.11.2021).

with this is noticeably higher: Danes — 81 % and Swedes — 78 %. It is noteworthy that among the respondents from 28 EU countries, 50 % from Denmark and 58 % from Sweden believe that the government is making insufficient efforts to integrate migrants. Denmark also leads among the EU countries whose citizens believe that the media portray migrants in a negative light (59 % of Danes, 36 % of Europeans).

Discussion of attacks by migrant men on women in Cologne (on New Year's Eve 2016) and waves of terrorist attacks in Europe catalyzed the process of securitization of foreign cultural migration. Danish political discourse associates immigration with crime and security. The former Minister of Immigration and Integration of Denmark Stoyberg (2015—2019), pointed to a significant excess of the proportion of migrants and their descendants from non-Western countries among convicted criminals (255 % compared to native Danes)[13]. She also noted the social danger of the crimes committed (street shootings, violent crimes committed by gangs). For instance, the Black Army, a group of Somali immigrants, forced the homeless in Fallsmos to give cash benefits and sell drugs intimidating them by beatings, cutting off fingers, and killings, including government officials. According to Stoyberg, gangs of immigrants from African countries are a destabilizing factor due to their unprecedented readiness for violence and demonstrative unwillingness to integrate. Resocialization programs do not work for them; the only way out is their deportation.

The negative discourse around migrants from non-Western (primarily Muslim) countries is politically articulated and influences decision-making. In 2019, a large-scale statistical study revealed a significant excess of the national crime index (taken as 100) by second-generation immigrants from Lebanon (373), Somalia (313), Syria (287), Pakistan (276), Morocco (265), Iraq (229) and Turkey (247)[14]. A significant excess of the national crime index indicates a low integration potential of people from these countries. As already noted, in November 2020, the Danish Ministry of Immigration and Integration introduced a new classification of migrants (ethnic minorities), singling out non-Western migrants origin from North Africa and the Middle East, taking into account a higher crime rate and a lower employment rate[15].

[13] Immigrant gangs plague Denmark, and the only solution is deportation: former immigration minister, 2020, *Remix News,* available at: https://rmx.news/article/commentary/immigrant-gangs-plague-denmark-and-the-only-solutin-is-deportation-former-immigration-minister (accessed 11.11.2021).

[14] Indvandrere i Danmark 2020, 2020, *Danmarks Statistik*, Udgivet af Danmarks statistik. December 2020, p. 108, available at: https://www.dst.dk/Site/Dst/Udgivelser/GetPubFile.aspx?id=29447&sid=indv2020 (accessed 11.11.2021).

[15] Denmark: New statistics category for migrants from Muslim countries, 2020, *European Commission,* available at: https://ec.europa.eu/migrant-integration/news/denmark-new-statistics-category-for-migrants-from-muslim-countries (accessed 11.11.2021).

The Right Parties and the Political Agenda for Immigration

In the 21 century, immigration control and integration of migrants is a sensitive political issue during election debates. In the 2015 elections, the DPP doubled its share of the vote and became the second largest party in the parliament. By campaigning on an anti-migration agenda, the party has gained support outside the big cities, where economic growth has been slow, and state aid has been cut. After these elections, the DPP provided strong support to the centre-right minority government led by Prime Minister Lars Lokke Rasmussen, although it was not part of the government. For the traditional parties in Denmark, this created the effect of a "latent" conquest of voters: members of the ruling Venstre party (Prime Minister Rasmussen, Minister of Immigration and Integration Stoyberg) influenced the increase in electoral support for their party.

Denmark, like Sweden, confirms the general trend of the growing popularity of right-wing parties in the EU [25, p. 183]. Until the 1980s, right-wing radicals in European countries were stigmatized as marginalized and did not enjoy success in elections. The gradual increase in electoral support from 1 % in the second half of the 1980s to 15.4 % in 2018[16] has caused changes in the electoral preferences of voters in Europe, as they are responding to the erosion of national identity and other consequences of liberal immigration policies. In liberal democracies, there is a mixture of political and ideological positions of parties and movements, which can be explained by the effect of institutional isomorphism [26, p. 36]. In political science, a similar concept is used — the "contagion effect" introduced by Duverger. Modern researchers point to the "contagion effect" arising from the electoral success of right-wing radical parties (far-right contagion) [27, p. 417]. Established parties hijack the political agenda articulated by the leaders of right-wing parties.

The results of the 2019 parliamentary elections were surprising: the DPP was defeated (8.7 % of the vote instead of 21.1 % in 2015). The situation, at first glance, is strange. The central theme of the election campaign was immigration, and it is the main point of the DNP program. However, the beneficiaries were the Social Democratic Party (25.9 %) and the Venstre (23.4 %). The main reasons for the failure of the DPP are the "hijacking of the agenda" of the restrictive immigration policy by the Rasmussen government, leading to the sharp reduction in the influx of refugees. There was also a clear shift to the right of the Social Democrats who had supported anti-immigration laws in the Folketing in the previous four years voting with the government in more than 90 % of cases [28]. Characterizing the results of the 2019 parliamentary elections, Pleavako noted: "...Both the centre-right parties and the DPP, and now the Social Demo-

[16] *Timbro Authoritarian Populism Index 2019*, 2019, available at: https://populismindex.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/TAP2019C.pdf (accessed 11.11.2021).

crats, associate the salvation of the welfare state with a restrictive policy towards immigrants and refugees because they are seen as illegal consumers of social benefits" [29, p. 45].

On June 3, 2021, the Danish Parliament (Folketing) passed a law allowing the deportation of asylum seekers to countries outside of Europe, ignoring calls from NGOs and the United Nations to repeal the legislation. The bill was introduced by the Social Democratic government led by Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen (70 deputies voted "for" and 24 "against"). "If you apply for asylum in Denmark, you know that you will be sent back to a country outside of Europe, and therefore, we hope that people will stop seeking asylum in Denmark," said government spokesman Rasmus Stocklund quoted by the Reuters news agency[17]. Asylum cases will be handled in a third country, and the applicant could potentially be granted protection in that country. In May 2021, Denmark signed a migration agreement with Rwanda, leading to speculation that it intends to open a centre there. Human rights groups fear there is now a risk that countries hosting more refugees will also pull out.

Thus, in Denmark, the main political forces have arrived at a consensus over the goals and methods of immigration policy. National security interests take precedence over humanitarian obligations, which manifests in the maximum possible restriction of immigrants' access to the provisions of the welfare state.

Policies on the integration of migrants at the municipal level

Municipalities are active participants in migrant integration; their policies, especially those of large municipalities, have many innovations. For example, Aarhus, the second-largest city, was the first to start formulating an integration policy (1996), three years earlier than it appeared at the national level. Later the municipality of Aarhus made independent efforts to create an expert and analytical centre, study the British experience, and develop integration programs. The former mayor of Aarhus Simonsen was appointed Minister of the Interior in 1997 and initiated the adoption of the Integration Law [30, p. 328]. The main goal of the integration policy is to ensure social cohesion by achieving equality of rights, duties, and opportunities for participation in the city's life for representatives of ethnic and cultural minorities. Civic participation is promoted through formal and informal networks, forums for dialogue between the municipality and migrants, meetings and hearings, the participation of immigrants in the development and implementation of integration policies. The integration policy defines goals and outcomes in four target areas: social citizenship, anti-discrimination, education, employment and housing.

[17] Denmark asylum: Law passed to allow offshore asylum centres, 2021, BBC news, 03.06.2021, available at: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-57343572 (accessed 11.11.2021).

Another example is the policy of the municipal authorities of Copenhagen towards migrants, which, according to experts, includes the principles of multiculturalism, although, as mentioned above, it was criticized in Denmark. Copenhagen's authorities define two aspects of the integration policy: 1) the solution of social problems in such areas as education, employment, health care and urban planning; 2) civic engagement, combating discrimination, participation in associations and ensuring the safety of the city.

To measure the results of integration policy, Copenhagen was the first to introduce (2006) such an instrument as the "integration barometer" with indicators of employment, education, language skills, civic engagement, discrimination, self-determination and gender equality, ghetto areas, crime.

Danish municipalities have considerable freedom and independence in managing integration policies and adapting them in different directions. This is facilitated by the election of the governing bodies at the regional (district) and municipal levels. The Law on Local Self-Government (2010) expanded the powers of municipalities in solving the problems of the local community. The central government develops the overall policy framework implemented at the local level. The state provides social benefits, but almost all social benefits are carried out by municipal governments, in particular, the payment of benefits and programs to help refugees and immigrants. Municipalities also use EU funding for their programs, for example, URBACT (Urban Action)[18]. The European Urban Development Program, financed by the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF), Norway and Switzerland, supports the development and implementation of concepts, including social inclusion and employment promotion (8 municipalities participate). Since 2016, the city of Aarhus has been participating in the program, having developed its own concept of active citizenship.

Findings

The immigration policy of Denmark, regularly criticized by the leadership of the European Union and several member states for violations of international norms in the field of human rights and asylum, has only strengthened its restrictive vector over the past two decades. The consensus between major political parties provided a right-wing anti-immigration agenda that helped the Social Democrats and Venstra maintain their dominant position and defeat the DPP in the 2019 parliamentary elections.

The Danish response to multiculturalism has been overwhelmingly negative. The Government saw the immigration from third countries contributing to the erosion of national identity as a problem, right-wing radicals — as a threat, not a

[18] *URBACT i Danmark*, 2021, available at: https://urbact.eu/urbact-i-danmark (accessed 11.11.2021).

resource. In the media and public opinion, migrants from different cultures were increasingly seen as a burden for the right-wing radical agenda of a "welfare state for their own people" and were stigmatized. Such a discourse is firmly rooted in Denmark legitimizing the persistence of the policy of tightening immigration policy regardless of the change of government. The policy of integration of migrants from different cultures where restrictions are combined with the assimilation of civic values through migrants' participation in the affairs of the local community became a response to the threats of erosion of Danish identity. Great importance is attached to the employment of refugees. Denmark has developed a multi-level management in migrant integration, in which municipalities have significant autonomy.

Denmark, being among the first in the European Union to adopt a law on the integration of migrants, is at the forefront of European liberal democracies in terms of revising its views on obligations to accept refugees. The new approach is that asylum is granted outside the EU so that people are protected in close proximity to conflicts, as is the case with opening a refugee centre in Rwanda. Denmark's migrant integration policy is pragmatic, based on the interests of the host society, focused on migrants from Western countries with a high integration potential and providing opportunities for those migrants from other cultures who are trying to become full-fledged citizens of a developed democratic state and contribute to its well-being.

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BETWEEN THE EURASIAN AND EUROPEAN SUBSYSTEMS: MIGRATION AND MIGRATION POLICY IN THE CIS AND BALTIC COUNTRIES IN THE 1990s—2020s

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Received 20.03.2022
doi: 10.5922/2079-8555-2022-2-8

The article analyses migration from border countries (the so-called overlapping area) of two migration subsystems — Eurasian (centred in the Russian Federation) and European (the European Union) from 1991 to 2021 (before the recent events in Ukraine). A step-by-step analysis of the migration situation in the countries of the former USSR — Belarus, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Ukraine and Estonia was conducted. The article examines bilateral and multilateral migration processes, analyses the main factors influencing their development and explores migration policy measures and their impact on the regulation of migration processes in the countries of the overlapping area. These countries, located between the two centres of major migration subsystems in Eurasia (Eurasian and European, or, in other words, between the Russian Federation and the core of the EU), are subject to their strong influence and 'competitive gravitation'. The strength of this gravitation depends not only on pull and push factors but also on the attractiveness and non-attractiveness of the migration policies prevailing in these migration subsystems at a given point in time.

Keywords:
migration subsystems, migration processes, migration policy, forced migration , labour migration

Introduction

The disintegration of the socialist camp and the appearance of fifteen independent states in its place changed radically the migration situation in Eastern Europe, which was once fenced off from the rest of the continent by the Iron

To cite this article: Ryazantsev, S. V., Molodikova, I. N., Vorobeva, O. D. 2022, Between the Eurasian and European subsystems: migration and migration policy in the CIS and Baltic Countries in the 1990s—2020s, *Balt. Reg.*, Vol. 14, no 2, p. 115—143. doi: 10.5922/2079-8555-2022-2-8.

Curtain. The newly established states found themselves in different socio-economic and geopolitical situations. A reaction to the political and economic transformations was the shift in the migration behaviour of the countries' nationals having now an opportunity to change their place of residence, work and study. The direction, scale and type of migration flows revealed how successful the transformations taking place in an independent state were. From the perspective of migration, the past thirty years in Eastern Europe and in the post-Soviet space were neither homogeneous nor peaceful. The Nation-building process continues in the newly formed states. The unsettled borders which date back to the Soviet times, mixed populations and the weakness of democratic institutions contribute to ethnic tensions and provoke international conflicts. The 1990s saw forced mass migration caused by the collapse of the USSR. Many migrants from the former USSR states gravitated towards Russia due to its cultural proximity and their family ties. At the same time, the open borders spurred emigration from all former Soviet republics. Stress-driven at first, this process turned into labour migration by the end of the 1990s. Since the early 2000s, labour migration has been the principal kind of population movement in the former USSR. The Baltics, having acceded to the EU, gained access to the labour markets of Western Europe. In the 2000s, there was a permanent outflow abroad when sporadic ethnic conflicts were forcing waves of refugees into Western countries.

In the 2010s, young people were becoming increasingly active as migrants when student migration to Eastern and Western Europe from former USSR republics took place. However, the increasing multilateralism of political development causes internal instability in the latter. The political crisis and hostilities in Ukraine, the revolutions in Kyrgyzia and rallies in Russia created waves of involuntary migrants in both directions.

The beginning of the 2020s was marked by the global pandemic and ensuing travel restrictions, which led to mass return migration to source states, including the Baltics and countries bordering the EU — Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova. Economic instability rose in many labour-exporting countries. Against this background, political conflicts resumed with a new intensity sending waves of refugees towards the West and Russia (the Karabakh conflict, the Kyrgyz-Tajik border skirmishes, the events in Belarus and Kazakhstan and the special military operation in Ukraine).

The theoretical framework of the study

This article discusses factors affecting the functioning of migration systems in Europe. Two migration subsystems can be currently distinguished on the continent. The first is the EU subsystem, which attracts migrants from Eastern Europe, former Soviet republics, Africa and the Middle East. The second gravitates towards the Russian Federation, which attracts migrants from Central Asia, the South Caucasus and the European states that once were part of the USSR. This dichotomy influences the trends in, and the scale of, migration flows in Europe [1].

In our opinion, there is a single global migration system the subsystems of which (including the European and Eurasian ones) function as its constituent parts. Yet, when considering the development of individual subsystems and interactions between them, we use the commonly accepted terminology, which defines sustainable regional migration links as ‘migration systems’. After gaining independence, Moldova, Ukraine, Belarus, Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia have constituted the region where European and Eurasian migration systems overlap. Russia has become an important destination for migrants from Eurasia due to its socio-economic attractiveness and the political alliances, agreements, treaties and programmes it has concluded (EAEU, CIS, CSTO and others). The geographical location of Moldova, Ukraine, Belarus and the Russophone space of the Baltics give migrants a choice between Russia and the EU.

For example, the three Baltic States acceded to the EU in 2004 and became members of NATO, having introduced a visa regime with their non-EU neighbours. The Baltics’ Russophones who have the status of an alien or a permanent residence permit can travel freely within the EU and Russia. Ukraine has withdrawn from the CIS, signed an association agreement with the EU and is aspiring to join NATO. The country has a visa-free regime with the EU and the CIS countries. Moldova, whilst retaining its CIS membership, has signed an association agreement with the EU and enjoys visa-free travel with the East and the West. Belarus has formed a union state with Russia but maintained its independence; it also has migration preferences with the EU[1]. As we will show below, the migration policy of each of these countries has specific features stemming from their geographical position as borderlands.

To measure the impact of migration policy on migration flows, we examine the migration situation in the borderland countries through the lens of the migration systems theory and the influence of the Eurasian and European subsystems [2; 3]. Douglas Messey et al. [4] emphasise, in line with earlier findings, that migrants from the same country may move to states in different migration systems; this phenomenon is characteristic primarily of countries of origin. Changes in the direction of migration flows from a country are associated with social transformations and economic or political problems. It has been argued [3] that essential to a country’s migration system is the intense exchange of information and migrants — tourists, students, workers, etc. — who drive the flows of goods, capital and ideas. It has also been demonstrated that a migration system is held together by economic, cultural, political and other ties. And the exchange of people, goods and capital within the countries of a system should be more intensive than with states outside it [5; 6].

[1] The borderland countries of the EU introduced free border movement regimes with Eastern Partnership countries (Moldova and Ukraine) [58].

There are several migration systems (or ‘subsystems’ in our interpretation): North America, Europe, Persian Gulf, Asia-Pacific, South America and Eurasia. The Western literature offers a comprehensive analysis of the first five [7—9]. Regional subsystems, such as US-Mexico, North Africa-Europe and Germany-Turkey, have also been identified and described [2; 10; 11]. The European migration subsystem has various linking factors: 1) overlapping national migration policies; 2) close economic and political ties between the countries; 3) a comparable level of economic development (a similar cultural background); 4) geographical proximity; 5) common migration patterns. The EU countries have a common financial, legal, economic and political system [8; 12], which has four subsystems with different migration regimes [13]. Messey and Hania Zlotnik believe that the European migration subsystem is a product of the Treaty of Rome, which forms the EU’s legal basis. The document ensures the circulation of people and a common market of labour, capital and services [8].

The Eurasian migration system has been conceptualised in Russia [13; 14]. Irina Ivakhnyuk defines the Eurasian migration system as a group of post-Soviet countries linked by numerous sustainable migration flows driven by the interaction of various factors: historical, economic, political, demographic, socio-ethnic, geographical and others [13]. Sergey Ryazantsev et al. (2020) [15] define and outline the content of the concept ‘migration corridor’, which denotes a form of sustainable migration relations between sending and receiving countries. Three migration corridors (Eurasian, Slavic and Caucasian), all three parts of the Eurasian migration subsystem, have developed on the territory of the former USSR.

The ties between the two migration subsystems make the migration situation in Europe peculiar, distinguishing it from those in the rest of the former Soviet republics. For example, the Baltics introduced a visa regime with the countries of the former Soviet Union after gaining independence in 1990s. Whilst maintaining migration ties with the post-Soviet space, the three states have gradually become thoroughly integrated into the migration subsystem of the EU. The Baltics are countries of origin for the labour markets of Western European countries: Great Britain, Ireland, Finland, Sweden and others. Ukraine and Moldova seem to benefit from both worlds: they retain strong migratory links with Russia and, at the same time, send labour and educational migrants to Europe, including new EU member states (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia). Belarus has joined the common labour market of the EAEU and its close integration with Russia has created a common migration space.

Messey et al. write that, in the 1980—1990s, the EU had six major zones distinguished by a considerable migration exchange [7]. As two migration subsystems (Eurasian and European) developed, interactions between them gradually intensified and the number of contact migration flows increased. Franck Düvel et al. attribute this to the emergence of new mobility forms in the Eastern European border zones [16]. Despite the political conflict, Ukrainian migrants move to Russia to work, study and settle permanently. Ukrainians have accounted for the majority of applicants for Russian citizenship in recent years. At the same time, the flow of labour and educational migrants from Ukraine to Western European countries is growing. Obviously, the increasing diversity of migration flows in the Eastern European border zone is closely linked to the migration choice opportunities available regardless of whether people move willingly or under forced circumstances [17].

The factor of migration policies pursued by the neighbouring countries (Russia and the EU states) affects the migration flow formation in Eastern Europe. A prime example is the current situation in the Republic of Belarus. Before the 2021 protests, most Belarusian had been leaving their country for Russia, but the new possibilities to obtain political refugee status in Europe and the risks of deportation from Russia for alleged activists redirected the flows of Belarusian emigrants towards Poland, Ukraine, Lithuania, the Czech Republic and other EU countries. The changed geopolitical situation and the migration policies of the neighbouring countries rapidly redirected emigration from Belarus in favour of the European Union [18].

Hein de Haas, a Western migration theorist notes in the article 'Formation and Decline of Migration Systems' that the formation of migration systems is explained neither by the growth of a system of stable links or the poor development of such systems, albeit strong connections emerge in other situations [17]. Later, a team led by Haas published a series of papers analysing migration policies pursued by several countries over fifty years [19; 20]. Looking at major trends and drivers of international migration over the last century, the authors question to what extent modern borders can be defined as uncontrollable and how effectively states regulate migration.

The aim and hypothesis of the study. Information sources and methods

This article aims to measure the impact of the migration situation on transformations in the migration policies of some countries in the EU-former USSR borderlands (or the region where the migration systems overlap). We focus on six countries: Belarus, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Ukraine and Estonia. The following objectives were achieved to fulfil the aim of the study: the analysis of the migration situation in the regions mentioned above; the investigation of the bilateral and multilateral migration processes and the main factors affecting their development in every studied period; the examination of migration policy measures and the way they affect the regulation of migration processes as well as the application of the main migration policy instruments to legal and administrative migration situation regulators in the 'region of the overlap'. This article hypothesises that these states, being sandwiched between two centres of the major migration subsystems in Eurasia (Eurasian and European) or, in other words, between Russia and the centre of the EU, experience a strong influence of both subsystems as well as of what can be called 'competitive attraction'. The intensity of gravitation to one or the other centre depends not only on the pull and push factors, but also on the attractiveness and unattractiveness of the migration policies pursued in a migration subsystem at a given moment. This study analyses migration from the borderland countries ('the region of the overlap') in the context of migration policy framing within two migration subsystems — Eurasian (with its centre in Russia) and European (the EU) — from 1991 to 2021 (before the recent events in Ukraine).

The subject of the study is migration flows from the six borderland countries, or 'the region of the overlap' (Belarus, Moldova, Ukraine, Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia); the focus is on the impact of migration policies of Russia and the EU member states on the development of emigration attitudes and the way people reacted to them in the six studied countries in 1991—2021. Although economic (primarily labour) emigrants accounted for most of the migration flow, student and forced migration was also noticeable. This article uses the comparative analytical method to assess migration legislation and the emigration situation in the six countries. The main information sources were the migration laws of Russia, the EU and the six borderland countries (the 'region of the overlap'). The study relies upon the data on emigration figures from the national statistics of the borderland countries and immigration data provided by Russia[2] the OECD, the EU countries receiving migrants from the borderland states, the IOM, the World Bank, the UN Development Programme, the ILO and the UNFPA.

Stages of emigration from the borderland states or the 'region of the overlap' in Eastern Europe

This study distinguishes six stages (or periods) in the development of emigration in the countries of the region in the context of Russia's and the EU's migration policies toward countries "region of the overlap'". The distinctive features of a period are, firstly, the currently dominant factors and trends in emigration shaping the socio-economic and geopolitical situation in the home country and, secondly, the migration regimes in Russia and the EU — the centres of the Eurasian and European migration subsystems (Table 1).

[2] Since 2014, Russian statistics has included information on the Crimean Peninsula, whilst Ukrainian statistics do not present data on the territories beyond the country's control.

Table 1

The evolution of migration flows in the 'region of the overlap' between the migration subsystems, depending on changes in the migration laws of Russia and the EU

Migration period (stage)	Major migration flows from the 'region of the overlap'	Main features of Russia's migration policy	Main features of the EU's migration policy
I. Early post-Soviet period (1991—1995)	Forced migration to Russia (refugees, displaced persons); return migration of Russophones to Russia; ethnic emigration to the West; shuttle migration of vendors in border regions	Development of migration laws; lenient migration laws, including those on citizenship; displaced persons acceptance	Visa-free travel with the Baltics; visa-free short-term tourist trips; visa-free shuttle travel for vendors in the border regions; acceptance of ethnic migrants by some countries (Germany, Israel, Greece, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Bulgaria)
II. Later post-Soviet period (1996—2001)	Forced migration to Russia; labour migration to Russia; shuttle travel of vendors to European countries and Turkey; labour migration to the West; undocumented migration to the West	Visa-free migration between CIS countries; migration regime within the union state of Russia and Belarus (1996)	Visa-free and simplified travel with the borderland countries of Central and Eastern Europe; intergovernmental agreements on employing labour migrants and including them in national social safety nets
III. Eastward enlargement of the EU and the 'securitisation' of Russia and Belarus (2002—2005)	Labour, migration to Russia and to the West (mostly undocumented)	New law *On the Legal Status of Foreign Citizens and Citizenship*; a stricter migration policy; crackdown on undocumented migration	Introduction of visa requirements for citizens of Russia and the borderland countries (Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus) by the Central and Eastern European (CEE) states granted Eu candidate status; accession of the Baltics to the EU; the labour markets of Ireland, the UK and Sweden opening to the citizens of the Baltics and CEE EU member states; the introduction of simplified border control areas and 'ethnic passports and cards' in some CEE countries

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IV. Lenient migration policy in Russia and the EU (2006—2011)	Growing labour migration to the West; student migration to Russia and the West; relocation of businesses to the West; forced migrants fleeing the conflict zones in South Ossetia and Abkhazia	A more lenient migration policy towards citizens of the CIS countries; Russian state repatriation programme	EU labour markets opening to migrants from the ‘new’ EU member states; simplified employment rules for citizens of Belarus, Moldova, Ukraine and Russia in the new EU member states; local border traffic regime for residents of the borderland CEE states further development of the ‘ethnic card’ and passport system; readmission agreements with Eastern Partnership countries
V. Growing tension in the relations between many CIS countries and the EU: ‘competition for migrants’ (2012—2019)	Forced migration from Ukraine to Russia (in most cases) and the West; labour migration to the West and Russia; investment emigration to the West; undocumented transit migration via the borderland countries from third states to the EU	Work patent system introduced in Russia; the emergence of a common EAEU market; liberalisation of the law *On Citizenship for Ukrainian citizens*; simplified employment of foreign students; more initiatives aimed at compatriots abroad	Easier access to the labour market of CEE countries (primarily Poland) for citizens of the borderland states; association agreements signed with Moldova (2013) and Ukraine (2017) allowing visa-free non-business travel; further development of Eastern European states’ return migration policy (Poland, Hungary)
VI. The pandemic period (2020 — early 2022)	Reduction in all types of migration; undocumented transit migration via the borderland countries from the third states to the EU (the migration crisis at the borders of Belarus, Poland and Lithuania); forced migration from Belarus to the EU	Borders closed for foreign citizens; state-supervised labour migrant attraction programmes; selected opening of borders with some states accompanied by virus spreading monitoring	Borders closed for citizens not vaccinated by an approved vaccine; more lenient rules for the employment of migrants with in-demand skills (seasonal workers in agriculture; service and construction workers, healthcare specialists)

Stage I: the early post-Soviet period (1991—1995)

In the 'buffer' zone countries, migration was involuntary in most cases, driven by political and socio-economic circumstances. The main push factors were armed conflicts, national politics, rising nationalism, bans on the use of the Russian language, declining production and unemployment. Emigration had a pronounced ethnic dimension, as some countries eagerly attracted 'compatriots' according to their ethnic origin: Germany welcomed Germans; Israel Jews; Greece Greeks; Romania Moldovans; Hungary Hungarians; Poland Poles; Bulgaria Bessarabian Bulgarians. By 2001, the number of Jews in Ukraine had fallen fivefold due to large-scale emigration. In the early 1990s, 6,000—8,000 people emigrated each year from Ukraine to Germany as ethnic Germans or Jews, and about 15,000 Ukrainian Greeks left for Greece [22]. The number of Russians, Ukrainians, Belarusians, Poles, Germans, Greeks and Bulgarians in non-motherland countries decreased in 1997—2000: by 40 per cent in Russia, 25 per cent in Ukraine and 45 per cent in Belarus [23].

After regaining independence in 1990, the Baltics witnessed mass emigration. Two groups of residents started to leave: the families of Soviet army officers and administrators, as well as Russian speakers apprehensive of their future or unwilling to learn the official language of the country of residence to obtain citizenship [24]. The Estonian and Latvian governments chose the 'restoration' model for granting citizenship[3]. This 'loyalty test' left more than 25 per cent of the population in the two countries without citizenship. In Latvia, those people acquired the status of non-citizens or aliens (Latvian *nepilsoņi*). In Estonia, such residents have the status of foreigners with permanent residence permits. Under international pressure, Estonia and Latvia amended their citizenship legislation whereby children of aliens born in these countries after independence acquired citizenship automatically at the request of their parents. Yet, as noted in the literature, despite the mass emigration of the 1990s, Russophones (Russians, Belarusians and Ukrainians) remained dominant in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania in the 2010s [25].

The location between two 'centres of gravity' has led to substantial population decline in Ukraine, Moldova and the Baltics, aggravating the problem of depopulation in the countries. In 1991—2000, Ukraine saw a negative net migration of 510,000 people (it was positive in 1991—1993); Moldova, 159,000; Latvia, 110,000; Estonia, 66,000; Lithuania, 47,000. These figures, however, include only those leaving for permanent settlement and do not cover temporary labour migration.

According to the official statistics, net migration in Belarus was negative in 1994—1995 (Table 2). Ninety per cent of the immigrants came from Russia, Ukraine and Kazakhstan. About 32 per cent entered the country for family reuni-

[3] Those who had family in the given countries before 1940 were automatically given citizenship.

fication, and 24 per cent in search of employment. Return migrants accounted for another 24 per cent. There was also undocumented migration, which the Ministry of Taxes and Duties estimated at 15 per cent of the national workforce [26].

Table 2

Net migration in Russia and the borderland countries of Eastern Europe in 1991—2000, 1,000 people

Country	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000
Belarus	3.0	53.8	32.4	–3.3	–0.2	9.3	14.8	19.9	17.6	12.1
Latvia	–5.8	–23.2	–23.7	–25.0	–13.7	–7.4	–5.0	–3.0	–1.5	–1.4
Lithuania	–4.4	–11.7	–17.0	–6.9	–2.8	–1.8	–0.6	–0.6	–0.3	–0.6
Moldova	–33.7	–36.8	–15.1	–14.8	–17.1	–16.5	–9.9*	–7.1*	–3.0*	–4.7*
Russia	136.1	266.2	526.3	978.0	653.7	513.5	514.1	428.8	269.5	362.6
Ukraine	151.3	287.8	54.5	–142.9	–131.6	–169.2	–136.0	–152.0	–138.3	–133.6
Estonia	–4.2	–21.8	–12.8	–10.2	–7.7	–5.0	–2.8	–1.2	–0.3	–0.4

Comment: * the data do not take into account the left bank of the Dniestr river and the town of Bendery.

The natural decrease in Russia and Belarus, on the contrary, was partly compensated for by migrants from the neighbouring borderland states. In 1992—2000, Russia's migration exchange with the CIS and the Baltic States amounted to about 6m people, making up for three-quarters of the country's natural decrease. Of all arrivals, one-fourth were from Ukraine. Most migration flows from Ukraine and Moldova, and to a lesser extent from Belarus, were oriented towards Russia [27].

A factor in Russia's attractiveness for migrants from the neighbouring borderland states was its lenient citizenship laws. In particular, the Law on Citizenship (1991) introduced a period of simplified acquisition of Russian citizenship which lasted until 1996 (later, it was extended repeatedly). The last amendment allowed the choice of citizenship until the end of 2001. Since the establishment of a union state with Russia in 2006, citizens of Belarus have enjoyed the rights of citizens of both countries of work and residence without limitations [28].

In the early 1990s, Russia adopted laws regulating the reception, accommodation and support for involuntariy migrants: the Law on Refugees (federal law No. 4528-I of 19.02.1993), the Law on Forced Migrants (federal law No. 4530-I of 19.02.1993), the Decree of the President of the RSFSR On Organizing Work to Provide Assistance to Refugees and Forced Migrants (No. 123-RP of 14 December 1991). At the time, the key documents of humanitarian migration policy were the Resolution of the Government of the Russian Federation of 3 March 1992 No. 135 On Measures to Assist Refugees and Forced Migrants, the Migration long-term republican programme (1992) and the Federal Migration Programme, which was in force in 1995—2001. Seven intergovernmental agreements were signed and ratified to regulate resettlement and protect the rights of migrants; Russia opened offices of the Federal Migration Service in several countries, including Latvia, Ukraine and Moldova. The state also signed bilateral treaties On Cooperation on Labour Migration and Social Protection of Migrant Workers with Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (1994); bilateral treaties on social security for military personnel (1996) and Russian citizens (2011) with Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia; bilateral agreements on retirement pensions with Moldova, Belarus and Ukraine [29]. Belarus concluded agreements on temporary employment with Moldova (1994), Ukraine (1995), Poland (1995) and Lithuania (1996).

In European countries, demographic ageing and workforce shortages created strong demand for labour. In addition, neighbouring countries, geographically and socio-culturally close to the Union, were an excellent pool of workforce. Since 1991, the EU has granted candidate countries (including the Baltic States) visa-free access to its territory. This move gave migrants ample opportunities for undocumented employment in the European labour market. Residents of the Baltics have been described to combine international travel with working illegally. In the 1990s, labour emigration from Lithuania was a viable strategy to hedge one's risks amid economic transition [30]. Many Lithuanians opted for emigration in search of work in the West [29; 31].

After the EU's eastward enlargement, migration regimes were liberalised for residents of border areas in the 'region of the overlap'. People residing in the border territories of Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus, as well as in the Kaliningrad region of Russia, could travel visa-free to Poland, Hungary, Romania, the Czech Republic and Slovakia. A zone of free movement of people within the former socialist camp was established [32; 33]. On this basis, shuttle migration and trade in used cars, food and consumer goods developed in the border regions. The shuttle trade between the countries of the former USSR (Russia, Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus), Central Europe (Poland, Hungary, Romania), Germany and Turkey flourished during this period. The introduction of a visa regime by the Baltic States in 1992 with all CIS countries (including Ukraine and Moldova) limited burgeoning shuttle trade to the near-border area.

Stage II: the late post-Soviet period (1996—2001)

In this period, emigration from the studied countries, influenced by both migration systems, was rapidly increasing in scale and diversifying geographically. Although labour migration came to the fore, shuttle trade retained a prominent role. More and more people were seeking opportunities to earn money abroad. In other words, the 'professionalisation' of emigration was taking place.

In 1994, many Ukrainian emigrants engaged in shuttle trade were still formally employed elsewhere; in 2002, 39 per cent of them indicated their status as 'unemployed'. By the early 2000s, shuttle labour had become the main occupation for many Ukrainians [34]. The geography of Moldovan emigration expanded dramatically from 17 countries of destination stated by those leaving the state in

1994 to 26 in 2002. Germany, Portugal, Italy and Spain appeared on the list of countries receiving a significant number of Moldovan citizens [35]. The duration of migration also increased: from a few days which Moldovan and Ukrainian citizens could spend abroad at a time in the early 1990s to much longer trips in 2002 [34; 35]. Although the financial crisis of 1998 effectively ended shuttle trade migration as a mass phenomenon, it encouraged emigrants to settle in the countries with which they traded [34—36].

At that stage, CEE countries and the Baltics took steps towards accession to the EU. They enacted a series of laws tightening border control with the neighbouring countries; the issuance of simplified visas began in 1997 [37]. Stricter border control increased the cost of official travel for citizens of the 'region of the overlap', and many migrants from the area attempted to enter the EU illegally or stay in the Union with a tourist visa. Ukrainian and Moldovan nationals topped the list of illegal border crossers to the EU [38; 39].

Russia, a major receiving country at the time, promptly developed, adopted and ratified pertinent government regulations, seven intergovernmental agreements, two bilateral agreements and the principal legislative act governing foreign labour recruitment — federal law No. 115 of 2002 On the Legal Status of Foreign Citizens [33].

Stage III: eastward enlargement of the EU and tighter migration control by Russia (2002—2005)

After the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, the US initiated a global shift towards a stricter migration policy and a crackdown on undocumented migration. The migration control and policy functions were delegated to the Ministry of the Interior. The 2001 law on citizenship was tightened, and the law On the Legal Status of Foreign Citizens was adopted (2002). Ukraine also reorganised its border guard service and established closer control at the eastern border with Russia. Belarus restored the Soviet-time border protection system [40].

In Russia, all foreign nationals had to go through a complicated registration system. As a result, only seven per cent managed to obtain necessary documents in due time, whilst the rest unintentionally became undocumented migrants and had to either pay fines (official or unofficial) for staying in the country without registration or turn to semi-legal intermediary companies to arrange fake registration. Only citizens of Belarus avoided these problems.

Restrictive migration policy led to an increase in the number of undocumented migrants (in 2001—2006, 75 per cent of migrants in Russia did not have a work permit, and another 50 per cent had no legal residence permit [41]). This trend in migration policy reduced migration flows to Russia from the former Soviet republics, partly redirecting them towards the West and new centres of gravity (Kazakhstan, China, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Turkey and the states of the Persian Gulf). Emigration was becoming more professional, involving doctors, researchers, professors, engineers, IT specialists and programmers.

The accession of the Baltics to the EU in 2004 intensified westward migration from the three states. About 52,000 Estonians live in Finland, comprising 21 per cent of all foreign nationals in the country[4]. Most new immigrants to Estonia were coming from Russia and Ukraine [42]. Mass labour emigration from Latvia resulted in the departure from the country of 260,000 people, or 14 per cent of the population. Lithuania's accession to the EU opened up new opportunities for the countries' residents[5]. In 2004, the net average earnings of a married couple with two children in the EU-15 was eight times that of in Lithuania, encouraging about 1 per cent of the country's population to relocate to the EU annually in 2004—2014 [29]. The UK and Ireland did not establish a transition period and immediately opened their borders to workers from the new member states. Today, the two countries have the largest Lithuanian diasporas [29].

The CEE countries preparing to accede to the Union in 2001—2003 (Romania, Poland, Hungary, Slovakia and the Czech Republic) introduced a visa regime with their neighbours. The new regime affected the historical ties between people living on both sides of the border and impeded the movement of cheap labour. In Hungary, the EU's demand to close the border sparked a debate about the fate of compatriots abroad. In 2003, the country's parliament passed a new 'status law' to allow Hungarians living in the neighbouring countries to use the Hungarian card (an equivalent of the passport) when entering Hungary [43]. Poland developed a similar initiative for ethnic Poles, introducing the Pole Card in 2007. Romania and Bulgaria also took steps to issue compatriots with passports. In 2004, Estonia launched the Programme for Compatriots (*Rahvuskaaslaste Programm*), which supported the culture and language of ethnic Estonians abroad.

In the early 1990s, the EU was euphoric about the defeat of socialism and the dream of an 'integrated and free Europe' coming true. In 2000, the future already looked much grimmer as a surge of migrants crossed the eastern border of the Union. The enlargement underscored the need for measures to control the Union's borders. Former Soviet republics were offered readmission agreements in exchange for visa liberalisation. Still, many countries, including Russia, were reluctant to sign these agreements, wary of the risk of becoming reservoirs of irregular migrants from Asia and Africa. During the 2014—2016 migration crisis, such fears were partly confirmed: many undocumented migrants took the northern route via Murmansk to reach the EU. Russia became a transit area for irregular migrants headed for the Union [44]. As a result, the country introduced measures to counter irregular migration in the CIS.

The EU authorities came up with the idea of creating a 'circle of friends' that would contribute to security and support peace and stability at the eastern bor-

[4] Population structure, *Statistics Finland*. In: Kalliomaa-Puha, L. "Migrants" Access to Social Protection in Finland., p. 152, URL: https://www.tilastokeskus.fi/tup/suoluk/suoluk_vaesto.html#muuttoliike (accessed 18.02.2019).

[5] Eurostat, 2019, Annual net earnings [earn_nt_net], *Eurostat Database*, URL: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/database (accessed 05.02.2019).

ders. It was put into practice through the European Neighbourhood Policy [45] implemented through running specific programmes. The EU intended to build a buffer zone to control potential threats coming from Belarus, Moldova, Ukraine and Russia. The latter state did not join the initiative, proposing instead a Russia-EU strategic partnership package [46]. The European Neighbourhood Policy followed the global approach to migration management. Yet, some experts maintain that it betrays commitment to power geopolitics dividing Europe into the EU and its environs [45].

Stage IV: the liberal period (2006—2011)

In January 2007, the demographic crisis and labour shortages prompted the Russian government to liberalise its migration policy. Net migration compensated in Russia for 75 per cent of the natural decrease. The liberalisation of labour migration was successful. About 7.5m migrants from visa-free CIS countries went through registration, and 2.5m received work permits. This new liberal policy yielded a budget revenue increase of 11bn roubles. In 2005, 54 per cent of migrants had registration; in 2008, 85 [47]. The law on citizenship was amended, restoring some privileges granted earlier to compatriots and launching the process of return migration. A state repatriation assistance programme was adopted with a target of 300,000 people per year [48]. The Russian regions (12 in 2006 and 13 in 2008) that welcomed repatriates within the programme were few and economically backward, and the target was not achieved in the first years of the initiative. Until 2011, the number of state programme participants did not exceed 30,000 per year.

In 2006, CEE countries (the Czech Republic, Poland, Slovakia and Hungary) eased access to their labour market for migrants from Moldova, Russia, Ukraine and Belarus. For example, Poland started liberalising its migration policy following the mass emigration of Poles to the EU after 2004 and a labour shortage in the national market. In 2007—2013, over 2m Poles emigrated to the UK, Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands and the US [49; 50]. The liberalisation of migration policy contributed to an increase in the number of migrants working legally in Poland [51].

Right before the introduction of the Schengen Agreement, CEE countries secured a possibility for citizens of the neighbouring countries to work on their territories for six months a year without a work permit upon application from an employer. After that, the flow of labour and educational migrants diverted to Poland and, later, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary [50]. In 2007, the EU decided to simplify visa procedures, signing readmission agreements with Ukraine, Russia and Moldova. Local border traffic agreements were concluded with Hungary in 2007, Poland and Slovakia in 2008 and Romania in 2014.

All the former Soviet republics suffered in the global financial and economic crisis of 2008—2009. The number of jobs for migrants sharply decreased, and many foreign workers were forced to return home or opt for shadow employment. In 2008—2010, Latvia went through a severe financial crisis, losing 25 per cent of its GDP and hitting an unemployment rate of 18.7 per cent [53].

Stage V: competition for migrants (2012—2019)

The data on permanent immigration indicates that, in 2010—2020, the principal country of destination in the region was Russia, which received from 100,000 to 320,000 migrants each year. Amongst the states of the 'buffer' zone, net migration was positive in Ukraine and Belarus. In the Baltics and Moldova, these figures were negative (except for Lithuania in 2019—2020; Table 3).

Table 3

Net migration in Russia and the borderland countries of Eastern Europe in 2010—2020

Country	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020
Belarus	10. 3	9. 9	9.3	11.6	15.7	18.5	7.9	3.9	9.4	no data	no data
Latvia [1]	–35.6	–20.1	–11.9	–14.3	–8.6	–10.6	–12.2	–7.8	–4.9	–3.4	–3.2
Lithuania [1]	–72.0	–38.2	–21.3	–16.8	–12.3	–22.4	–30.1	–27.5	–3.3	10.8	19.9
Russia [2, 3]	158.1	319.8	294.9	295.9	270.0	245.4	261.9	211.9	124.9	285.1	106.5
Moldova	–0.5	–0.9	0.1	–1.7	–1.6	–0.8	–1.1	–0.4	–0.2	–1.2	no data
Ukraine [4]	16.1	17.1	61.8	31.9	22.6	14.2	10.6	12.0	18.6	21.5	9.3
Estonia [5]	–2.5	–2.5	–3.7	–2.6	–0.7	2.4	1.0	5.2	7.0	5.4	3.8

Sources: **Rossiya i strany — chleny Yevropeyskogo soyuza. 2019: Statisticheskiy sbornik* [*Russia and the EU member states. 2019: A statistical book*], 2019, Rosstat, 2019, p. 43—45; *Rosstat*, 2022, URL: https://rosstat.gov.ru/storage/mediabank/Rus-Es2019.pdf (accessed 15.02.2022); Population change — Demographic balance and crude rates at national level [demo_gind], 2022, *Eurostat*, URL: https://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/submitViewTableAction.do (accessed 15.02.2022); **2010—2018 data: *Demograficheskiy yezhegodnik Rossii 2019, Statisticheskiy sbornik.* [*The demographic yearbook of Russia 2019. A statistical yearbook*]. Moscow: Rosstat, 2019, p. 200. URL: https://rosstat.gov.ru/storage/mediabank/Dem_ejegod-2019.pdf (accessed 15.02.2022); ***2019—2020 data: *Sodruzhestvo nezavisimykh gosudarstv. Predvaritelnyye itogi, 2020, Statisticheskiy sbornik Statkomiteta SNG* [*The Commonwealth of Independent States. Preliminary results, 2020. A statistical book of he Interstate Statistical Committee of the CIS]*, p. 151, URL: http://www.cisstat.com/ (accessed 15.02.2022); *****Державна служба статистики України,* URL: http://www.ukrstat.gov.ua/ (accessed 15.02.2022); ******Statista — The Statistics Portal,* URL: https://www.statista.com/statistics/1264960/estonia-immigration-figures/, https://lb-aps-frontend.statista.com/statistics/1264949/estonia-emigration-figures/ (accessed 15.02.2022).

In the 2010s, the Baltics emerged as destinations for migrants from third countries. Table 3 shows that Russia, Belarus, Latvia, Estonia and Ukraine had a positive migration rate during the study period.

Russia sees migrants from the CIS countries as a resource to compensate for the declining demographic potential. Unofficially, migrants from Ukraine and Belarus are considered the preferred ethnic group, whose adaptation and integration are the most unproblematic for Russian society. In 2014—2015, the Russian authorities liberalised the procedure for obtaining Russian citizenship by Ukrainian nationals. Ukrainians account for the vast majority of foreign nationals acquiring Russian citizenship (400,000 people in 2019).

The 2014 political crisis in Ukraine triggered a wave of forced mass migration [54]. The division of the country created two roughly equivalent flows of involuntary migrants: about 1m refugees from the Donetsk and Luhansk regions moved to Russia, and about 1.46 million internally displaced persons to other Ukrainian regions [55]. In 2015, Ukraine's GDP decreased by 10 per cent; unemployment and poverty grew, provoking labour emigration of Ukrainians.

Many Ukrainians participated in Russia's repatriation assistance programme. Belarus received about 60,000 asylum seekers from Ukraine in 2014.

In the same year, the five states of the former Soviet Union that signed the Eurasian Economic Community agreement established the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), which constituted a sub-national governance structure along with the Eurasian Commission. Several types of migrant workers entered Russia's labour market: 1) citizens of EAEU countries with free access to the labour market; 2) migrants from visa-free CIS states (including Ukraine and Moldova) with less easy, patent-based access to the market; 3) foreign national that need visas to enter Russia and require a work visa and work permit. This has created a hierarchy of inequalities in the labour flows [40].

In 2017, the Ukrainians were granted visa-free access to the EU; this spurred population mobility: 7.6 per cent of the country's population visited the Union in 2018, and 14.4 per cent in 2019. Each tenth (9.4 per cent) took a trip to visit friends and relations or find employment (8.2 per cent) [56]. The bus link between Moldova and Russia, running through Ukraine, became costly and unreliable; trains and flights to Russia were cancelled. Out of 728,000 Moldovan migrants, according to the IOM data, most still reside in Russia (over 217,000 people or 30 per cent). As a principal destination for the Moldovans, the country is followed by Italy (16 per cent), France (7 per cent), the US (6 per cent), Canada and Poland (5 per cent each), Portugal, Ireland, Ukraine and Germany (3 per cent each)[6]. Russia, however, was losing its attractiveness to the Moldovans. The decrease in the proportion of the country's nationals amongst all immigrants in Russia was as large as 55 per cent in 2005, 41 per cent in 2018 and 63 per cent

[6] Bolshe vsego grazhdan Moldovy za rubezhom nakhodyatsya v Rossii [Most of the Moldovan citizens abroad reside in Russia], 2022, Sputnik Moldova, 17.01.2022, URL: https://ru.sputnik.md/20220117/bolshe-vsego-grazdan-moldovy-za-rubezhom-nakhodyatsya-v-rossii-48087394.html (accessed 17.01.2022).

in 2019. Although this decline testifies to Moldova gravitating to the EU, the country remains part of the Eurasian migration system. The Moldovans seem to benefit from visa-free travel in both directions: European and Russian.

Ukrainian and Moldovan experts stress [57; 58] that the above factors, combined with the liberalisation of the visa regime with the EU, the economic crisis in Russia caused by the sanctions imposed by the West following the incorporation of Crimea and the ensuing devaluation of the rouble reoriented Ukrainian and Moldovan labour migration to the EU. The number of Ukrainian labour migrants decreased in Russia and grew in the Union.

Ukraine, Estonia and Lithuania, once countries of origin, were turning into destinations for migrants. Even before the pandemic, student mobility had become a major source of migrants from the 'region of the overlap'. The flow of young people leaving the area to study in the EU was increasing in almost all the countries: many states and universities awarded scholarships and grants. In the early 2000s, about 10,000 schoolchildren and university students from Ukraine studied in the EU. In 2020, their number reached 72,000[7]. Young people from the Baltics, Moldova and Belarus were actively involved in student migration. Russia adopted a policy aimed to attract international students as well. In 2018, Rossostrudnichestvo reserved 11,000 places at Russian universities for the children of ethnic Russians living abroad. Out of 282,000 international students studying in Russia, about 100,000 came from the CIS; 21,000 from Ukraine; 11,000 from Belarus; 501, 220 and 305 people from Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia, respectively[8].

Stage VI: the pandemic (2020 — early 2022)

In 2020, the studied countries were closing their borders and imposing lockdowns, and migration flows drastically reduced. The only exception was Belarus, which never introduced restrictive measures. Curfews and strict lockdown measures were introduced in the Baltics. In Poland, Ukraine and Moldova, the restrictions were partly lifted a month later. Russia, in turn, took rather strict restrictive measures. The closure of many border crossing points caused a 5.5-fold decrease in migration from Ukraine to Russia.

The lockdowns and closed borders sharply reduced the inflow of seasonal and temporary labour migrants to the EU and Russia, resulting in acute shortages of some categories of workers, primarily in construction, agriculture and service sector. Some European countries (Germany, Austria, the UK and Finland) liberalised their migration legislation, despite the pandemic, to attract seasonal work-

[7] *Global* flow of tertiary-level mobile students, 2022, URL: http://uis.unesco.org/en/uis-student-flow (accessed 15.02.2022).

[8] *Global* flow of tertiary-level mobile students, 2022, URL: http://uis.unesco.org/en/uis-student-flow (accessed 15.02.2022).

ers. Flights were chartered from Ukraine and Moldova. The Russian authorities repeatedly emphasised the shortage of construction workers. Yet, the country's migration policy focused on creating a system for organised recruitment from Uzbekistan and Tajikistan.

During the pandemic, net migration was positive in Lithuania and Estonia, apparently due to the growing return migration from Europe, including the UK [59]. Returning migrants are generally expected to bring a different culture of production, new skills and knowledge that will spur socio-economic development at home.

The migration situation in Belarus merits special attention. Since the second half of 2020, the country has experienced a major migration outflow caused by the domestic political situation that arose after the suppression of protests in August 2020. On 10 December 2020, the Belarusian government restricted exit across the land border with Ukraine, Poland, Lithuania and Latvia to some categories of citizens. The number of Belarusian emigrants headed for Poland continued to increase during the pandemic: from 65,000 in 2019 to 78,000 in 2020 [60]. By mid-2021, 0.5 per cent of the population had left the Republic of Belarus for political and economic reasons, mainly for Lithuania, Latvia, Poland, Ukraine and Russia [18].

The EU's decision to ban Belarus's flag carrier, Belavia, from the EU's airspace in May 2021 unexpectedly provoked a migration crisis on the country's borders with Poland and Lithuania, i.e., the eastern boundary of the Union[9]. Belavia had to divert its routes from the West to the Middle East (Iraq, Syria, Turkey), thus adding to the inflow of transit migrants disguised as tourists. Unauthorised camps of irregular migrants striving to get to Germany were pitched at the EU's eastern borders. The migration crisis caused the then Lithuanian government to resign in July 2021[10]. Belarus's Western neighbours started to build a wall along the border with the country[11]. These developments resulted in tighter control over the EU's eastern border as well as strained relations between the Union and Belarus.

[9] YeS zakryl nebo dlya Belarusi iz-za intsidenta s samoletom Ryanair [EU closes airspace for Belarusian airlines over Ryanair flight incident], 2021, *BBC*, 24—25 May 2021, URL: https://www.bbc.com/russian/news-57358491 (accessed 15.02.2022).

[10] Shturm Vilnyusa i otstavka pravitelstva: k chemu vedet migratsionnyy krizis v Litve [An attack on Vilnius and the cabinet dismissed: possible outcomes of the migration crisis in Lithuania], 2021, *Rubaltic,* URL: https://www.rubaltic.ru/article/politika-i-obshchestvo/20210728-shturm-vilnyusa-i-otstavka-pravitelstva-k-chemu-vedet-migratsionnyya-krizis-v-litve/ (accessed 15.02.2022).

[11] Migratsionnyy krizis na granitse Belarusi: polskiye pogranichniki strelyayut v vozdukh, Lukashenko grozit perekryt gaz [The migration crises at the Belarusian border: Polish border guards fire warning shots, Lukashenko threatens to pull the plug on gas], 2021, *BBC,* 11 November, https://www.bbc.com/russian/news-59250538 (accessed 15.02.2022).

Russia's migration policy had some remarkable features during the pandemic: the president of Russia repeatedly renewed patents and residence permits for foreign nationals. Many experts considered this measure the most effective assistance to labour migrants rendered one of the most vulnerable social groups by the pandemic. Still, severe labour shortages aggravated by the pandemic did not preclude another round of complicating migration procedures, which took place at the end of 2021. From 29 December 2021, Russia introduced obligatory dactylography for migrant workers at the place of stay; medical examination rules were also tightened up: now, the procedure had to be repeated every three months[12]. Although these rules have not yet affected citizens of Belarus, they have complicated the situation for labour migrants from Ukraine and Moldova. As the literature shows, stricter labour migration requirements push a substantial proportion of migrants towards the shadow economy and add to corruption [61; 62]. Thus, migrants from Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova, having several migration options, were likely to choose EU countries with clear migration laws.

The study countries have yet to overcome COVID-19 and eliminate its consequences. The WHO maintains that no varieties of the disease pose a significant risk to the livies of the vaccinated. And many countries have begun to open their borders since February 2022; migratory links are being gradually re-established.

Migration policy of the Eastern European borderlands: old factors and new trends.

After the dissolution of the USSR in December 1991, the Baltics applied for NATO and EU membership, which they were granted in 2004[13]. This added a new, European, dimension to the countries' migration policy influenced by the bitter historical memory of incorporation into the Russian Empire and the USSR. Soviet deportations dealt a hard blow to the demography of the Baltic States. Today, their migration strategies seek to increase the proportion of the titular (state-forming) ethnic group, establish the total dominance of the national languages and counter demographic ageing and population reduction. The states have returned to the laws in force during their first independence in the 1920s. At the same time, the situation is complicated by the presence of Russophone minorities and the mass migration of the titular population to economically developed countries, primarily in the EU [63].

Latvia is very sensitive to immigration from outside the EU, jealously preserving the ethnic balance and protecting the country's language and culture.

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[12] Amendments to law No. 115-FZ On the Legal Status of Foreign Citizens in the Russian Federation of 25.07.2002; laws № 128—93 On the State Dactylographic Registration in the Russian Federation of 25.07.1998 and № 109-FZ On the Migration Registration of Foreign Citizens and Stateless Persons in the Russian Federation of 18.07.2006.

[13] Vzaimodeystviye Litvy i NATO [Lithuania-NATO cooperation], 2022, *НАТО.рф*, URL: https://xn--80azep.xn--p1ai/ru/lithuania.html (accessed 15.02.2022).

This sensitivity is a reaction to the deportations and the consequences of Soviet-time Russification. As a result of the deportations, the proportion of ethnic Latvians in the country declined from 77 per cent in 1935 to 52 per cent in 1989. According to the 1989 census, Latvia had a population of 2.67m, which decreased by 738,000 to 1.93m in 2018[14].

In 2018, Latvia's Cabinet of Ministers approved a migration policy concept, which simplified some procedures for non-EU graduates of Latvian universities seeking employment in the country.

Despite Latvia's immigration policy being generally aimed at protecting the local workforce, visa liberalisation was nevertheless initiated to tackle labour shortages. According to the Population Register[15], 2,101,061 people lived in Latvia as of 1 July 2018. Of them, 228,855 were aliens and 92,342 third-country nationals: 54,258 citizens of Russia, 7,485 of Ukraine, 3,318 of Belarus, 1,708 of India and 1,556 of Uzbekistan.

In 2017, Latvia introduced start-up visas for top talented and developers of innovative products. Yet the number of arrivals from third countries was rather small in 2017: 4,029 Ukrainians, 1,230 Belarusians and 1,095 Russians[16]. Latvia also issues immigrant investor visas: 17,000 thereof were given in 2010—2017. They allow non-EU investors to obtain a residence permit in exchange for a certain amount of investment in real estate, *venture capital and credit institutions. Russians accounted for the majority of investor visa holders (70 per cent), followed by Ukrainians (8 per cent)*[17]. Residents of the neighbouring countries who have Latvian origin[18] can obtain dual citizenship.

Just like in the other Baltic States, the demographic situation in Lithuania is alarming[19]. The country's migration model, however, has started to change. In 2018, 32,200 of its residents emigrated, which is 33 per cent below the

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[14] Centrālā statistikas pārvalde, 2018, Latvija 2018, *Galvenie statistikas rādītāji*, p. 5, URL: https://www.csb.gov.lv/sites/default/files/publication/2018-05/Nr%2002%20Latvija%20Galvenie%20statistikas%20raditaji%202018%20%2818_00%29%20LV.pdf (accessed 03.05.2020).

[15] Population Register (Iedzīvotāju reģistrs), 2018, *Latvian residents by nationality (Latvijas iedzīvotāju sadalījums pēc valstiskās piederības),* URL: https://www.pmlp.gov.lv/lv/assets/documents/statistika/Iedz%C4%ABvot%C4%81ju%20re%C4%A3istrs%20st.%20uz%2001072018/ISVP_Latvija_pec_VPD.pdf (accessed 10.01.2018).

[16] LR Saeima, 2018, *Imigrācijas loma darbaspēka nodrošinājumā Latvijā. Sintēzes ziņoe jums*, URL: https://www.saeima.lv/petijumi/Imigracijas_loma_darbaspeka_nodrosinajums_Latvija-2018_ aprilis.pdf. (accessed 03.05.2020).

[17] OCCRP, 2018, *Latvia's Once Golden Visas Lose their Shine — But Why?* 5 March, URL: https://www.occrp.org/en/goldforvisas/latvias-once-golden-visas-lose-their-shine-but-why (accessed 03.05.2020).

[18] For example, the US, the UK, Australia and some EU countries.

[19] Population on 1 January by age, sex and type of projection [proj_15npms], 2019, *Eurostat Database*, URL: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/database (accessed 05.02.2019).

2017 level. The country welcomed 28,900 immigrants in 2018, 57 per cent of whom were return migrants. Ukrainians accounted for almost half of foreign immigrants; Belarusians 26 per cent; Russians 6 per cent. Compared to 2017, the number of westward immigrants from Ukraine increased by 32 per cent; Belarus, 20 per cent; Russia, 19 per cent [31]. Lithuania drew up the Action Plan for Integration of Foreigners in Lithuanian Society 2018—2020, and the most recent strategy for demographic, migration and integration policy for 2018—2030 was adopted in September 2018[20]. Its primary goals are to ensure positive net migration, encourage return migration and attract foreign workers to meet demand in the labour market [29].

About 15 per cent of Estonia's residents were born outside the country (Population Census, 2011) [64]. Most Soviet-time immigrants arrived in Estonia from Russia, Ukraine and Belarus [65; 66]. The immigrant question is sensitive in the country. Although Estonia's immigration policy relies on a quota system for third-country nationals, the rules have become more lenient in recent decades in response to labour shortages. The country launched the Bringing Talent Home initiative. The International House Estonia, an institution assisting newcomers in their settlement efforts, finances trips to Estonia for IT specialists willing to move to the country [67]. Although there are signs of an emerging immigrant inflow, Estonia still has near-zero net migration [68].

Conclusion

The economic and political competition between CEE countries and Russia for the population of the western borderlands of Europe's two migration subsystems has been growing in the last 30 years. The situation does not benefit Russia. The crisis in Russian — Ukrainian relations could reorient the Ukrainians, Moldovans and Belarusians towards the EU.

Russia's migration policy, like that of the Baltics, focuses on compatriots abroad and student migration. Yet, transforming temporary labour migration into circular, for which Russia has all the prerequisites and resources, may be just as effective in addressing demographic and socio-economic problems.

The socio-demographic and political situation is acute in the western part of the post-Soviet space: Ukraine, Moldova and the Baltics. The latter, however, demonstrate GDP growth supported by socio-economic improvements and attract more and more labour and involuntary migrants from the other study countries. This trend will slow down the Baltics' emigration losses in the long run.

Most labour migrants arrive in the Baltics from former Soviet republics with which they have preserved close ties despite the formal desire of Lithuania, Lat-

[20] Strategy for the Demographic, Migration, and Integration Policy for 2018—2030, 2018, Seimas, 20 September 2018, URL: https://www.lrs.lt/sip/portal.show?p_r=119&p_k=2&p_t=260865 (accessed 05.02.2019).

via and Estonia to fence them off and become part of the West. Historical roots and memory work on both sides. The Baltics' Russophone space is another factor in their attractiveness to migrants. The Baltic Sea region is receiving more and more migrants from other source countries, such as Central Asian states, Moldova, Ukraine and Belarus.

Immigration processes, still largely gravitating to Russia, will not ensure significant population growth without revising the current, overly strict immigration policy. The westward shift in the migration flows from the former western Soviet republics will continue to influence the transformation of the ethnic, social, professional and confessional composition of the Russian population.

European countries, particularly the most developed EU member states, can increasingly rely on an influx of educated and skilled workers from Ukraine and Belarus, many of whom seek asylum in the West. This pattern of migration exchange is not favourable; it depends not only on the nature of migration policy measures but, above all, on the internal political and socio-economic situation in each of the study countries and Russia.

In the pre-crisis period, the most widespread form of migration behaviour amongst the Ukrainians, Moldovans and Belarusians was systematic circular labour migration (mainly for 3—6 months) to the neighbouring countries. The expansion of the labour migration geography slowed down during the pandemic. During lockdowns, travel to neighbouring countries was safer and less complicated. Before the pandemic, 31 per cent of labour migrants working in Poland were willing to land a job in Germany or another EU country where salaries are significantly higher; today, this proportion does not exceed 19 per cent[21].

The liberalisation of migration laws (the Covid amnesty) by receiving countries has proved most effective in reducing undocumented labour migration. It has not only legalised the status of foreigners and ensured their legal access to the labour market, but also reduced migration-related crime and corruption, as well as migrant exploitation. No return to the pre-pandemic situation in interstate migration relations is expected. Obviously, the scale, directions and types of migration will not be what they were before.

Another scenario of interstate migration relations may include a prolonged decline in the incomes of labour migrants' households and the unwillingness of economies at home to remedy the situation. In this case, the need for jobs outside the country will grow, and workforce supply from labour-exporting countries will increase. But will there be matching demand for workforce in the importing

[21] Cherez koronavirus migranti v Polshi vse menshe dumayut pro zarobitki v Nimechchini: doslidzhennya [Due to the coronavirus, migrants in Poland think less and less about earning money in Nimedchini: research], 2022, Nash vybir, URL: https://naszwybir.pl/doslidzhennya-cherez-koronavirus-migranty-v-polshhi-vse-menshe-dumayut-pro-zarobitky-v-nimechchyni/ (accessed 15.02.2022).

countries? To what extent will the structure of demand for certain professions be met by the supply? The transformation of migration policy tools and mechanisms in all the partner countries will depend on the answers to these questions. Both scenarios and developments in each of them need to be taken into account by all the borderland countries in Eastern Europe, as well as Russia and the EU, when devising national migration policies.

Against the background of Russia's special military operation in Ukraine, about 5m Ukrainian have left the country, most of them to the EU[22]. The system of migration flows in the European part of the post-Soviet space is changing. Unfortunately, the unpredictability of the development and results of the current crisis in Russian — Ukrainian relations impedes any forecasts about its consequences, particularly as regards migration dynamics in the region. It is equally impossible to provide recommendations on migration policy measures. The architecture of relations and ties between these countries is undergoing fundamental change.

Acknowledgements

This study was supported within the framework of the Priority 2030 programme at the People's Friendship University of Russia.

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THE RUSSIAN-SPEAKING DIASPORA IN THE BALTIC STATES: A SOCIO-CULTURAL ASPECT

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Received 24.03.2022
doi: 10.5922/2079-8555-2022-2-9

Currently, more than 20 million Russians permanently reside outside Russia. As migration trends show, their number will be increasing in the future. The Russian-speaking diaspora in the Baltic States is an essential part of the Russian community abroad. Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia used to be a single state with Russia for a long time. It could not but affect the formation of these countries as subjects of international politics. Since May 2004, the Baltic States have been members of the European Union. Together with Finland, they constitute the EU's border space with Russia. To a large extent, it determines their geopolitical role in Europe. The article examines the Russian-speaking diaspora in the Baltic States. It substantiates the factors facilitating its stability and the preservation of the Russian cultural space, analyses the socio-economic and legal status of different groups of Russian-speaking residents, and identifies the peculiarities of various groups of the Russian-speaking population as well as prospects for the development of the diaspora.

Keywords:
Russia-EU border area, Russian-speaking diaspora, factors of sustainability and development

Introduction

Speeding up migration processes requires a scientific study. Investigations of Russian diasporas — 20 million people strong and counting[1] — are much in line with the global trend for exploring communities abroad. Yet the current state and prospects of Russian diasporas remain poorly understood: full-scale comprehensive studies have not been carried out at the public (Rossotrudnivhestvo institutions, the Russkiy Mir foundation, etc.) or the academic level.

For geographical, cultural-historical, political and economic reasons, these studies are particularly relevant in the Baltics when conducted with a focus on the

[1] *Rossiya v tsifrakh. 2019, 2020, Kratkiy statisticheskiy sbornik* [*Russia in digits. 2019. 2020. A statistical digest*] 2020, Rosstat, p. 81.

To cite this article: Simonyan, R. H. 2022, The Russian-speaking diaspora in the Baltic states: a socio-cultural aspect, *Balt. Reg.*, Vol. 14, no 2, p. 144—157. doi: 10.5922/2079-8555-2022-2-9.

Russia–EU relations. Along with the Russians, these countries have welcomed members of other ethnic groups residing in the USSR [1, p. 151]. Since Russian is the common language of all these migrants, they are referred to collectively as 'Russian speakers' instead of 'Soviet citizens', the latter term being unacceptable today. Moreover, in the countries of destination, locals perceive migrants from the former USSR — Ukrainians, Belarusians, Tatars, Jews and members of other ethnic groups — as 'Russians'.

The Russophone diaspora in the Baltics is a sociocultural rather than ethnic phenomenon, where Russians play the role of the 'diaspora-building' group. In the context of the Baltics' post-Soviet policies, this phenomenon is construed as an indication of the affiliation of various ethnic groups with Russia. Its political angle manifests itself in the fact that Russians do not prevail amongst the leaders of the Russophone diaspora. In Latvia, the rallies against the ban on using Russian as a language of instruction in schools were headed by members of other ethnic groups — Yakov Pliner, Vladimir Linderman, the member of the Saeima Boriss Cilevičs and the member of the European Parliament Tatjana Ždanok. In Estonia, prominent figures protecting the rights of the Russians are Vadim Polishchuk, Hanon Barabaner, Igor Rosenfeld, Eteri Kekelidze, Rafik Grigorjan and the member of the European Parliament Yana Toom.

The Baltics' Russophones are an example of the classical diaspora thoroughly described in the literature [2—8].

The demographic and spatial dimension of diaspora stability

In December 1991, after the demise of the USSR, Russians accounted for 1.46 million people or 18.3 per cent of the Baltics' 7.9 million-strong population. After the accession to the EU, the Baltics, like other Eastern European states, were increasingly becoming countries of origin for migrants headed to Western Europe. The 2008 crisis contributed substantially to the process: about 20 per cent of residents able to work left the region. This trend continued until the onset of the Covid pandemic. In 2018, Latvia's population declined by 7.6 per cent (raking first in the EU in this respect). The ethnic factor did not matter: labour migrants were people from all ethnic groups. The common denominator was demographic losses.

Compared to the Soviet period, the population of Estonia declined by 16.2 per cent; Lithuania, 26.8 per cent; Latvia, 29.3 per cent. These figures prompted Lithuanian economist Povilas Gylys to call the process 'evacuation' rather than emigration [9, p. 359].

The population of the Baltics decreased to 6 million in the post-Soviet period, with Russians comprising 17.6 per cent or 1.07 million people. The proportion of Russian speakers fell from 47.6 to 37.5 per cent in Latvia; from 20.2 to 15.3 in

Lithuania; from 38.5 to 31.4 in Estonia. Yet, if the military personnel of the Baltic Military District and their families who had left the Baltics by the beginning of 1996 are taken into account, the percentage of Russians has not changed over the past 30 years. This circumstance testifies to the strength of their position in this region, which has strategic importance to Russia.

Emigration from Russia has been growing recently. According to Rosstat, 498 people left the country for the Baltics in 2010 (139 for Latvia, 153 for Lithuania and 206 for Estonia). In 2018, this number reached 2,516: 1,024 people emigrated to Latvia, 625 to Lithuania and 867 to Estonia[2]. The emigration of Russian speakers to the Baltics from other former republics of the USSR is also increasing.

The stability of a diaspora largely depends on settlement patterns. Russian speakers in the Baltics have impressive territorial bases. In Latvia, it is Riga with 45 per cent of Latvians and 55 per cent of Russian speakers. The country's second-largest city, Daugavpils, is the most Russian area: Russians account for 53.6 per cent of the population; Latvians and Latgalians, 19.8; Poles, 14.2; Belarusians, 7.4. In Liepaja, Latvians comprise 59 per cent of all the residents; in Jelgava, 58; Ventspils, 57; Jurmala, 53; Rēzekne, 47; Salaspils, 42.

In Lithuania, Klaipeda, the country's third-largest city ethnic Russians constitute 19.5 per cent of the population. The cities of Visaginas and Zrasai are also important, with 52 and 23 per cent of Russians, respectively. In Vilnius, Lithuanians comprise 63.5 per cent of the population; Poles, 16; Russians, 11.9; Belarusians 4.4; Ukrainians, 1.5.

In Estonia's third most populous county, Ida Virumaa, Russians account for 83 per cent of its 137,000-strong population. Narva, the third-largest city in the country, is located there: amongst the locals, 86 per cent are Russian and 95 per cent Russophone. Other cities and towns of the country also speak Russian. These are Estonia's fifth-most populous city Kohtla-Järve (80 per cent of the population are Russians and 15 Estonians) and the country's second-largest seaport Sillamäe (87.5 and 4.8 per cent, respectively). In the latter, 8,500 of the total 16,000 population are Russian citizens. In Maardu, home to the largest cargo port in the country, Estonians account for less than 25 per cent of the population. Another port city of Estonia, Paldiski, is Russophone as well: Estonians comprise only 32 per cent of its population. Finally, there is Tallinn, where Russian speakers account for 43 per cent of the population, and 36.5 per cent are Russian. In Tallinn's largest district, Lasnamäe (119,000 people), Russian speakers comprise 75 per cent of the residents (Russians, 67 per cent) and Estonians less than 25 per cent. The Rigans call this district Lasnagrad, following the pattern seen in many names of Russian cities and towns. In ethnic terms, the area resembles the suburb

[2] *Rossiya v tsifrakh. 2019, 2020, Kratkiy statisticheskiy sbornik* [*Russia in digits. 2019. 2020. A statistical digest*] 2020, Rosstat, p. 81.

of Maskavas Forštate, where Russian merchants and artisans settled from the 18th century onwards. The area surrounding Lake Peipus is densely populated by Russian Old Believers, who moved to Estonian in the 18th—19th century.

Therefore, the Russophone diaspora gravitates toward large industrial cities and strategically significant areas. This pattern distinguishes it from other Russian-speaking communities dispersed across other world regions. The latter, albeit growing in numbers, do not have the potential to form 'functioning' diasporas. History provides ample evidence. The dispersed settlement of 2.7 million Russians (white émigrés), which took place in the 1920s in Europe and America, led to the emergence of many diasporas. But two generations later, the Russians almost entirely assimilated with dominant ethnic groups. A completely different case is the 7,000 Old Believers, the *dukhobory*, who emigrated to Canada in the 19th century and settled in the province of Saskatchewan to form a single community. Today, Canada is home to over 30,000 *dukhobory* who speak Russian and cherish national traditions [10, p. 95].

The cultural-historical factors behind the stability of diaspora

The Baltics are smaller states where the numbers of the titular and non-titular ethnic groups are of the same order of magnitude. In Lithuania, this ratio is 79:21; Estonia, 68:32; Latvia, 63:37. The comensurateness of the main lan6guage groups makes it possible to classify the Baltics as dual-community countries, with this factor preventing ethnic assimilation.

The stability of diasporas in the Baltic States is affected by many other factors, including historical ones. The Russians expanded to the Baltic coast in the 11th century, when Yaroslav the Wise founded Yuryev (Tartu) in 1030. In the 13th—15th centuries, Russians comprised the majority of the population of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and Russia (Western Russia in Russian historiography); the country's codes of laws — the Statute and the Metrica — were published in Church Slavonic. In the 16th century, the majority of highborn boyars (the then Russian elite) headed by Prince Kurbsky emigrated to Lithuania, fleeing from the repressions unleashed by Ivan the Terrible. In the 17th century, the Schism of the Russian Church caused a massive exodus of Old Believers to the Baltics. Since then, they have become the autochthonous population of the area [11]. From the 18th century, after Peter I prevailed in the Great Northern War, the territories of the Baltics were part of Russia for 200 years. Finally, in the 20 century, they were Soviet republics for another 50 years. All this left a mark on the historical memory of the Russians. A manifestation thereof is the phrase *russkaya Pribaltika* (the Russian Baltic area); coined in the 19th century, it became a substantial element of the Russian collective consciousness [12; 13].

An indicator of a diaspora's stability is its representation in the receiving society. The Baltic Russians have always enjoyed developed institutions [14; 15]. Today, there are 46 Russian associations in Latvia (including the Russian Community, which has a consular status at the UN[3]), 35 in Estonia and 29 in Lithuania.

An important consolidating factor is the spiritual life of a diaspora, a necessary element of which is historical memory. 9 May, the Victory Day in some Eastern European countries, including Russia, is celebrated with fervour by many residents of the Baltics. The commemoration has had a big part in uniting the Russophone diaspora. This is particularly so in Latvia. The square at the Monument to the Liberators of Riga is covered with flowers on that day. This large-scale act of solidarity creates a powerful impression.

Theatre culture, which has a long tradition in the Baltic States [16; 17], occupies an essential role in strengthening the spiritual unity of the diaspora. In addition to regular tours by leading theatre companies from Russia, permanent theatre companies operate in the Baltics. The Russian theatre in Vilna, established in 1864, held performances until World War I. The Russian Drama Theatre of Lithuania has been working since 1946; the Russian Theatre in Riga traces its history back to 1883. In 2006, it was named after Mikhail Chekhov, its director in the 1930s. The Russian Theatre of Estonia has worked in Tallinn since 1948. Before that, from 1928 to 1940, a Russian theatre functioned in Narva.

The core elements of any culture are language and religion [18, p. 116]. Orthodox Christianity is represented in the Baltic States by numerous churches and monasteries. The Cathedral of the Theotokos in Vilnius, built in 1348 by Russian architects to resemble the St. Sophia Cathedral in Kyiv, is one of the oldest Christian sanctuaries in Lithuania; the cathedral is located in the city centre. The 19th-century Cathedral of the Nativity of Christ in Riga, which is opposite the Palace of Justice, and the Alexander Nevsky Cathedral in Tallinn, situated on Toompea opposite the Estonian Parliament, are also in central locations.

Another factor in diaspora stability is its geographical position, namely proximity to Russia and its highly developed western regions, which are home to the principal cultural centres — Moscow and St. Petersburg. The Baltics' Russian-speaking diaspora is not just an ethnocultural community but part of the people of a big neighbouring country (unlike, for example, the Chinese diaspora in the US). Geographical nearness to the historical homeland is a powerful incentive for diaspora consolidation.

Changes in the social structure of the diaspora

In 1991, when the Baltics gained independence, the Russian-speaking diaspora included eight groups.

[3] The UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) is one of the main bodies of the organisation; it coordinates economic and social cooperation.

Group 1 comprised those who had lived in the Baltics since the pre-war or even pre-revolutionary times, including a large Old Believer community. This group became fully integrated into society. In 1993, about 130,000 ethnic Russians were granted citizenship in Latvia and another 100,000 in Estonia.

Group 2 comprised members of the Russian intelligentsia, including such prominent figures as Yuri Lotman, Boris Egorov, Mikhail Bronstein, David Samoilov in Estonia, Yuri Abyzov, Nikolai Zadornov, Vladlen Dozortsev in Latvia and Konstantin Vorobiev, Grigory Kanovich in Lithuania. They settled in the Baltic republics after the war, as the ideological pressure there was much less intense than in Moscow or Leningrad. They constituted a small but influential group that contributed significantly to the region's cultural development. 'Many researchers whose mother tongue is Russian,' says Tiit Matsulevitš, one of the founders of the Estonian political party Res Publica, 'have done a lot for the development of science [in the country]. Without them, Estonian culture and spiritual life would have lost a lot' [19, l. 34].

Group 3, which was much larger, brought together engineers, doctors, teachers, economists, actors, journalists, etc.; most came to the Baltics at an invitation from the employer or having taken a job by distribution after graduation.

Group 4 consisted of skilled workers and junior technicians mastering new technologies at large enterprises built during the post-war industrialisation of the Baltic Republics.

The arrival of groups 2, 3 and 4 to the Baltics, driven by production needs, added to the republics' creative richness and human and technological potential. Overall, members of those groups were welcomed by the titular nation.

Group 5 consisted of the officers of the Baltic Military District and their families. The time they spent in the Baltics was regulated by orders: the active military personnel were not free to decide where to live. But retirees, who then enjoyed numerous privileges, stayed in the region by choice, causing little excitement amongst the locals. Military retirees constituted Group 6.

The other two groups had the lowest social status.

Group 7 comprised common conscripts who, after completing their military service, managed to stay in the Baltics, gain a foothold there and move their families, creating a 'plume of immigration'.

Finally, Group 8, which brought together 'last-minute migrants' (about 40 per cent of the diaspora), was the least educated. Its members had come to the Baltics to build economic facilities of all-Union importance: the Muuga Port, the Olaine chemical complex, the Popov Riga Radio Factory, the Ignalina NP and sundry objects constructed in Estonia for the 1980 Olympic Games. Most of these newcomers were rural inhabitants from the country's poorest locations, mainly in the neighbouring Leningrad and Pskov regions; for them, moving to the prosperous Baltics was an undoubted success. The titular nation looked at the members of this group with apprehension [20].

These eight groups differed sharply in many respects, including socio-political views: groups 7 and 8 were socially indifferent, and groups 1—4 engaged in civic participation. All the diaspora leaders came from the latter four groups.

Thus, by the time the USSR was dissolved, the Baltics' Russian-speaking diaspora was heterogeneous in social, ideological and cultural terms. To this day, it remains highly stratified in many regards.

Criteria for legal relations with the state of residence

Lithuania adopted a law on citizenship allowing anyone, regardless of nationality and the period of residence in the country ('zero variant'), to become a citizen. In this respect, the Russian diaspora in Lithuania is homogeneous, whilst in Latvia and Estonia, it consists of three social groups radically different in their socio-political status: citizens of the countries of residence, citizens of Russia and aliens or non-citizens.

Today, 530,000 Russians live in Latvia: 341,000 are citizens of the country, 137,000 aliens and 52,000 Russian citizens. In Estonia, out of 327,000, 127,000 are citizens of the country, 69,000 are aliens, and 86,000 are Russian citizens (6.4 per cent of the total population)[4].

Not all aliens are Russians: amongst the total Russian population of Latvia, 26.1 per cent are aliens; amongst Ukrainian, 41.8 per cent; amongst Belarusian, 44.9.

In the 1990s, the governments of Latvia and Estonia devoted much effort to limiting the participation of Russian speakers in political life. The alien status, a product of this effort, is a formidable obstacle to the full integration of the Russian diaspora into the life of society, depriving a significant part of the population of representation in the parliament and imparting ethnocratic features to the political regime.

The main motive to refuse citizenship lies in the realm of morality and ethics. Many see the need to apply for citizenship in one's own country as unfair: a self-respecting adult is made to prove his or her social worth to an official.

Aliens are subject to job-related restrictions: they cannot hold positions at public institutions or serve in the army and law enforcement agencies. The most severe limitations are associated with aliens in Latvia, where 80 differences between the rights of citizens and non-citizens have been recorded [21—23].

In contrast to Latvia, Estonian aliens can participate local elections. This legal norm, adopted in response to the ethnic situation in Ida-Virumaa, has ensured the dominance in administrations of many cities, including the capital, of members of the Centre Party, which receives solid support from Russophone voters.

There is a correlation between civic status and age. In Latvia, 86.8 per cent of aliens are over 40 years old. Amongst Russian-speaking youth aged 18—25, 93.4 per cent are Latvian citizens.

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[4] Estonia has the second-largest proportion of Russian citizens after Russia.

Aliens also enjoy some preferences. The EU granted them the right to travel visa-free across the Union from 1 January 2007. After that, the rate of non-citizen naturalisation decreased dramatically. Since 18 June 2008, Estonian and Latvian aliens have enjoyed visa-free travel to Russia as well.

Most Estonians deplore the institution of non-citizenship. According to a study carried out at Tallinn University in cooperation with the Saar Poll polling company in December 2012, 74.8 per cent of Estonians considered the citizenship examination unfair [24].

The most significant socio-economic restriction was that, during the 1990s' privatisation, non-citizens had been denied the right to own large properties. According to the then prevailing opinion of radical nationalist lawmakers, Russian speakers, once deprived of full civil rights, were bound to return to Russia. This did not happen. Denied access to big business, aliens began to set up small and medium-sized enterprises. Whilst the Estonians and the Latvians occupied vacant seats in the state institutions, the Russian speakers successfully ventured into commerce, encouraging Latvia's Prime Minister Valdis Birkavs in February 1994 to seek sympathy from the European Commission because 'Russians are in control of business in Latvia' [quoted according to 25].

The socio-economic criterion

The structural changes in the economy that accompanied the market transition affected skilled workers more severely than anyone else. Radical nationalists are still proud of the destruction of large enterprises, which, in their opinion, helped get rid of 'outside' workforce.

It was widely believed until recently that citizenship and a good command of the language of the titular ethnic group would automatically give Russophones equal economic opportunities. Although knowledge of the state language does give Russian speakers better chances, it does not equate them with the titular ethnic groups. Economic relations turned out to be part of political relations. According to official statistics, the average income of non-titular ethnic groups is 10—12 per cent below that of the titular ones.

About 20 per cent of the diaspora are employed in business and about 15 per cent in education, healthcare, hospitality and household, consulting and information services. About 27 per cent work in industrial production, transport and construction. A large proportion of skilled workers seek employment in other EU countries. Approximately 28 per cent are pensioners, including former military officers. The remaining 8—10 per cent are unemployed.

The Baltics' pension systems have been aligned with the EU norms. Both aliens and Russian citizens permanently residing in Latvia and Estonia are entitled to superannuation if they meet the minimum work experience requirement of

15 years. In 2021, the amount of superannuation was 320 euros in Latvia, 440 in Lithuania and 520 in Estonia. This disparity is accounted for by significant differences between the countries in GDP per capita based on purchasing power parity (PPP). According to the 2021 IMF data, GDP (PPP) in Latvia was USD 31,509; in Lithuania, USD 38,824; in Estonia, USD 37,745 (compared to USD 27,930 in Russia). But the way GDP is distributed is no less important.

The Gini coefficient is used to assess economic inequality: the more its value deviates from zero and approaches one, the higher the concentration of wealth in certain population groups. This indicator is calculated based on official data, the shadow economy not taken into account. According to UN data, the 2020 Gini coefficients in Latvia (0.345), Lithuania (0.356) and Estonia (0.342), albeit not as impressive as in the classical Nordic welfare states of Denmark (0.252), Sweden (0.256) and Finland (0.263), pointed to far better performance than that observed in Russia (0.418). Economic inequality is not an acute social problem in the Baltic States.

Yet, the socio-economic polarisation of the Russian-speaking diaspora is stronger than of the titular nation, as evidenced by various rankings: in 2005—2011, seven of Latvia's ten wealthiest people were Russian speakers. This situation was unprecedented for an EU country. Even today, there are many Russophones amongst the Baltic millionaires.

The economic development of the Baltics is affected by three factors. The first is physical infrastructure and the research and academic potential dating back to the Soviet period; the second is the economic reforms carried out in the 1990s under strict public control and the ensuing technical modernisation; the third is financial assistance from the EU.

As early as 2015, the Baltics managed to halve the GDP (PPP) gap between themselves and the 'old' EU member states (EU-15). The receipts of the three countries increased steadily after the 2008 crisis until the 2020 pandemic (Lithuania's economy grew by only 0.34 per cent in 2020).

Over the 30 years after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the Russian-speaking population has adapted to their new situation. Of course, not all segments of the diaspora proved equally receptive to the post-Soviet transformations. Members of groups 7 and 8 were the most immune.

The lower-status groups adapt to dramatic events more easily, having more experience and skills in coping with trauma. Moreover, they tend not to take such things to heart; this helps them get used to the new conditions more quickly. Remarkably, members of these groups were the first to send their children to schools with instruction in the titular languages.

A principal source of income for the residents of the Baltic States is cross-border cooperation with Russia, and the border areas have traditionally enjoyed a favourable regime for international trade in goods and services. A European Commission decision of August 2014 exempted cross-border cooperation with Russia from the sanctions regime. In the Baltic States, most of the population of areas bordering Russia is Russophone.

A multi-ethnic yet close-knit Russian-speaking community has emerged in the Baltic States. It has a distinctive common feature: in the first post-Soviet years, on the one hand, it learnt not to be overly opposed to the national legislation and political institutions, and, on the other, it came up with ways to circumvent them. In this sense, there are no substantial differences between the social behaviour strategies of the diaspora in the Baltics and the residents of present-day Russia. In other words, Russians living in these countries habitually employ the psychological mechanism of self-protection that developed under the totalitarian regime — the socio-psychological restrictionism, at which the Russians excelled so much in the 20th century [26]. At the same time, the Ukraine events forced the Baltics' authorities to pay greater attention to the Russophone population. In the last eight years, the political role of the Russian diaspora in the Baltics has markedly increased [27].

The criteria of identity

Today, the difference in identifying oneself with Latvia, Lithuania or Estonia is noticeable not so much between age groups as between those born in the country of residence and those born elsewhere. At the same time, even the latter consider the respective Baltic State their native home where they have worked, created a family, retired or, in other words, lived their whole life. Although for most Russians born in the Baltics, their countries of residence are their motherlands, they identify themselves with Russia (consider themselves Russians by ethnic origin). The Russian-born Baltic residents of the older generation have a strong local identity: they use the demonyms *Rigan, Klaipedian and Narvian* much more frequently than members of the respective titular nations do.

The middle generation tends to see themselves as Latvian, Lithuanian, or Estonian Russians because their parents are Russian; they are proud of Russian culture, but their social ties with the country are weak, and they have no intention to relocate there.

Although all generations identify themselves with Russia to an extent, the younger one feels a stronger connection to Russian culture than the country in its geographical aspect. The older generation is attached to not contemporary Russia but the Soviet Union. However, even amongst the younger people, many acknowledge the influence of the USSR and its largely Russian culture [28; 29].

Two communities within one society create two information spaces: part of the population receives information in the titular language and others in Russian.

These spaces rarely overlap. The mutual isolation of the titular and Russian-speaking communities gradually decreases as generations change, the younger diaspora members being more receptive to multiculturalism.

The new generation of Russians, the descendants of the 'last-minute migrants' of the 1970s—1980s, lead an active social life in the Baltics. Many of them have never seen their historic homeland. Stockholm or Frankfurt am Main are much closer to them than Moscow or Nizhny Novgorod. They strive to establish themselves socially and economically, not politically. Having obtained Lithuania, Latvian or Estonian citizenship, they do not hurry to the ballot box, which naturally annoys the party leaders seeking more cordial relations with Russia.

Young Russian speakers in the Baltics differ from their Russian peers in their business-like, practical and diligent attitude. As a rule, they speak both the language of the titular nation and English. From the very beginning, they could not rely on anybody's help and had to struggle for survival. Many have acquired expertise in commerce, banking, financial transactions, and information technology and established business contacts in the West.

Still, they are less politically active compared with their peers in the titular nations, having less free time and being more occupied at work. It is easier for them to enter a European or American university; they are more successful in internships abroad. They have little interest in the problem of identity, with their worldview defined by regional as much as national consciousness (for them, the concept of *Baltic Russians* is similar to notions such as *Uralians*, *Kubanians*, *and Siberians*). The Baltics' younger Russian speakers can be defined as having ambivalent ethnic psychology characterised by a lack of uncritical immersion in one's culture and a tendency to distance oneself from a different culture, which denies basic national values. The combination of European business experience with the breadth and universality of the Russian ethnicity largely contributes to the creative potential of the diaspora.

A qualitatively different inter-ethnic relationship is emerging between the younger generations of the Baltics' two largest communities: a dialogue between sovereign consciousnesses is being established. Young businesspeople from the titular ethnic groups, who will soon replace the current politicians, are shaping their social behaviour according to the laws of market rationality. Committed to their national positions, they are less concerned about preserving the Latvian or Estonian languages, which are experiencing increasing pressure from English. They have a greater proclivity for interethnic cooperation. At the same time, the Russophone diaspora supports the trend toward abandoning traditional identities as the global-regional dialectics develop.

Conclusion

Amongst territories bordering Russia, the Baltic region occupies a special place: it is where Russia neighbours the EU. The Union is a major actor (along with the US and China) in creating the new world-system configuration — an actor closest to Russia in historical and civilisational terms. In this geostrategic region, the Russian-speaking diaspora has considerable potential in terms of Russia-EU interactions. This potential is rooted in the unique features of the diaspora: historical (the ‘Russian Baltic area’ is over 300 years old); demographic (no other diaspora comprises such a substantial proportion of the population); economic (a strong position in the Baltics’ economies); settlement-related (close-knit communities in selected areas contribute to identity preservation); geographical (proximity to Russia); administrative (strong representation in public and municipal authorities); geopolitical (preferred settlement in the capitals, large industrial centres and port cities); infrastructural (a vast network of cultural, educational, information and denominational institutions); linguistic (a significant part of the titular nation speaks Russian, and younger members of the diaspora speak the titular languages).

All this determines autonomy, stability, significance and prospects of the only area in the EU with a strong Russian presence. The Ukraine events have even further increased the role of the Russian diaspora in the Baltics.

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Scientific journal

BALTIC REGION

2022
Vol. 14
№ 2

Editors: *E. Boyarskaya, Yu. Farafonova,*
Yu. Shevchenko, A. Brushinkina
Original layout: *E. Denisenko*

Signed 13.05.2022
Page format 70 × 108 1/16. Reference printed sheets 14
Edition 300 copies (first print: 20 copies). Order 47.
Free price

I. Kant Baltic Federal University Press
Gaidar str., 6, Kaliningrad, 236001