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DEMOGRAPHY

CURRENT SCENARIOS FOR THE DEMOGRAPHIC FUTURE OF THE WORLD: THE CASES OF RUSSIA AND GERMANY

V. A. Iontsev[1]
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In this article, we explore the demographic future of the world with a focus on scenarios for Russia and Germany. We seek an alternative to the Western standards of scenarios for global demographic development. We consider demographic development both in a positive and negative sense. Our analysis rests on such theoretical structures as the general theory of population, the classical theory of demographic transition, the concepts of the 'second', 'third', and 'fourth' demographic transitions, and scenarios for the 'Eurasian demographic development path'. We employ a range of methods from comparative demography as well as historical analogies, expert evaluations and demographic forecasts. We analyse the patterns of current demographic development in Russia and Germany to explore various demographic scenarios.

In the conclusion, we stress the need for Russia and other countries, including Germany, to embark on the 'Eurasian demographic development path' in view of the countries' geographical positions and demographic values, with children being a dominant one. Otherwise, both Germany and Russia may disappear as national states as early as this century. The findings of this study can be used to improve the demographic policies of Russia and Germany.

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Introduction

We would like to begin with a quote from T. Sarazzin's book *Germany is Abolishing Itself*: 'A cynic might argue: they [migrants] can do all the lowly jobs — for instance, the bearing and rearing of children — that Germans are reluctant to take… The childless or child-poor German middle and upper classes live comfortably in their suburbs and decorate old buildings. They have not even registered the fact, but the land is changing beyond all recognition due to demographic developments and Germany is threatening to abandon itself, to put it mildly. When they do notice it, it could be too late. As G. Hegel poetically and darkly wrote, "The Owl of Minerva first takes flight with twilight closing in".'[1] At the end of the article, we will propose a scenario that will deter the great state of Germany and the equally great state of Russia from 'abolishing themselves'. This is up to the politicians and people living in these countries, the fates of which have become so closely intertwined in the history of civilisations.

We must make several important remarks regarding the concepts of 'demographic development', the 'Eurasian path of demographic development', and 'demographic crisis'.

Demographic development is usually associated with a continuous ascent. However, 'demographic development' is a more complex phenomenon that comprises both positive and negative determinants [2, pp. 78—79]. Moreover, the world population has been shaped by these determinants throughout its history. At different stages, these determining factors have different weights. We believe that today's demographic development of the countries of the West, some Asian states, and Russia, is dominated by negative determinants that amount to a demographic crisis.

The demographic crisis started in 1963 in the US [3]. Later, at the turn of the 1970s, it spread across Western Europe. The crisis manifests itself not only in quantitative negative changes, primarily in the marriage and birth rates (which corresponds to the second demographic transition

[1] Ein Zyniker könnte argumentieren: Die können dann auch all die anderen niedrigen Arbeiten verrichten, die viele Deutsche — wie die Zeugung und Aufzucht von Kindern — nicht gerne selber erledigen… Die deutsche Mittel- und Oberschicht lebt dagegen kinderlos oder kinderarm und komfortabel in ihren Vorstadtvillen und schmucken Altbauwohnungen. Sie registriert nicht einmal, dass sich das Land infolge der demografischen Entwicklung bis zur Unkenntlichkeit verändert, dass es sich selbst aufzugeben droht — um das Mindeste zu sagen. Wenn sie es merkt, könnte es zu spät sein. Wie sagt Hegel so poetisch und so dunkel: „Die Eule der Minerva beginnt erst mit der einbrechenden Dämmerung ihren Flug". (Sarrazin T. 2010. *Deutschland schafft sich ab: Wie wir unser Land aufs Spiel setzen*. Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, p. 361).

concept formulated by Ron Lesthaeghe [5] and Dirk van de Kaa [4]), there are both negative structural (sex and age) and qualitative (demographic behaviour, reproductive health and spirituality) changes in the population. The demographic crisis in today's Europe was described in detail in a recent article by the famous Hungarian-American demographer Paul Demeny. However, he did not address the third component of the phenomenon, which we believe to be the most important [6, pp. 111—114] — the negative qualitative changes in the demographic development both in Russia and in many developed countries of the world.

We are convinced that the demographic crisis can be overcome, at least in Russia, through treading the Eurasian path of demographic development — a combination of different models. One of them is that of fourth demographic transition, which we will consider in detail below, alongside the idea of Eurasianism.

Statistical data and methods of research

This study employs the official data on socio-demographic measures from Russia's Federal Service for State Statistics (Rosstat). These are the results of 2002 and 2010 national censuses, the Statistical Yearbook of Russia, Rosstat's statistical reports 'Natural Population Change in the Russian Federation' and 'Population Number and Migration in the Russian Federation', the Russian Demographic Data Sheet 2016, and a number of other Russian sources published over the past 20 years. The statistics for Germany are taken from the data of the Federal Statistical Office of Germany, the US Central Intelligence Agency, the World Population Prospects, and the Human Mortality Database.

In using these data and employing the method of comparative demography (a range of demographic measures and rates), we corroborated the conclusions made in the course of empirical observations and the analysis thereof. The examination of the total fertility rate demonstrates that Russia and Germany have relatively similar fertility rates (see Tables 1 and 2). However, if we consider the development prospects, the process of ageing, and the territorial factors, Russia might seem to be faced with a more complicated situation.

As to the mortality rate, cross-country comparisons largely use such an indicator as life expectancy at birth (LEB). Our forecast, based on an analysis of the current trends and life tables and the extrapolation method, shows that, by 2050, LEB in Germany will reach 90.6 years for both sexes (90 years in males, and 91.6 years in females), whereas LEB in Russia will be 75.7 years for both sexes (69.9 years in males and 80.7 years in females). The forecasted gap once again stresses the need for Russia to adopt a nation-saving lifestyle, which is the essence of the Eurasian path of demographic development.

Table 1

The total fertility rate in 2017 in selected countries

Developed countries	Baltic region	Eurasia	Developing countries
France — 2.07	Sweden — 1.88	Tajikistan — 2.63	Turkey — 2.01
UK — 1.88	Norway — 1.85	Kirgizia — 2.61	Nicaragua — 1.89
US — 1.87	Finland — 1.75	Kazakhstan — 2.25	Vietnam — 1.81
Netherlands — 1.78	Denmark — 1.73	Uzbekistan — 1.76	Chile — 1.80
Belgium — 1.78	Estonia — 1.60	Armenia — 1.64	Iran — 1.87
Australia — 1.77	Lithuania — 1.59	Russia* — 1.61	Brazil — 1.75
Canada — 1.60	Latvia — 1.51	(1.62)	Thailand — 1.52
Switzerland — 1.56	Germany — 1.45	China — 1.60	
Italy — 1.44	(1.60)	Belarus — 1.48	
South Korea — 1.44	Poland — 1.35		

* Russia is also a Baltic region state.

The data of national statistical services are given in brackets.

Prepared based on The World Factbook by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). 2018.

Cross-country migration analyses usually employ such an indicator as net migration per 1,000 population. As Table 2 shows, Germany has been outperforming Russia in terms of net migration over the past 12 years. Immigration is both Germany's advantage and a phenomenon harbouring a threat of the native population being replaced by immigrants (*cf.* 'third demographic transition' concept). As to Russia, the forecast prepared by the Russian researchers D. Ediev and S. Shulgin and colleagues[2] predicts that, by 2035, the projected population number will reach 141.1 million people at zero migration or 146.5 million people with migration taken into account. Thus, at the moment, there is little hope of 270,000—300,000 immigrants per year coming to the country (see Table 2).

Table 2

The main demographic measures of Russia and Germany, million people

	1995		2005		2015	
	Russia	Germany	Russia	Germany	Russia	Germany
Total number of births	1.363	0.765	1.457	0.686	1.940	0.738
Total number of deaths	2.203	0.885	2.303	0.830	2.030	0.925

[2] See the Russian Demographic Data Sheet 2016. Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration (RANEPA), the Federal State Statistics Service (Rosstat), and International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA): Moscow, Russia and Laxenburg, Austria, 2016.

End of Table 2

	1995		2005		2015	
	Russia	Germany	Russia	Germany	Russia	Germany
Natural increase/decline	−0.840	−0.120	−0.846	−0.144	−0.090	−0.188
TFR*	1.34	1.25	1.29	1.34	1.77	1.50
LE*	64.5	76.4	65.4	78.9	71.3	81.1
Total size of the resident population, as of the beginning of the year	147.938	81.538	143.801	82.501	146.267	81.198
Number of females	78.5	41.893	77.1	42.148	78.5	41.362
Number of males	69.5	39.645	66.7	40.353	67.8	39.836
Age groups (years)**:						
0—19	34.03** (23.0%)	17.53 (21.5%)	34.32 (23.9%)	16.75 (20.3%)	31.22 (21.3%)	14.78 (18.2%)
20—59	84.03** (56.8%)	47.13 (57.8%)	84.46 (58.7%)	45.21 (54.8%)	85.98 (58.8%)	44.17 (54.4%)
60 and over	29.88** (20.2%)	16.88 (20.7%)	25.02 (17.4%)	20.54 (24.9%)	29.07 (19.9%)	22.25 (27.4%)
Net migration	0.503	0.398	0.282	0.790	0.228	1.139

* TFR is the total fertility rate (the average number of birth per a woman of childbearing age). LEB is life expectancy at birth (years).

** Age groups for Russia in 1995: 0—15 years, males aged 16—59 years and females aged 16—54 years, males aged 60 years and over and females aged 55 years and over.

Prepared based on data from Russia's Federal Service for State Statistics (Rosstat). URL: http://www gks.ru and from the Federal Statistical Office of Germany. URL.: https://www.destatis.de

Demographic development theories and concepts behind different demographic scenarios

The general theory of the classical demographic transition has not only gained wide currency but it is also being imposed by the Western countries upon the international community. However, the question arises whether the other states have to copy slavishly the Western model of demographic development. The central thesis of this theory holds that all the countries without exception have to go through the four stages of demographic transition. This was emphasised as early as the 1970s by the famous Australian demographer John Caldwell. In his analysis of the demographic transition in developing countries, he emphasised the 'Westernization' of fertility [7]. He also stressed that, in theory, the de-

mographic transition was not a universal process. The pervasiveness of the transition, which is involving a growing number of developing countries, is a result of their mindless imitation of social relations, worldview, and lifestyle stemming from the West, primarily the US and Western Europe. Moreover, such 'borrowings' are possible only as part of the industrial transformation of society [7]. Some countries that have not completed the fourth stage of the classical demographic transition (for example, Poland, Latvia, Estonia, etc.) are trying to skip to the fifth stage of the 'Western model' (the second demographic transition). The latter means the dead-end road to demographic extinction, which is looming for countries with small populations.

The process of 'imposing' negative Western demographic standards on less developed countries has gained momentum in the recent 30 years, as the global information space is being drawn into the World Wide Web.

Among these standards, the emergence of the so-called nuclear family raises the greatest concern. The reproductive goals of such a family are changing dramatically to the worse. 'One family — one child' has become the dominant model. In a short-time perspective, it may turn into a childless family, i. e. one that rejects the idea of bearing children. According to the director of the Berlin Institute for Population and Development, Reiner Klingholz, childless families accounted for 15 % of all German families in 2012 [8, p. 8]. This proportion is similar in other developed countries. To a degree, this situation is brought about by the childfree movement, which — having appeared in the US in 1993 and planted in the rich European soil of sexual revolution — rapidly spread across Western Europe. Unfortunately, in 2006, this movement appeared in Russia too. In effect, this and similar movements advocate a conscious rejection of childbirth or 'personal freedoms without children'. If one takes into account a steep increase in the number of quasi-families — egalitarian families, cohabitation unions, and same-sex families (same-sex marriages have already been legalised in 16 European countries and throughout the United States), one start questioning the demographic future of these countries. Why should all these 'charms' — which, if nothing changes, will inevitably lead to 'the Death of the West' [1; 3; 9] — be imposed upon the whole world? Probably, this is done to expedite the absurd idea of the 'world domination' without damaging the environment and natural resources. Why should one spend trillions of dollars on armaments, when one can simply change the minds of new generations so that they start killing themselves demographically? However, this does not mean that Germany and most European countries will be part of this 'world dominion'. Probably, the above explains the negative demographic changes observed across Europe since the 1960s-1970s. One of the first affected states was Germany, where the natural decline in the native population (i. e. the mortality rate exceeding the birth rate took place) was first observed in 1971. The trend continues and is expected to accelerate (see Table 2).

The slow but sure homicide has already begun. It is aggravated by the Internet, which — alongside other forms of the information technology — has become a tool in the information war waged by a small group of developed countries, primarily, the US and the UK, on less developed states [10; 11]. The Russian philosopher A. A. Zinoviev, who had spent many years in Germany, was among the first to consider the consequences of this war. In particular, he wrote, 'the bomb of Westernisation, which exploded in Russia, caused unprecedented devastation not only in the spheres of statehood, economy, ideology, and culture but also in the *very human material of society* (our italics). At such a scale and in such a short time, it had never been done by any conqueror or by any weapon. Designed by its inventors to defeat communism, the 'bomb of Westernisation' turned out to be a much more powerful weapon — it destroyed the centuries-old robust union of people' [12, pp. 11—12]. This thesis is open to debate. However, the possible highly negative influence of information technology on human minds has become a reality. This reality is especially pronounced when it comes to demographic behaviour. Moreover, the changes are occurring at the genetic level, which was stressed by V. I. Danilov-Danilyan, who wrote about 'genetically distorted decay-bringing individuals' that pose 'a threat to the humanity as dangerous as the degradation and demise of the environment' [13, pp. 474—475].

The consequences of the 'Westernisation' of fertility are felt not only in developing but also developed countries (see Table 1). Especially conspicuous is the decrease in the fertility below the replacement level (2.15 children per a woman of fertile age) in Italy and Poland, where the traditions are becoming blurred and the Western lifestyle is being imposed upon the population. All this has virtually resulted in a demographic crisis.

The famous demographer David Coleman believes that the increase in fertility to 2.0 observed in some countries of the West, for example, France, may herald the Western demographic renaissance [14, pp. 107—115]. Nevertheless, such a renaissance seems questionable if today's negative qualitative changes in the Western population continue. Swedish kindergartens instil into children, who start associating their sex with certain somatic and behavioural characteristics as early as age 3—4, the perception of themselves as sexless creatures. Sexlessness is being increasingly imposed upon people. In particular, this is achieved by the 'mindless' and broad use of the concept of 'gender' as the 'social sex'. The term 'economic sex'[3] was coined by some Russian gender scholars. It is very

[3] See, for instance, Kalabikhina I. E. *Ekonomiko-demograficheskoe razvitie Rossii: gendernyi aspekt. Doktorskaya dissertatsiya na soiskanie uchenoy stepeni doktora ekonomicheskikh nauk [The Economico-Demographic Development of Russia: The Gender Aspect: A Postdoctoral Thesis]*. Moscow, 2010, pp. 36—36. Is not it symbolic that, in this work, the word 'gender' is every now and then autocorrected to 'tender'?

difficult to imagine a more dangerous anti-demographic notion. In 2017, Germany officially recognised a 'third sex'. Against this background, it is not surprising that the number of same-sex marriages and quasi-families, which are *a priori* unable to contribute to population replacement, is increasing. Adoption by such marital unions can end in a tragedy for the adopted children.

Although fertility is increasing in the West, none of the Western countries has achieved the replacement level (2.15). A special role in this process is played by numerous immigrants, most of whom naturalise. Among immigrants, the fertility rate is much higher than among the native population. For instance, the fertility rate among the Turkish population exceeds that of the German native population three or fourfold. Probably, it is not a coincidence that, as the Turkish community in Germany has grown (the number of Turks naturalised as Germans exceeded 3 million people). The total fertility rate increased from 1.34 in 2005 to 1.5 in 2017. Thus, the process of the native population being replaced by immigrants — Coleman described the phenomenon as early as 2006 in his concept of the'third demographic transition' [15, p. 402—407] — continued and even accelerated.

The concept of the 'third demographic transition' offers a demographic scenario for the developed countries. It suggests that if the current trends continue, the native population may be completely replaced by immigrants. The countries will remain, although they will change their identity and culture. To prevent it, Coleman suggests banning or limiting the new waves of migration from developing countries. To what degree is this possible in today's globalising world? We believe that since the world has been set in a continuous migration motion (for more detail, see [16]), which is crucial for future development, migrations cannot be stopped by any 'iron curtain'. With all the reservations, this scenario can be perceived as a warning of to what the underestimation of the demographic factor in the development of the world, its regions, and its countries may lead.

Unfortunately, the 'Western charms' are spreading across Russia — from the Far East to the Kaliningrad region. It is important to understand that Russia has unique demographic features. Firstly, the country has a vast territory of over 17 million sq km, which cannot be cultivated without 'extra hands'. This holds true for not only the northern regions and Siberia but also the central part of the country, where hundreds of thousands of sq km of non-black-earth lands have been virtually depopulated. Secondly, Russia has completely exhausted its domestic demographic potential. There is not a single region in the country that can contribute to the population of desolate territories, as was the case in the imperial and Soviet periods. All this lends urgency to the problem of Russia's demographic future.

Choosing the Eurasian path of demographic development

All the above gives rise to the questions as to what path of demographic development should a country choose and whether this should be the Western path or an original one taking into account a country's location, traditions, demographic and cultural values, religious beliefs, historical experience, and many other factors. As of today, the second path has been chosen by very few states. These are, for example, China and North Korea. These considerations lend urgency to the problem of the Eurasian demographic development (Eurasian demographic transition) of Russia and the neighbouring countries. Although these countries trod the Western path of demographic development (the second demographic transition), they are advocating the idea of Eurasianism. Remarkably, the President of Russia Vladimir V. Putin proposed the creation of a big Eurasian partnership in his speech at the Saint Petersburg International Economic Forum held on June 16—18, 2016 [17]. It was not the first time President Putin had addressed the idea of Eurasianism. In April 2012, he stressed that 'Eurasianism is a tradition in our political thought. It established itself in Russia a long time ago and, today; it is being given a new dimension' [18].

This idea did not simply establish itself in Russia as early as the 1920s. Russia is a unique country. Its location, or *mestorazvitie*[4], as Lev Gumilev put it [19, p. 10], in **Eu**rope before the Ural Mountains and in **Asia** behind them — and its mentality (the double-headed eagle) make it a truly Eurasian state, the Core of the Eurasian space. Russia's geographical location between the West and the East translates into its Core position. The causes of the revival of Eurasianism were considered by Prof. M. L. Titarenko. Not long before his death in February, 2016, he wrote, 'we are interested in the essence of new Eurasianism, which was the focus of post-Soviet ideo-political discussions and a key element in the search for a national idea that would ensure Russia's cohesion and prosperity amid the aggressive cultural and civilizational expansion of the West. This expansion resulted in the considerable blurring of the cultural and civilizational self-identity, apoliticisation, the spiritual depression of the Russian people and the other ethnicities of the Russian Federation, the germinating ideas of local separatism and regional isolationism, and the emergence and aggravation of ethnic tensions' [20, p. 2]. As mentioned above, all this had an extremely negative effect on the demographic behaviour of the Russian population. None of its numerous nationalities and peoples was spared and the country found itself pushed towards the path of second demographic transition.

[4] The term is usually translated as 'developmental space' or 'topogenesis'.

Although opposing the idea of the Western path of demographic development, in particular, that of the second demographic development, we do not reject it completely. The countries of Western Europe were the first to achieve a notable demographic success. Having strengthened the institution of family and having secured a relatively high fertility rate, these states managed to dramatically reduce the mortality rate. All this translated into the100 years of the so-called European demographic explosion, which began in the 1830s. It was accompanied by a decrease in infant and maternal mortality, an increase in life expectancy, and the improvement of physical health. However, contrary to common sense, these and other demographic achievements underwent dramatic negative changes at the turn of the 1970s to cater for the interests of large capital and the consumer society. These trends constituted the concept of the second demographic transitions, which is being imposed upon the world. The central element of the concept is the transition to a nuclear family that either has one child or is childless. However, when developing this concept, van de Kaa emphasised that it applied only to the developed European countries. Thus, he forgot in some mysterious way about the US — the absolute champion in imposing mass culture and the quasi-family models (this imposition was especially pronounced under Presidents Clinton and Obama).

The Eurasian demographic transition, on the contrary, suggests following the best national traditions of the 'multiplication and preservation' of the population, (M. V. Lomonosov wrote on the issue in the context of Russia as early as the 18th century) [21], while adopting the best European achievements. This is the essence of the 'phenomenon of Eurasianism', which, as Titarenko stressed, 'embraces elements that are characteristic of not only the cultures of the peoples of Eurasia. Eurasianism postulates equality and horizontal relations between different cultures, whereas Eurocentrism postulates vertical relations, thus recognising one culture as superior and the others as inferior. The stratagem of Eurocentrism considers the assimilation of other cultures and the extinction of unique small cultures as a normal and inevitable phenomenon. It demands that original systems of cultural values be replaced with some 'universal' ones, which, in effect, are nothing else but the values of Western mass culture' [22, p. 4].

To gain a better understanding of these values, one may address the book of the eminent US politician Patrick Buchanan *The Death of the West* (2001). He wrote, 'Public homosexuality, pornography, abortion, trash talks on TV and in movies, and filthy lyrics in popular music have all been around since before they [new generation] can remember… It is the traditional culture they find odd'. The following 17 years aggravated the situation, having added a dozen new 'non-traditional generations'.

The muddy waters of the marketed mass culture flooded many a country and the Internet is ready to bury the whole world beneath them. Unfortunately, this flood did not bypass Russia and many other states. Undoubtedly, this had a negative effect on the demographic development of the affected countries.

Despite a slight increase in the birth rate and a reduction in the mortality rate observed in 2010—2015, Russia is drowning ever deeper in the demographic crisis brought about, primarily, by negative changes in the Russian youth, which has grown susceptible to marketed mass culture and demographic surrogates. The latter is facilitated by not only the Internet but also mass media and, especially, 'our own' television. As S. P. Kapitsa stressed in his article 'Russia is Being Turned into a Land of Fools', television is engaged in 'corrupting the consciousness of people', which is, in essence, a criminal act. Over the eight years, the situation has not improved in the least. 'What a disappointment! The fool is being cherished, the fool is being nurtured, the fool is being nourished, and there is no end in sight…' [22, p. 126]. Thus, one may assume that, if the number of 'fools' or 'decay-bringing individuals' continues to increase, soon it will be too late to speak of the demographic renaissance in Russia. Any renaissance would be impossible with such a population. The same has been stressed by Sarrazin in the case of Germany and by Buchanan in the case of the US. The goal of the healthy part of our society and the leadership of the country and its regions is to prevent this situation. To this end, one must at least acknowledge the harmfulness of the current demographic development, which, in part, is the result of the raging information war.

Our efforts to develop the concept of the 'Eurasian demographic transition' [23, pp. 463—464], which can embrace different models of demographic development, are aimed against the above-described 'universality' of the Western demographic transition and the spread of mass-culture demographic values across the world. In the case of Russia, the Eurasian model rests on the concept of the fourth demographic transition [8, pp. 15—21; 1, pp. 80—84], which incorporates the basic Eurasian demographic values (a major one being healthy children) and principles (a harmonious coexistence of cultures). From the perspective of demographic development, the mentioned principle is crucial.

The concept of the fourth demographic transition, proposed by V. A. Iontsev in 2010 as an alternative to Coleman's scenario, considers migration as an entirely positive phenomenon, which can have negative consequences only if its essence is misinterpreted and the relevant national policy is flawed. A positive phenomenon, migration can have a beneficial effect on the future demographic development, if the national interests are taken into account and marriages between the native population and immi-

grants are encouraged. Children born from such marriages will create the core of the 'new population' that will have better reproductive attitudes and qualitative characteristics meeting the 21st-century national needs.

Note that the number of such marriages is constantly increasing in many countries, including Russia and Germany. According to the Federal Statistical Office of Germany, transnational marriages accounted for 11 % of all marital unions. Russia has witnessed an increase in the number of transnational marriages since 1959. The 1989 census recorded 12.8 million such marriages (17.5 %). In today's Russia, this trend is continuing.

It is important to understand when speaking of quantitative and qualitative changes in the population — the more so when the negative ones are considered — that the two types of changes are interrelated. 'Sick' parents usually give birth to even 'sicker' children, whose future children will probably be unable to produce a new generation. Many of these 'grandchildren' may not be even able to reach the reproductive age (for instance, drug-addicted infants). Therefore, one generation later, negative qualitative changes may have a negative effect on fertility, mortality, and other demographic processes. Unfortunately, this is already happening in Russia and Germany.

Conclusions

Both qualitative and quantitative measures presented in Table 2 significantly aggravate the demographic situation that has developed over the past 35 years. Common to Russia and Germany is that, in the past decades, they have experienced depopulation as a result of low fertility, which rapidly leads to an increase in the proportion of the senior population and, thus, to problems associated with demographic ageing. In Russia, the elderly account for almost 20 % whereas the population of Germany is ageing at an even greater rate (the proportion of senior citizens is above 27 %). In Russia and Germany, depopulation has reached an extreme level, which is manifested in the natural population decline. In Russia, this process started in 1992. The 20-year population loss (1992—2012) reached 13.5 million people. In Germany, where the natural population decline was observed as early as 1971—1972, the population loss of 1980—2012 reached 3.42 million people. However, the level of losses is decreasing. It amounted to 90,000 in 2015 against 846,000 in 2005. Unfortunately, this trend, which is expected to accelerate in Germany, is not observed in Russia (see Table 2). In recent years, Russia's working-age population (aged 15—59) has declined at a rate of 1 million people per year. Actually, Germany's working-age population is also declining. Since 2016, the least numerous generation of females born in the 1990s

has been reaching childbearing age. This exerts an additional negative effect on fertility and aggravates the already grim demographic situation in the country. Moreover, there is an urgent need for a special attention to the quality and rearing of children.

Having assumed office on May 7, 2018, President Putin signed the decree 'On the National Targets and Strategic Goals of the Development of the Russian Federation until 2024'. As one of the goals, the document mentions an increase in **healthy** life expectancy up to 67 years in 2024. This testifies to the fact that the improvement of qualitative characteristics of the population has finally attracted attention [24].

Thus, Germany and, even to a greater degree, Russia are faced with the choice of a demographic development path. This also holds true for the neighbouring countries. We believe that the best option for these states is the Eurasian demographic transition, which takes into account a country's geographical position, traditions, culture, mentality, and demographic values, a major one being 'healthy and intelligent children'. For Germany, a leading destination for migrants, — such a scenario may also prove helpful. If the country continues to develop within the framework of the second demographic transition, until the end of the century, Germany may cease to exist as a German state. A similar fate may await Russia and many other Baltic Sea states — especially, in view of their small populations and negative net migration — if they do not abandon the negative Western trend of demographic development.

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GEODEMOGRAPHY OF THE SAINT PETERSBURG SUBURBS

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In this article, we analyse the structure and the development dynamics of the Saint Petersburg suburbs — home to over 1.6 million people. To this end, we employ statistical, historical, and empirical research methods and carry out a comparative analysis. Geodemographic studies should take into account not only demographic data but also the characteristics of the settlement system. Such studies are particularly important for suburbs. Russian social geography pays little attention to suburban studies, although such territories have become an independent object of research in international geographical science. The Saint Petersburg suburbs are of special interest from the perspective of geodemography, which is explained by the significant size of the area — a result of the territory's historical development. The formation of the settlement system of the Saint Petersburg suburbs started with the foundation of the city, and continues to this day. Today, their spatial structure is shaped by the current administrative border between Saint Petersburg and the Leningrad region — a product of the territory's development in the Soviet period of Russia's history. The lengthy process of border formation has given it a peculiar character. The most vibrant and attractive areas of the suburbs are located at a distance of 14—32 km from the centre of Saint Petersburg, between the isochrones of forty- and ninety-minute transport accessibility. Lying at a distance of approximately 60 km from the city centre, the two-hour travel time band marks the border of both the commuter zone and the Saint Petersburg agglomeration. A new settlement system is emerging within the suburban area of Saint Petersburg — the most economically, demographically, and socially vibrant territory of Russia's North-West.

Keywords*:* geodemography, suburban area, borders, population, natural population movement, migratory movement, distance, isochrones

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Introduction

Geodemographic research has been on the rise in recent years in Russia. According to G. Fedorov, "geodemography is a research area developing at the junction of several social sciences… It allows for a complex study of regional demographic features in their connection to both internal (demographic), and external (economic, distributive, social, ethnic, ecological, political) factors" [1, p. 7]. This definition seems to be the most suitable foundation for geodemographic research, but for one point — the settlement distribution is so closely bound to demographics that it can hardly be considered an external factor. Moreover, studying of both demographic and distributive factors together allows to classify a research project as a geodemographic one, i. e. geographical in its core.

As E. Faybusovich and S. Kornekova put it, "It would be very desirable that geodemography, absorbing the ideas of demography, would develop as a geographical science: the same way as economic geography absorbs the ideas of economic sciences, or social geography — of social sciences and so on" [2, p. 34]. T. Borodina, rarely ever using the concept 'geodemography', notes, "The analysis of the distribution of the population and its territorial shifts traditionally serves as one of the integral subjects of the late Soviet and Russian social and economic geography, within which the natural resources potential of territories, their economic systems and resettlement are investigated interdependently" [3, p. 47].

The very definition of geodemography showcases essential differences between Russian and Anglo-Saxon research traditions. Within the latter, geodemography is considered to be a purely applied rather than theoretical line of research, used to identify various preferences of particular groups of the population. In their article "Past, Present and Future of Geodemographic Research in the United States and Great Britain", A Singleton and S. Speelman state that "Geodemographic models can be considered idiographic, providing descriptive characterization of multiple geographical areas; with their operationalization based on the principle that socio-spatial structure is highly correlated with behaviors, attitudes, and preferences. In this way, geodemographic classifications are "theory-free,"" [4, p. 563].

In recent years, much attention has been paid to studying spatial aspects of St.-Petersburg and the Leningrad region. Some of the latest geographical papers on the topic include, for example, I. Reznikkov's "Identification of borders of the Saint Petersburg city agglomeration" [5] or A. Hodachek's "On the Saint Petersburg agglomeration from the city-planning perspective" [6]. Some of these papers have even been published internationally (see, for example, [7]). Much is also written on the geography of the Moscow agglomeration, and can be a useful reference

for studying Saint Petersburg (see, for example, [8; 9]). Finally, there is a lot of literature with geodemographic (in the Anglo-Saxon sense) research into city agglomerations of Britain or the US (see, for example, the study of Greater London geodemography in [10]).

Yet an "agglomeration" is not the same as a "suburban area". For the purposes of this article, “suburban area” of Saint Petersburg incorporates those territories of the Leningrad region that used to be subordinate to the Leningrad city council, as well as those areas of the region directly adjacent to the city of Saint Petersburg.

Soviet public geography never paid much attention to purely suburban issues. Neither does the public geography of the post-Soviet Russia, which keeps the tradition of viewing suburbs as little more than an "annex" to the main city of agglomeration. In the Western geography, however, and especially in the American one, suburban areas became a separate object of economical and geographical research several decades ago. One example of such approach is the book "Suburban Gridlock", first published in 1986 and running several editions up until 2017 [11]. The book’s author, R. Cervero, says the following on the role of the suburbs: "Suburbia has come to represent an important slice of Americana over the post-WWII era, a place where families can maintain a rural-like lifestyle while residing close enough to big cities to enjoy the same occupational choices as urban dwellers. The image of the suburbs as predominantly bedroom communities is forevermore being redrawn by the steady influx of offices and businesses, and the urban kinds of problems they bring along” [11, P. XXI—XXII]. While the history of Russian, and in particular, Saint Petersburg, "suburbia" is significantly different from that of the US, many of our modern suburban problems are very similar to the North American ones.

Border of the Saint-Petersburg and the Leningrad region

Administrative borders of the modern St.-Petersburg and the Leningrad region have been developing for several decades, and are — for the most part — artificial in nature. They would often be literally drawn right along the street, one side of which was deemed “Saint Petersburg”, and another — “the Leningrad Region”. To answer the question on how the borders of Saint Petersburg and the Leningrad Region, along which suburbs have subsequently sprawled, were created, one should look at the system of the administrative-territorial division (ATD) of the Soviet period. In the USSR, there was no rhyme, reason or public discussion on where the administrative borders should be drawn. Since no logical explanation can be offered as to *why* the ATD is shaped the way it is today, it is only possible to trace *how* particular borders came to be formed.

In the end of the 1920s, during the reform of administrative-territorial division of the better known as the "division into districts", the Leningrad Region is formed from the city of Leningrad, and the Leningrad, Pskov, Novgorod, Cherepovets and Murmansk provinces. Officially, this happened on August 1, 1927. On this basis, the Leningrad suburban district is formed in 1930s, surrounding the city of Leningrad in its then borders. In 1931, the city of Leningrad becomes a separate administrative entity within the territory of the Leningrad region, while the town of Kronstadt is placed under authority of the Leningrad city council. In 1936, the Leningrad suburban area is abolished, and a part of its territory including Peterhof, Detskoe Selo (Pushkin) and Kolpino is also placed under the Leningrad city council, remaining at the same time in structure of the Leningrad region. Another part of the Leningrad suburban area remains both in structure and under the administration of the Leningrad region. Krasnoselsky, Slutsk (Pavlovsk), Pargolovsk and Vsevolozhsk districts are formed. In 1948 Sestroretsk and a small part of the former (until 1940) Finnish territory with the main town of Terioki (Zelenogorsk) is placed under the Leningrad city council. In 1950 the town of Uritsk (Ligovo) is included in the boundaries of the city of Leningrad.

In 1953 the Pavlovsk district of the Leningrad region is abolished, its territories divided between the city of Leningrad (northern part of the territory with the town of Pavlovsk itself) and the Leningrad region (Tosnensky and Gatchina areas). In 1954 Pargolovsky district shares the fate of Pavlovsk, with its southern part — including the settlements of Pargolovo, Levashovo, Osinovaya Roscha — now belonging to Vyborg (Leningrad) and Sestroretsk (one of the territories subordinate to Leningrad) areas, and its northern part merging with the Vsevolozhsk district of the Leningrad region. One result of these changes was that the Vsevolozhsk district now consisted of two very different parts divided by the Rzhev artillery ground. In 1955, 1960 and 1963 some the Vsevolozhsk district territories join Leningrad, and the border of the city is moved further East. In 1973, Krasnoye Selo also becomes a part of the Leningrad city. In 1976, the town of Lomonosov, while remaining the administrative centre of the Leningrad region, submits to the Leningrad city council.[1]

These historic shifts in administration and territorial division have produced the intricate border between St.-Petersburg and the Leningrad region that we know today. On the northern coast of the Gulf of Finland, the most distant point of the Saint Petersburg urban area lies approximately 70 km from the downtown (the settlement of Smolyachkovo of Kurortny district), on the southern coast — approximately 50 km (Bronka, the western suburb of Lomonosov), in the north — about 25 km (Osi-

[1] Administrative-territorial division of the Leningrad region. Reference book. Source: http://msu.lenobl.ru/Files/file/2_-_soderzhanie.pdf (accessed 21.04.2018).

novaya Roscha of Vyborgsky district of Saint Petersburg), in the south — approximately 30 km (near the settlement Lesnoye belonging to Pushkin district of Saint Petersburg), in the east — approximately 10 km.

When the Constitution of the Russian Federation was signed in 1993, the federal city of Saint Petersburg and the Leningrad region both received the status of "territorial subjects of the federation", with borders between them subsequently fixed in the regional laws: namely, in the Saint Petersburg law of 31.12.1996 No. 186—59 "On the administrative-territorial division of Saint Petersburg ", and its replacement regulation "On the territorial division of Saint Petersburg ", which came into effect on June 30, 2005 and is still in effect[2]. In the Leningrad region, the law no. 9-OZ "On the administrative-territorial division of the Leningrad region" was first introduced on 17.04.1996 and reintroduced (under the same number code) on 26.05.2017.[3]

These laws abolished "territories of the Leningrad region subordinate to the Saint Petersburg city council" as a type by securing their status as parts of the city (Kronstadt and Kurortnny districts, part of Primorsky and Vyborgsky districts, Kolpino, Pushkin, Petrodvorets districts). Still, these nonexistent “city council subordinates” are to this day mentioned in literature, as, for example, in the article "On the periphery the areas of mass housing estate border on a ring of regional territories in the city council subordination" [12, p. 43]. By the time the article quoted above appeared — 2010 — "suburban territories of city council subordination" had not existed for fourteen years already. And even when they were still there, there was hardly ever any “ring” to speak of, since these territories never extended to the east, where the city directly bordered the Leningrad region.

Smaller shifts of borders between Saint Petersburg and the Leningrad region, including those that require changes in places of registration of their inhabitants (St.-Petersburg to the Leningrad region and vice versa), are a common occurrence. So, in 2004 the territory of the tank regiment located between Pesochnoye (Kurortny district of Saint Petersburg) and Sertolovo (Vsevolozhsk district of the Leningrad region) was reassigned from Kurortny district of Saint Petersburg to the Leningrad region. Accordingly, about 1,5 thousand people "moved" between territorial subjects of the federation without leaving their houses. Similar thing happened with a military unit located along Ryabovskoye highway on the border of the Vsevolozhsk district of the Leningrad region, where 500 residents ended up being “relocated” in this way.[4]

[2] The law of St. Petersburg "On the territorial division of St. Petersburg. Source: http://gov.spb.ru/law?d&nd=8414528 (accessed 21.04. 2018).

[3] Law on the administrative-territorial division of the Leningrad Region. Source: http://docs.cntd.ru/document/891832035 (accessed 21.04.2018).

[4] The new border between St. Petersburg and the Leningrad region calls into question the legitimacy of the St. Petersburg deputies. Source: https://regnum.ru/news/226072.html (checked on 21.04.2018).

In 2010 the border between the Lomonosov district of the Leningrad region and the Krasnoselsky district of Saint Petersburg, where a new residential district, Novo-Gorelovo, was built, was changed to extend the limits of the city. The city council, who had approved of the construction of a new housing estate, learned that the territory on which the estate was being built belonged to the Leningrad region only after the works had begun. Both the territory and several thousand people residing within its limits were subsequently made a part of Saint Petersburg. [5]

The village Khvoinyu with the population more than 5 thousand people, a part of Saint Petersburg located to the south from its main territory and surrounded from all sides by the Gatchina district of the Leningrad region is another headache for local authorities [13]. While delineating the borders between the city and the region in the 1990s, those eager to draw a clear line between the two subjects of the new federation simply forgot to account for this small settlement.

Saint Petersburg and the Leningrad region: two sides of one suburban area

Data on change of the population of the main towns in the modern suburban area of Saint Petersburg, irrespective of their administrative status as part of either the city or the region, is provided in Table 1. The names of the towns are given in an order of their geographical arrangement around Saint Petersburg, clockwise.

It should be noted that the legal status of the towns and settlements, which are a part of Saint Petersburg is not quite clear. Officially, there is only one town or city on this territory, Saint Petersburg. Yet the existence of other towns within its borders is still recognized by, for example, the Head department of the migration service of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation (or Federal Migration Service), which registers population at their place of residence by specifying their towns or settlements within Saint Petersburg. For example, a registration may read, "Saint Petersburg, the town of Peterhof". If a settlement is a part of another town within the city, which is sometimes the case, then the official registration turns into a tiered structure, for instance: “Saint Petersburg, [town of] Pargolovo, [settlement] Osinovaya Roscha”. Without such detalization, it may not be possible to understand what street a per-

[5] The resolution of Legislative assembly of the Leningrad Region of December 8, 2010 "On the enactment of the Padding agreement to the Agreement "On specification of border between St. Petersburg and the Leningrad region as territorial subjects of the Russian Federation". Source: http://lenobl.kodeks.ru/lenobl?d&nd=891843911&prevDoc=891843911&spack=110listid%3D010000000100%26listpos%3D175%26lsz%3D5089%26nd%3D9000002%26nh%3D0%26start%3D160%26 (accessed 21.04.2018).

son lives in, since many streets bear standard names, repeated from settlement to settlement (Lenina, Sovietskaya, Lesnaya, Parkovays, Sportivnaya, Shkolnaya etc.).

Table 1

Population of the cities of the residential suburb of Saint Petersburg in the end of the 19th — the beginning of the 21st century*

City	Population, thousand people			
	1897	1959	1989	2018
Sestroretsk	10	25	35	41
Sertolovo	—	—	18	53
Vsevolozhsk	—	—	32	73
Shlisselburg	5	7	13	15
Kirovsk	—	11	24	27
Otradnoye	—	6	24	25
Kolpino	9	35	141	146
Nikolskoye	—	—	17	23
Tosno	—	15	32	38
Kommunar	—	5	18	22
Pushkin	22	46	98	110
Gatchina	15	37	79	94
Krasnoye Selo	3	16	No data**	57
Peterhof	11	38	81	98***
Lomonosov	5	28	42	43
Kronstadt	60	40	45	44

Notes: * towns in the Table are listed by their present names; ** in a census of 1989 the town Krasnoye Selo which is a part of Krasnoselsky district of Leningrad — Saint Petersburg, was not considered separately; *** population of Peterhof in 1959, 1989 and 2018 is given together with the settlement Strelna, without it population of Peterhof for 2018 is 83 thousand people.

Compiled by the authors based on: [6, 7, 8, 9, 10].

[6] First General population census of the Russian Empire of 1897. Actual population in provinces, counties, the cities of the Russian Empire (without Finland). Source: http://www.demoscope.ru/weekly/ssp/rus_gub_97.php (accessed 21.04.2018).

[7] All-Union population census of 1959. Urban population of RSFSR, its territorial units, city settlements and urban areas on a floor. Source: http://www.demoscope.ru/weekly/ssp/rus59_reg2.php (accessed 21.04.2018).

[8] All-Union population census of 1989. Urban population of RSFSR, its territorial units, city settlements and urban areas on a floor. Source: http://www.demoscope.ru/weekly/ssp/rus89_reg2.php (accessed 21.04.2018).

[9] Population of St. Petersburg as of January 1st, 2018. Source: http://petrostat.gks.ru/wps/wcm/connect/rosstat_ts/petrostat/resources/4e67d90040bd4afc874f87a3e1dde74c/СПб+числ+на+01.01.2018+по+МО.pdf (accessed 21.04.2018).

[10] Assessment of population of the Leningrad Region for January 1st, 2018. Source: http://petrostat.gks.ru/wps/wcm/connect/rosstat_ts/petrostat/resources/8478a90040bd4d06876d87a3e1dde74c/ЛО_Числ+на+01.01.2018.pdf (accessed 21.04.2018).

One may note that there is no data on the settlements of the suburban area for the interbellum period. This is explained by the fact that the Leningrad suburbs suffered a massive destruction during the Great Patriotic War, especially those occupied by the German troops — the towns of Peterhof, Krasnoye Selo, Gatchina, Pushkin, and Pavlovsk. According to Yu. Stupin, urban population of the Leningrad region for January 1st, 1945 was 27,4% to the pre-war number [14, page 65]. In other words, after 1945 the history of these settlements begins from scratch, since there at that point there is very little connection to the way they used to exist before 1941 [15]. Data on the population in 1897 is mainly given to provide with a starting point in understanding the features of spatial transformations of the settlements within the Leningrad region and Saint Petersburg suburban areas in the 20th century.

In the end of the 19th — beginning of the 20th century practically all suburban towns and other settlements of the territory were located to the south from Saint Petersburg and mostly along the main tracks, thus keeping to the pattern established from the 18th century onwards. The only new town that appeared there in the interbellum period is Kirovsk (Nevdubstroy), which started as a settlement near the construction of the district power plant and took on administrative functions from the nearby Shlisselburg township, located further up the Neva river. During the post-war decades, the system of urban settlement around Leningrad began to gradually change — mainly by incorporating previously rural territories to the north and east of the city.

The "filling of the space" that begins with the renewal of mass housing construction at the beginning of the 21st century, links suburban towns with each other as well as with the city of Saint Petersburg, thus giving a new start to the polarizing turn in the Saint Petersburg system of resettlement postponed in the 1990s. T. Nefedova and A. Treyvish [16; 17] proposed to analyze regional systems of resettlement of Russia from the theory of a differential urbanization already at the beginning of the 21st century.

To estimate the volume and value of this "filling of space" and the geodemographic component of this polarized reversion, one needs to analyze the changes in population along the Leningrad (Saint Petersburg) and the Leningrad region border from 1979 to 2017. 1979 is chosen as a starting point because it is by this time the administrative-territorial division system of the Leningrad region takes its present-day shape.

Table 2 shows data on those districts of Leningrad (Saint Petersburg) that up to the mid-1990s had been registered as “the territories of the Leningrad region subordinate to the Leningrad city council”. Districts of Leningrad (Saint Petersburg) city proper, even those immediately adjacent to the Leningrad region border, are not shown Table 2. As for the

Leningrad region, all areas bordering Leningrad (Saint Petersburg) are accounted for except for the Vyborgsky district, since its main area lies outside the Saint Petersburg suburbs. So, the following territories are listed as Saint Petersburg suburbs: suburbian parts of the Primorsky (earlier Zhdanov) and Vyborgsky (St.-Petersburg) districts, Kolpino, Pushkin, Pavlovsk (1995—2005), Petrodvorets and Lomonosov (Saint Petersburg, 1995—2003) districts, as well as Kronstadt and Kurortny (Sestroretsk). Vsevolozhsk, Kirovski, Tosnensky, Gatchina, Lomonosov (Leningrad region) districts are listed as suburbs of the Leningrad region.

Table 2

Population of the suburbs of Leningrad (Saint Petersburg) and the Leningrad region in 1979—2017

Year	Leningrad (Saint Petersburg)		Leningrad region		Total	
	Thousand people	%[11]	Thousand people	%[12]	Thousand people.	%[13]
1979	514	11,2	591	38,9	1105	18,1
1989	563	11,2	661	39,8	1224	18,3
2002	543	11,5	728	43,6	1264	20,0
2012	592	12,0	803	48,1	1395	20,1
2018	733	13,7	877	50,0	1610	22,5

Compiled by the authors based on: [14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20].

The decade between two last Soviet (1979 and 1989) saw a gradual, evolutionary development of the Leningrad suburbs, irrespective of whether the territory belonged to the city or to the region. Suburban population grew at rates comparable to those typical for both Leningrad and the surrounding region.

[11] Share to the total population of Leningrad — the Saint Petersburg;
[12] Share to the total population of the Leningrad region;
[13] Share to the total population of Leningrad — the Saint Petersburg and the Leningrad region.
[14] All-Union population census of 1979.
[15] All-Union population census of 1989.
[16] All-Russian population census of 2002.
[17] Population of municipal units of St. Petersburg for January 1st, 2012.
[18] Population of municipal units and the Sosnovoborsk city district of the Leningrad region for January 1st, 2012.
[19] Population of St. Petersburg as of January 1st, 2018.
[20] Assessment of population of the Leningrad region for January 1st, 2018.

One of distinctive features of the suburbs subordinate to either the city or the region has long been a high proportion of "private sector" housing. Going back to the 1950s—1960s, where a growing housing problem within the city limits led to the allocation of land plots to be used for the construction of single-storied, detached suburban houses. As a result, there are now concentrated clusters of private one-family homes that once housed staff of nearby enterprises — for example, the Skorokhod settlement within the town of Peterhof. Suburban apartment blocks were another popular solution for those companies who wished to improve the living conditions of their workers, and entire housing estates would be constructed on the order of the companies and with their own resources at the least favorable locations. So, the settlement Pesochny in Sestroretsk (Kurortny) became home to the workers of the Russian Diesel factory.

In the 1990s the population of suburban territories of the Leningrad region grew at a faster rate than in the suburbs of Saint Petersburg, where the number of people declined with the drop in the population of the city. In the Leningrad region, on the other hand, the 90s were the time of active development of residential housing in the areas along the city limits. This can be seen in the case of the Vsevolozhsk district, where the construction of new residential quarters adjoining Devyatkino metro station (the only station of the Saint Petersburg subway located on the territory of the Leningrad Region) began. The first years of the 21st century saw a rapid population growth in the suburban areas of both the city and the region.

For Saint Petersburg, the growth in the number and share of the suburban population demonstrates that, in the urban settlement system, both concentration and polarization are declining. Table 3 allows to compare data on the population of the central and suburban districts of the Leningrad (Saint Petersburg) city in 1959—2017. For the purposes of this paper, "central" districts are those where the most of the Leningrad (Saint Petersburg) city population resided in the 20th century. From 1959 to 1989 central districts were Leninsky, Oktyabrsky, Kuibyshevsky, Smolninsky, Dzerzhinsky, Vasileostrovsky (in 1959 — together with Sverdlovsky) and Petrogradsky districts; for 2002, 2012 and 2017 — Admiralteisky (including Leninsky and Oktyabrsky areas), Tsentralny (Kuibyshev, Smolninsky and Dzerzhinsky areas), Vasileostrovsky and Petrogradsky districts.

On January 1st, 2018, there were more people living in the suburbs of Saint Petersburg than in the central districts. In 2014 it was said that in Russia suburbanization did not lead to the deconcentration of the population [18, p. 65], yet the data provided in Table 3 shows that in Saint Petersburg the population deconcentration has been an ongoing process for several decades now.

Table 3

The number and share of the population central and the suburban districts of the Leningrad (Saint Petersburg) city in 1979—2017

Year	Suburban districts		Central districts	
	Thousand people	% [21]	Thousand people	%
1959	357	11,6	1 513	52,2
1979	514	11,2	951	20,7
1989	563	11,2	850	16,9
2002	543	11,5	759	16,3
2012	592	12,0	716	14,5
2018	733	13,7	730	13,6

Compiled by the authors on the basis of: [22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29].

That the suburbs would grow, and their growth would reflect in the growing population, is neither new or unusual, but a logical consequence of the main trends of urban development — when a city grows in layers, with alternating industrial and residential "belts". The development of the Leningrad suburbs from1960s to 1980s was also a manifestation of deconcentration, as well as of surbanization: new suburban districts developed at the site of old suburban settlements, which until 1950s were located outside the city limits. So, the present-day large Shuvalovo-Ozerki district now occupies the site of two settlements — Pargolovo 1 and Pargolovo 2. The vast bedroom community of Kupchino grew between the Moscow and Vitebsk railroads between 1960s and 1990s and kept the name of one of the villages that had previously existed in this area. Had the borders of Leningrad (Saint Petersburg) remained unchanged over the 20th century— as was the case with Paris or New York, for example, — several dozen independent towns would have grown beyond Obvodny Canal to the south and the Bolshaya Nevka river to the north.

Saint Petersburg and the Leningrad region are very often "bundled" together in the most different contexts, including that of geodemographic research (see, for example [19]). In reality, these regions differ in the most possible respects, including several key geodemographic trends.

[21] from the total number of the population of Leningrad — St.-Petersburg.
[22] All-Union population census of 1959.
[23] All-Union population census of 1979.
[24] All-Union population census of 1989.
[25] All-Russian population census of 2002.
[26] Population of municipal units of St. Petersburg for January 1st, 2012.
[27] Population of municipal units and the Sosnovoborsk city district of the Leningrad Region for January 1st, 2012.
[28] Population of municipal units of St. Petersburg as of January 1st, 2018.
[29] Population of municipal units of St. Petersburg as of January 1st, 2018.

For the Leningrad region, population growth in the Saint Petersburg suburbs means further concentration and, consequently, further deepening of the chronic demographic divide between the region's periphery and the city's suburbs. Starting with 2003, the region's population grew through migration, which compensated for the decline in natural reproduction. With each passing year, suburban areas of the Leningrad region show better population dynamics, while the population at the periphery of the region has been dropping since 2012 due to the decline in migration hindered by the low attractiveness of the territory (see Table 4). By 2016, the only district with the growing population outside the suburban areas of the Leningrad region was the Sosnovoborsky town district (around the one-company town of Sosnovy Bor, the company being the Leningrad Nuclear Power Plant).

Table 4

Population dynamics in the suburban municipal districts of the Leningrad region in 2011—2016, people

Municipal districts	2011			2013			2016		
	NI	MI	CI	NI	MI	CI	NI	MI	CI
Leningrad region, total	–10481	25807	15326	–9813	22602	12789	–8600	21659	13059
Suburban MD, total	–4205	17487	13282	–3882	19201	15319	–3024	22010	18986
Vsevolozhsk	–981	6389	5408	–853	12008	11155	–355	19329	18974
Gatchina	–1293	5309	4016	–1352	4144	2792	–1124	767	–357
Kirovsky	–682	1905	1223	–572	194	–378	–472	961	489
Lomonosovsky	–421	168	–253	–412	462	50	–374	595	221
Tosnensky	–828	3716	2888	–693	2393	1700	–699	358	–341
Peripheral MD, total	–3929	5600	1671	–3620	1460	–2160	–3478	51	–3427

NI — natural increase, MI — migration increase, — combined increase, MD — municipal districts.

Compiled by the authors based on: [30].

According to A. Makhrova and P. Kirillov, post-Soviet Russia developed its own urbanization model, for which the housing sphere became both an important indicator and a development factor [20]. One must keep in mind, however, that it often happens that housing projects follow people, not the other way round. Indeed, as V. Grishanov et al. put it, "It is a paradox, but there you are: migrants are attracted by life in large cities and agglomerations, where accommodation is the most expensive. Yet there are more jobs, and thus more opportunities for people with various qualifications to thrive". They continue, "it once again confirms that the

[30] Database of indexes of municipal units of the Leningrad Region. Source: http://www.gks.ru/dbscripts/munst/munst41/DBInet.cgi (accessed 21.04.2018).

leading attraction for migrants is not the availability of housing *per se*, but it is still an important factor in restricting successful migrations" [21, pages 92 and 95].

Growing residential capacity of the suburban area became the reason the differences in migration trends between the suburban territory of the Leningrad region and its periphery, diversified migration flows and changed its balances (see Table 5).

Table 5

Migration increase in the suburban municipal districts of the Leningrad region in 2011—2016, people

Municipal district	Migration increase	2011	2013	2016
Vsevolozhsky	Total, including:	6389	12008	19329
	within Russia, including	5286	9210	17729
	intraregional	– 151	526	1245
	interregional	5437	8684	16484
	international	1103	2798	1600
	External (for the region) migration	6540	11482	18084
Gatchinsky	Total, including:	5309	4144	767
	within Russia, including	4328	2915	530
	intraregional	150	204	– 98
	interregional	4178	2711	628
	international	981	1229	237
	External (for the region) migration	5159	3940	865
Kirovsky	Total, including:	1905	194	961
	within Russia, including	1354	716	614
	intraregional	– 16	– 91	39
	interregional	1370	807	575
	international	551	– 522	347
	External (for the region) migration	1921	285	922
Lomonosovsky	Total, including:	168	462	595
	within Russia, including	6	56	483
	intraregional	– 58	– 108	– 34
	interregional	64	164	517
	international	162	406	112
	External (for the region) migration	226	570	629
Tosnensky	Total, including:	3716	2393	358
	within Russia, including	3308	1321	163
	intraregional	349	114	– 59
	interregional	2959	1207	222
	international	408	1072	195
	External (for the region) migration	3367	2279	417

Compiled by the authors based on: [31].

[31] Database of indexes of municipal units of the Leningrad Region.

Municipal districts of Vsevolozhsk and Lomonosov, leaders in housing construction, find themselves under increasing pressure, since the incoming migration had more than tripled from 2011 to 2016. Some settlements broke all records of an increase in migration balance: Anninskoye had a 69-fold increase in migration, and Murinskoye a 13-fold increase.

Increasing the flows of migrants into residential suburbs would rejuvenate the population and become an important regional factor for the improvement of natural reproduction indices. However, this result is still to be achieved at the municipal level — as can be seen from the dynamics of both mortality and birth rates. By 2016 only the areas close to the Saint Petersburg city limits showed natural increase of the population, which was achieved by the low mortality rate. Apart from the Vsevolozhsk settlement, the level of birth-rate in the same area is still below the regional average (see Table 6).

Table 6

Birth-rate, mortality, and natural increase coefficients of the suburban municipal districts of the Leningrad region in 2011—2016, for 1000 people

Municipal district	Coefficient	2011	2013	2016
Leningrad Region	CBC	8.6	8.8	9.2
	CCM	14.7	14.4	14.0
	CCNI	−6.1	−5.6	−4.8
Vsevolozhsk	CBC	7.7	8.5	9.6
	CCM	11.4	11.6	10.7
	CCNI	−3.7	−3.1	−1.1
Gatchinsky	CBC	8.5	8.4	8.9
	CCM	14.0	13.9	13.5
	CCNI	−5.5	−5.5	−4.6
Kirovsky	CBC	8.0	8.4	9.1
	CCM	14.7	13.8	13.6
	CCNI	−6.7	−5.4	−4.5
Lomonosovsky	CBC	7.0	7.6	7.7
	CCM	13.0	13.5	13.0
	CCNI	−6.0	−5.9	−5.3
Tosnensky	CBC	8.2	8.4	8.0
	CCM	14.9	13.7	13.4
	CCNI	−6.7	−5.3	−5.4

CBC — common birth-rate coefficient, CCM — common coefficient of mortality, CCNI — common coefficient of natural increase.

Compiled by the authors on the basis of: [32, 33].

[32] Database of indexes of municipal units of the Leningrad region.

[33] Regions of Russia. Socio-economic indicators — 2014. The total fertility, mortality, infant mortality and natural population growth rates Source: http://www.gks.ru/bgd/regl/B14_14p/IssWWW.exe/Stg/d01/02-08-1.htm (accessed 11.04.2018).

Unfortunately, it would make no sense to try and compile similar data for the city of Saint Petersburg and its subordinate suburban settlements due to the peculiarities of birth registration system. The federal law of 15.11.1997 No. 143-FZ "On the civil status acts " dictates that "the state filing of birth is made by a body of civil registration in the birthplace of a child or in the place of residence of her parents" (par. 1)[34]. So, for every child born in Saint Petersburg, the city will be listed as their birthplace without any indication as to the specific municipality or settlement within the city limits. Furthermore, while accounts of births are made at local registry offices, birth certificates are issued either by either the local authority at the parents' official area of residence or the local authority closest to the actual place of birth (most often — a maternity home). The choice is entirely up to the parents, whose actual residential address, one should note, will often differ from their official address. To top all that, children of visitors from other regions or even countries who happened to be born in Saint Petersburg are often registered there — for the "Northern Capital" appeal. Thus, any data on the natural movement of the population through the municipalities and settlements constituting the city of Saint Petersburg has to be treated with a healthy dose of skepticism.

Difficulties also arise when one tries to trace natural population movement in the towns and rural settlements of the Leningrad region that belong to the residential suburbs. For example, the common birth-rate coefficient of the Sertolovo and Vsevolozhsk settlements (both in the Vsevolozhsk district), while very similar in rates and type of population change in the post-Soviet time, but of change of population in Post-Soviet time, suddenly shows a 2.7 difference for 2016 (Sertolovo— 6,5‰, Vsevolozhsk — 17,7‰). The explanation is simple: the only maternity home for the Vsevolozhsk district is located in the town of Vsevolozhsk, so the babies born there are listed Vsevolozhsk residents. From Sertolovo, on the other hand, it is easier to reach the maternity homes of Saint Petersburg than go to Vsevolozhsk, so many parents homes register their newborns at their actual birthplace — the city of Saint Petersburg.

Residential suburbs as symbiosis of Saint Petersburg and the Leningrad region

At the same time, both sides of the Leningrad region — Saint Petersburg border experience the development of similar territorial communities (in A. Tkachenko's terms [22]), or territorial social systems, as understood by A. Druzhining. His definition of the territorial social systems reads that those are "a combination of territorial and social (economic, cultural, political) programs, relations, institutes, symbols "working" (and showing itself) in a variety of spheres — economy, demography, social environment and others " [23, p. 43].

[34] The Federal Law "On the Civil Status Acts" of 15.11.1997 N 143-FZ (latest version). Source: http://www.consultant.ru/document/cons_doc_LAW_16758 (accessed 21.04.2018).

To support this claim, in Table 7 we have gathered data on the population growth for the municipalities within the Saint Petersburg city and the rural/urban settlements of the Leningrad region located within the suburban area. Municipalities, or municipal units, are the building blocks of Saint Petersburg administrative-territorial division, while rural/urban settlements serve the same function for the Leningrad region administrative-territorial division. Data on the population of municipal units within the "suburban" parts of Saint Petersburg includes the southern part of Krasnoselsky district, and all data on the rural/urban settlements of the Leningrad region adjoining city borders includes the Vyborgsky district of the Leningrad region. Additionally, data on the distance from a municipal unit or a rural/urban settlement. Municipal units of Saint Petersburg and settlements of the Leningrad region are listed clockwise. As there are fewer settlements in the Leningrad region adjoining the Saint Petersburg city borders than there are municipal units within the city, table columns will not always match.

Table 7

Population of the suburban municipal units of Saint Petersburg and rural/urban settlements of the Leningrad region

Districts and municipal units of St. Petersburg				Districts and rural/urban settlements of the Leningrad region			
Name	Population, thousand people		D[35]	Name	Population, thousand people		D
	2012	2018			2012	2018	
Kurortny district				*Vyborgsky district*			
Village Smolyachkovo	0,5	0,8	70	Polyanskoye	15,7	15,4	87
Settlement Molodezhnoye	1,6	1,7	66	Pervomaiskoye	8,7	9,5	67
Settlement of Serovo	0,3	0,3	65	Roshchinskoye	20,4	20,8	66
Settlement of Ushkovo	0,6	0,7	60	*Vsevolozhsk district*			
Town of Zelenogorsk	15,1	15,3	50	Sertolovo	48,9	53,0	27
Settlement of Komarovo	1,2	1,3	48	Yukkovskoye	3,4	4,2	20
Settlement of Repino	2,5	2,8	45	Bugrovskoye	9,1	13,4	17
Settlement Solnechnoye	1,4	1,6	41	Murinskoye	8,3	30,8	18
City of Sestroretsk	37,8	41,1	36	Novodevyatkinskoye*	11,4	18,4	20
Settlement of Beloostrov	2,1	2,2	34	Vsevolozhsk	60,6	73,1	30
Pesochnoye settlement	8,3	9,0	27	Zanevskoye	7,5	29,6	15
Primorsky district				Sverdlovskoye	10,6	12,1	29
Settlement Lisyi Nos	4,8	4,9	25	*Kirovsky district*			
Lahta-Olgino	4,0	4,4	21	Otradnoye	24,5	25,4	36
Vyborgsky district				*Tosnensky district*			
Settlement of Levashovo	3,7	4,9	24	Nikolskoye*	20,4	23,1	45
Settlement of Pargolovo	15,9	59,2	20	Krasnoborskoye	5,2	5,2	39
Kolpino district				Telmanovskoye	12,5	14,5	37
Metallostroy	26,6	29,2	22	Fyodorovskoye	3,7	4,2	37
Ust-Izhora	1,5	1,8	22	*Gatchina district*			
Petro-Slavyanka	1,1	1,3	23	Susaninskoye	7,8	8,4	66
Pontonny	8,3	9,0	26	Kommunarskoye	20,7	22,1	38
Sapyorny	1,4	1,6	29	Pudomyagskoye	6,0	6,4	47
Town of Kolpino	140,4	145,7	31	Verevskoye	6,6	7,2	41

[35] Distance to the centre of Saint Petersburg, km.

End of Table 7

Districts and municipal units of St. Petersburg				Districts and rural/urban settlements of the Leningrad region			
Name	Population, thousand people		D[36]	Name	Population, thousand people		D
	2012	2018			2012	2018	
Pushkin district				*Lomonosovsky district*			
Settlement of Shushary	23,3	77,1	16	Villozskoye	6,6	7,8	43
Settlement of Aleksandrovskaya	2,7	2,7	25	Lagolovskoye	3,8	3,6	36
Town of Pushkin	95,2	109,9	26	Anninskoye	7,7	9,4	27
Settlement of Tyarlevo	2,0	1,4	28	Gorbunkovskoye	9,9	9,0	30
Town of Pavlovsk	16,4	17,7	33	Nizinskoye	4,0	4,3	35
Krasnoselsky district				Penikovskoye	2,5	2,9	60
Gorelovo	23,3	29,7	26				
Town of Krasnoye Selo	45,0	56,8	28				
Petrodvorets district							
Settlement of Strelna	12,6	14,8	25				
Peterhof	74,1	82,9	30				
Town of Lomonosov	43,1	43,2	40				
Kronstadt district							
Town of Kronstadt	43,7	44,4	51				

Note: * — short distance from the Saint Petersburg border, but does not border Saint Petersburg immediately

Compiled by the authors based on: [37, 38, 39, 40].

One should keep in mind that the data given above reflect the number of the population registered in the municipal units of Saint Petersburg and urban/rural settlements of the Leningrad region for those people whose residential address matches their actual address. In reality, the numbers can be similar to those provided in the Table, or could swing either up or down. Given the current system of statistical indicators, it is impossible to collect actual data on the movement of people across municipal units.

From what we can see, the population in the suburban area of Saint Petersburg mainly increases in the settlements located at a distance of 14—16 to 30—32 km from the centre of the city, irrespective of whether they are listed as municipalities within the city proper or within the Leningrad region. In some settlements lying within this interval, one can see quite a few jumps in the number of people. For instance, to the north from the city in the town of Pargolovo (Vyborgsky district of Saint Petersburg), located at approximately 20 km from the centre of Saint Petersburg, the population almost quadrupled, having grown from 16 to 60 thousand peo-

[36] Distance to the centre of Saint Petersburg, km.

[37] Population of municipal units and the Sosnovoborsk city district of the Leningrad Region for January 1st, 2012.

[38] Population of St. Petersburg as of January 1st, 2018.

[39] Population of municipal units of St. Petersburg as of January 1st, 2018.

[40] Assessment of population of the Leningrad region for January 1st, 2018.

ple within six years (2012—2018). In the settlement Shushary, 16 km to the south from Saint Petersburg around the town of Pushkin, the population also grew by almost four times, from 23 up to 77 thousand people. In the Murinsky urban settlement (Vsevolozhsk district of the Leningrad region) located 18 km from the centre of St. Petersburg, the population also jumped from 8.3 thousand people to 30.8 thousand people. A similar increase happened in the urban settlement of Zanevsky (15 km from the centre of Saint Petersburg), where the number went from 7.5 thousand to 29.6 thousand people.

This belt (14—15 km to 30—32 km) is shared by the larger urban settlements (Sertolovo, Vsevolozhsk, Pushkin, Peterhof, etc.) that also experience rapid population growth. Note that the distances of up to 32 km, while large for the suburban area, are calculated by approximating the distance from the centre of Saint Petersburg to the centre of a respective administrative-territorial unit, and the sizes of the administrative-territorial units in question are not accounted for. The settlement of Pargolovo, for example, with its 60 thousand population in 2018, stretches 7 km along the Vyborg highway.

Beyond 30—32 km from the centre, Saint Petersburg 's influence on the population size of the area starts to weaken, disappearing completely at the 50 km mark. One may conclude that the suburban area where demographic processes are defined by its proximity to Saint Petersburg does not stretch beyond the 32 km range from the centre of the city. Settlements located further than that form their local systems of settlements that are influenced by the proximity to Saint Petersburg but not shaped by it, which is reflected, for example, in a somewhat sluggish population growth rates.

In Zelenogorsk (50 km from Saint Petersburg), Kronstadt (51 km), Lomonosov (40 km) the population practically did not change from 2012 to 2018. At distances over 60 km from the Saint Petersburg city centre, its influence on demographic processes is not visible at all. Sixty kilometers from the centre of Saint Petersburg correspond to an isochrone of two-hour commute to the centre, which usually defines an agglomeration border. Typically, this isochrone lies approximately 120 to 130 km from the respective centre, calculated from the average traveling speed of a vehicle on a highway. But this calculation does not account for traffic jams and stopovers for those who commute by car, or waiting periods or transition times for those who travel by public transport.

That a 60-km-drive from the Saint Petersburg suburbs to the city centre takes approximately two hours is an empirical observation. Moreover, when approaching the centre time is reduced at a slower rate than distance does: it takes about 1.5 hours to drive the first 30 km, and about an hour to cover the consecutive 20 km, irrespective of direction. At distances shorter than 20 km dependence on the direction is can be observed, with minimum commute time of about 40 minutes for settlements

of a residential suburb in the vicinity of the Devyatkino metro station mentioned above. Borrowing the term from the Polish geographer, P. Shleshinsky [24], we are talking about “ideal isochrones”, but the real ones are not too far behind. Thus, from the "temporal" viewpoint, the most geodemographically active part of the suburban area lies between an isochrone of forty-minute and one-and-a-half-hour commute from the centre of Saint Petersburg.

Deconcentration of the settlement pattern in Leningrad (Saint Petersburg) really began in the 1960s, when the metro took over as the main public transport.

In the 1970s, with the construction of new residential areas, deconcentration trends began to be visible, with each new area eventually blooming into a semiautonomous city. During the “industrial” period of Leningrad history, the internal unity of the city was supported by the continuous commute of people from their bedroom communities to their workplaces. In the 1990s, with the crash of most industrial enterprises, the majority of new jobs were created in the historical centre of the city, and the commuter traffic between the suburbs and the city centre only amplified.

The first years of the 21st century suburban areas have become the most economically dynamic part of Saint Petersburg, and experienced their own "post-industrialization". The majority of new jobs are now created here, a considerable proportion the population of suburban areas no longer needs the long commute. At the same time, external borders of the suburban zone move further out swallowing more territories as they shift.

Now the unity of the city rests on the pillars of higher education (the majority of higher education institutions are located in the central districts) and culture (museums, theaters, etc.), yet for the majority of the suburban population, their local social infrastructure suffices. Furthermore, abundance of the undeveloped areas in the residential suburbs allows to look into building their own academic community. In fact, both Saint Petersburg State University and the ITMO University have recently announced their plans to build campuses in the new satellite town with the working name Yuzhny whose construction is to take place between Pushkin and Gatchina [25; 26].

Conclusions

The recent decades are seeing active transformation of the spatial structure of society along the borders between of Saint Petersburg and the Leningrad region. Geodemographic processes are especially interesting here, as there, for the first time in contemporary Russia, we observe the processes of decentralization of system of resettlement, whereby the previously developed territories belonging to two different federal subjects constitute a new, shared, spatial network. The territorial system of resettlement, in which the residential suburb is its most dynamic part, is formed — perhaps, a first in Russia.

These processes can be framed within the concept of "communication environment" [27] developed by one of the authors, that allows not only to describe the formation and the current spatial structure of a society, but to predict its future developments.

As far as practical solutions connected with the development of this suburban area are concerned, they could involve a change in the administrative status of suburban territories with the need to amend the current legislation of the Russian Federation. It is obvious that such changes are required to organize a comprehensive system of interaction between the suburban territories which fall into different jurisdictions of the territorial subjects of the federation. Here it is possible to use the approaches to the formation of "metropolitan municipal areas" as offered by A. Tkachenko and A. Fomkina based on the reference metropolitan statistical areas of the USA [28] and on the international experience of management of city agglomerations development, the detailed analysis of which from geographical positions is given in an article by A. Batchayev, B. Zhikharevich and N. Lebedeva published in 2012 [29].

A. Makhrova writes about the current state of the Moscow agglomeration, "its combination of features characteristic of different stages of development leaves open a question of its current stage. It is not clear whether Moscow undergoes a re-urbanization stage, having endured a stage of suburbanization and counterurbanization in the form of seasonal country migration, or experiences its unique model of development caused by historical heritage and modern specifics" [30, p, 16]. In other words, transformation of the system of resettlement in the Moscow area is so chaotic that it is difficult to either describe or explain it in unambiguous terms.

Saint Petersburg falls behind the capital in its urbanization processes but this lag can be used to orchestrate a systemic spatial development of its suburban area considering that this zone will be one of the most active ones in the Russian Northwest from the point of view of demographic, social, and economic growth for years to come.

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POPULATION CHANGE IN THE NEIGHBOURING REGIONS OF RUSSIA AND THE EUROPEAN UNION COUNTRIES

T. Yu. Kuznetsova[1]

In this article, I carry out a comparative analysis of population change in the bordering regions of Russia and the European Union. Peripheries of their countries, most of these regions enjoy a more or less favourable demographic situation, which, however, differs from place to place. To attain the aims of the study, I analyse official data from Russian and EU statistical offices and map the results obtained. I identify significant differences between border regions and cities. The most adverse demographic situation is observed in the borderlands of the Baltics, a slightly better one in Poland and Finland. As to Russia's border regions, a population increase is characteristic of Saint Petersburg and the Leningrad and Kaliningrad regions. Yet, a number of cities in the immediate vicinity of the border face a population decline. The demographic situation could be improved by more active transboundary collaborations and by the border serving increasingly as a contact area rather than a barrier.

***Keywords**:* demographic situation, border regions, border cities, Russia, Baltics, Poland, Finland

Introduction

The end of the 20th century became a watershed that dramatically changed the course of economic and demographic development of the former socialist countries of Eastern Europe. This also holds true for regions that became borderlands after the demise of the Soviet Union. These regions had two options — either to turn into periphery or into territories, the development of which is boosted by transboundary cooperation. Neighbours

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of Eastern European states, having traditional market economy, witnessed the improvement of the economic and geographical position of former socialist countries, as frontiers turned into a contact area rather than a barrier. The westernmost territories of Eastern European countries and their Western neighbours became more involved in transboundary economic cooperation. The accession to the EU of some former socialist countries and ex-USSR republics gave their residents an opportunity to migrate to more developed EU countries in search of a better-paid job and higher living standards. These countries too faced an influx of migrants from less economically developed 'third world' states, although they were not affected as much as their richer western neighbours were.

Russia borders on five EU member states. All Russia's borderlands with the EU lie within the Baltic macroregion. Recently, Russian researchers have paid special attention to demographic problems. Typological distinctions between regions have been identified and analysed [1].

A comparative analysis of the demographic situation in Russia and its regions, on the one hand, and in the neighbouring countries and their regions, on the other, is still a rare find. However, the Baltic Sea region, which includes Russia's North-West, is a popular object of research [2—8]. A number of studies have focused on the regional dimension of demographic development in the CIS countries [9—10] and the Barents Region [11]. In this article, I juxtapose the demographic performance of the neighbouring regions of Russia and the EU and estimate the potential and relevance of transboundary cooperation.

Among Russia's EU neighbours, Finland is a country with a traditional market economy, Poland is a former socialist state, and Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia are ex-USSR republics. The former socialist states treading the path of market development, the accession of Poland and the Baltics to NATO and the EU, and Finland's accession to the European Union changed the character of the border between the Russian Federation and the above countries after the disintegration of the USSR. However, this border is still less transparent than that between the EU member states [12]. In this article, I analyse previously published statistical data to consider how (and if) the changes in the geopolitical position of regions on either side of Russia's border with the five EU countries affected the demographic processes and structures on these territories. I also explore differences in the demographic processes and the development of the geodemographic situation in the said border regions. My analysis is to demonstrate whether the concept of polarisation is applicable to the territory in question, namely, how border regions (which some researchers class as periphery [13—15]) develop in comparison with other regions of Russia and the neighbouring EU countries.

Methods

In this article, I examine the demographic situation in the border regions of Russia and the EU. Since the principles behind the subdivision of Russia and the EU member states do not match completely, my analysis will focus on Russian regions, on the one hand, and NUTS 3 units, on the other. I hold that these subdivisions stand in a close, although not exact, correspondence.

The study employs statistical data on population change (in 1950—2018 at the national and in 1990—2017 at the regional level), population growth, natural increase, net migration, and crude birth and mortality rates (2016). The regional demographic situation is analysed, among other things, in the context of national trends. I employ a number of methods of economic and statistical analysis — grouping, graph analysis, typology — and carry out the mapping of the results obtained.

I use statistical data from Rosstat[1] (for Russia and its regions) and those from Eurostat and national statistics handbooks.[2]

Population change in Russia and the neighbouring EU countries

As complex phenomena, the dynamics of population change mirror the state of economy and society [16]. Studying these dynamics is crucial for understanding the characteristics of the demographic situation and assessing the progress of economic and social processes in countries and regions. It has been stressed that population decline is not an easily reversible process [17]. Coupled with an economic downturn, population decline becomes a link in the chain of negative phenomena (a reduction in tax revenues, degrading infrastructure and social services, etc.) that force people to leave. At the same time, comparative studies into the development of European countries pay special attention to their economic development and changes in living standards [18—21]. I build on the assumption that demographic changes have a similar effect and the new

[1] Demography // Federal State Statistics Service. URL: http://www.gks.ru/wps/wcm/connect/rosstat_main/rosstat/ru/statistics/population/demography/# (accessed 12.05. 2018).

[2] Eurostat. URL: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat (accessed 10.05.2018) ; Kaliningradstat. URL: http://kaliningrad.gks.ru (accessed 22.06.2018) ; Central Statistical Bureau of Latvia. URL: http://www.csb.gov.lv/en (accessed 08.06.2018) ; Statistics Estonia. URL: https://www.stat.ee/en (accessed 08.06.2018) ; Statistics Finland. URL: https://www.stat.fi/index_en.html (accessed 08.06.2018) ; Statistics Lithuania. URL: https://www.stat.gov.lt/en (accessed 08.06.2018) ; Statistics Poland. URL: http://stat.gov.pl/en/ (accessed 08.06.2018).

demographic situation in the east of Europe does not only influence the economic development but also plays a significant role in the changes in living standards and even civilizational values.

The most complicated situation is observed in the Baltics, where a steep reduction in the already low birth rate and massive emigration (for instance, in Lithuania and Latvia), observed from the early 1990s, result in a rapid population decline [22]. The population of Estonia is approximately half of that of the Leningrad region and it might soon become smaller than that of the Kaliningrad region. In Latvia, the population figures are at the level of the early 1960s. In Russia, the rate of population decline is much lower. Poland's population is growing, although at a lower rate than before. In Finland, which has not experienced such dramatic political transformations, the population growth is rather significant.

In 2016—2017, the populations of Russia, Finland, and Poland were growing, although in all the three countries, the mortality rate exceeded the birth rate. The population growth is accounted for by immigration, which is rather considerable in Finland and Russia and less significant in Poland. In Lithuania and Latvia, the situation is less favourable because of the high rate of natural decline and even greater negative net migration (the massive emigration from these countries to richer EU states testifies to the centre-periphery relations in today's Europe [23]). In Estonia, the rate of natural decline was lower and net migration was slightly positive. However, the latter could not make up for a high mortality rate, which translates into population decline, just as in the case of the two other Baltic States. Thus, based on the characteristics and sources of population change, countries of the Baltic region can be divided into two groups. The first one, bringing together Russia, Poland, and Finland is characterised by better demographic performance (note that, in Russia, the birth rate is higher than in the other two countries, although the mortality rate is more considerable too). The other group, comprising Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, demonstrates poor demographic performance characterised by a low birth and a high mortality rate, particularly, in the two former states.

Population change in the border regions of Russia and the EU

Overall, the demographic performance of the studied regions is below the respective national averages. In 1990—2016, the population of the border region as a proportion of the national total decreased everywhere with the exception of Poland. The most dramatic reduction was observed in the countries where borderlands are home to from 1/5 to 1/3 of the national population (fig. 1).



Fig. 1. Changes in the population of border regions as a proportion of the national total, 1990—2016

However, the demographic development of the border regions is irregular. Below, I will consider this thesis in detail.

The Russian Federation

Russia's territories bordering on the EU are the Republic of Karelia and the Murmansk, Leningrad, Pskov, and the Kaliningrad regions. They have slight demographic differences. Some of them, classed as 'international development corridors'[3] [24; 25] (the Leningrad and the Kaliningrad regions) are characterised by better socioeconomic and demographic

[3] The concept of 'international development corridors' [24; 25] is a continuation of the idea first outlined by George Friedman, who defined 'development corridors' as regions that, sandwiched between 'core' regions, take advantage of their geographical position to the benefit of their economies [26]. 'International development corridors' — unlike their inland counterparts — lie between the 'core' regions of two or more states. They can cater for international trade, integrate into common value added chains, and borrow innovations from the 'core' regions of two or more countries.

performance. In the others — the depressed Republic of Karelia and the Murmansk and Pskov regions, — the demographic situation has been highly unfavourable throughout the post-Soviet period. The high rates of migration from the regions testify to this fact. In the former regions, the population is growing, in the latter, declining (fig. 2). However, in the Leningrad region — despite the overall positive trend, towns situated immediately at the border with Estonia are losing population [27].



Fig. 2. Dynamics of population change in Russia's regions bordering on the EU, 2018 (as of the beginning of the year)

A source of population in the emerging 'international development corridors' is net migration (fig. 3). In the Northern areas — Karelia and the Murmansk region — it is negative, whereas, in the Pskov region, it is slightly above zero.

The rate of natural increase is close to zero in the Kaliningrad and negative in the Leningrad region. However, the high rate of natural decline reflected in the regional statistics is explained by that part of birth

records pertaining to the Leningrad region is made in Saint Petersburg. This is why the region's birth rate is the lowest among the five territories under consideration. In the other three regions — the Republic of Karelia and the Murmansk and Pskov regions — the population is declining.



Fig. 3. The rate of natural increase, net migration, and the total population growth rate in Russia's regions bordering on the EU member states, 2016

The EU member states

The sources of, and differences in, the population change dynamics observed across the EU regions bordering on Russia are rather similar to those described above. In terms of demography, there are pronounced 'growth poles' — international 'development corridors' — and depressed periphery. The Gdansk area, where rapid population growth is explained by the city being part of the Tricity agglomeration, is an 'international development corridor', similar to Russia's Leningrad and the Kaliningrad region. The Gdansk area is different from its counterparts: the significant growth of its population is almost equally a result of positive net migration and a high rate of natural increase, with a birth rate reaching 13.3 per 1000 population (2016) and a mortality rate as low as 7.5. This relates to a 'younger' age structure of the population, explained by a considerable influx of immigrants.

A slightly lower growth rate is observed in Finland's Northern Ostrobothnia, where growth is sustained by a high rate of natural increase explained, in turn, by a considerable birth rate. In the other regions of the

five countries, the population has been declining since 1995 (fig. 4, 5). Similarly to their Russia's counterparts, Finland's northern regions (fig. 4) are losing population. The most rapid decline is associated with the Baltics' regions bordering on Russia (fig. 5). Out of the seven territories, only the Klaipėda County is losing population at a rate below the national average, which can be explained by its functioning as an 'international development corridor'. A rapid population decline is observed across all Latvia's municipalities lying at a considerable distance from the capital [28]. However, in the Russian regions, this process is less pronounced.



Fig. 4. Population change in Poland's and Finland's regions, 1990—2017, % of the 1990 level



Fig. 5. Population change in the Baltics' regions, 1990—2017, % of the 1990 level

Fig. 6 and 7 show the correlation between the natural increase and net migration as components of population change in the regions under consideration. In Poland, among the regions sharing a border with Russia, only the Gdansk area had positive net migration in 2016. In Finland, net migration was positive only in South Karelia — home to the rapidly developing city of Lappeenranta. Note that both countries are characterised by slightly positive net migration. In the Baltics, all the regions bordering on Russia were characterised by negative net migration.



Fig. 6. The rate of natural increase, net migration, and the total population growth rate in Poland' s and Finland's regions bordering on Russia, 2016

Source: [10].



Fig. 7. The rate of natural increase, net migration, and the total population growth rate in the Baltics' regions bordering on Russia, 2016

Source: [10].

A comparison of population change in the bordering regions of Russia and the EU

A juxtaposition of the total growth, the rate of natural increase, and net migration per 1000 population in the borderlands with the respective national averages shows the following. Firstly, among the Russian territories, only the Kaliningrad region, despite its exclave position, performs above the national average in terms of three measures (although the high rate of natural increase is explained not by a high total fertility rate, which is below the national average, but by a high proportion of population aged 18—30). In the Leningrad region, the values of two measures are above the national average, whereas the rate of natural decline is greater than that. The only above-the-average measure in Karelia is the rate of natural increase. However, just as in the Kaliningrad region, it owes to the age structure of the local population.

The demographic performance of the EU's border regions seems even poorer as against the respective national averages. In Poland, only the Gdansk area performs above the national average in terms of three measures. In all the other three regions, the values of all the three measures are below the national average. In Finland, only one of the six regions — Northern Ostrobothnia — demonstrates above-the-average performance in terms of one demographic measure (the rate of natural increase). In Lithuania, the values of all the three measures are slightly above the national average in the Klaipėda County. In the other two counties, all of them are below the national average. The demographic performance is below the national average in both Latvian and both Estonian regions.

The above testifies to the fact that the three border areas classed as 'international development corridors', the Kaliningrad and Leningrad regions and the Gdansk area, stand out among the other territories, which seem to be depressed in both demographic and economic terms. This fits the core-periphery concept. The Klaipėda County exhibits some features of a 'development corridor'. However, its potential is limited by the small size of Lithuania's economy. Therefore, most of the regions under consideration share a border that serves more as a barrier than as a contact zone. The 'development corridor' regions are no exception, since their rapid development has little to do with their transboundary ties. They are home to large port facilities catering for the transit ties of their countries or of large hinterlands.

Fig. 8 shows a geographical juxtaposition of the population change measures of Russia's and the EU's neighbouring regions. All the Russian regions perform better than their Polish and Baltic neighbours, the only exception being the Gdansk area, where the total population growth rate

and the rate of natural increase are higher than they are in the Kaliningrad region (although net migration is below the Kaliningrad level). The correlation between Russia's and Finland's regions is not as straightforward. In some Finnish border areas, the situation is better than in their Russian counterparts (especially in the north, in North Karelia, Northern Ostrobothnia, and Lapland), in the others it is worse (particularly, in Kainuu).



Finland
FI1D3 North Karelia
FI1D4 Kainuu
FI1D6 Northern Ostrobothnia
FI1D7 Lapland
FI1D5 Kymenlaakso

Estonia
EE008 South Estonia
EE 007 North-East Estonia

Latvia
LV 005 Latgale
LV 008 Videzeme

Lithuania
LT 003 Klaipėda County
LT 004 Marijampolė County
LT 007 Tauragė County

Poland
PL 633 Gdansk
PL 621 Elbląg
PL 622 Olsztyn
PL 623 Ełk

Fig. 8. A comparison of the natural change dynamics in the neighbouring regions of Russia and the EU

At the border with the Leningrad region — an area of relatively active transboundary cooperation, the demographic performance is below Finland's average. The population is growing virtually only in the city of Lappeenranta situated close to the border. This is partly explained by Russia-speaking Ingrian Finns emigrating from Russia. It has been re-

ported that the city has a large proportion of the Russophones.[4] However, the border city of Imatra, which is also located in South Karelia, as well as the region in general are losing population. As to the Russian border cities, which are connected by transport routes with Lappeenranta and Imatra and make transboundary pairs with them (Vyborg — Lappeenranta and Svetogorsk — Imatra), their population has been stable since the 2000s after a steep decline observed in the 1990 (see Table).

Population change in the neighbouring regions of Russia and the EU*

	Population, thousand people, 2017, as of the beginning of the year	Population change, annual average, %		
		1979—1988	1989—1999	2000—2016
Russia — Finland				
Imatra (Finland)	28.4	0.6	-3.7	-0.7
Lappeenranta (Finland)	55.5	3.9	3.9	0.4
Vyborg (RF)	78.5	3.4	-0.7	-0.1
Svetogorsk (RF)	15.7	9.1	-0.6	0.1
Russia — Estonia				
Narva (Estonia)	57.1	0.7	-1.5	-0.9
Sillamäe (Estonia)	13.7	2.4	-1.6	-1.4
Kohtla-Järve (Estonia)	35.4	-1.6	-2.4	-1.6
Võru (Estonia)	12.4	0.4	-1.5	-1.2
Ivangorod (RF)	10.5	1.0	0.1	-0.7
Kingisepp (RF)	45.3	2.5	0.4	-0.6
Pechory (RF)	10.0	1.9	1.4	-2.1
Russia — Latvia				
Balvi (Latvia)	6.3	1.9	-0.7	-1.8
Pytalovo (RF)	5.3	3.1	0.1	-1.8
Russia — Lithuania				
Kybartai (Lithuania)	4.8	0.3	-0.7	-1.9
Šilutė (Lithuania)	15.9	2.6	0.1	-1.7
Neringa (Lithuania)	3.1	1.1	-0.3	1.6
Nesterov (RF)	4.1	0.2	0.4	-1.3
Sovetsk (RF)	40.5	0.4	0.3	-0.3
Zelengradsk (RF)	15.5	1.0	1.2	1.3
Russia — Poland				
Bartoszyce (Poland)	23.8	1.8	0.0	-0.2
Kętrzyn (Poland)	27.5	1.2	-0.5	-0.1
Bagrationovsk (RF)	6.4	1.1	0.7	-1.2
Chernyakhovsk (RF)	36.4	1.1	1.1	-2.0

*Calculated by the author based on the official statistics from the RF, the EU, Poland, Finland, and the Baltics.

As the Table slows, in 1979—1989, the population of all the cities situated along today's Russia — EU border was growing. The only exception is Kohtla-Järve, the economy of which was struggling at the time because of the shale industry losing its once prominent position. After

[4] Finnish cities. Lappeenranta. URL: http://da.fi/304.html (accessed June 15, 2018).

independence, the population of Estonian border cities has been decreasing twice as rapidly as across the country due to the emigration of its Russian population. The same processes have been observed in the border cities of the other two Baltic States — with the exception of the resort of Neringa — in the post-Soviet period. Partly, the population decline is explained by the Russian population leaving the cities for Russia, particularly, the neighbouring border territories. A slight population decline (below the border voivodeship average) is observed in Poland's border town. The neighbouring Russian towns — the only exception is the resort of Zelenogradsk — are also losing population, sometimes, at an even higher rate. For instance, Cernyakhovsk is affected by the attractiveness of the rapidly developing city of Kaliningrad.

Thus, the border position of the neighbouring Russian and EU cities and towns seems to play a negative role in their development. The exceptions are few. Only Finland's Lappeenranta and the Polish towns have taken advantage of transboundary ties by developing transboundary trade and producing semi-finished goods imported by Kaliningrad companies. The performance of the resorts of Zelenogradsk and Neringa has little to do with their border position. In the other cases, the negative effect on the development of border cities is associated with their periphery position.

Conclusions

There are considerable differences in the population change dynamics in the neighbouring border regions of the Russian Federation and the European Union. A major negative factor is a significant rate of natural decline and negative net migration in the Baltics' regions, across which the differences are also significant. The smallest demographic losses are associated with South Estonia. The most favourable situation is observed in Russia's Kaliningrad and Leningrad regions, Poland's Gdansk area, and Finland's Northern Ostrobothnia.

The performance of all the Baltics' regions pales in comparison with that of the Leningrad and the Kaliningrad region. However, the Pskov region is quite comparable with South Estonia, although its situation is much better than that observed in the other neighbouring territories of Latvia and Estonia. With the exception of Gdansk, the situation in Poland's border regions is also worse than in the Kaliningrad region. This can be explained by a negative net migration in the Polish borderlands and a positive one in the Kaliningrad region. However, the difference in the rate of natural increase is insignificant. The performance of Finland's and Russia's cities is comparable. A rapid population growth is observed in the Leningrad region and a slow one in Finland's Northern Ostrobothnia. The other neighbouring regions are gradually losing population due to both natural decline and negative net migration.

When examining border regions, particularly from the perspective of their demographic potential, it is important to consider their considerable differentiation. Most of them — as the polarisation concept suggests — are depressed. However, some of them turn into 'international growth poles' that can forge strong transboundary ties. In the others, an international neighbourhood can mitigate the periphery factor and give an impetus to socioeconomic and demographic development.

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CONTACTS WITH DIASPORAS AND DIASPORA ORGANISATIONS AS A KEY TO A SUCCESSFUL MIGRANT INTEGRATION POLICY IN THE EU

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The article analyses European Commission and European Parliament documents — directives, communications, conclusions, recommendations — and best practices for EU member states' international projects focusing on migrant integration in the EU states and the countries of origin of migrants. Special emphasis is placed on the role of diasporas and the efforts taken by the EU to involve them into the integration process. We stress the need for a new supranational EU immigration and integration policy concerning diaspora involvement, in the context of new migration trends and the so-called migrant crisis. The study shows that the EU integration policy is targeting migrants, the host countries and the countries of origin. Since the early 2010s, the involvement of various diaspora organisations in the implementation of the EU migrant integration policy has significantly increased. An analysis of the EU integration projects shows that diasporas have a potential of becoming one of key actor in the EU integration policy. We suggest expanding the list of the objectives for the national integration policy of the EU countries. This may be achieved by boosting efforts to reduce the gap in the socio-economic development of the host countries and the countries of origin, particularly, by promoting multilateral cooperation with diaspora organisations.

Keywords: diaspora, forced migration, labour migration, multiculturalism, migrant integration policy, diaspora organisations, EU

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Introduction

Migration issues are among the most important ones on the agenda of developed countries. The number of citizens of third countries (TCs) residing in the European Union (EU) has been growing recently and has reached 20.7 million people, or 4.1 % of the EU population in 2016. Most TCs nationals choose one of the five EU states — Germany, the UK, Italy, Spain, and France. Citizens of TCs residing in these five countries account for 76 % of the total number of immigrants.

The European migration patterns suggest that there are significant cross-country differences in the development of national and regional approaches and in the search for supranational measures shaping the European migration policy. These differences account for by the particularities of national migration patterns and the number of EU and TCs immigrants residing in each state.

In some countries, a migrant integration policy was developed much earlier than that of the European Union. The formation of a government attitude towards migrants as part of the multiculturalism began across the ocean — in Canada and Australia. Later, at different times throughout the last third of the 20th century, this position was supported in the Netherlands, Sweden, and partly in the UK [1]. France embraced the assimilation concept as early as 120 years ago [2]. Since the late 1990s, common migration problems encouraged all the EU states to start a supranational dialogue on migration regulation. It resulted in a noticeable convergence of the national policies of the EU member states and the development of a common European migration policy. In the late 1990s, alarming social phenomena — such as a declining birth rate, the pension system crisis, job deficit in some industries, enclavisation of society, and growing irregular migration — emphasised the need for the EU states to pay close attention to the integration policy, which had previously fallen within the remit of national states.

A possible way towards greater integration of immigrants is launching initiatives aimed at involvement of diasporas and the countries of origin. Many studies have addressed this aspect of the EU immigration policy, although official documents of the European Commission (EC) did not mention diasporas as one of the major integration institution until the 2010s. As to the recent EC documents, the term ‘diaspora’ is used in the 2011 ‘European Agenda for the Integration of Third-Country Nationals’.[1] The 2016 ‘European Agenda for the Integration of Third-Country Nationals’[2] of 2016 name diasporas an important integration institution.

[1] Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions COM (2011) 455 final of 20 July 2011, 2011. European Agenda for the Integration of Third-Country Nationals.

[2] Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the

Our analysis of the role of diasporas in the EU integration policy employs EU documents on immigration integration — directives, communications, legislative acts, and initiatives — focusing on the problems of the immigration policy aimed at the involvement of diasporas into immigrant integration at the supranational and national levels. In the first part of the article, we briefly analyse how the EU integration policy had been developing before 2010. In the second part, we address changes made to this policy in the aftermath of the so-called EU migrant crisis, which sparked off in 2014.[3] In the third part, we consider the place of diaspora organisations of the EU states in the European supranational integration policy. Finally, in the fourth part, we describe the practices of diaspora involvement at the local and supranational levels. We identify lines of diaspora activities that seem to be promising from the perspective of their contribution to the European integration policy and the local and national experiences of the EU member states as well. In the conclusion, we summarise opportunities for the diaspora involvement in the integration of TCs nationals. In the article, we do not discuss the integration problem of the EU country nationals, although we think that this problem exists. For example, the abuse of the right to housing and to the freedom of movement of the Romanies residing in France was investigated by the Directorate-General for Justice and Consumers that conducts a regular monitoring of the cases of civil right and freedom violations across the EU.

The emergence of a new supranational immigration and integration policy in the EU

The common principles of a supranational immigration policy, which were enshrined in the Treaty of Rome (1957), the Schengen Agreement (1985), and the Maastricht (1993), Amsterdam (1999), and Lisbon (2009) Treaties, rest on the international ***declarative*** principles of general law enforcement practices. Since the late 1990s, the common European immigration and asylum policy has become part of the effort to create a 'common space of freedom, security and justice' in the EU. It was given

Regions COM (2016) 377 final of 7 June 2016, 2016. Action Plan on the Integration of Third Country Nationals.

[3] Here, we define the EU migrant crisis as the movement, which reached a level beyond the control of the EU border forces, of migrants from African and Asian TCs embroiled in war and economic crises in search for a refuge and better lives in the EU countries. Since Russia received almost the same number of refugees coming from Eastern Ukraine and the country did not face a migrant crisis, we believe that the problem lies on the politicisation of the absence of migration control. A crisis is any event that entails instability and uncertainty affecting not only individuals but also groups and society in general.

a boost within the subsequent five-year migration programmes (the Tampere Action Plan (1999), the Hague Programme (2004), the Stockholm Programme (2009), and the Ypres Guidelines (2014) [3].

The development of a coordinated integration and immigration policy across 27 member states became a major priority for the European Commission. The institution focuses on the 'harmonisation'[4] of the EU member states' migration policy along four major lines: 1) effective development of regular immigration and a reduction in irregular immigration; 2) the development and improvement of immigrant integration programmes; 3) the creation of a common European asylum system; 4) the enhancement of cooperation with third countries in the area of migration [5].

The starting point of the common European integration model is the idea of immigrant employment as a self-support opportunity. This economic consideration contains a solution to the problems of accommodation, employment, free access to education, social and medical insurance, and of social engagement. A *sine qua non* of successful integration is the knowledge of local languages, the culture and structure of a receiving society.

In 2004, the European Union formulated the Common Basic Principles for the Immigrant Integration Policy, which viewed integration as a ***bilateral process*** of mutual adaptation of immigrants and native residents, based on the EU values.[5] In 2005, the Policy Plan on Legal Migration[6] was adopted. The cultural and religious diversity had to be ensured at the municipal and national levels if they are not in discord with the national regulations and traditions. The same year the Framework for the Integration of Third-Country Nationals in the European Union[7] was approved for 2005—2010. This document provides the foundation for the revision of the integration policies by the EU member states.

Several funds with a total worth of 3.8 billion euros were established in 2007 to support the programme in 2007—2013. These were the Euro-

[4] The harmonisation of law rests on Article 115 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (the Treaty of Rome and, later, the Treaty of Lisbon), which governs the convergence of legal provisions on regulation and administrative actions affecting the functioning of the common labour, capital, currency, and other markets. This is achieved by the convergence of national laws based on the harmonisation directives developed by the European Commission. See [4].

[5] Common Basic Principles for Immigrant Integration Policy in the European Union. Council of the European Union, 2004. 2618th Council Meeting. [press release] 19 November 2004. Available at: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/jha/82745.pdf [Accessed 18 April 2018].

[6] Communication from the Commission COM (2005) 669 final of 21 December 2005, 2005. Policy Plan on Legal Migration.

[7] Communication from the Commission to the Council, The European Parliament, The European Economic and Social Committee and The Committee of the Regions COM (2005) 389 final of 1 September 2005, 2005. A Common Agenda for Integration — Framework for the Integration of Third-Country Nationals in the European Union.

pean Fund for the Integration of Third-Country Nationals (EIF, 825 million euros)[8], the European Refugee Fund (ERF, 630 million euros), the European Return Fund (RF, 678 million euros), and the Externa Borders Fund (EBF, 1820 million euros).[9] Additional funding for immigrant integration was allocated from the European Social Fund (ESF).[10]

The EU member states became increasingly aware of the need to engage diaspora organisations as agents of the EU supranational integration policy, since it was deemed necessary to cooperate with the countries of origin. Cooperation with the non-EU countries of origin was first mentioned as a priority in the Global Approach to Migration and Mobility,[11] proposed by the European Council in 2005. From that moment on, the EU has been creating joint platforms for multilateral and bilateral transboundary dialogue with non-EU partners to discuss migration, integration, and diaspora collaborations (the Prague Process, A Silk Routes Partnership for Migration, the Africa — EU Migration and Mobility Dialogue, etc.). Bilateral mobility partnerships were signed with Morocco, Tunisia, Jordan, Ethiopia, Nigeria, and other countries [6]. The European Pact on Immigration and Asylum[12] was approved in 2008. The Pact emphasises that immigrant integration begins even before the departure from the country of origin, although it does take place in the country of destination. Thus, ***instead of the bilateral immigrant — receiving society cooperation, the European Commission proclaimed a commitment to trilateral integration actions with the involvement of the countries of origin***. The EU is striving to incorporate a policy towards the countries of origin based on financing a series of programmes (for example, Africa — EU Migration and Mobility Dialogue and the European Neighbourhood Policy) into its integration policy, as well as to strengthen grassroots cooperation through developing action plans for cooperation between the EU and individual third countries.[13]

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[8] The EIF supports projects contributing to the social, academic, cultural, religious, and linguistic integration of foreigners, which is expected to translate into greater social cohesion and the development of rights and freedoms in the EU.

[9] Council Decision 2007/435/EC of 25 June 2007, 2007. Council Decision establishing the European Fund for the Integration of third-country nationals for the period 2007 to 2013 as part of the General programme 'Solidarity and Management of Migration Flows'.

[10] The Fund is a financial instrument to support all legal residents of the EU.

[11] Presidency Conclusions of the Brussels European Council 15914/1/05 Rev 1 of 30 January 2006 (15—16 December 2005). URL: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/87642.pdf (accessed 04/04/2018).

[12] Council of the European Union, 2008. European Pact on Immigration and Asylum (No. prev. doc.: 13189/08 ASIM 68 of 24 September 2008). URL: http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&f=ST%2013440%202008%20INIT (accessed 14.05.2018).

[13] Committee of the Regions on Integration Policy and Intercultural Dialogue, 2009. Opinion of the Committee of the Regions on 'Integration Policy and In-

Such programmes can be either comprehensive or targeted (for instance, aimed at employment assistance, legal awareness, or social protection). Diasporas in the country of destination can make a major contribution to these programmes through raising awareness, encouraging immigrant education, providing accommodation and medical services, and assisting newcomers in finding employment and preventing discrimination. However, the above-mentioned EU and EC documents never mentioned diasporas as institutions directly.

In 2008, the ten Common Basic Principles for Immigrant Integration Policy were developed. The European Commission presented them as part of A Common Immigration Policy for Europe: Principles, Actions and Tools, which laid the groundwork for the Stockholm Programme for 2010—2014 and the new Ypres Guidelines for 2015—2019. These principles demonstrate the commitment of the European countries to encouraging legal migration in line with the needs of the EU labour market and to partnerships with the countries of origin in the area of migration management.[14]

However, the economic crisis of 2008—2009 suspended the EU integration initiatives for a short time, since the national funding of these programmes was cut. When the crisis was over, the European Commission stressed in its 2011 Global Approach to Migration and Mobility the need for a broader dialogue with diasporas, migrant groups, and other non-governmental organisations, in pursuit of greater efficiency of immigrant integration. An important landmark was the adoption of the European Agenda for the Integration of Third-Country Nationals in 2011.[15] The document calls for a close cooperation between diaspora communities and the countries of origin in order to promote transnational entrepreneurship and international trade. The agenda introduces the European integration modules, whereas the Commission Staff Working Paper[16] contains European initiatives to support immigrant integration.

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tercultural Dialogue' (2009/C 76/01 of 31 March 2009). Available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:52008AR0251&from=EN [Accessed 14 May 2018].

[14] Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, The Council, The European Economic And Social Committee And The Committee of the Regions COM (2008) 359 of 17 June 2008, 2008. A Common Immigration Policy for Europe: Principles, actions and tools {SEC(2008) 2026} {SEC(2008) 2027}. European Commission, 2015. 20 years of Migration Policy: the path to a European Agenda on Migration. [electronic print] Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/elibrary/docs/timeline_en/timeline_en.pdf [Accessed 18 April 2018].

[15] Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions COM (2011) 455 final of 20 July 2011, 2011. European Agenda for the Integration of Third-Country Nationals.

[16] Commission Staff Working Paper accompanying the Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, The Council, The European Economic And Social Committee And The Committee of the Regions on the Euro-

The results of the *intensification* of the efforts to develop a common European integration policy in the form of 'soft law' are as follows:

— the establishment of a network of the National Contact Points on integration;

— the organisation of an annual European Migration Forum (European Integration Forum until 2015) that brings together over 100 EU non-profits;

— designing a European website on integration;

— regular publication of a Handbook on Integration for policy-makers and practitioners;

— the development of indicators for monitoring the EU immigrant integration policy.

The migrant crisis and the single European and national integration policies

The migration crisis of 2014 transformed the immigration, integration, and asylum policies of the EU member states, because of the inability of the EU to control external borders and refugees flows from Middle Eastern and African countries. The influx of asylum-seekers resulted in security issues replacing integration at the top of the EU agenda. In 2013, the four above-mentioned funds were consolidated into two — the 3.9 trillion euro-worth Internal Security Fund and the new 3.1 trillion euro-worth Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund for 2014—2020. The latter replaced the EBF, ERF, and RF. The total funding doubled. However, the problems of migrant integration were overshadowed by security issues.

Taken to the supranational level in line with the Treaty of Amsterdam, the immigration policy remains to a significant degree within the remit of national states, whereas the EU provides a framework for coordination, monitoring, performance evaluation, and information exchange in developing national integration policies and allocating funds for immigration policy initiatives [7]. Nevertheless, commitment to the common principles of immigrant integration significantly affects the work with refugees from third countries in some EU member states [8]. An EU justice and interior ministerial meeting, which took place on June 5—6, 2014,[17] proposed the development and expansion of selected aspects of the common principles, in order to overcome discrimination, facilitate partnerships with the countries of origin, and prevent social isolation of the most vulnerable groups of immigrants.

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pean agenda for the integration of third-country nationals SEC(2011) 957 final of 20 July 2011, 2011. EU initiatives supporting the integration of third-country nationals.

[17] Council of the European Union, 2014. 3319th Council Meeting. [press release] 5—6 June 2014. Available at: http://www.iem.gov.lv/files/text/143119.pdf [Accessed 18 April 2018].

In May 2015, the European Agenda on Migration[18] was adopted. The document gave priority to rescue efforts in the Mediterranean and to the upgrade of the existing asylum provision system. Since then, the focus of the EU integration policy has been on refugee integration. The Action Plan on the Integration of Third-Country Nationals[19] (below, the Plan), which was approved in 2016, also contains measures to solve some refugee problems, for instance, ensuring their access to education and professional training, and supporting social contacts between refugees and the receiving society.

The document specifically mentions the efforts of diasporas, alongside those of other non-governmental and religious organisations. Today, the Plan is shaping the dialogue with diaspora organisations. In particular, it spans such initiatives as the European Integration Network, the European Migration Forum, partnerships within the Urban Agenda for the EU, and the roundtables with the Commission and mayors of major European cities.

In 2014—2020, the EU will support integration initiatives of diaspora organisations through the European Development Fund (EDF), the Global Public Goods and Challenges (GPGC) programme, the Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development, Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund, various international organisations (IOM, UNHCR, UNDP), and national ministries and funds of EU member states.

The migrant crisis has shown that the declared common position on migrants and especially refugee integration is not shared by all the EU member states. There are pronounced national, regional, and local differences [9; 10]. The southern EU member states — Portugal, Italy, and Spain — pursue an active integration policy, whereas countries with a long history of immigration — the UK and the Netherlands succumbed to weariness and disappointment over immigration [2, p. 218]. The Visegrád Group — Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia — adamantly refuse to participate in the refugee distribution and integration programs.

Today there is no common legal framework for evaluation the level of migrant integration in individual EU countries [11]. A promising tool is the Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX, Table 1), which rates on a scale from 0 to 100 such parameters as labour market mobility, education, anti-discrimination and health, political participation, access to nationality, long-term residence, and family reunion. The latest data (2014) suggest that most EU member states (14 out of 27) have middling MIPEX scores, i.e. they pursue an active integration policy only partually. There are many obstacles to the engagement of immigrants in the social, economic, and political life of the receiving society. Only eight EU member

[18] Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions COM (2015) 240 final of 13 May 2015, 2015. A European Agenda on Migration.

[19] Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions COM (2016) 377 final of 7 June 2016, 2016. Action Plan on the Integration of Third-Country Nationals.

states score highly and boast laws that contribute to the active (or mostly active) immigrant integration. Experts stress that these countries' integration policies ensure maximum equality of rights and opportunities of immigrants and local residents. The other five EU member states pay little attention to immigrant integration and thus they are classified as pursuing a passive integration policy. In these countries, immigrants are often faced with adaptation and integration problems and exposed to the anti-immigrant rhetoric of authorities (Table 1).

Table 1

EU-27 ranking by MIPEX 2007, 2010, 2014

State	Index 2007	Index 2010	Index 2014
Sweden	84.7	83.1	80.0
Portugal	76.4	78.8	80.0
Finland	69.5	69.2	71.0
Belgium	64.4	67.3	70.0
Germany	58.9	57.4	63.0
Netherlands	70.8	67.7	61.0
Spain	61.7	62.5	61.0
Luxembourg	51.9	60.2	60.0
Italy	65.3	60.4	58.0
Denmark	50.9	52.7	59.0
UK	65.8	56.6	56.0
France	54.0	50.6	54.0
EU	**53.7**	**51.3**	**53.0**
Ireland	52.3	48.6	51.0
Estonia	43.3	46.0	49.0
Slovenia	52.5	48.5	48.0
Austria	39.2	41.0	48.0
Greece	40.1	49.0	46.0
Hungary	47.2	44.9	46.0
Czech Republic	42.1	45.8	45.0
Romania	—	45.2	45.0
Bulgaria	—	40.5	44.0
Poland	43.3	41.8	43.0
Malta	40.0	36.9	39.0
Lithuania	42.7	39.8	38.0
Slovakia	38.4	36.3	38.0
Cyprus	36.2	35.2	36.0
Latvia	30.4	30.7	34.0

National laws contribute to an active integration policy (MIPEX score of over 80.0) or a mostly active integration policy (MIPEX score of 60.0—79.0)

National laws partly contribute to integration (MIPEX score of 41.0—59.0)

National laws condone a passive integration policy (MIPEX score of 40.0)

Source: Migrant Integration Policy Index, 2015. *Overall score, 2014.* [online]. Available at: http://www.mipex.eu/play/ (accessed 01.05.2018).

Some countries abandoned the earlier accepted common basic principles of migration regulation and embarked on a search for individual solutions to acute migration problems. For instance, in 2016, the Austrian authorities suspended the Schengen Treaty,[20] whereas Sweden adopted a temporary law introducing stricter rules for obtaining a residence permit.[21] Hungary, Romania, Macedonia, Croatia, Norway, and some of the Baltics are erecting walls along the borders with third countries.

Since the 50-year population projections for Africa and Asia indicate that their population will increase at a high rate amid ongoing conflicts in Africa and the Middle East, the EU countries are full of fears on an influx of refugees and displaced persons.[22] Thus, the problem of increasing the efficiency of cooperation with non-EU countries of migrants' origin is coming to the fore in foreign, immigration, and integration policies [12] at both the common European and national levels. The search for, and dissemination of, the most advanced practices is a crucial aspect of the integration policy [13—15]. Therefore, we argue that the use of the existing potential of ethnic communities and diasporas is an important and promising line of action.

The place of diaspora organisations of the EU member states in the European integration policy

It is hardly possible to evaluate the precise number of diaspora groups in the EU. This is explained by the vagueness of the term 'diaspora' [13] and the diversity of institutional forms and legal statuses of such organisations, their wide spectrum of activities ranging from cultural, social, and religious to political, economic, and legal ones [16]. Diaspora organisations often are formed based on different principles — the country of birth or origin, ethnicity or religion, occupation, social status, age, sex, etc. Diasporas can emerge at either a grassroots or national level [2]. Our research has shown that diaspora organisations often act as a 'bridge' connecting three major agents of integration — immigrants, the country

[20] Avstirya priostanovila Shengen [Austrian suspends the Schengen Treaty] // "Expert Online": National Business Analytics Resource. 2016. URL: http://expert.ru/2016/01/17/avstriya-priostanovila-shengen/ (accessed 01.05.2018).

[21] Parlament Shvetsii odobril zakon po uzhestocheniyu migratsionnoy politiki [Sweden's Parliament approves Stricter Migration Policy Law] // RIA Novosti. 2016. June 21. URL: https://ria.ru/world/20160621/1449527769.html (accessed 01.05.2018).

[22] Gapminder Foundation, 2014. *DON'T PANIC — Hans Rosling showing the facts about population*. [video online] Available at: https://www.gapminder.org/videos/dont-panic-the-facts-about-population/ (accessed 01.05.2018).

of origin, and the country of destination. As a rule, collaborations with diaspora organisations take place across different levels — those of supranational and national, regional and local institutions, of business communities, trade unions, religious, and other non-governmental organisations, and of individual persons.

An analysis of collaborations of diaspora organisations with immigrants and the countries of origin shows that the basic areas of this cooperation almost match the eleven Common Basic Principles for Immigrant Integration Policy in the European Union[23] and the priorities of the national integration policies of the EU member states (table 2). Today, the engagement of diaspora organisations in integration processes and the integration policy of the EU should exploit the potential of diaspora collaboration with immigrants and their countries of origin. Our analysis demonstrates that the contribution of diaspora organisations to integration is most significant in facilitating a cross-cultural dialogue between the receiving society and immigrants, in providing support for immigrant and diaspora businesses, and in assisting immigrants in finding employment.

Of special importance is the engagement of diaspora organisations in the protection of the rights and freedoms of immigrants and in support for the most vulnerable groups of newcomers. Another major line of the EU member states' integration policy that might fall within the remit of diaspora organisations is *narrowing the gap in the socioeconomic development of the countries of origin and the countries of destination through facilitating progress in the former*. These measures seem to be urgent due to several reasons. Firstly, it is much easier for the receiving society to integrate the immigrant and for the immigrant to become integrated, if both belong to the same social and economic strata. Secondly, a reduction in socioeconomic disproportions will translate into a higher level of education in potential immigrants. This, in turn, will result in greater trust of and tolerance to immigrants in the receiving society and will help to manage immigration more efficiently in view of the needs of the receiving labour market.

A number of projects, for instance, IOM's Migration for Development in Africa, which is run in Belgium, represent the best EU practices [14—15]. The groundwork for the gap-narrowing approach was laid in the common European immigrant integration policy (see the 2011 European Agenda for the Integration of Third-Country Nationals).

[23] Common Basic Principles for Immigrant Integration Policy in the European Union. Council of the European Union, 2004. 2618th Council Meeting. [press release] 19 November 2004.

Table 2

Major areas of cooperation of diaspora organisations' with immigrants and the countries of origin. Elements of the EU member states national integration policies[1]

Elements of the EU member states' national policy in line with the common basic principles for immigrant integration policy in the EU	Activities of diaspora organisations	
	Initiatives targeting immigrants in the EU countries	Collaborations of diaspora organisations in the EU member states with the countries of origin
Basic principles 1, 2 Tolerance and anti-discrimination (including awareness campaigns among the local residents and immigrants)	Development of a sense of responsibility and respect for the receiving society (particularly, via mass media). Organisation of orientation and language courses Prevention of ethnic conflicts	Facilitation of a cross-cultural dialogue between the countries of origin and destination. Raising awareness in the counties of origin of life in the receiving society
Basic principle 11 Pre-emigration training in the country of origin		Dissemination of information on the rules of entry, stay, and residence in the country of destination, on various aspects of contacts with the receiving society, on the provision of public services in the country of destination, etc. Pre-emigration support for potential immigrants, organisation of pre-emigration courses (via mass media and on the Internet). Knowledge and competence transfer to the country of origin

[1] Prepared based on [2; 7; 16—23] ; Common Basic Principles for Immigrant Integration Policy in the European Union. Council of the European Union, 2004. 2618th Council Meeting. [press release] 19 November 2004. Available at: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ue Docs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/jha/82745.pdf (accessed 04.05. 2018) ; International Organization for Migration (n.d.). ELCI study country report. Template the local contribution of migrant organisations to integration Czech Republic. Available at: http://www.iom.cz/files/Full_Country_Report_NGOs_Czech_Rep.pdf (accessed 04.05.2018).

Continue of Table 2

Elements of the EU member states' national policy in line with the common basic principles for immigrant integration policy in the EU	Activities of diaspora organisations	
	Initiatives targeting immigrants in the EU countries	Collaborations of diaspora organisations in the EU member states with the countries of origin
Basic principles 1, 2, 4, 7 Cross-cultural dialogue	Preservation of ethnic identity and support for cultural and religious ties (including language support, organisation of cultural and art events). Development of public spaces and a cultural environment for immigrants (construction of temples, schools, cultural centres, etc.). Development of social competences (educational city tours as part of orientation courses)	Promotion of the national culture and support for cross-cultural dialogue between the countries of origin and destination
Basic principles 3, 7 Support for immigrant and diaspora businesses	Support for business activity in the countries of destination; Assistance in obtaining necessary documents and in contacts with authorities. Information support. Helping members of diasporas to obtain new knowledge that they can use upon return. Teaching the basics of entrepreneurship, business mentorship	Support for diaspora businesses in the countries of origin. Raising awareness in the countries of origins of business resources available in the countries of destination (including finances); support for international cooperation and development. Support for bilateral trade between the countries of origin and the countries of destination. Development of socioeconomic and infrastructure projects in the rural areas of the countries of origin. Projects aimed at encouraging the investment of diaspora capitals and immigrants' money transfers
Basic principles 9, 10 Protection of basic rights and freedoms	Legal protection of the rights and freedoms of immigrants and members of their families. Assistance in obtaining necessary documents and in contacts with authorities. Assistance in re-integration in the country of origin. Information support. Assistance in solving everyday problems, finding housing and employment. Social care in emergencies situations. Teaching the basics languages knowledge in the countries of destination	Assistance in reintegration in the country of origin'

Basic principles 1, 6, 10 Social engagement	Support for immigrants' social contacts with the receiving society. Assistance in obtaining necessary documents and in contacts with authorities. Encouraging immigrants to express their opinions in diaspora mass media, at integration events, etc.	Development of social projects aimed to improve immigrants' living conditions in the interests of the country of origin, lobbying
Basic principles 1, 7, 8 Political engagement	Encouraging immigrants to express their opinions in diaspora mass media, at integration events, etc. Raising awareness of the right to political engagement among immigrants. Support for immigrants' participation in election campaigns. Support for diaspora candidates in municipal elections, lobbying	Participation in elections held in the country of origin, when in the country of destination. Promotion of the interests of the country of origin in the country of destination (particularly, through contacts with political parties and the official government structure of the country of residence)
Basic principles 3, 5 Equality and access to the labour market	Assistance in employment, regularisation, and improvement of immigrants' prospects in the labour market of the country of destination. Assistance in professional training in the country of destination. Information support. Legal and language support	Assistance in planning labour emigration from the country of origin, in line with the needs of the country of destination. Assistance in creating professional training centres for potential migrants in the countries of destination to facilitate their adaptation to the labour market of the country of destination
Basic principles 6, 11 Support for the most vulnerable groups of immigrants (refugees, children and adolescents, women, senior immigrants)	Assistance in obtaining necessary documents and in contacts with authorities. Information support. Legal and language support. Programmes for counteraction of human trafficking in the countries of destination and origin. Support for, investment in, and creation and development of rehabilitation centres for affected immigrants	
Basic principle 11 Family reunion	Assistance in obtaining necessary documents and in contacts with authorities. Information support	
Basic principle 4 Equality and access to educationnal services	Assistance in obtaining education. Information support. Legal and language support. Teaching the language of the prevalent regional diaspora at schools and kindergartens	Development of a system of trainings and scholarships by the members of diasporas to improve the professional skills of the residents of the countries of origin
Basic principle 4 Equality and access to healthcare	Information support. Legal, language, and other kinds of support	—

End of Table 2

Elements of the EU member states' national policy in line with the common basic principles for immigrant integration policy in the EU	Activities of diaspora organisations	
	Initiatives targeting immigrants in the EU countries	Collaborations of diaspora organisations in the EU member states with the countries of origin
Basic principles 6, 7, 8 Equality and access to private services	Assistance in social contacts with the receiving society. Assistance in finding housing. Information support. Legal, language, and other kinds of support	—
Equality and access to nationality	Assistance in obtaining necessary documents and in contacts with authorities. Information support	Assistance in preserving the nationality of the country of origin;
Basic principles 6,7,8 Prevention of territorial segregation and isolation of immigrant communities	Information support. Assistance in finding housing. Financial assistance to rent-payers (private loans). Development of public spaces and a cultural environment for immigrants (construction of temples, schools, cultural centres, etc.)	Development of return and reintegration programmes for immigrants
Narrowing the gap in the socioeconomic development of the countries of origin and destination through facilitating progress in the former	Assistance in the development of small businesses in the country of origin. Assistance in the effective use of money transfers; Promotion of the idea of tax exemptions for money transfers. Joint business support programmes run by the countries of origin and destination	Support for communications between immigrants and the country of origin. Support for the development of rural areas and local communities (children, adolescents, vulnerable groups, etc.) in the countries of origin. Support for bilateral trade and tourism between the countries of origin and destination. Raising awareness in the countries of origins of business resources available in the countries of destination (including finances); support for international cooperation and development. Transfer of knowledge, competences, innovations, and social interaction models to the country of origin. Environment protecting actions in the countries of origin. Lower cost of money transfers. Political engagement in the country of origin. Investment in the country of origin (agriculture, healthcare, education, etc.)

Our analysis on collaborations of diaspora organisations with immigrants and the countries of origin shows that there is a wide range of tools for such cooperation. In particular, these are:

1) Mass media (websites, newspapers, magazines, television, etc.) and awareness campaigns;

2) Platforms for dialogue (workshops, forums, etc.);

3) Cultural, religious, sports, art, and other events in the countries of destination (festivals, exhibition, etc.);

4) Financial support (funds, membership and other fees, income from services rendered, public and private financing);

5) Educational programmes;

6) Projects run in the countries of origin and destination;

7) A network of centres for collaborations between migrants and the countries of origin (with a focus on education, access to the labour market, etc.);

8) Databases, contacts of immigrants and relevant actors in both the country of origin and the country of destination.

The most successful practice of the integration of immigrants is associated with the assistance of an integrated diaspora to the development of its homeland [18]. The EU member states usually engage diasporas and diaspora organisations in the integration of migrants through awareness campaigns and consultations, support for diaspora businesses and knowledge and technology transfer, competence development, the encouragement of local associations, and financial support for migration and development initiatives [19]. A good example is the Federal Impulse Fund for Migrant Policy (FIM) in Belgium or Centre for International Migration and Development in Germany (CIM), which operate in the countries of origin. Some of the EU member states have established platforms and centres for collaborations between diaspora and 'national' organisations (for instance, the Diaspora Network in Norway, the Africa-Europe Diaspora Development Platform (ADEPT) in the UK). This issue was also addressed within the European Local Cooperation for Integration programme ELCI, which was run in 2011—2012 in France, Spain, Italy, Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Germany, and Belgium. The programme aimed at closer cooperation in the area of integration between local authorities and immigrant organisations.[1]

Until 2000, the Dutch non-governmental organisation IntEnt provided business mentorship services for immigrants in the Netherlands and for native residents in Ghana, Suriname, Morocco, and Turkey. After 2000,

[1] International Organization for Migration (IOM), 2018. *European Local Cooperation for Integration — ELCI*. URL: http://www.iom.cz/aktivity/integration-of-foreigners/ (accessed 04.05. 2018).

the programme expanded its geography in both the EU and third countries. Similar organisations were set up in France, the UK, and Germany. The recipient countries are Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cape Verde, Sierra Leone, and Curaçao. Fifty-two new companies were established in 2009. A total of 350 businesses have been started since the establishment of IntEnt. In 2009, the organisation set up the Friends & Family Fund, which grants up to 50,000 euros to migrant entrepreneurs [15].

Diaspora engagement in the local-level integration

Regions and municipalities account for the bulk of work with diaspora organisations, as concerns immigrant integration. This fits well with the European trend towards the decentralisation of integration policy and top-down delegation of authority to the levels of a city, a district, or a province. A major mechanism of interaction is the establishment of platforms for dialogue on migration and integration (for instance, the The National Minorities Platform Landelijk Overleg Minderheden, or LOM)) and the establishment of local advisory bodies with the participation of diaspora members. These bodies advise authorities in devising regulations on migration, integration, etc. A good example is the target group set up in the city of Gdynia (Poland), which brings together representatives of local authorities, welfare and employment organisations, business communities, and NGOs specialising in immigration issues.[2] In some European countries, state-supported centres were established to provide individual services for diaspora organisations (for instance, the 4th Pillar of the Flemish Development Cooperation in Flanders). These centres assist diasporas in finding financial support for their initiatives through consulting, training, awareness campaigns, etc.

An interesting case is integration and diaspora policies of some Belgian cities. In Belgium, this aspect of migration policy is within the remit of regions and municipalities. In 2004, the Government of Flanders established a ministry for immigrant integration (today, Ministry for Local and Provincial Government, Civic Integration, Housing, Equal Opportunities and Poverty Reduction), which is officially responsible for financing municipal projects in the areas of integration policy and ethnic diversity [24]. Moreover, in 2015, the Government of Flanders financed the establishment of an independent institution — the Integration Agency, which incorporated a number of integration monitoring structures. The Agency operates in five municipalities of Flanders and in the Brussels-Ca-

[2] Strategies for integrating migrants and refugees in the community. 2016. International City Forum. Kiel, Germany, 18 June 2016. P. 44.

pital region. It cooperates closely with diaspora organisations and immigrants. In particular, the Agency provides consulting, interpreting, educational, and other services. A public regional status was granted to the Flemish Minority Forum — Minderheden Forum. First held in 2000, it brings together over 1500 members of diaspora organisations from 18 ethnocultural associations annually. The forum encourages joint projects and research. Its *Scan-4-Diversity.be* site promotes events organised by local diaspora associations and disseminates diaspora views on migration and integration problems.[3]

In Hungary, details on events held by local diaspora NGOs are available on the websites of smaller cities' local administrations (for example, Kaposvár). Each year, Budapest hosts roundtables and consultations for representatives of diaspora NGOs, which receive support in solving various problems, for instance, in preparing grant applications. Hungary boasts a thought-through policy towards the country's eleven minorities (eight originating from the neighbouring states, Germans, the Romany, and Armenians). They have a right to organise self-government at the local level, to run for municipal positions, to establish NGOs, and to lobby for their interests. The twin city system helps the country of destination to become acquainted with immigrants' homelands. Usually, the twins are located in the prevalent countries of origin. Hungary's National Radio broadcasts for migrants from China, Russia, Armenia, and other countries.

In 2010—2011, to help immigrants and refugees to get a better understanding of the Budapest labour market, the Budapest Chance nonprofit launched the European Commission-supported Learning Cities for Migrants Inclusion project.[4] The Budapest municipality adopted guidelines for social services employees in order to provide better access to the labour market for migrants and to improve the skills of public employees in working with immigrants and members of diasporas.

Conclusions

Although the EU does not influence the national integration policies of its member states directly, it develops regulations on migration policies. These documents have an indirect effect on integration processes and allocate dedicated funds. The coordination and cooperation pursued

[3] Minderheden Forum, 2017. *Wie zijn wij*. URL: http://www.minderhedenforum.be/wie-zijn-wij (accessed 03.05.2018) ; Federatie van sociaal-culturele verenigingen van mensen met een migratieachtergroung, 2018 ; *Scan 4 Diversity*. URL: http://fmdo.be/projecten/scan-4-diversity/ (accessed 03.05.2018).

[4] Learning Cities for Migrants Inclusion.

by the European Commission should and does result in the harmonisation of national laws with the EU directives and guidelines. The process is supported by different European funds. However, with the onset of the so-called migrantion crisis, the EU abandoned the idea of equating as much as possible the rights of migrants with those of EU citizens. This revision was necessitated by the objective reality faced by the EU member states, particular, Central European (Visagrad 4countries), that deny the EU resettlement policy. The complexity and ambiguity of migration processes leave little room for a common European policy for refugee redistribution and resettlement either in the EU or beyond it (for example, in Turkey) [25].

The analysis of the key areas and tools for collaborations of diaspora organisations with immigrants and their countries of origin shows that these initiatives can significantly contribute to the adaptation and integration of immigrants. At the same time, the efforts of supranational and national bodies aimed to engage diaspora organisations in integration processes are obviously insufficient. We hold that a greater emphasis should be placed on the current efforts of diasporas to promote the common European integration policy. They can be supported through the development of a regulatory framework for the coordination of diaspora organisations in the EU and through the simplification of financial assistance to such associations. In particular, A Common Agenda for Migration (2015) calls for the development of better tools for recruiting in-demand specialists. Thus, it seems promising to engage diaspora organisations in planning labour emigration from the countries of origin in line with the needs of the EU member states and in creating centres for professional training in both the countries of destination and origin.

Moreover, the current supranational integration agenda should be expanded to include a new objective, namely, narrowing the gap between the socioeconomic development of the countries of origin and the countries of destination. There is also a need to diversify the integration policy tools through the engagement of diaspora organisations in integration processes. In this respect, it might be useful to draw on the experience of the regions and municipalities that have established advisory bodies with diaspora participation to produce recommendations to public authorities on the problems of integration.

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THE CHINESE DIASPORA IN THE EU COUNTRIES

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This article is a further contribution to the discourse on the ethnic 'diffusion' in European countries — the debate started on the pages of the Baltic Region journal by the triumvirate of three authors — Yu. N. Gladky, I. Yu. Gladky, and K. Yu. Eidemiller [4]. We assume that Europe has been a major centre of attraction for immigrants in recent decades and a site for the rapid emergence of ethnic communities. Unlike Muslim immigration — a product of the Arab Spring and often a measure of the last resort, — the Chinese immigration is a result of a certain convergence between the ideologies of the host countries, committed to multiculturalism, and the country of origin, pursuing a 'go global' policy. We chose the EU countries as a 'demonstration site' and the Chinese diaspora as the object of research. Our aim is to describe the process of migration from China and the formation of a Chinese diaspora in European countries. We analyse the timeline and scope of Chinese immigration, the qualitative changes in the composition of the immigrants, factors affecting the choice of the country of entry, and the quantitative parameters and settlement patterns of today's Chinese diaspora in the region. We suggest grouping the Baltic region states by the numbers and 'age' of their Chinese diasporas. We consider the ethnic 'diffusion' as part of the 'European project' within Beijing's global strategy.

Keywords: ethnic 'diffusion', 'new' migrants, Chinese diaspora, EU countries

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European countries in the global migration mosaic. An integral part of the globalisation process, the international migration became an easily observable phenomenon at the end of the 20th century. As of 2015, according to the UN data, there were over 245 million people

living outside their country of origin,[1] which is approximately 3 % of the population of the Earth [25]. Obviously, the influence of the 'migrant nation' on the political, social, demographic, and economic development of individual countries, as well as on the intergovernmental collaborations and integration processes, is growing. The increase in irregular migration and the formation of ethnic communities often aggravates a wide range of problems. These include the 'erosion' of the pillars of national cultures, the replacement of the native population by migrants, the growing xenophobia, the overloading of the labour market and the social security system, brain drain, security threats (including those of terrorist attacks), the increased crime and corruption rates, etc. Recently, this problem has merited the close attention of international organisations, the governmental circles from different countries, the academic communities, and the general public [2; 5; 11; 13; 24].

One of the largest migration systems in the world, Europe is being tested in the crucible of mass immigration [10]. In 2015, the number of new arrivals was estimated at 1.5 million in the EU alone. In 2016, the estimate was at 1.8 million people (fig. 1).



Fig. 1. Changes in the number of immigrants in the EU, 2011—2017

Prepared based on [20].

With the looming economic downturn and ethnic tensions, many countries of the region imposed strict control over immigration and retargeted their migration policies at receiving the qualified specialists at the expense of all the other categories of migrants, including refugees. During his time in office, Nicolas Sarkozy stressed the need to move from

[1] This estimate does not take into account undocumented or irregular migrants.

'suffered' to 'chosen' immigration [26, p. 17]. Although the political elite has gained a better understanding of the gravity of the problem, few practical measures have been taken. This results in 'a rapidly growing criticism of the migration policy in Europe. The problem cannot be reduced to migration and minorities. They are not synonyms of poverty, unemployment, and aggression — which, for instance, Britons view as the cause of riots in their cities provoked by the so-called chavs. Crises also affect members of the middle class, thus widening the gap between them and the upper class. This does not eliminate the question about strategies for integration, adaptation, multiculturalism, focal or dispersed ethnic settlement pattern. Nor does it eliminate the question about social stratification or the absence thereof' [18, p. 11]. The temptation of multiculturalism remains a 'headache' for both Western European governments and the advocates of multicultural and tolerance [4, p. 45]. Before the beginning of the emergency EU summit on migration scheduled for June 2018, the President of France Emmanuel Macron emphasised that migrant crisis in the EU had grown into a political crisis [14].

'Two sides of the same coin' or the timeline of the Chinese immigration in Europe. Against the background of an unprecedented increase in immigration in the region in the aftermath of the Arab Spring, few studies pay attention to migration from China. Works focusing on the geographical aspect are either absent or unknown to us. To a degree, this is explained by the history of the process, which can be perceived and evaluated from two perspectives — those of the country of origin and the country of destination. In terms of scale, direction, and structure, Chinse emigration is divided into two distinct eras. The first era comprises three periods. The first period — from antiquity to the 19th century — is characterised by relatively modest Chiense migration to the neighbouring countries, primarily those of South-East Asia. The period spanning through the 19th century, the fall of the Qin dynasty, the substantial weakening of China, and the foundation of the People's Republic of China in 1949, was marked by a considerable expansion of the geography of migration, its main channel being the coolie trade. In the next three decades — from 1949 to 1978 — migration was almost non-existent, since the country's borders were closed at the time. The second era began as China embarked on economic reforms in 1978. Few have paid attention to the fact that almost half of today's Chinese diaspora emigrated from the country after this landmark event. The emergence of the so-called 'new' migrants dramatically affected the existing diasporas and the perception of the Chinese across the world. Such migrants have made a significant contribution to the development of China. They became a major force behind the Chinese modernisation and an important link between the People's Republic of China and the rest of the world [17].

Despite its geographical remoteness, the European continent has attracted the Chinese population for a long time. Experts distinguish three stages of the Chinese immigration in the region. The first stage — from the late 19th to the mid-20th century — was characterised by sporadic arrivals of the Chinese and the emergence of small diasporas in Western European countries, mostly those with a colonial past. Having come by sea, most migrants settled in the port cities. Others were arriving by land via Russia. The only period of a massive influx of migrants from China spanned the first years of the First World War, as the European countries were faced with workforce shortage. The native population of Great Britain and France often viewed such migrants as a 'national threat'. After the end of the war, most Chinese migrants were repatriated. During this period, Chinese migrants founded small Chinese quarters — ethnic enclaves, Chinatowns — in many large cities. The second stage (from the mid-20th century to the 1980s) witnessed an increase in the number of Chinese immigrants, accounted for by the undocumented emigration from the PRC during the Cultural Revolution and secondary migration influxes from Asia.[2] At the time, the Chinese appeared in the countries of Central Europe and occupied their own economic niche — the restaurant business [32]. The third, current, stage, is a product of the historical coincidence, when the second era of Chinese emigration met the liberalisation of migration laws in the European countries aimed at attracting international human resources. The distinctive features of the period are the massive Chinese immigration and the emergence of the Eastern European states as the likely destinations. The new wave is unique in terms of the sex ratio, the high proportion of young people and qualified specialists, and the large contribution of the educational migration. Note that over 2.6 million Chinese students obtained the higher education abroad. Only 1.1 million (41.9%) returned home. In 2011, 339 thousand Chinese students were studying at international universities [21; 30].

According to Ernst G. Raventstein's econometric model [34] and Everett S. Lee's push-pull theory — if one refrains from analysing the pushing agents — the attractiveness of Europe for the Chinese immigration is sustained by several groups of historico-geographical, political, and socio-economic factors. Calculating the correlation between the proportion of Chinese migrants in the national population and a series of statistically available measures for the set of EU member states (table 1) makes it possible to take into account and 'weigh' the significance of individual factors. It turns out that, alongside the tenets of the immigration policy, the most important motivators in choosing the country of destination are the local population's wellbeing and incomes, the labour market performance, and the economic cooperation between the possible destination and the PRC.

[2] The UK was the preferred destination for the ethnic Chinese from Malaysia and Hong Kong; the Netherlands, for those from Indonesia and Surinam; and France, for those from Indochina.

Table 1

The significance of factors affecting the Chinese immigration in European countries, 2013*

Measures	The proportion of the Chinese immigrants in the national population
HDI	0.7
Annual net	0.67
FDI stock from China	0.58
Unemployment rate	−0.26
Chinese diaspora as a proportion of the population	0.78

* Comment: the significance of factors is determined based on a calculation of rank correlation coefficients.

Compiled by the authors on the basis of [20; 23; 27; 29].

However, the decisive role is played by the 'feedback' — the presence of an established Chinese community (here, the correlation coefficient reaches 0.78), which once again testifies to the importance of immigrants' social networks.

In 2015, the Chinese accounted for less than 3 % of the 76 millions of international migrants in Europe [22; 23; 27]. Not all the first generation immigrants are the citizens of the PRC or the Republic of China.[3] Their distribution is very irregular, which is explained by the differences in the personal priorities and in the attractiveness of individual countries. For example, 285,000 Chinese people live in the UK, from 80 to 160 thousand in France, Italy, Spain, Germany, and the Netherlands. Much fewer Chinese immigrants live in Italy and Hungary. Note that, recently, the latter has been playing the role of the 'gate to Europe'.[4] In view of the high mobility of population both within the EU and beyond the Schengen Area, to obtain an accurate estimate of the distribution of the first-generation Chinese immigrants, it is necessary to eliminate the intraregional migrations. The calculations of the proportion of the Chinese in the allochtonous population show that, while becoming more pronounced, the overall situation does not change dramatically. However, it is possible to distinguish three categories of countries. The first one brings together states that are extremely attractive to Chinese migrants

[3] The European countries, all the countries of the EU, consider the Republic of China a part of the PRC and do not establish diplomatic ties with the former.

[4] For example, from October 1988 to April 1992, 45,000 transit migrants from China crossed the territory of Hungary. Later, they have scattered across Europe and, partly, North America [33, p. 16].

(the Netherlands, Ireland, Norway and Finland). The countries of the second category are equally attractive to Chinese and European migrants (Germany, Belgium, and Luxembourg). The third group comprises countries characterised by the greatest openness to the 'outer world'. The UK and France are the major destinations for migrants both from Europe and from all the other regions (fig. 2).



Fig. 2. Chinese migrants in the EU and EFTA countries, 2011

Prepared on the basis of [20; 23; 27].

The increase in the number and spatial concentration of immigrants launched the formation of a Chinse diaspora. Nevertheless, there is no established research methodology for studying this phenomenon. A clear definition, a set of generic characteristics, and a single classification are also lacking [5, p. 563, 569]. As T.S. Kondratyev stresses, despite the long history of the phenomenon, this diaspora drew the international researchers' attention only in the late 1970s. In Russia, they have been studied since the second half of the 1990s. Nevertheless, 'in the past decade, such eminent Russian researchers as M.A. Astvatsaturov, V.I. Dyatlov, T.S. Illarionov, Z.I. Levin, A.V. Militarev, T.V. Polodkov, V.D. Pop-

kov, V. A. Tishkov, Zh. T. Toshchenko, T. I. Chaptykova, and others have not only presented their viewpoints on a wide range of diaspora-related issues but also started an animated discussion' [9]. Chinese diaspora studies are complicated by a historically ramified conceptual framework. According to the law of the PRC on the Protection of the Rights and Interests of the Returned Overseas Chinese and their Relatives of September 7, 1990 [6], there are several terms and definitions for the Chines living outside the country.

Tongbao — 'compatriots' (Chinese 同胞) — are the Chinese living in the Republic of China and the special administrative regions of Hong Kong and Macau. Technically, they are not considered members of the Chinese diaspora.[5]

Huaqiao — 'Chinese migrants' (Chinese 华) — are the Chinese holding the citizenship of the PRC or the special administrative regions of Hong Kong and Macau but permanently residing abroad. Historically, this term included the Chinese migrants rather than those living overseas on a permanent basis. This term is widely used in the Russian language literature.

Waiji huaren — 'foreigners of Chinese descent' (Chinese 外籍华人) — are the Chinese (huaqiao and their descendants), naturalised or holding a foreign citizenship by birth, and thus stripped off the citizenship of the PRC, the Republic of China, or the special administrative regions of Hong Kong and Macau. This term refers to the foreigners of Chinese descent. It is often abbreviated to huaren — the Chinese (Chinese 华人).

Huayi — 'descendants of the Chinese' (Chinese 华裔) — are people of the Chinese origin, descendants of Chinese migrants. This term refers to people born and raised outside China, who studied and socialised abroad, i. e. the migrants of the second, third generations. The Huayi are part of huaren.

The term Haiwai huaren — the overseas Chinese (Chinese 海外华人 huaren) — refers to all the Chinese and people of Chinese origin living abroad, all the Chinese migrants, the overseas Chinese community, virtually, the Chinese diaspora. All the official documents of the PRC and the Republic of China use this term to denote the Chinese living outside China, regardless of their citizenship. It refers to both the citizens of the PRC, the Republic of China, and the special administrative regions of Hong Kong and Macau, residing abroad and the naturalised ethnic Chinese. The diaspora includes the descendants of the Chinese migrants and the people born outside China in multi-ethnic families but preserving their ethnic identity and ties to the homeland.

[5] After the incorporation of Hong Kong and Macau, on October 31, 2000, amendments were made to the respective laws.

The English language literature often uses a calque of the Chinese term to describe the diaspora (all the Chinese living outside China) — the overseas Chinese.

There can be no doubt about the existence of the Chinese diaspora as — according to the definition given by T. V. Poloskova — a robust cohesive social group (an association of people sharing a distinctive characteristic and participating in joint efforts coordinated by formal and informal institutions) that lives outside the country of the common geographical origin, has a common ethnic identity, and creates social, political, and economic institutions to support their identity and cohesion [15]. However, the varying terminology and principles of statistical recording cause the calculations of the size of the phenomenon to vary dramatically. The estimates of the number of the ethnic Chinese residing outside the country of origin range from 35 to 62 million people. In Beijing, they say with pride: 'Everywhere where the Sun shines, there are our compatriots' [12]. However, most of the Chinese community — above 70 % — lives in the ASEAN countries. In comparison, the diaspora in Europe looks very modest, although its exact numbers are unknown. In 2011, the Europe — China Research and Advice Network (ECRAN) estimated the number of the ethnic Chinese in the EU countries at 2.3 million people, which is 1.5 times the estimate of the Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission (OCAC) [27; 31].

At the same time, when compared to the other regions of the world, Europe stands out in that its Chinese diaspora is highly mosaic (fig. 3). Firstly, the size of diasporas ranges widely: from 650,000 in the UK to below 1,000 in some smaller countries. Secondly, the ratios between the huaren and huaqiao significantly differ, which translates into the predominant loyalty either to the local or to the Chinese authorities. Naturally, the former are prevalent in most of the EU member states with few exceptions (Italy, Spain, Finland, etc.). Thirdly, there is a dramatic differential among European countries in the proportions of the first-generation migrants with a 'youth excess', of highly educated people, and of the qualified specialists striving to assimilate with Europeans and find prestigious employment in science, medicine, business, finance, education, management or arts. Such migrants determine the quantitative parameters of the diaspora. They are responsible for the 'model minority' stereotype, entrenched in the American society.[6] However, this stereotype is only partly accurate, since it applies only to the privileged part of the diaspora. There is another, 'shadow' part, comprising the manufacturing and ser-

[6] The term 'model minority' was coined by the sociologist William Peterson in his essay 'Success Story: Japanese American Style' published by the *New York Times* in 1966. It referred to Asian Americans as ethnic minorities that managed, despite marginalisation, to achieve success in the US.

vice workers. Although they vary significantly in the demographic parameters, they are brought together by a low level of education and well-being, as well as a poor command of the local language. Many of such migrants are undocumented. This is a separate and, as of yet, poorly studied, field. However, the emergence of what is called in classical political science 'mutually reinforcing cleavages' — deep divides between local citizens and deprived immigrants speaking a different language and professing a different religion — is very unlikely in this case [28; 35; 37].



Fig. 3. The Chinese diaspora in the EU, 2011

Compiled by the authors on the basis of [20; 27; 31].

As of today, there exists parity between the first-generation Chinese immigrants (53 %) and the very diverse huayi in the EU. However, in the two thirds of the member states, the Chinese diaspora started to develop only recently, which testifies to the novelty of the phenomenon and stresses the need for further studies. A combined analysis of the size and 'age' of a diaspora makes it possible to divide the EU member states into four major groups. Two groups are represented by countries with a significant proportion of the Chinese diaspora. New' migrants account for less than 50 % in the first group (the UK, France, Italy, the Netherlands, and Ireland) and for over 50 % in the second one (Germany and Spain). The two groups characterised by small Chinese diasporas are formed by analogy. Most of such countries have a large proportion of the first-generation migrants (table 2). In a number of cases, for instance, in Sweden and the Baltics, they account for at least 85 % of the respective diasporas.

Table 2

The EU member states grouped by the size and 'age' of the Chiense diaspora, 2011

Size category	Size of the diaspora, thousands	'Age category':*	
		'Old'	'Young'
Large		Large and 'old'	Large and 'young'
	Above 500	UK, France,	
	100—500	Italy, Netherlands	Spain, Germany,
	50—100	Ireland	
Small		Small and 'old'	Small and 'young'
	10—50	Belgium, Portugal	Austria, Sweden, Greece, Hungary Denmark
	Below 10	Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia	Finland, the Czech Republic, Poland, Luxembourg, Cyprus, Slovenia, Lithuania, Croatia, Malta, Latvia, Estonia

* The 'age' of a diaspora is identified based on the proportion of the first-generation immigrants.

Compiled by the authors on the basis of [27].

The gravitation of the 'new' migration towards a few destination countries contributed to a greater differential in the Chinese diaspora distribution. The size of diasporas has a distinct longitudinal gradient — it decreases eastward (fig. 2) — closely corresponding to the geography of the most economically developed and populous countries. In particular,

this is proven by the high correlation coefficients for the EU member states (0.8174 for GDP and 0.7908 for the population size). Over 98 % of the diaspora live in 10 countries, with the UK and France being new home to 50 % of Chinese migrants. Large Chinese communities emerged in Germany, the Netherlands, Italy, and Spain. Note that the latter two states — which are often considered migrants exporters' — offered an amnesty to illegal immigrants. The Nordic countries and Eastern European states, the borders of which opened to the Chinese immigration only in the 1990s, pale against this background. The only exceptions are Hungary and Romania, which are characterised by an excessive proportion of the Chinese in the structure of international immigration. In other words, from the perspective of the core-periphery concept, the distribution of the Chinese diaspora in Europe is polycentric, with a distinctive regional core and a vast north-eastern periphery. Experts are expecting the diaspora to grow rapidly in the major countries of the core — the UK, France, Germany, and the Netherlands, as well as in Hungary, which still serves, to some degree, as a transit hub.

Due to a number of circumstances, the Chinese minority is almost absent in rural areas. The Chinese obviously gravitate towards cities. One might say that the distribution of the Chinese diaspora closely corresponds to Europe's urban geography, with an emphasis on capital and port cities. The discrimination against the Chinese at the first stage of immigration resulted in the emergence of ethnic enclaves — Chinatowns.7 The elimination of the problem, as well as the new integration opportunities, which arose after World War II, explain why there are no large American-style Chinese enclaves in the European agglomerations. The Chinese live dispersed across Europe. Sparsely populated, the few enclaves serve mostly as a scene for ethnic businesses. In the UK, the main centres of the Chinese diaspora settlement are London (30 % of the diaspora), Birmingham, Glasgow, Manchester, and Liverpool. In France, these are Lyon and Marseille; in Italy, Milan, Florence, Turin, and Venice; in Spain, Madrid, Barcelona, Valencia, and Alicante; in Germany, Berlin, Hamburg, Bonn, Frankfurt, and Munich; in the Netherlands, Amsterdam; in Ireland, Dublin. The histories, sizes, and structures of the diaspora are very different across these cities. This information can provide the key to understanding the geographical origins of the Chinese immigrants. The diaspora of the German agglomerations is dominated by the people from Shanghai and the north-eastern provinces of China. Most of the Chinese residing in Dublin came from Guangdong and Hong Kong. The Amsterdam Chinese originate, primarily, from Hong Kong and the former Dutch colonies — Indonesia and Suriname.

Ethnic 'diffusion' or a part of the 'European project' in Beijing's global strategy? Not only is the 'new' the Chinese immigration beneficial

[7] The largest Chinatowns are found in Paris, London, and Liverpool [19].

for the European sociodemographic structures and labour markets but it contributed to the image of the 'model minority' and changed the structure and distribution of the ethnic diaspora in the region. Depending on the initial research objective, the Chinese diaspora can be studied from different perspectives. Firstly, one may employ the Euro- or the Sinocentric approach. Secondly, such a research can be either specialised or comprehensive. In both cases, it is crucial to consider the most favourable conditions for immigration and emigration when the economic and cultural globalisation has eliminated the need to make a final decision about a permanent residence. Philip Q. Yang characterised this phenomenon as the 'transnationalism' of Chinese migration [36].

Within the transition to the third global integration cycle, the problem of the Sinification of Europeans is assuming a partly local character amid the emerging struggle of major powers for the world leadership. The current positions of the parties involved in the migration processes can be generalised and expressed by oriental provers. For China, the most suitable saying is 'The best time to plant a tree was 20 years ago. The second best time is now'. For Europe, it is 'Live in peace. When the spring comes it will take no effort for the flowers to bloom'. Remarkably, China considers emigration to be a part of its global strategy, which can be easily combined with other effective 'soft power'[8] tools to engage European countries in cooperation in various fields, including trade, projects and investment, research and development, education,[9] sociocultural initiatives, etc.

In Europe, the scale of Chinese businesses is much larger than that of all the other Asian minorities. Over the past six years, Chinese investment in the EU has increased tenfold [7]. According to EY Consulting, it grew threefold in 2016 alone — from USD 30.1 billion to 85.8 billion. That year, the Chinese bought into 309 European companies. Here, Germany ranks first (68 companies); the UK second (47); and France and Italy, third (34 each). For the sake of comparison, ten years ago, in 2007, the Chinese purchased 51 European companies [16]. Although the priorities of the Chinese are quite clear, the country's investment is very diverse in terms of geography. It is present in all the European states, including those of the Baltic region. In particular, the project 16 +1 [10] was launched as early as 2012 to promote cooperation with Central and East-

[8] The term 'soft power' is interpreted very differently. In China, it means 'wise power'. Principally, it stands for the Confucian wisdom and the cultural identity, which serve as major guidelines for the country's foreign policy decision-making [8].

[9] For example, according to the Ministry of Education of China, as of the end of 2017, European countries accounted for over 1/3rd of all the Confucius Institutes and Classrooms.

[10] It brings together eleven EU member states and five Balkan countries (Albania, Bulgaria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Croatia, Montenegro, the Czech Republic, and Estonia).

ern European states. The central goal of the project is to 'gain access to technology and research, the international sales channels and the major brands, to ensure the supply of raw materials for the needs of the Chinese economy. Another goal of Chinese businesses is investment in the external infrastructure projects, as well as granting the concessional loans to projects carried out by Chinese contactors' [1].

In other words, China is 'here to stay'. Moreover, the official Beijing is shutting down repatriation projects, which were aimed at making up for the human capital losses, and is embarking on a 'serve the homeland from abroad' strategy. The new strategy is designed to create a Sinocentric stratum that will serve as a factor of the national influence in the countries with a high proportion of ethnic communities. Later, such interest groups are expected to entrench themselves in the socio-political and economic spheres of the country of destination and, when necessary, promote the interests of China. Thus, the emphasis will be placed on the preservation and strengthening of the diaspora's national identity as a factor of China's future global political and economic superiority [3].

This study gives rise to a series of general and specific questions. The former relate to the joint interdisciplinary efforts in studying the phenomenon of ethnic diasporas, the modernisation of the international migrant registration system, and the creation of a single centre for the registration of people living outside the country of birth. The specific questions focus on Russia, particularly, on the development of effective collaborations with the Russian diaspora, on the launch of international projects, and on a comprehensive consideration of the international — primarily, the Chinese — experience in implementing a 'soft power' policy.

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ECONOMIC AND DEMOGRAPHIC SECURITY

EVALUATING AND MEASURING THE SECURITY OF RUSSIA'S BORDER REGIONS: THEORY AND PRACTICE

E. V. Voloshenko[1]
K. Yu. Voloshenko[1]

The economic security of Russia's regions has been the focus of numerous studies. Significant contributions have been made to relevant methodological approaches and measurement tools. However, economic security has been little studied in the context of border regions. In this article, we address the methodological problems of employing existing methods and models for measuring the economic security of border regions. We pay special attention to the development of an evaluation algorithm incorporating the border regions' characteristics, the identification of groups (classes), a set of universal, specific, and special indicators as well as the impact of protective measures on economic security. To justify our proposals, we analyse the economic security of the Kaliningrad region; it is a study based on an evaluation of protective measures in the regional agricultural industry and of the effect of different factors on the generation of value added in the sector. We emphasise the need to take into account regional conditions when assessing economic security and to introduce economic and mathematical calculations into the relevant measurement algorithm at its different stages. We use our findings in providing a rationale for the central principles and procedures for creating a comprehensive model of the economic security of Russia's western border regions.

Keywords: economic security, border region, types, measures, evaluation methods, sectoral model, Kaliningrad region

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Introduction

The problems of measuring and evaluating regional economic security have been addressed in many works by Russian and international authors. Researchers pay special attention to terminology, threats, techniques, and algorithms for evaluating regional economic security, to indicators and their threshold values, and to management mechanisms and tools to enhance regional economic security [1, p. 5]. Despite the rapid development of the theory and practice of regional economic security, many methodological problems remain unsolved. In particular, there is no universally accepted list of regional indicators. The problems of justifying and forecasting the threshold values of such indicators remain poorly studied. Moreover, there is a need for a deeper insight into the effects of exceeding the threshold values. Thus, it is difficult to identify the state of a regional system and, according to [2], to establish the boundaries of its critical state that would hinder the normal development of the economy and social sphere. Note that critical states translate into the destructive tendencies in production and standards of living. Moreover, there are very few studies on the specifics of border regions.

The relevance of studying the evaluations of the economic security of Russia's border regions determined the aims and objectives of this research. We set out to assess the applicability of the existing theoretical and methodological approaches to the examination of border regions' economic security when developing a methodological framework for the use of such approaches. We considered the specifics of border regions, in particular, their economic performance, the quality of and risks associated with the environment, their influence at the national level, and the consequences of different threats and shocks, as against the other regions of Russia.

The novelty of the study lies in that we define the content and essence of the concept of economic security and its evaluation in the context of border regions. Moreover, we develop an assessment algorithm that will ensure the compliance with the situation identification requirements, contribute to the forecasting of the degree of region's 'safety', and help to assess the consequences of measures taken to overcome weaknesses.

Following the logic of the study, in this article, we consider consecutively the theoretical and practical problems of assessing the economic security of Russian regions, as well as the application methods and models for measuring economic security when analysing border regions. We present an algorithm for assessing and evaluating the economic security of border regions. In order to identify and evaluate the effect of protective measures on the level of economic security, we justify the application of

certain economico-mathematical models. We illustrate our findings with a value added simulation for the Kaliningrad region's agricultural industry. The simulation is based on the sectoral models that we developed in the framework of a project aimed to create data analysis software for regional studies. The project was supervised by Dr. Kseniya Voloshenko [3].

The theoretical framework for a methodology for diagnosing and evaluating regional economic security

A significant contribution to the studies into the problems of Russia's economic security and the development of a methodology for assessing regional economic security was made by researchers from the Institute of Economics of the Russian Academy of Sciences (Moscow) under the supervision of V.K. Senchagov [2; 4—7]. Equally important input was provided by research teams from the Institute of Economics of the Ural Branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences (Yekaterinburg), led by A.I. Tatarkin and A.A. Kuklina [8—11]; from the Institute of Economics and Industrial Engineering of the Siberian Branch of the RAS (Novosibirsk), led by S.V. Kazantsev [12—14]; and from the R.E. Alekseev State Technical University of Nizhny Novgorod (Nizhny Novgorod), led by S.N. Mityakov [2; 15; 16].[1] The Omsk Research Centre of the Siberian Branch of the RAS and the Omsk Regional Laboratory for Economic Studies of the Institute of Economics and Industrial Engineering of the Siberian Branch of the RAS also carry out research in the field, under the supervision of V.V. Karpov [1; 17].

The approaches to evaluating and diagnosing regional economic security have been classified in the works of V.K. Senchagov, Yu. M. Maksimov, S.N. Mityakov, and O.I. Mityakova [2; 6]; A.V. Konstantinov, E.A. Kolesnichenko, I.N. Yakunina, I.D. Motin [18]; A.A. Korableva, and V.V. Karpov [1]; Tambovtsev V.L. [19]; A.I. Tatarkin and A.A. Kuklin [10]; M.I. Krotov and V.I. Muntiyan [20], and others.

In the international literature, as T. D. Romashchenko stresses [21], economic security is studied within two independent disciplines — catastrophe theory (C. Zeeman, T. Oliva, E. Laszlo) and theory of risk (R. Dembo, R. Ceske, J. Clark, K. Arrow). Among the most prominent Western researchers focusing on the problems of economic security are R. Godland and H. Daly [22], V. Cable [23], A. Posen and D. K. Tarullo [24], Sheila R. Ronis [25], p. J. DeSouza [26, 27], Joseph J. Romm [28], A.H. Westing [29], Craufurd D.W. Goodwin [30], H. Nesadurai [31],

[1] Since 2010, the R.E. Alekseev State Technical University of Nizhny Novgorod has been closely collaborating with the Institute of Economics of the Russian Academy of Sciences. A laboratory for the regional problems of economic security was created and the 'Economic Security of Russia: Problems and Prospects' annual international conference established.

D.K. Nanto [32], Miles Kahler [33], G. Geeraerts and H. Weiping [34], M. Li [35], C. Lee [36], Jiang Yong [37]. In considering the phenomenon of economic security in the context of national security, they employ such categories as sustainability, efficiency, and globalisation.

Traditionally, Western researchers associated the term 'security' with protection from external threats (see, for example, [20; 25; 38]), as something that requires action from armed forces and intelligence services [39, p. 93]. However, later, 'security' studies incorporated a pronounced economic component. In particular, internal security factors are studied in the context of globalisation and international relations, [31; 33] and industry security in the context of industrial economics [35]. Moreover, the concept of 'economic security' is converging with that of 'sustainability'. In a number of works, there have been attempts to develop a system of measures that would take into account all the functional components of economic security. Here, one must mention R.M. Ashimov, A.S. Vasilyev, N.S. Vashchekin, A.V. Vorotyntsev, A.L. Gendon, G.A. Gershanokm N.S. Komendantova-Amann, I.I. Kokhanovskaya, Zh. A. Mingaleva, V.V. Mishchenko, A.A. Polyakov, A.L. Romanovich, A.D. Ursul, and O.N. Yutyaev.

This work is an attempt to adapt current theoretical and methodological findings to the conditions of a border region. This relates to the basic concepts, the evaluation of individual elements of economic security, the creation of an economic security system at the level of a border region, and the methodology for assessing and evaluating the phenomenon. In particular, based on an analysis of the existing approaches to regional economic security, we identify its semantic content as applied to a border region. This makes it possible to justify the key criteria for assessing and evaluating the economic security of border regions and to develop an assessment algorithm when considering the applicability of the current methodological approaches. Such an algorithm takes into account 1) the typological distinctions of regions, including border ones; 2) the identification of groups (classes) of threats to certain types of regions; 3) general, specific, and special indicators corresponding to performance assessment and the effect of border position factors. In building on the achievements and major findings of earlier studies, we contribute to the development of a theoretical and methodological framework for economic security studies in the context of border regions.

A rationale for applying current models and techniques to the evaluation of the economic security of border regions

A considerable number of original approaches to assessing regional economic security have been proposed so far. The range of tools is constantly growing. However, only a small group of techniques, most of which are based on measuring the dynamics of macroeconomic indicators, ranking, indices, and expert reviews, has found wide currency. Eco-

nomic and mathematical techniques and models are used much more rarely. A number of works analyses the methods for, and approaches to, assessing regional economic security [see, for example, 1; 2; 6; 9; 40; 41]. Based on our earlier conclusions, we systematise the existing approaches and offer an overview of models and techniques as applied to assess the economic security of border regions. The criteria for assessing the applicability of the existing approaches are identified based on the largely accepted theoretical concepts of economic security and respective approaches to defining the scope of the category of economic security [1; 6; 42] — fig. 1.



Fig. 1. The semantic content of the concept of 'economic security' in assessing and measuring border regions

Comment: ES is economic security, RES regional economic security.
Source: adapted from [1; 6; 40; 42].

At the same time, we are concerned with the fuzziness and generic character of the concept, whereas some publications do not add any clarity either to the classification or to the definition of the supplementary semantic content [40, p. 127]. Unfortunately, many works copy or borrow generously from other publications and studies, which largely complicates establishing exact authorship of the ideas proposed.

From the perspective of analysing the essence of the concept and the basic characteristics, the economic security of border regions should be considered, in our opinion, through examining or creating a combination of conditions and factors that ensure protection from external and internal threats and the achievement of desired goals. Therefore, the characteristics of border regions — their geography, economic structure, potential, resources, and others — account for the need to employ the philosophical and organisational approaches to studying economic security, which has been stressed by T. Yu. Serebryakova and N. Yu. Timofeeva [43, p. 239]. This equally applies to the 'economic security triad' of interests, stability, and independence, which was formulated by S.A. Afontsev [44, p. 16]. On the one hand, border regions are affected by negative external and internal impacts more strongly than their inland counterparts are. Here, 'safety' — the situation when 'external or internal threats to the preservation of a region's socioeconomic and financial strength are either absent or minimised' [6] — acquires crucial importance. On the other hand, in view of the considerable uncertainty and risks associated with a border region's environment, which may cause stability to suffer, achieving the state of safety is impossible without proactivity, adequate and timely reactions to challenges, and the creation of necessary conditions and factors. All this comprises the organisational approach to the problem of economic security.

In studying the category, or object, of economic security, it is important to consider international trade, since the geographic position of border regions makes them highly dependent on transboundary ties and the quality and condition of intergovernmental relations [45, p. 3]. As a result, border regions have a high capacity to integrate into the processes of the international division of labour and to gain competitive advantages by developing international cooperation and supporting various integrating forms of cooperation. In the structure of economic relations, international trade serves as one of the important sources of reproductive processes in a regional economy. However, under adverse conditions, external factors have a significant destructive effect on regional economies.

The border position of a region — a territory that is sometimes remote or isolated (for example, the Kaliningrad region) from Russia's major centres for industry, technology, resources, and production — lays down certain requirements to a balanced development from the perspectives of both internal growth and socioeconomic development and of national economic security. We consider equilibrium as the achievement of desired ratios and as a condition for economic reproduction. As a system-

ic characteristic of the rates and ratios of economic development, regional equilibrium can be ensured only through the interactions of local forms (based on production factors and stages of the production cycle [see, for instance, 46, p. 35]).

In the context of border regions, an analysis of the concept of 'economic security' helps to identify major criteria for assessing the applicability of the existing approaches to evaluating economic security. These criteria include:

1) consideration for types and specific features of regions. Regardless of the usual typology of regions, it is advisable to identify regional characteristics pertaining to the emergence and impacts of different classes of threats. This criterion is of critical importance for border regions;

2) indicators for evaluating different classes of threats, including those associated with international trade, from the perspective of the influence of transboundary ties and the quality and condition of intergovernmental relations on the financial and economic operations and regional performance;

3) an assessment of the (lack of) equilibrium and existing ratios in studying the economic security of different types of regions (particularly, border ones);

4) a developed research framework for analytical tools used to evaluate economic security: a procedure for compiling a list of indicators and their threshold values (economic and mathematical models, expert reviews, comparisons of statistical data, etc.), opportunities for assessing and forecasting the situation, comparisons with other regions;

5) the possibility of evaluating regional economic security in view of threat-producing catalyses for crises and the degree of a regional system's 'safety' and weaknesses (fig. 2).



Fig. 2. The place of regional economic security (RES) in the change in an economic system's condition

Source: prepared based on [44].

In our study, 'weaknesses' stand for the condition of institutions, the quality of individual parameters and elements of a regional system, as well as factors and conditions precluding effective protection.

As a result, the existing and emerging actual and potential threats have a negative effect on, and adverse consequence for, a region. In particular, they result in deviations from equilibrium, disproportions, and skewed ratios. Overall, threats translate into the deterioration of a region's macroeconomic performance. All the approaches have similar limits as concerns the application of the techniques for assessing the economic security of border regions (table 1). Firstly, the procedure for selecting the indicators is not evident. Secondly, the sources for identifying the indicators' 'threshold' values are not clear. Thirdly, the universal nature of the techniques and approaches does not allow for the specific features of regions, in particular, border ones.

We believe that the disadvantages of the approaches to, and techniques for, evaluating the performance of border regions can be overcome by developing an algorithm for measuring economic security.

A methodology for evaluating and assessing a border region's economic security

An algorithm for assessing regional economic security has been addressed in the literature [10; 15; 47; 48 et al.]. Based on these findings, we propose to identify groups (classes) of threats to individual types of regions and to justify a system of general, specific, and special assessment indicators (fig. 3).

General indicators of the degree to which the major goals and objectives of protection and regional economic security are attained correspond to national interests. These indicators have the same form and content for any territory and object of assessment.

Specific indicators are those of the specific features of individual territories. These features are identified according to the groups (classes) of threats and problems in ensuring regional economic security. Special indicators are used to evaluate a region's safety in terms of food, transport, energy, financial, social, and other types of security.

The identification of the limits of the indicators' 'threshold' values requires a rationale that will use economico-mathematical simulations in combination with expert reviews. This combination is necessary for carrying out both quantitative and qualitative evaluations. Of crucial importance is the identification of the stage of indicator analysis and forecast. This makes it possible to assess the 'safety' of a regional economic system and its weaknesses based on deviations from 'threshold' indicators.

Table 1

Techniques and models for assessing and evaluating economic security

Approaches, techniques, models	Essence	Limits of application in the case of border regions
Macroeconomic techniques S. Yu. Glazyev [50]; E.A. Utkin and A.F. Denisov [51]; I.V. and N.I. Krasnikov [52]; E.D. Kormishkin [53]	The development of a system of RES indicators and identification of their threshold values and deviation, in particular, by using indices	The techniques do not take into account the specifics of regions of different types; it is not clear how the indicators are selected; sustainability parameters are not evaluated. The techniques satisfy applicability criteria 2 and 5
Expert review and rankings N.V. Dyuzhenkova [54]; S.P. Volkov [55]; N.P. Lyubushin, E.E. Kozlova, O.G. Cherkasova [56]	Ranking, scoring, expert reviews, in particular, by means of standardisation, normalisation, and the calculation of a composite index	The techniques and approaches cannot be applied to system sustainability parameters, assessment of catalysts for crisis, weakness, and 'safety'. The techniques satisfy applicability criteria 2 and 4
Economic-statistical techniques V.K. Senchagov [2; 4—6]; S.N. Mityakov [2; 4; 15; 16]; I. V. Dolmatov [57]; O.S. Filetkin [58]; S.N. Yashin, E.N. Puzov [59]; I.V. Nikiforova [60]	A multivariate statistical analysis, correlation and regression analysis, index technique, ANOVA	The techniques do not take into account the specifics of regions of different types. Approaches to the identification of 'threshold' values are lacking. The assessment of weakness and 'safety' is complicated. The techniques satisfy applicability criteria 2, 4, 5
Econometric (economic mathematics) V.V. Karpov and K.K. Loginov [17]; Lapaev D.N. [15; 47]; E.S. Mityakov [16; 47]; Lagzdin A. Yu. [61]; V.V. Karpov, A.A. Korableva [1; 14; 17]	ARIMA, ARMA, differential calculus, Fourier analysis, adaptive filtering, fractal analysis, etc.	The technique is complicated in terms of cross-regional measurements and comparative analysis (within one type). The possibilities for a follow-up monitoring are not clear. The techniques satisfy applicability criteria 2, 4 and 5

Game-theoretical techniques and operational research V. V. Ivchenko, T. M. Shulkina, M. V. Bilchak [62]; O. V. Komelina, N. A. Fursova[63]; S. G. Svetunkov and T. S. Klebanova [64]; V. V. Nikitin [65]	Network and analytical simulations, CGE models, elements of the complex variable theory	The techniques are applicable to measurements at the level of a single region. The results of evaluating the impact and consequences of threats are satisfactory but require a large number of calculations. The techniques satisfy applicability criteria 1, 2, 3
Neural network and fuzzy set techniques and models O. V. Latuta [48]; A. F. Rogachev [66]; V. V. Borisov, V. V. Kruglov, A. S. Fedulov [67]; A. I. Galushkin [68]	Neural network models for assessing a region's fragility and relevant threats using the mathematical tools of fuzzy logic	The application is limited to the identification and/or forecasting of the proximity of crises (catastrophes). The approach has to be further developed to cater to a wider range of problems. The techniques satisfy applicability criteria 2, 4
Balance method O. N. Chuvilova and I. V. Romanyuta [69]; E. S. Yankovskaya [70]	Geo-economic (geo-financial) balance, economic system imbalances as a threat to RES. An assessment of individual RES parameters: food, energy, financial, and other types of security	The я satisfy applicability criteria 2, 3, 5
Integrated approach V. K. Senchagov [6]; A. I. Tatarkin [9]; D. V. Tretyakov [41]; D. A. Kuznetsov and M. N. Rudenko [71]; T. Yu. Feonfilova [72]; T. D. Romashchenko [21**Ошибка! Источник ссылки не найден.**]	A combination of the above techniques and approaches at different stages of aggregation	The techniques are universal, which precludes the identification of the essence and features of ES evaluation in the case of border regions. The techniques satisfy applicability criteria 2, 4, and 5

Comments: 1 — region type, 2 — threat class (according to their sources and/or types), 3 — system stability parameters (balance, ratios, equilibrium), 4 — a developed research framework, 5 — an assessment of catalysts for crises, weaknesses, and 'safety'.

Source: prepared based on [40; 41].



Fig. 3. An algorithm for regional economic security assessment taking into account the border region typology

Source: prepared by the authors.

If relevant data and the results of economico-mathematical simulations of a regional system's development are available, it is advisable to assess and forecast the impact of the existing and proposed 'protection' measures on the level of economic security. The last step of the algorithm is of special importance. However, such assessments are not carried out. The problem of ensuring regional economic security in view of the efficiency of the measures taken and their effect on the achievement of targets remain unsolved. Moreover, a relevant methodological framework is lacking.To illustrate the above conclusions we propose to consider the application of economico-mathematical simulations to evaluating the effect of different factors and conditions on regional economic security and assessing the efficiency of 'protection' measures. The analysis employs economico-mathematical techniques based on our earlier developed sectoral models [3; 49], as applied to a regional milk and dairy market. There were several reasons to select such an object. Firstly, it is the availability of representative data on milk and dairy products, which were obtained through sampling value added chains in the Kaliningrad region's agricultural industry. Secondly, the problem of milk and dairy supply deserves special attention from the perspective of food security. Thirdly, milk and dairy value chains [3] were thoroughly studied, which was made possible by the availability of full and relevant information on the coordination of actors in the production chains of the regional agricultural industry.

The reference conditions for assessments and simulations are presented below.

We started from the changes in the regional economic environment that took place in 2014—2016 amid the deterioration of the geopolitical situation, the sanctions imposed by the EU and the US against Russia, and Russia's countersanctions.

1. Industry: milk and dairy products.

2. Threats and risks: currency basket volatility; a reduction in the imports of raw materials and components; changes in the sales geography.

3. Target: an assessment of the efficiency of the measures for regulating the level of regional production localisation, from the perspective of economic security (in the case of the agricultural industry). Reference year: 2014.

4. Measure subject to regulation: the proportion of imported components. There are three variants for the calculation of the proportion of imported components. Variant (1) is assumed at the level of the reference year, (2) is reduced by 50 % as compared with the reference year; (3) is reduced by 0 %.

5. All the variants allow for exchange rate volatility as compared with the reference year. According to the Central Bank of the Russian Federation, the average nominal euro to rouble exchange rate was 50.46 roubles in 2014, 67.43 roubles in 2015, and 74.06 roubles in 2016.[1]

[1] The Central Bank of the Russian Federation. URL: https://www.cbr.ru/statistics (accessed 07.12.2017).

Table 2 and figures 4 and 5 show selected results of the testing of the model for the milk and dairy market.

Table 2

A comparative analysis of regulatory measures in the agricultural industry of the Kaliningrad region from the perspective of economic security

Measure	Simulation output		
	Variant 1	Variant 2	Variant 3
1. A reduction in the value added along the chain caused by currency exchange rate violations, %			
value added at the optimal price and demand levels	–10.29	–9.37	–8.54
valued added at scenario (actual) price and demand values	–12.84	–10.63	–8.65
2. The ratio between the scenario (actual) and optimal value added, %			
without currency rate volatility	81.12	81.42	81.82
after changes in the currency rate	78.82	80.29	81.82
3. An increase in the value added upon a reduction in the proportion of imported components, as compared with the reference year, %			
without changes in the currency rate	100.00	100.63	101.70
agriculture companies	100.00	100.80	102.15
processing companies	100.00	100.66	101.76
after a change in the currency rate	100.00	103.18	106.59
agriculture companies	100.00	104.04	108.37
processing companies	100.00	103.33	106.91

Source: calculated using the authors' methodology.

A reduction in the imports at the level of agriculture companies (table 2) leads to a smaller decrease in the value added along the chain in comparison with the reference year (–10.29% according to variant 1, –8.54% according to variant 2). At the same time, an increase in localisation against a reduction in the value added, following a change in the currency rate (variant 1), translated in a subsequent growth in value added by 6.59% (variant 3).

All the variants show an increase in the value added in comparison with the guaranteed value added. This is explained by that the actual market prices grew more rapidly than the cost of purchasing resources from external suppliers.



Fig. 4. Changes in the value added along the chain, in comparable prices (the case of milk and dairy products), million roubles

Source: calculated based on the authors' methodology[2].



a) Value added along the chain at an optimal price and demand level

b) Value added at the scenario (actual) price and demand level

Fig. 5. Value added along the chain, in comparable prices (the case of milk and dairy products), million roubles

Source: calculated based on the author's methodology.

[2] Guaranteed value added is the value added obtained by regional agricultural and processing industry companies in the previous (reference) period.

However, as the currency rate changes, the measures to increase the production localisation cannot make up for a reduction in the value added. Within variant 3, the scenario (actual) cost reaches 1 209.64 million roubles, whereas, at a stable exchange rate and proportion of imports, it would be at 1 301.98 million roubles. Complete discontinuation of imports (fig. 5) translates into a reduction of the value added — 566.4 million roubles as against 614.09 million roubles in the reference year.

Overall, calculations suggest that a reduction in the costs borne by agriculture companies and an increase the value added occur as production localisation grows. Changes in the currency rate have a negative impact on value added (a reduction by 8—12 %). In the case of the economic security of the Kaliningrad region, it is clear that even a full transition to Russian components does not ensure the optimal level of the value added, either before or after the change in the currency rate (a reduction within 18 %).

All the above stresses the need for the employment of additional tools. Firstly, it is a reduction in imports at the level of processing companies. Secondly, it is cooperation and networking at the level of the chain. Thirdly, it is the introduction of special measures, different from production localisation.

The above simulation emphasises the need to take into account regional specifics when evaluating economic security, as well as the importance of employing economico-mathematical calculations at different steps of the assessment algorithm.

Conclusions

This study addressed the most acute methodological problems of applying the existing techniques and models for economic security evaluation to border regions. These are the definition of the content of a border region's economic security and the identification of relevant conditions and factors, and significant principles and criteria. Overall, these issues comprise a framework for the further development of a methodology for a border region's economic security.

Based on the existing theoretical and practical works on regional economic security, and our own study into the theory and practice of evaluating Russia's regional economic security, we developed recommendations for improving the algorithm for assessing and evaluating economic security in the case of border regions.

The following requirements turn out to be of crucial importance: 1) the consideration of the types and specifics of regions; 2) the evaluation of different classes of threats, including those relating to international trade;

3) an assessment of the equilibrium and relevant ratios; 4) a developed research framework; 5) the identification of catalysts for crises resulting in threats and the assessment of a regional system's 'safety' and weaknesses.

An overview of the theoretical and methodological issues relating to assessing and evaluating economic security in the case of border regions requires the identification of most urgent problems. Our study can serve as the basis for theoretical and practical recommendations for developing an integrated approach to evaluating border regions' economic security. We believe the following theoretical and methodological tools to be the most significant.

1. The formulation of a more precise definition of the concept and structure of the functional components of a border region's 'economic security' in view of the synthesis of the relevant theoretical foundations. For instance, it is important to consider the systemic, situational, process, resource (investment), cluster, and cyclic approaches [18, p. 242—243].

2. A classification and a typology of economic security indicators in view of regional specifics. The identification of essential elements of border regions' economic security. These elements are subject to assessment and evaluation. The requirement of result comparability and sufficiency for ensuring the economic security of border regions amid geopolitical turbulence.

3. An assessment of the applicability of different models, techniques, and tools to assessing and evaluating a border region's economic security. The development of a methodological framework for, and an integrated approach to, assessing and evaluating the economic security of border regions. Techniques and models are tested in the cases of Saint Petersburg, Sevastopol, the Leningrad, Kaliningrad, Smolensk, and Rostov regions, and the Republic of Crimea.

4. The construction of a conceptual model of regional economic security in order to assess the impact of changes in geopolitical, geo-economic, geo-ecological, and other factors on a region's economic security.

5. The testing of the conceptual economic security model in the cases of Russia's western borderlands (Saint Petersburg Sevastopol, Leningrad, Kaliningrad, Smolensk, Rostov, Murmansk, Pskov, Bryansk, Kursk, and Voronezh regions, and the Republics of Crimea and Karelia).

We believe that a major impediment to the study was the large number of quantitative and qualitative parameters that lack representative databases and official statistics. Moreover, there is a need to develop a package of economico-mathematical models that require identification and adjustment to individual regional economic systems. Special attention should be paid to expanding the use of economico-mathematical

techniques and models, particularly, in assessing the influence of various factors and administrative and regulatory measures on changes in the economic security parameters.

In view of the urgency of the above problems, our findings and recommendations will be used in developing and testing a conceptual economic security model for the regions of Russia's western borderlands.

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DEMOGRAPHIC SITUATION AND DEMOGRAPHIC SECURITY IN THE REGIONS OF RUSSIA'S WESTERN BORDERLANDS

G.M. Fedorov[1]

In this study, I address the vast and complicated problem of population replacement in Russia's border regions. Although both national and regional demographic indicators have improved in Russia in recent years, many issues relating to sub-replacement fertility, irrational migration, etc. remain unresolved. This lends an urgency to studying regional demographic security, namely, the problems of ensuring replacement fertility, regulating migrations, and overcoming a skewed age and sex structure. I provide a detailed definition of the notion of demographic security and a list of indicators for evaluating it. I stress typological differences in the demographic situation across Russia's western borderlands to ensure a differentiated approach to providing regional demographic security. In this study, I use economic-statistical methods, a comparative analysis, and an empirical typology of regions based on the above indicators. In terms of theory, the findings obtained can contribute to a more detailed definition of demographic security and a better methodology of regional population studies. In practical terms, the study has relevance to the development of proposals for improving national and regional demographic policy and regional strategic planning given the identified typological differences.

Keywords: demographic situation, demographic situation, demographic security, Russia, Western borderlands

Introduction

Studies of the effect of a border position on the development of Russian regions stretching along Russia's western border gained momentum in the 2010s [1—4]. However, comparative analysis and classification of the totality of border regions lying in the West of the country remain a relatively new line of research [5—7].

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The key to comparative analysis of regional situations is the juxtaposition of regional demographic processes. Although the interest in demographic problems dropped in the 1990s, recently they were once again brought to the fore of social studies in Russia. This may be explained by depopulation and ageing, processes observed in both Russia and the overwhelming majority of economically developed countries. Another factor is uncontrolled migration, which may be viewed as irrational from the perspective of not only economics but also politics and social matters. Overall, significant differences in the demographic performance of Russian regions lend an urgency to research in the field.

Not only the socioeconomic but also the political significance of studies into national and regional demographic processes is associated with the emerging concept of 'demographic security'. It is often considered as falling within the broader category of 'integrated regional security' or 'economic security'. However, it can take on an independent meaning, since it is ultimately connected to the very existence of the nation.

In this article, I will attempt to define the scope of the concept of 'demographic security', clarify its use at a regional level, identify the indicators of demographic security, and estimate values of such indicators for the regions located in Russia's western borderlands — an area of exceptional geopolitical significance.

The concept of Russia's borderlands

Russia's borderlands — if both the land and maritime borders are taken into account — include 17 Russian regions from the Nenets autonomous region in the north to the Krasnodar region in the south [6]. Ten of them were border territories in the Soviet period (the old western borderlands) and seven became such after the disintegration of the USSR (fig. 1).

As to the old western borderlands, the Nenets autonomous region, the Arkhangelsk region, and the city of Sevastopol have only a maritime border. The Republic of Karelia, the Leningrad, Kaliningrad, and Krasnodar regions, and the Republic of Crimea have both maritime and land borders. Technically, Saint Petersburg does not have either a land or a maritime border. However, we class the city as a border region, since it comprises an integrated socioeconomic system with the Leningrad region, which is a borderland. Moreover, playing a crucial role in the defence of the national border, the city's port of Kronstadt is one of the two major bases of Russia's navy in the Baltic.

Russia's new western borderlands with land boundaries include the Pskov, Smolensk, Bryansk, Kursk, Belgorod, and Voronezh regions. The Rostov region has both a land and a maritime border.



Fig. 1. Russia's western borderlands

A — old borderlands; B — new borderlands; 1 — Russian regions with an outlet to a maritime national border (including Saint Petersburg); 2 — Russian regions with an outlet to a maritime and a land border (in the USSR, the Republic of Crimea and the Krasnodar region had only a maritime outlet); 3 — Russian regions with an outlet to a land border

Prepared by the author.

Demography of the western borderlands

Although the demographic situation in Russia's western borderlands has many common features with the national performance, it also has a number of distinctive characteristics. Moreover, there are significant disparities between the old and the new western borderlands.

Figure 2 shows changes in the population change rate in 1959—1989 and 1989—2018. Noticeably, in both periods, the old western borderlands performed above the national average. In both periods, their population was growing, although in 1989—2018 at a lower rate than in 1959—1989. The new western borderlands performed below the national average, and thus below the old western borderlands' rates. In 1959—1989, a slight growth was observed and 1989—2018 witnessed a slight population decline.



Fig. 2. Population change dynamics in Russia's old and new borderlands, shown against the national average

Prepared by the author based on [8].

Cross-regional differences in population change rates are even more striking (fig. 3). As early as the Soviet period, some regions of the western borderlands saw a population decline. These were the new western borderland regions of Pskov, Bryansk, and Kursk. However, in 1959—1989, the population increased 2.6-fold in Sevastopol and twofold in the Murmansk region and the Republic of Crimea. The situation changed dramatically in the post-Soviet period. Only in six out of seventeen regions, the population size in 2018 was above the 1989 level. These areas include Saint Petersburg and the Leningrad region, the Kaliningrad region, the Krasnodar region, the city of Sevastopol, and the Belgorod region. Note that Saint Petersburg and the Leningrad, Kaliningrad, and Krasnodar regions are economically developed vibrant coastal regions, often classified as development corridors. The Krasnodar region boasts a mild climate that not only makes the territory an attractive area to live in but also contributes to the development of agriculture, tourism, and recreation. The Kaliningrad region and Saint Petersburg are home to two Baltic fleet bases — Baltiysk and Kronstadt — that testify to the geopolitical significance of the regions. The population of the Belgorod region is growing thanks to a dynamic metallurgical industry and burgeoning agriculture. The population is growing in the geopolitically crucial city of Sevastopol, home to the principal base of Russia's Black Sea Fleet.



Fig. 3. Population change in the regions of Russia's western borderlands

Prepared by the author based on [8].

Whereas the old borderlands have an equal number of regions with growing and with declining population, only one region of the new borderlands reports population growth, while significant decline is observed in some regions of the old borderlands. These are the northern territories with harsh climate: the Republic of Karelia, the Murmansk and Arkhangelsk regions, and the Nenets autonomous region, whose natives are moving further south.

At the level of individual regions, the contribution of natural change and migration to the population dynamics differs dramatically. All the regions with growing population (with the exception of the Nenets autonomous region) have a high net migration rate. In the Nenets region, migration is negative and the population growth is accounted for by a high birth rate.

Figure 4 shows the 2017 distribution of the western borderlands regions by natural change and migration rate. As compared to the entire 1989—2018 period, the Republic of Crimea joined the regions with a population growth, whereas a natural increase was observed not only in the Nenets autonomous region but also in Saint Petersburg. In both cases, high birth rate was the factor behind the growth, accounted for by an above average proportion of people of young age (including women of fertile age), which in itself is a result of migration from other Russian regions and neighbouring countries. In all the regions of new borderlands, the Republic of Karelia, and the Murmansk and Arkhangelsk regions the population was declining. In the three latter regions, as well as in the Pskov, Bryansk, and Kursk regions of the new borderlands, both rates were negative.



Fig. 4. Distribution of the western borderlands' regions by natural change and net migration rate per 1000 population, 2017

Legend: ***Nenets AR*** — population growth; Smolensk region — population decline.

Prepared by the author based on [8].

However, across all the regions of both old and new western borderlands, the rate of natural increase was below the national average. In

2016, the total fertility rate was 1.7 in the old western borderlands and 1.58 in the new western borderlands, both below the national average of 1.76. Still, it is a significant increase to the 2000 levels, when, following the crisis of the 1990s, the national average did not exceed 1.20 (the lowest rate of 1.16 was observed in 1999). The trend towards higher birth rates was characteristic of all the western borderland regions (fig. 5). Only in the Nenets autonomous region it translated in above-replacement fertility. A total fertility rate of slightly above 1.8 (1.82, which corresponds to a net reproduction rate of 0.9) was reached in 2016 only in the Krasnodar region. According to the official data, the lowest TFR was observed in the Leningrad region (1.32) [8].



Fig. 5. Changes in the total fertility rates in the regions of Russia's western borderlands, 2005—2016

Prepared by the author based on [8].

Life expectancy at birth is an important measure of population change. In 2017, it reached 72.7 years in Russia (67.5 for men and 77.6 — for women). To compare, it was 80.8 years in Germany in 2014 (78.6 and 83.3 years respectively) [8]. These figures are used as 2030 targets in the Presidential decree of May 7, 2018 [9].

Although life expectancy in the western borderlands is close to the national average, there are significant cross-regional differences (from 68.5 years in the Pskov region to 74.4 years in Saint Petersburg), with values of the indicator increasing in 2000—2015 by 5—10 years, depending on the region. And while the difference between the life expectancy for males and females reduced from 13.2 to 10.8 years, it is still rather dramatic, being 4—5 years greater than in most economically developed countries. Being roughly the same as in Belarus and the Baltics (9—11 years), it falls behind the former socialist countries of East Europe, with 6 to 8 years difference between male and female life expectancy.

Table 1 shows changes in life expectancy at birth in 2000—2015.

Table 1

Life expectancy at birth in the Russian western borderlands

Life expectancy, years, 2000	Life expectancy, years, 2015		
	68.0—69.9	70.0—71.9	72.0—74.9
68.1	—	—	Belgorod region, Saint Petersburg
66.0—67.9	—	Voronezh region, Rostov region	Krasnodar region
64.0—65.9	—	**Russia** Murmansk, Bryansk, Kursk regions	—
62.0—63.9	Republic of Karelia, Smolensk region	Arkhangelsk, Leningrad, Kaliningrad regions	—
60.0—61.9	Pskov region	Nenets autonomous region	—
No data	—	Republic of Crimea, Sevastopol	—

Prepared by the author based on [8].

Differences in life expectancy, on the one hand, and disproportions between the so-called male and female jobs, on the other, lead to a skewed sex ratio in many Russian regions. In 2015, the national ratio was

1158 females per 1000 males. In most economically developed countries, the ratio is 1040 per 1000, respectively. Across Russia's western borderlands, the closest ratio is observed in the Nenets and Murmansk regions (1152 to 1088). Saint Petersburg — a popular destination for young women from the villages and towns of the Leningrad and neighbouring regions — has 1213 females per 1000 males.

In 1990—2015, the female excess increased by 23 points, from 1135 to 1158 females per 1000 males, due to the high male mortality observed in the 1990s. As to the Western borderlands, the most significant increase — by 100 points — occurred in the Murmansk region, whereas, in some other regions (the Leningrad, Pskov, Smolensk, Belgorod, and Voronezh regions and Saint Petersburg), the difference between the number of females and males narrowed. Improved life expectancy, increasing at a higher rate in men than in women, will contribute to fewer disproportions in the sex structure of the population. In 2015, as compared to 1990, only six out of seventeen Western borderland regions witnessed a decrease in the number of females per 1000 males (table 2), i. e. the sex disproportion was growing.

Table 2

Female to male ratio in the western borderland regions in 1990—2015

Females per 1000 males, 2015	Changes in the number of females per 1000 males, 1990—2015		
	from –25 to –1	from 0 to 24	from 50 to 109
1200—1249	Saint Petersburg	Kursk region	—
1150—1199	Belgorod, Voronezh, Smolensk, Pskov regions	Bryansk, Rostov, Krasnodar regions	Republic of Karelia
1100—1149	Leningrad region	—	Arkhangelsk region, Kaliningrad region
1050—1099	—	Nenets autonomous region	Murmansk region

Comment: the 1990 data for the Republic of Crimea and Sevastopol were not available; in 2015, the female to male ratio was 1175 and 1143 per 1000 respectively.

Prepared by the author based on [8].

Regional demographic security

The concept of regional demographic security has been increasingly used in demographic, economic, and other social studies. A theoretical and methodological framework for relevant research is rapidly develop-

ing. Regional demographic security is viewed as a factor of economic [10] and geopolitical [11] security and often associated with major national interests [12, 13]. In other cases, it is interpreted as an independent component of national security, alongside its economic, environmental, and other aspects [14—18]. Sometimes, the scope of the concept is expanded to socio-demographic security in general [19].

The literature justifies the use of indicators that provide a qualitative and quantitative description of demographic processes and structures [14; 16; 20]. There have been attempts at developing an integrated demographic security index comprising a number of demographic indicators [17; 21].

In my opinion, demographic security should be defined as a state of demographic processes and structures that prevents depopulation, meets the needs of regional socioeconomic development, and contributes to the preservation and promotion of Russian culture. This means *attaining the replacement — or above-replacement — fertility against the background of high life expectancy and a migration that is sufficient for economic development*. These demographic parameters, which, to a degree, can be altered by direct national policy measures, require an accurate estimation. An additional requirement is the *absence of significant sex and age disproportions*. Of course, being a result of long-term natural population change and migration processes, such disproportions largely escape direct regulation. However, they can serve as a measure of the current level of demographic security. The other demographic, socio- and economico-demographic, and other indicators (marriage rate, divorce rate, disease incidence, urbanisation rate, population density, etc.) that cast light on specific aspects of demographic processes and ratios, as well as their connection to other regional characteristics, seem to be of secondary importance. They either provide more detail on the nature of demographic characteristics or describe the conditions for and factors behind demographic security.

Classification of the regions of the Western borderlands by the level of demographic security

The demographic processes observed in Russia's western borderlands since the early 2000s have been showing an improvement of regional demographic situations. Although there may be significant cross-regional differences, none of the regions can be considered demographically secure. The regions also differ in the state of population and the characteristics of demographic security. All this has to be considered in devising regional policies and planning regional socioeconomic development at

the federal level. To this end, it is necessary to classify the regions by key demographic parameters that also serve as measures of regional demographic security. My attempt at such a classification is based on a juxtaposition of the three major indicators of demographic security — total fertility rate, life expectancy at birth, and net migration rate — and one auxiliary measure (the number of females per 1000 males). Table 3 and figure 6 show the results of such a classification — five types distinguished based on the level and features of demographic security.

Table 3

Demographic security of the regions of Russia's western borderlands

Region	Demographic security indicators			
	Major			Auxiliary
	Total fertility rate	Life expectancy	Net migration rate	Females per 1000 males
1 — Nenets autonomous region	+	0	–	+
1 — Arkhangelsk region	+	0	–	+
1 — Murmansk region	0	–	–	+
1 — Republic of Karelia	+	–	–	–
2 — Leningrad region	–	+	+	+
2 — Saint Petersburg	0	+	+	–
3 — Kaliningrad region	0	+	+	+
3 — Krasnodar region	+	+	+	0
4 — Republic of Crimea	+	0	+	–
4 — Sevastopol	0	–	+	+
5 — Belgorod region	–	+	0	0
5 — Voronezh region	–	+	0	–
5 — Rostov region	–	+	0	0
6 — Pskov region	+	–	0	0
6 — Smolensk region	–	–	0	0
6 — Bryansk region	–	–	–	–
6 — Kursk region	0	0	0	–

Legend: – — unfavourable situation; 0 — satisfactory situation; + — favourable situation.

Prepared by the author based on [8].



Fig. 6. Demographic security of the regions of Russia's western borderlands

Although all of the regions are characterised by a low level of economic security, there are significant cross-regional differences.

The first two types include the regions of the old western borderlands. Type 1 comprises the northern borderland regions that have a high or average birth rate, average or low life expectancy, negative migration, and a relatively low — with the exception of Karelia — female excess.

Type 2 is represented by Saint Petersburg and the Leningrad region. They are characterised by high life expectancy and positive migration, and a low or average birth rate. At the same time, Saint Petersburg has a large and the Leningrad a rather small female excess. In effect, the two regions comprise an integrated demographic system, where the differences in demographic indicators are accounted for by the peculiarities of

statistics recording. Some data relating to the Leningrad region (for instance, the number of births) can be recorded as pertaining to Saint Petersburg, and vice versa.

The Krasnodar and Kaliningrad regions (type 3) perform above average in three of the indicators and demonstrate an average result in one. The demographic situation in these regions is more favourable and the level of demographic security is higher than in the other areas of Russia's western borderlands.

Type 4 is also characterised by above-average demographic performance. It brings together the Republic of Crimea и Sevastopol — the two regions that became part of Russia quite recently — and have a high or average birth rate and positive migration. However, Sevastopol has a low life expectancy and the Republic of Crimea is characterised by a skewed sex structure.

The two other types comprise the regions of the new western borderlands.

The Belgorod, Voronezh, and Rostov regions, which comprise type 5, boast the second-best climate conditions across the western borderlands, beaten only by type 4. These areas have a low rate of natural increase, high life expectancy, slightly positive migration, and an average female excess (with the exception of the Voronezh region, where the excess is considerable).

Type 5 (the Pskov, Smolensk, Bryansk, and Kursk regions) is characterised by depopulation. The rate of natural decline is rather high. Over many years, local residents have been leaving the regions for the Moscow and Saint Petersburg agglomerations. Only the Smolensk region had positive migration in 2017.

When classified, these regions resemble linear clusters. The regions of each type are located along the border, one after another. The most favourable situation is observed in the regions comprising types 2—4, which represent the old western borderlands. The most alarming situation and the most acute demographic security problems are associated with the northern regions of type 1 (old western borderlands) and types 4 and 5 (new western borderlands). Lying at the border between the RSFSR and the other Union republics, these regions were considered the periphery in the Soviet times. Apparently, the cross-republic ties in the USSR were not as strong as they are usually believed to be. Otherwise, such connections would have contributed to the economic and demographic development of the relevant territories. The best demographic performance and the highest level of demographic security are associated with the regions located on the coasts of the Baltic and Black Seas. Evidently, the coastal position has a beneficial effect on the demographic and socioeconomic development.

Conclusions

The polarisation hypothesis holds that, as the periphery, border regions face greater demographic challenges than inland areas— the more so if the border serves as a barrier rather than a contact zone. This is especially the case when inland regions turn into border ones or when the nature of relations with the countries on the other side of the border changes. Both considerations hold true for Russia's western regions, which became borderlands after the disintegration of the USSR. Some of the regions turned from inland into border ones and others are affected by the unpredictable changes in Russia's relations with the countries lying west of its national border.

The findings obtained suggest employing the following quantitative parameters in order to ensure regional demographic security:

— replacement or slightly above replacement fertility (a net reproduction rate of 1.0—1.1),[1] which roughly corresponds to a total fertility rate of 2.1—2.3;

— net migration sufficient for the needs of regional economic development;

— a life expectancy of 80 years (77.5 years for males and 82.5 years for females).[2]

The auxiliary indicators should have the following values to correspond to the above parameters:

— a female to male ratio of 1040 to 1000;

— the group aged 0 to 15 accounting for 20 % of the population, aged 16 to 59 for 55 %, and aged 60 and over for 25 % (2015: 17 % — 63 % — 20 %).

Among the regions of Russia's western borderlands, those comprising types 2, 3, and 4 — namely, the Baltic and Black Sea coastal regions — demonstrate demographic performance that is closest to the above levels. The least favourable situation is observed in the regions of type 6 located at the borders with Ukraine and Belarus. For them, attaining the desired levels poses a considerable challenge. However, in all the regions, achieving the targets above will require a package of direct and indirect demographic policy measures.

The identification of type-specific demographic features of Russian western borderland regions and their juxtaposition with the demographic

[1] The presidential decree of May 7, 2018, 'On the national target and strategic goals of the development of the Russian Federation until 2024' emphasises the need to 'ensure a stable nature increase in the population of the Russian Federation' [9].

[2] As compared to a 4—5 year sex difference observed in most economically developed countries.

targets help to justify measures for regulating migration and natural change and contribute to better national and regional policies, as well as improved regional socioeconomic development strategies.

Alongside direct measures, demographic processes require that the indirect effect of eliminating disproportions and optimising the development of spatial socioeconomic systems (production, settlement patterns, socio-ecosystem, etc.) is considered. This requires the use of the geodemographic situation concept, which was developed as early as the 1970s—1980s [22—23] and has been adapted for recent regional studies [24—26].

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SOME ASPECTS OF ECONOMIC SECURITY OF SAINT PETERSBURG AND THE LENINGRAD REGION UNDER CONDITIONS OF GEOECONOMIC UNCERTAINT

S. S. Lachininskii[1, 2]

In this article, I consider individual aspects of the economic security of Saint Petersburg and the Leningrad Region amid the geo-economic uncertainty observed since 2014. The object of the study is the economic and technological sustainnability of Saint Petersburg and the Leningrad Region given geo-economic risks and growing challenges to economic security. To evaluate the economic security of Saint Petersburg and the Leningrad Region, I employ some of the parameters proposed in the Strategy for the Economic Security of the Russian Federation until 2030. I also use other parameters pertinent to the evaluation of the state of an economy amid geoeconomic uncertainty, in this case, in the conditions of the crisis of 2014—2016, brought about by both external and internal factors. I employ the concept of the triad of regional economic competitiveness, regional economic security, and sustainable regional socio-economic development. I believe that this triad does not only demonstrate the logic of the current and prospective development of a Russian region but also highlights weaknesses and opportunities for future development. The competitiveness of Saint Petersburg and the Leningrad region amid geo-economic uncertainty is considered through the performance of the regions' key enterprises and emerging technology companies. I analyse the revenue profiles of the regions' leading industrial enterprises in 2014—2015 and emphasise the role of key industrial exporters. This article is a preliminary study without any claim to completeness. Further research will seek to present the findings obtained in more detail.

Keywords: economic security, geo-economic uncertainty, Saint Petersburg, Leningrad Region, economic stability, competitive advantages, innovations

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Introduction

Ensuring economic security at the regional level has acquired special significance, given the fact that the recent economic crisis was provoked not only by internal but also by external factors. The period of geo-economic uncertainty of 2014—2016 was caused by a combination of factors [1] whereas the current economic downturn in Russia has occurred mainly due to internal factors.

In [2] it is noted that "the steady decline in growth rates, which began in late 2012, was primarily due to a marked decrease in the investment activity in the Russian economy". This position was shared by other authors, "... during the analyzed sanction period 2014—2016, the negative consequences of sanctions were damaging not so much because of external shocks (fluctuation in oil prices, the prevailing economic trends and the state of the global financial system, etc.), but because of internal factors (‘failures’ in the regulation of the national economy)"[3]. However, these and similar statements sounded credible until the events of 2018, when the western sanctions and restrictions began to affect macroeconomic stability and had a negative impact on the most important sectors of the national economy — oil and gas, energy, and metallurgy. At the beginning of 2018, it became clear that these sanctions focused on specific companies and industries, and affected the economy of the most advanced and successful regions, which were and are integral parts of the global geo-economic space such as Saint Petersburg and the Leningrad region. It can be stated that the study of the genesis and driving forces of the last crisis has developed in socio-economic sciences [4—12].

In particular, some economists point out that “from the middle of 2014, a combination of geopolitical risks, external and internal shocks have resulted in the destabilization of the situation; these factors triggered crisis processes and determined the logic and parameters of a new recession in Russia" [3]. In this regard, issues of economic security, reflected in the Strategy for Economic Security of the Russian Federation until 2030 [12], require inventory particularly when it comes to their implementation in the key regions of the country. In this sense, Saint Petersburg and the Leningrad Region, which ensure the transshipment of 233.7 million tons of cargo in 2017 (or 30 % of the national sea freight turnover of ports) deserve special attention.

Economic security of the region: theory and practice

The concept of economic security appeared in the 20th century. It developed in the United States after President F. Roosevelt announced the creation of a federal committee for economic security. Since then, eco-

nomic security has been discussed at various levels of governance and administration, including the regional level.

The problems of economic security of the region have been analysed in numerous publications in Russia and abroad [13—19]. At the same time, very few authors offered their own evaluation of the system of economic security and its indicators [14]. For example, in [15] it is noted that “economic security and competitiveness are characteristics of the national economic complex and its components. However, if competitiveness is both a goal and an indicator of the degree of development of the national economy and its components, then economic security is a condition for its existence and development". Some authors point out that economic security is not a volatile state; it should be regarded as an instant process of the interaction of subjects where the governing body understands the logic of what is happening without any further study of the factors that caused system transformations in the economic complex of the region [16]. In [14] it was noted that "the socio-economic security of the region depends on the degree of self-sufficiency and financial independence of the region, the development of its economic potential (industrial, labour, investment, innovative and research”. These authors connect the concepts of ‘economic security of the region’ and ‘economic stability of the region’, where the latter relies on the economic complex of the region and the ability to maintain continuous reproduction of goods and services, with a stable increase in production and economic indicators.

Some researchers [17—18] link the concept of ‘economic security’ to the notion of competitiveness. P. Ya. Baklanov interprets economic security as a factor, a condition, and an element of sustainable development. He believes that economic security is an ‘internal ability of a country or a region to develop in a sustainable and efficient way’, i. e., economic security is a narrower concept that constitutes a broader term — ‘sustainable development’ [20]. Both concepts are often used in the definitions of each other: ‘economic security’ means ‘sustainable development’ and *vice versa*. Indeed, there is a link between the competitiveness and economic security of the region and its sustainability of its development. Understanding the link gives a more complete picture of the logic of today's and tomorrow's development of Russian regions and allows us to see weaknesses and opportunities of their future development.

At the same time, in the state planning and management, the regional dimension of economic security is barely noticeable. The Strategy [12] contains only one point, Paragraph 24, which states "uneven spatial development of the Russian Federation, the strengthening of the differentiation of regions and municipalities in terms of the level and pace of socio-economic development." It can be concluded that the stability of the country's spatial structure, its macroregions and strategically important zones etc. has been given the necessary attention.

Yet, the Strategy notes that among the main tasks for the implementation of the sustainable spatial regional development of the Russian Federation there are the following ones:

1) improvement of the system of territorial planning, taking into account challenges and threats to the national security of the Russian Federation;

2) improvement of the national settlement system, the creation of conditions for the development of urban agglomerations;

3) reduction of the level of interregional differentiation in the socio-economic development of the regions of the Russian Federation;

4) expansion and strengthening of economic ties between the regions of the Russian Federation, the creation of inter-regional production and infrastructure clusters;

5) priority development of the economic potential of Eastern Siberia, the Far North, the Far East, the North Caucasus, the Crimea and the Kaliningrad region;

6) development of the Northern Sea Route, the modernization of the Baikal-Amur and Trans-Siberian railways.

Thus, Saint Petersburg and the Leningrad Region can be considered in the context of the implementation of the tasks of Paragraphs 1—3 of the Strategy [12].

After the reorganization of the executive authorities of Saint Petersburg in late 2012 — early 2013, the Interdepartmental Commission on Economic Security under the Government of Saint Petersburg resumed its work. A number of relevant departments and services were invited to participate in the discussion of security-related issues — the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Federal Security Service and others.

It is clear that the tasks of a balanced spatial and regional development of the Russian Federation can be resolved only in the cooperation between regional and federal executive authorities responsible for socio-economic development.

Indicators of the economic security of regions

The problem of selecting indicators for the study of any phenomenon is always fraught with certain difficulties: the availability of data, their representativeness and ‘quality’. To assess the economic security of Russia's regions, we will rely on the system of indicators proposed in the Strategy [12]. However, out of the forty proposed indicators, only very few can be used for the assessment of the economic security of regions: GRP per capita, share of investments in fixed assets in GRP, trade balance, and retail trade turnover.

In our study we used the following indicators: population size, migration growth, GRP, GRP per capita, revenues of the consolidated budget of the entity, share of investment in fixed assets from GRP, share of investments in fixed assets from GRP, volume of shipped goods of own production, (processing production), the volume of retail trade, and the balance of trade balance.

Table 1

Economic security indicators for Saint Petersburg and the Leningrad Region *

Indicators	Saint Petersburg			Leningrad Region		
	2010	2016	Growth	2010	2016	Growth
Population, mln. people	4,88	5,28	108,2	1,72	1,79	104,1
Migration increase, th. people	58,6**	44,7	76,2	25,8	21,7	83,9
GRP, bln. rubles	2628	3742	142,4	788	914	116,0
GRP per capita, th. rubles	536,3	712,3	132,8	345,2	511,8	148,2
Incomes of the consolidated budget of the entity, mln. rubles	552,0	485,9	88,0	111,9	136,7	122,2
Share of investments in fixed assets from GRP, %	37,7	15,5	…	87,1	28,7	…
Volume of shipped goods of own production, (processing), bln. rubles	2071	2062	99,6	254	899	353,9
Volume of retail trade, bln. rubles	1075,4	1234,3	114,8	266,3	342,6	128,6
Trade balance, bln. dollars	-19,9	-5,5	…	8,5	2,1	…

* priced at 2016; ** — 2011.

Table 1 shows that most economic security indicators of both regions demonstrate positive dynamics; it proves that the economic model of the regions was sustainable.

Saint Petersburg has been following the development pattern of the biggest cities in the world. The city's economy accounts for a much more impressive share (21 % of GRP in 2016) in the shipbuilding, automobile and mechanical engineering industries. The trade sector accounts for

25% of the city's economy. The economy of the Leningrad region is also based on the processing industry (about 30% GRP) and transport infrastructure (transport and communications — 17% GRP).

The population of both regions has been growing due to both natural and mechanical growth. At the same time, there was a reduction in migration growth rate after the devaluation of the ruble in 2014—2016. This resulted in the freezing of a number of construction projects. An alarming indicator for Saint Petersburg is a decrease in revenues of the consolidated budget during the analysed period. At the same time, the Leningrad region increased its revenues. In both regions, there was a decrease in the share of investments in fixed assets in GRP, which hindered the modernization of physical assets of the regions. It should be noted that in Russia the economic crisis of 2014—2017 was preceded by almost zero dynamics of investments in fixed assets in real terms during 2013. An important parameter of the economic security of the regions was the trade balance, which declined mainly due to lower imports.

Competitiveness of Saint Petersburg and the Leningrad Region under the conditions of geo-economic uncertainty

The competitiveness of Russian regions, as well as regions of other countries, is based on the competitiveness of their core businesses. The activity of such enterprises determines the specialization of the regions and provides the bulk of tax revenues to the consolidated regional budgets. It plays a major role in the formation of household incomes [21].

However, table 2 shows that the basis for competitiveness is formed by the oil and gas producing companies and retail trade. At the same time, the existing system of state defense orders allowed the United Shipbuilding Corporation (UCS), which historically developed in the city of the shipbuilding cluster, took the fifth place among 11 enterprises of the cluster including such industrial giants as Baltiysky Zavod, Admiralteyskye Verfi, SZ Severnaya Verf and others. In turn, the leading companies of the Leningrad region are mostly domestic and foreign manufacturing companies.

In 2015, out of the 50 largest technological companies in Russia [22] three were located in Saint Petersburg - Admiralteyskye Verfi (17th place), CDB MT Rubin (20th place), and SZ Severnaya Verf (38th place).

During the crisis of 2014—2017, both regions focused on import substitution and the construction of new industrial facilities. In 2016, a new production facility for manufacturing railway carriages was opened at the Oktyabrsky Electric Car Repair Plant (Saint Petersburg). The production capacity of this enterprise is about 200 underground train carriages and at least 70 trams a year.

Table 2

The volume of sales of the largest companies of Saint Petersburg and the Leningrad region

Saint Petersburg		Leningrad Region	
2010	2016	2010	2016
1. Gazpromneft	Gazpromneft	Philipp Moris Izora	Novotek-Ust-Luga
2. O`Key	VTB	Philipp Moris Izora	Philipp Moris Izora
3. Agrotorg	Agrotorg	Baltnefteprovod	TD Intertorg
4. Lenta	Lenta	Kirischinefteorg-sintez	Nockian Schina
5. Transoil	UCC	Vyborg Shipping Factory	Orimi Traid
6. Petersburg Supply Company	Rostelecom	Henkel-Era	International Paper
7. Transaero	KIT Finans	International Paper	Tikhvin Railway Car Building Plant
8. Gazpromtransgaz	O`Key	Titan-2	Titan-2
9. Petro	Stroygazconsalting	Nockian Schina	Jacobs
10. Gosznak	Stroyneftegaz	VIS	Ust-Luga Oil

The dynamics of revenues of the leading industrial companies in 2014—2015 shows that industrial enterprises in Saint Petersburg and the Leningrad region contributed to the strengthening of economic security and increasing the competitiveness of regional economies of these subjects of the Russian Federation.

Table 3

Dynamics of revenues of the leading industrial enterprises of Saint Petersburg and the Leningrad Region in 2014—2015 [23]

Company	Region	Industry	Revenues, billion rubles		Revenue growth rate, %
			2014	2015	
Gazpromneft	SPb	Fuel	1408,2	1467,9	4
Novotek-Ust-Luga	LR	Fuel	76,1	142,7	88
Hyundai Motors Manufacturing Rus	SPb	Automotive	85,4	103,2	21
Group Ilim	SPb	Pulp and paper	71,3	102,5	44
Nissan Manufaturing Rus	SPb	Automotive	152,0	97,0	–36%

End of Table 3

Company	Region	Industry	Revenues, billion rubles		Revenue growth rate, %
			2014	2015	
Petersburg Supply Company	SPb	Power	85,8	96,7	13%
Philip Morris Izhora	LR	Tobacco	69,9	88,6	27%
Baltika Breweries	SPb	Foodstuffs	83,2	86,6	4%
TGK-1	SPb	Power	69,0	69,4	1%
Power Machines	SPb	Power engineering	69,8	59,8	–14%
Kirischinefteorgsintez	LR	Oil refining	54,7	56,5	3%
British American Tobacco-SPb	SPb	Tobacco	32,6	48,8	50%
Petro	SPb	Tobacco	35,4	47,3	34%
Admiralteyskie Verfi	SPb	Shipping	36,4	45,3	24%
IDGC of the North-West	LR	Power	46,9	42,4	–6%
Lenenergo	SPb	Power	41,6	39,0	–6%
Orimi	LR	Foodstuffs	26,7	35,5	33%
International Paper	LR	Pulp and paper	25,9	36,4	41%
Gosznak	SPb	Poligraph	44,1	36,0	–19%

It is important to emphasize the fact that some of the companies are large exporters. For example, industrial companies in Saint Petersburg accounted for $ 2.2 billion of industrial exports in 2015, and $ 1.2 billion in the Leningrad Region [24]. There are several big exporting companies in the two regions: Ilim Group ($ 1.2 billion), Phosphorit ($ 0.3 billion), British American Tobacco-Saint Petersburg ($ 0.16 billion), International Paper ($ 0.15 billion, LPK), Philip Morris Izhora ($ 0.13 billion), Metachim ($ 0.12 billion), Gosznak ($ 0.1 billion), Vtormet ($ 0.09 billion), Power Machines ($ 0, 07 billion), MM-Efimovsky ($ 0.06 billion), Mera ($ 0.06 billion), Tikhvin Ferroalloy Plant ($0.05 bln. dollars), and others.

During the crisis, many leading industrial companies managed to enter international markets — those of the post-Soviet space, the Middle East and Europe. 15 companies from Saint Petersburg were included in the national ranking of the Russian fast-growing technology companies, "Tehuspeh" (Success in Technology). These companies represented the following sectors: information technology (1 company), electronics and mechanical engineering (5 companies), pharmaceuticals (3 companies),

machine building (1 company), industrial equipment (1 company), engineering (2 companies), electronics (1 company), and energy generation (1 company).

Table 4

Rapidly growing technology companies of Saint Petersburg in 2017 ("Tehuspeh" ranking [25])

Basic Rating		Fast-growing		Innovative	
Company	№	Company	№	Company	№
Biokad	4	Optoseans	10	Laboratory "Computational mechanics"	2
Optoseans	11	ETU	14	Laser Systems	8
Laboratory "Computational mechanics"	12	Laboratory "Computational mechanics"	20	Geoscan	14
		Racurs-engineering	23	Radar MMS	18
		Geoscan	24	Biokad	24
		Biokad	36	DIACONT	26
		BI Pitron	54	Optoseans	29
		Laser Systems	59	Geofarm	32
		Geofarm	63	Alkor Bio	38
		Alkor Bio	83	BI Pitron	44
		SPBEK	93	ARGUS-SPEKTR	51
		Radar MMS	94	SPBEK	85
		ARGUS-SPEKTR	102	Skayt	96
		DIACONT	110	Racurs-engineering	100
				ETU	107

Compared with 2014, the number of companies increased from 14 to 15.

Recommendations for the state policy in the field of economic security

The conducted analysis allows us to elaborate a number of recommendations, which can be used for strengthening economic security by the authorities of Saint Petersburg and the Leningrad region.

Firstly, it is necessary to intensify the work of the Interdepartmental Commissions under the Government of Saint Petersburg and the Leningrad Region on economic security with a view to solving tasks 1—3 of the Strategy.

Secondly, it is advisable to learn from the experience of Concern of the East-Kazakhstan region Almaz-Antey (2007—2015). The enterprise set up a North-West Regional Centre (NWTC), which is a modern innovative production and technology cluster. This experience should be disseminated in other sectors of Saint Petersburg — shipbuilding, propulsion engineering, automobile industry, power engineering, IT and pharmaceuticals.

Thirdly, taking into account the change in the procedure of paying corporate income tax for large companies, it is expected that the budget deficit will increase further (the deficit will grow from 31.4 to a record 51.5 billion rubles). This makes it necessary to radically change the economic policy in the field of supporting and stimulating industrial production through the creation of large industrial and technological clusters with a scientific, experimental, laboratory and production facilities outside the historical centre of the city[1].

Fourthly, in line with the overall goal of the Saint Petersburg Social and Economic Development Strategy until 2030, which is aimed at increasing the global competitiveness of Saint Petersburg, it is necessary to focus the cluster policy on attracting private and public businesses[2] to clusters. It is necessary to move away from the prescriptive and move on to stimulating the initiative from below, from business, primarily in projects involving the state (shipbuilding, military-industrial complex, transport complex, infrastructure, urban economy, creative sectors of the economy).

Fifthly, in the face of increasing geo-economic risks and external pressure, there is an increasing need to force large-scale import substitution projects in line with sector-specific import substitution plans approved by the orders of the Ministry of Industry and Trade of Russia (for Leningrad Region — woodworking, agriculture, furniture industry).

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[1] OAO Klimov (production of aircraft engines) is completing the implementation of a strategic investment project for the transfer of production facilities, reconstruction and technical re-equipment of the scientific and production base for the production of aviation gas turbine engines (the volume of investment in the project is 6.5 billion rubles). Power Machines (production of power equipment and turbines) is already implementing a project that provides for the withdrawal of the production facilities of the branches of the Leningrad Metal Plant, Electrosila, Turbine Blades Plant from the historic centre and the construction of a modern plant for the production of power equipment on land sites located in non-residential zones "Metallostroy" and "Izhorskiye Zavody".

[2] As part of the development of the Cluster of the Medical, Pharmaceutical Industry and Radiation Technologies in St. Petersburg, a number of investment projects are underway to create laboratory complexes and pharmaceutical production: ZAO Tsitomed; POLISAN; Grotex; OOO "Gerofarm"; OOO Samson-Med.

Sixthly, the Leningrad Region still lacks fast-growing technological companies. It threatens not only the economic security of the region, but also its competitiveness in the medium term. In this regard, there is a urgent need to prepare industrial sites and investment projects to attract technological companies to the areas adjacent to Saint Petersburg and to the already existing industrial centres of the region[3].

Conclusions

The economic security of Saint Petersburg and the Leningrad region under the conditions of geo-economic uncertainty of 2014 cannot be considered in isolation from the competitiveness of the regional economy. It should be regarded through the prism of activities of key enterprises of the two regions. Our analysis of the activity of fast-growing technological companies showed that the Leningrad Region still does not have such companies whereas in Saint Petersburg the most dynamic companies work in the pharmaceutical industry, machine building, engineering and electronics.

The analysis of revenues of the leading industrial companies of both regions in 2014—2015 showed that 15 of 20 leading industrial companies demonstrated positive dynamics. Our analysis showed that the economic security of the Leningrad Region under conditions of geo-economic uncertainty was characterized by greater stability. The fact that both regions had large industrial exporters contributed to their competitiveness.

In Saint Petersburg due to the presence of fast-growing technological companies belonging to the fifth and the sixth technological paradigms, a foundation has been laid for strengthening the competitiveness and economic security of the region in the future. A more detailed study of the economic security of the regions at the level of specific enterprises requires a special survey, a questionnaire of managers (management) of the leading enterprises of key enterprises of both regions. The first group of respondents could include managers of companies having the highest volume of sales (table 2) as well as industrial leaders (table 3).

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[3] In the summer of 2018, the Kalashnikov Concern completed the acquisition of a 60% stake in Kingisepp Machine-Building Plant LLC and Dieselsipservice LLC. The enterprises will become a base for a diesel engine cluster, the creation of which is planned in the Leningrad Region [25]

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